Independent Concrete Pumping Corporation v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Wakefield (October 20, 2011)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


INDEPENDENT CONCRETE  	     v.		BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF
PUMPING CORPORATION					THE TOWN OF WAKEFIELD
		     		

Docket No. F300394					Promulgated:
							     October 20, 2011


This is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 60A, § 2 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Wakefield ("assessors" or "appellee") to abate excise on certain motor vehicles in Wakefield owned by and assessed to Independent Concrete Pumping Corporation ("ICPC" or "appellant") under G.L. c. 60A, § 1 for 2008.  
Commissioner Mulhern heard this appeal.  He was joined in the decision for the appellee by Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Egan, and Rose.   
These findings of fact and report are made at the requests of the appellant and the appellee pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.


Joseph P. Dever, Esq. and Frederick W. Riley, Esq. for the appellant.

Thomas A. Mullen, Esq. for the appellee.

            
            FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT

	On the basis of the testimony and documents entered into evidence in this appeal, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") made the following subsidiary findings of fact.
At all times relevant to this appeal, ICPC was a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Wakefield, Massachusetts.  It was an owner and operator of mobile concrete pumping equipment.  A mobile concrete pump consists of a pump unit and boom equipment integrated into a truck chassis.  The truck engine supplies power for the pumping equipment, which receives wet concrete from a separate concrete mixing truck.  The wet concrete travels through the jointed pipeline attached to the boom and down to its ultimate location within a construction site.  
During the periods relevant to this appeal, ICPC owned and operated a fleet of approximately 28 mobile concrete pumps; two such pumps - identified as Truck Number 112 ("Truck No. 112") and Truck Number 113 ("Truck No. 113") are the subject of this appeal (together, "Truck Nos. 112 and 113" or the "subject property").  
On February 9, 2009, the assessors issued 2008 motor vehicle excise bills to the appellant for the subject property.  The assessors valued Truck No. 112 at $27,200 and assessed an excise thereon, at the rate of $25 per $1,000, in the total amount of $680.  The assessors valued Truck No. 113 at $108,800 and assessed an excise thereon, at the rate of $25 per $1,000, in the total amount of $2,720.  On February 10, 2009, the appellant filed two Applications for Abatement with the assessors, and those abatement applications were denied by vote of the assessors on February 24, 2009.  The appellant filed an appeal with the Board on May 22, 2009.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.  
 The excise at issue in this appeal is imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1, which imposes, with certain exceptions not relevant here, an excise in the amount of $25 per $1,000, on "every motor vehicle and trailer registered under chapter ninety, for the privilege of such registration."  The principal issue in this appeal was whether Truck Nos. 112 and 113 were properly classified by the assessors as motor vehicles.  General Laws c. 60A, § 1 does not contain its own definition of the term "motor vehicle," but instead defines the term by reference to G.L. c. 90, § 1, which provides the following definition: 
[A]ll vehicles constructed and designed for propulsion by power other than muscular power including such vehicles when pulled or towed by another motor vehicle, except railroad and railway cars, vehicles operated by the system known as trolley motor or trackless trolley under chapter one hundred and sixty-three or section ten of chapter five hundred and forty-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-seven, vehicles running only upon rails or tracks, vehicles used for other purposes than the transportation of property and incapable of being driven at a speed exceeding twelve miles per hour and which are used exclusively for the building, repair and maintenance of highways or designed especially for use elsewhere than on the travelled part of ways, wheelchairs owned and operated by invalids and vehicles which are operated or guided by a person on foot; provided, however, that the exception for trackless trolleys provided herein shall not apply to sections seventeen, twenty-one, twenty-four, twenty-four I, twenty-five and twenty-six . . . ." (emphasis added).  

The assessments at issue in this appeal arose after years of internal debate among the assessors and following extensive correspondence by the assessors with the Massachusetts Department of Revenue ("DOR").   The evidence showed that on at least three occasions between 1994 and 2001, the DOR responded to inquiries posed by the assessors regarding the taxability of the appellant's mobile concrete pumpers.  In response to each inquiry, the DOR informed the assessors of its opinion that mobile concrete pumpers are motor vehicles and as such are subject to the motor vehicle excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  
The assessors likewise sought the opinion of the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles ("RMV") as to the proper classification of mobile concrete pumpers.  The RMV responded that in its opinion, mobile concrete pumpers were "special mobile equipment," defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1 as
motor vehicle[s] which [are] principally designed to conduct excavations or lift building materials at a public or private construction site and [are] operated on a way for the sole purpose of transportation to or from said construction site and [have] a gross vehicle weight of at least twelve thousand pounds. This definition shall not include a motor vehicle which is designed to carry passengers, or any load, on a way.

However, the RMV took no stance on the taxability of mobile concrete pumpers.  In fact, in its response to the assessors, the RMV explicitly deferred to the DOR on matters of taxation.  
Despite the DOR's advice, the assessors did not assess motor vehicle excise on the subject property until 2008.  Evidence entered into the record indicated that there was significant internal debate among the assessors as to the proper course of action.  Ultimately, as something of a test case, the assessors voted to assess motor vehicle excise on just two of ICPC's 28 mobile concrete pumpers, Truck Nos. 112 and 113.  Because the assessors were uncertain whether the excise should be based on the value of the truck chassis alone or the value of the truck chassis as improved by the pump and boom equipment, they assessed excise on the value of the truck chassis alone for Truck No. 112 and on the value of the truck chassis as improved by the pump and boom equipment for Truck No. 113.  
Three witnesses testified at the hearing of this appeal.     Testifying for the assessors was Paul Faler, who is a member of the assessors.  Mr. Faler's testimony primarily focused on the series of events leading up to the assessment of the subject property, including the aforementioned correspondence between the assessors and the DOR.  Testifying for the appellant were William Heinz, a 25-year employee of ICPC who, at the time of the hearing, was serving as its Controller, and Thomas Anderson, a former member of the Board of Directors of the American Concrete Pumping Association who was, for over 25 years, the Chief Operating Officer of Schwing America Corporation, which is a manufacturer of mobile concrete pumpers like the subject property.
Both Mr. Heinz and Mr. Anderson testified about the construction and procurement of mobile concrete pumpers such as the subject property.  The assembly of a mobile concrete pumper begins with a Mack truck chassis.  Certain elements of the truck are then removed to facilitate the integration of the pump and boom equipment, which is firmly welded onto the truck chassis such that it becomes a complete, integrated unit.  Both Mr. Anderson and Mr. Heinz testified that the mobile concrete pumpers are purchased as complete, integrated units.  They additionally testified that once a mobile concrete pumper is assembled, it cannot be disassembled without causing substantial damage to the component parts, including the truck chassis.  Mr. Anderson also testified that, after the removal of the pump and boom equipment, the truck chassis could only be sold for scrap. 
Mr. Heinz testified that ICPC's operators drive the concrete pumpers from one of ICPC's four garage sites to the designated construction site, where the operator pumps concrete at the direction of the customer.  Upon the completion of each job, the operator drives the concrete pumper back to the garage site.  There was no dispute between the parties that ICPC's mobile concrete pumpers can and do regularly travel safely at speeds well in excess of twelve miles per hour.  The evidence showed that they often travel at highway speeds.
The appellant advanced several arguments in support of its position, but the Board found none of them persuasive.  The appellant's primary argument was that its mobile concrete pumpers, including the subject property, were not motor vehicles subject to the excise imposed under G.L. c. 60A, § 1 because they were not "motor vehicles" but instead were "special mobile equipment" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1.  The appellant argued that mobile concrete pumpers are not merely truck chassis outfitted with pumping equipment.  It contended that although the assembly of a mobile concrete pumper begins with a truck chassis, the significant structural alterations made thereto transformed the units into something other than "motor vehicles" for purposes of the excise.   
The appellant's argument failed because it ignored the relevant statutory language.  The only exception from the definition of "motor vehicles" contained in G.L. c. 90, § 1 that the subject property could possibly have qualified for is the exception for "vehicles used for other purposes than the transportation of property and incapable of being driven at a speed exceeding twelve miles per hour and which are used exclusively for the building, repair and maintenance of highways or designed especially for use elsewhere than on the travelled part of ways."  However, the evidence showed that the subject property could and did travel safely at speeds far greater than twelve miles per hour.  In fact, the evidence showed the appellant's mobile concrete pumpers often traveled at highway speeds.  The Board thus found that the subject property was not among the categories of vehicles carved out of the statutory definition of "motor vehicles."  
Furthermore, the evidence offered by the appellant to support its arguments failed to provide that support.  The appellant offered into evidence various items of correspondence issued by the RMV and the DOR, as well as a manual published by the DOR entitled "Motor Vehicle & Trailer Excise Manual."  The "Motor Vehicle & Trailer Excise Manual" indicated that "special mobile equipment" is not subject to the motor vehicle excise and should instead be taxed as personal property.  However, in a written response to an inquiry made by the assessors regarding this statement, the DOR clarified the statement to mean only that special mobile equipment that is not also a "motor vehicle" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1 is not subject to the motor vehicle excise and should be taxed as personal property.  In that same item of correspondence, the DOR reiterated its previously-articulated opinion that mobile concrete pumpers are "motor vehicles" subject to the motor vehicle excise.  Further, the items of correspondence from the RMV merely served to confirm that agency's opinion that the appellant was eligible to receive "owner-contractor" plates for its mobile concrete pumpers because, in the RMV's opinion, mobile concrete pumpers were "special mobile equipment."  The Board found that this opinion had no bearing on the taxability of the subject property.  In fact, in a letter dated December 18, 2001, the RMV declined to opine on the taxability of mobile concrete pumpers, and instead explicitly deferred to the DOR on that matter.  The Board therefore found that this evidence was not probative of the subject property's taxability.    
Similarly unpersuasive was the appellant's attempt to use a 1985 Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Letter Ruling, issued to a different taxpayer, to support its contention that mobile concrete pumpers are not subject to the excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  As discussed more fully in the Opinion below, the Board found that the applicable legal authority at issue in that Letter Ruling differed materially from the statutes at issue here, and the Board therefore rejected the appellant's attempt to liken the federal excise to the motor vehicle excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  
In sum, though several types of vehicles are carved out of the statutory definition of "motor vehicles," the Board found that the subject property was not among them.  The Board further found that G.L. c. 60A, § 1 contained no express or implied exemption for the subject property.  Accordingly, on the basis of all of the evidence, the Board found that Truck Nos. 112 and 113 were subject to the excise imposed by that statute. Because the Board found that Truck No. 112 and Truck No. 113 were motor vehicles, it did not reach a secondary issue presented in this appeal, which was, in the event that Truck No. 112 and Truck No. 113 were not motor vehicles, whether they were exempt from taxes on personal property as the appellant's "stock in trade."  		
The appellant additionally asserted that Truck No. 112 was "primarily garaged" in Greenville, New Hampshire.  The Board inferred that the appellant was impliedly asserting that Truck No. 112 was not subject to the excise assessed by the assessors because under G.L. c. 60A, § 6, the excise is to be imposed by the municipality in which the motor vehicle is "customarily kept,"  although the appellant did not expressly articulate that argument.   To the extent that the appellant intended to make such an argument, the Board found that the evidence did not support its claim.  The only evidence offered by the appellant on this point was a statement made by Mr. Heinz during his deposition that Truck No. 112 was garaged in New Hampshire.  Although Mr. Heinz testified at the hearing of this appeal, he made no similar assertion at the hearing.  				Moreover, a sales log for Truck No. 112 was entered into evidence, and that log showed that Truck No. 112 was used primarily for projects in Massachusetts.  It was also used for projects in New Hampshire and Vermont, but not as frequently as it was used in Massachusetts.  The appellant offered no insurance documents indicating that Truck No. 112 was garaged or insured in New Hampshire, nor did it offer evidence indicating that Truck No. 112 was registered in New Hampshire.  Rather, the appellant repeatedly indicated at the hearing of this appeal that both Truck No. 112 and Truck No. 113 had been issued owner-contractor license plates by the RMV.  Based on all of the evidence, the Board found that the record did not support the appellant's assertion that Truck No. 112 was garaged primarily in New Hampshire.  Accordingly, the Board found that Truck No. 112, like Truck No. 113, was subject to the motor vehicle excise tax imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  
Lastly, the appellant claimed that it was entitled to an abatement of the excise because the excise was based on an incorrect valuation of the subject property.  G.L. c. 60A, § 1, imposes the excise, at a rate of $25 per $1,000, and for the purpose of the excise, the value of each motor vehicle is:
deemed to be the value, as determined by the commissioner, of motor vehicles or trailers of the same make, type, model, and year of manufacture as designated by the manufacturer, but not in excess of the following percentages of the list price established by the manufacturer for the year of manufacture, namely: --   

In the year preceding the designated year of manufacture 50%
In the year of manufacture 90%
In the second year 60%
In the third year 40%
In the fourth year 25%
In the fifth and succeeding years 10%.


G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  The appellant offered no evidence of overvaluation, nor did it offer evidence demonstrating errors in the assessors' valuation methodology.  The evidence showed that Truck Nos. 112 and 113 were both 2006 Schwing mobile concrete pumps.  Each had a manufacturer list price of $349,000.  For Truck No. 112, the assessors based the excise on only the value of the truck chassis, which they valued at $27,200.  Accordingly, they assessed a total excise of $680.  For Truck No. 113, the assessors based the excise on the value of the truck chassis as improved by the pumping equipment.  Accordingly they valued Truck No. 113 at $108,800, and assessed an excise thereon in the total amount of $2,720.  
	As an initial matter, pursuant to G.L. c. 60A, § 1, the motor vehicle excise is based on a vehicle's manufacturer list price, as reduced by the appropriate percentage indicated in the statute.  Nothing in the language of the statute indicated that property such as the subject property should be assessed based on the value of only a component part - a truck chassis - rather than the motor vehicle's list price, as reduced by the appropriate percentage.  To the extent that the assessors assessed excise for Truck No. 112 on only the value of its truck chassis, then Truck No. 112 was undervalued, not overvalued.  
With respect to Truck No. 113, the evidence showed that it was a 2006 motor vehicle with a manufacturer list price of $349,000.  Under the terms of G.L. c. 60A, § 1, the excise for Truck No. 113 for 2008 should have been based on 40% of its manufacturer list price, which was $139,600.  The assessors valued Truck No. 113 at $108,800, which was less than 40% of its manufacturer list price.  Once again, the evidence showed that, if anything, the subject property was undervalued, not overvalued, by the assessors.  The Board therefore rejected the appellant's claim that the subject property was overvalued.  
On the basis of all of the evidence and its subsidiary findings of fact, the Board found that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it was entitled to an abatement.  The Board therefore issued a decision for the appellee in this appeal.  						
				  OPINION
General Laws c. 60A, § 1 imposes an excise, with certain exceptions not relevant here, in the amount of $25 per $1,000, on "every motor vehicle and trailer registered under chapter ninety, for the privilege of such registration."  The issue in this appeal was whether Truck Nos. 112 and 113 were "motor vehicles" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1.  On the basis of all of the evidence, the Board found and ruled that the subject property came within the definition of "motor vehicles" set forth in the statute.  
G.L. c. 90, § 1 provides the following definition of "motor vehicles": 
[A]ll vehicles constructed and designed for propulsion by power other than muscular power including such vehicles when pulled or towed by another motor vehicle, except railroad and railway cars, vehicles operated by the system known as trolley motor or trackless trolley under chapter one hundred and sixty-three or section ten of chapter five hundred and forty-four of the acts of nineteen hundred and forty-seven, vehicles running only upon rails or tracks, vehicles used for other purposes than the transportation of property and incapable of being driven at a speed exceeding twelve miles per hour and which are used exclusively for the building, repair and maintenance of highways or designed especially for use elsewhere than on the travelled part of ways, wheelchairs owned and operated by invalids and vehicles which are operated or guided by a person on foot; provided, however, that the exception for trackless trolleys provided herein shall not apply to sections seventeen, twenty-one, twenty-four, twenty-four I, twenty-five and twenty-six. The definition of "Motor vehicles" shall not include motorized bicycles. (emphasis added).  
Here, there was no dispute that the appellant's mobile concrete pumpers, including Truck Nos. 112 and 113, could and did travel safely at speeds exceeding twelve miles per hour.  In fact, the evidence indicated that they often traveled at highway speeds.  Because the subject property did not fit within any of the categories of vehicles carved out of the statutory definition, the Board found and ruled that they were "motor vehicles" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1.  The Board further found and ruled that the subject property was not among the categories of vehicles exempted from the excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  
The appellant's arguments to the contrary were unavailing.  The appellant's main contention was that Truck Nos. 112 and 113 were not subject to the motor vehicle excise because they were not "motor vehicles" but instead were "special mobile equipment" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1.   That section defines "special mobile equipment" as 
motor vehicle[s] which [are] principally designed to conduct excavations or lift building materials at a public or private construction site and [are] operated on a way for the sole purpose of transportation to or from said construction site and [have] a gross vehicle weight of at least twelve thousand pounds. This definition shall not include a motor vehicle which is designed to carry passengers, or any load, on a way.

Owner-contractors who own special mobile equipment may be entitled to receive special registration plates under G.L. c. 90, § 5, which permits the issuance of special registration plates to the following categories of owners:    (1) manufacturer; (2)dealer; (3)repairman; (4)recreational vehicle and recreational trailer dealer; (5) boat and boat trailer dealer; (6) farmer; (7) owner-contractor; (8) transporter; and (9) person involved in the harvesting of forest products as defined by the regulations of the registry of motor vehicles.  G.L. c. 90, § 5.  										However, the Board found and ruled that the issuance of such plates was not dispositive of the issue presented in this appeal.  While Chapter 90 defines "motor vehicles" and sets forth the parameters for registration and operation of motor vehicles, it is G.L. c. 60A, § 1 which imposes the motor vehicle excise, and thus the terms of that statute dictate whether the subject property is subject to the motor vehicle excise.  As discussed above, the Board found that G.L. c. 60A, § 1 contained no express or implied exemption for the subject property.   Rather, the exemptions enumerated in that statute were limited to vehicles owned by certain categories of individuals or entities, such as disabled veterans, former prisoners of war, and charitable organizations.  Of the nine categories of individuals eligible to receive special plates under G.L. c. 90, § 5, it is noteworthy that G.L. c. 60A, § 1 exempts only three of them - farmers, manufacturers, and dealers - from the motor vehicle excise.   It is apparent from the statutory scheme that not all of the vehicles eligible to receive special registration plates under G.L. c. 90, § 5 are likewise exempt from the motor vehicle excise under G.L. c. 60A, § 1; vehicles which are "special mobile equipment" under G.L. c. 90, § 1 and therefore eligible for special registration plates under G.L. c. 90, § 5 may be - and in this case are - "motor vehicles" subject to the excise under G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  As the subject property fell within the definition of "motor vehicles" provided by G.L. c. 90, § 1 and was not within the class of vehicles exempted by G.L. c. 60A, § 1, the Board found and ruled that it was subject to the motor vehicle excise.  In making its argument, the appellant relied in part on various items of correspondence issued by the RMV and the DOR as well as a manual published by the DOR entitled "Motor Vehicle & Trailer Excise Manual."  The Board found that none of these items supported the appellant's position.  The DOR's "Motor Vehicle & Trailer Excise Manual" indicated that "special mobile equipment" is not subject to the motor vehicle excise and should instead be taxed as personal property.  However, in a written response to an inquiry by the assessors regarding this statement, the DOR clarified the statement to mean only that special mobile equipment that is not also a "motor vehicle" as defined by G.L. c. 90, § 1 is not subject to the motor vehicle excise and should be taxed as personal property.  In that same item of correspondence, the DOR reiterated its previously-articulated opinion that mobile concrete pumpers are motor vehicles subject to the motor vehicle excise.  Additionally, the items of correspondence from the RMV merely served to confirm that agency's opinion that the appellant was eligible to receive "owner-contractor" plates for its mobile concrete pumpers because, in the RMV's opinion, mobile concrete pumpers were "special mobile equipment."  The Board found that this opinion had no bearing on the taxability of the subject property.  In fact, in a letter dated December 18, 2001, the RMV declined to opine on the taxability of mobile concrete pumpers, and instead explicitly deferred to the DOR on that matter.  	Similarly unpersuasive was the appellant's attempt to use a 1985 IRS Letter Ruling, issued to a different taxpayer, to support its contention that mobile concrete pumpers are not subject to the excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  That letter ruling pertained to the federal excise on "highway vehicles," defined under Treas. Reg. § 48.4061(a)-1(d)(1) as "any self-propelled vehicle, or any trailer or semitrailer, designed to perform a function of transporting a load over public highways, whether or not also designed to perform other functions but does not include a vehicle described in section 48.4061(a)-1(d)(2)."  Although the IRS determined that mobile concrete pumpers fell into the general definition of "highway vehicles," it also determined that they fell into the express exception provided by § 48.4061(a)-1(d)(2)(i), which exempted from the excise vehicles that consist of chassis with machinery or equipment permanently mounted thereto, and which engage in construction, manufacturing processes or the like, provided that the chassis serves only as a means of mobility and power source and, by reason of its design, the chassis could not, without substantial structural modification, be used as a vehicle to carry loads other than its specialized equipment or machinery.  Not only did the definition of "highway vehicle" differ from the definition of "motor vehicle" at issue here, but, unlike in the present appeal, vehicles such as mobile concrete pumpers were expressly exempted.  As discussed above, the Board found and ruled that the relevant statute contained no such exemption for the subject property, and the Board therefore rejected the appellant's attempt to liken the federal excise to the motor vehicle excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  					Additionally, under G.L. c. 60A, § 6, the excise is to be imposed by the municipality in which the motor vehicle is "customarily kept."  G.L. c. 60A § 6.  The appellant asserted that Truck No. 112 was primarily garaged in New Hampshire, and the Board inferred from this assertion that the appellant impliedly argued that Truck No. 112 was not subject to the excise assessed by the assessors.  However, the appellant offered no insurance records, registration information or other documentary evidence indicating that Truck No. 112 was garaged primarily in New Hampshire.  To the contrary, the evidence indicated that Truck No. 112 was registered in Massachusetts and used most frequently in Massachusetts.  The Board therefore found and ruled that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the appellant's assertion, and accordingly, it rejected the appellant's implied argument. 				Lastly, the appellant claimed that it was entitled to an abatement of the excise because the excise was based on an incorrect valuation of the subject property.  G.L. c. 60A, § 1 imposes the excise, at a rate of $25 per $1,000, and for purposes of the excise, the value of each motor vehicle is:
deemed to be the value, as determined by the commissioner, of motor vehicles or trailers of the same make, type, model, and year of manufacture as designated by the manufacturer, but not in excess of the following percentages of the list price established by the manufacturer for the year of manufacture, namely: --   

In the year preceding the designated year of manufacture 50%
In the year of manufacture 90%
In the second year 60%
In the third year 40%
In the fourth year 25%
In the fifth and succeeding years 10%.


G.L. c. 60A, § 1; see also Lily Transportation Corp. v. Assessors of Medford, 427 Mass. 228, 230 (1998).  The appellant offered no evidence of overvaluation, nor did it offer evidence demonstrating error in the assessors' valuation methodology.  The excise for Truck No. 112 was based solely on the value of its truck chassis, an amount much lower than its manufacturer list price.  The Board found and ruled that there was nothing in the statutory language requiring the assessors to base the excise on the value of a motor vehicle's chassis alone rather than the applicable percentage of manufacturer list price.  See DePesa v. Assessors of Norwell, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2004-484, 491 (ruling that motor vehicle excise was properly based on value of entire motor home, not on chassis alone, exclusive of coach).  With respect to Truck No. 113, the evidence likewise showed that the assessors based the excise on a value lower than the value derived by using the formula designated in the statute.  The evidence showed that, if anything, the subject property was undervalued, not overvalued.  The Board therefore found and ruled that the appellant did not prove that the subject property was overvalued.  
The burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to make out its right as a matter of law to abatement of the tax.  Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  A taxpayer claiming exemption from taxation must show clearly and unequivocally that it comes within the terms of the exemption.  Town of Milton v. Ladd, 348 Mass. 762, 765 (1965).  In the present appeal, the Board found and ruled that the appellant did not establish that the subject property was exempt from the excise imposed by G.L. c. 60A, § 1, nor did it prove that the subject property was overvalued.  The Board therefore found and ruled that the appellant did not meet its burden of proving its right to an abatement of the excise.  Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee in this appeal.  
	                         
                           APPELLATE TAX BOARD 

            
				   By: ________________________________
					  Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman
A true copy:

Attest: _________________________
	      Clerk of the Board

 There was evidence that the assessors voted to issue a motor vehicle excise bill to ICPC in 2001, but the excise so assessed was later abated and the bill was rescinded.  
 Motor vehicles owned by motor vehicle dealers are not completely exempt from the excise under the statute, but are instead taxed at a reduced rate.  

ATB 2011-917