SYLVIE SINAPAH v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (And a Consolidated Case).

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

20-P-650

SYLVIE SINAPAH

vs.

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (and a
consolidated case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Sylvie Sinapah, appeals from orders and a

judgment of the District Court, and an order by a single justice

of this court, stemming from two separate decisions by the

Department of Unemployment Assistance Board of Review (DUA). We

affirm.

In the first case, DUA deemed Sinapah ineligible for

unemployment benefits. Five months later, Sinapah filed a

complaint for judicial review in the District Court, accompanied

by a motion for leave to file a late appeal. See G. L. c. 151A,

§ 42 (establishing thirty-day appeal period). A judge denied

Sinapah's motion, and the complaint was dismissed. Sinapah did

not appeal. Instead, she filed a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P.

1 The consolidated case involves the same parties.
60 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), to vacate the judge's order

denying her request to appeal late. A different judge denied

the motion, and Sinapah appealed that decision.2

In a second case, DUA allowed recoupment of money from

Sinapah's State income tax refund because she had received

benefits to which she was not entitled. A different judge

denied Sinapah's petition for review and Sinapah appealed.3

After the record was assembled for the appeal, Sinapah filed a

"Motion to Impound Some Materials." The judge endorsed the

motion "No action taken as file has been transferred to Appeals

Court." Sinapah's request for reconsideration of that ruling

was denied and she appealed. Sinapah also moved in the District

Court to proceed under a pseudonym in both cases. When her

motions were denied, Sinapah appealed.4 The two appeals were

consolidated in this court. Sinapah's subsequent application

for a stay of the consolidated appeal was denied by a single

justice, and her appeal of that order was also consolidated into

this appeal.

2 That appeal, from the order in Northampton Dist. Ct. No.
1645CV000252, was docketed in this court as case no. 20-P-650.
3 That appeal, from the judgment in Northampton Dist. Ct. No.

1745CV000062, was docketed in this court as case no. 20-P-452.
4 The appeal of the orders in no. 1745CV000062 were consolidated

with 20-P-452; the appeal of the order in no. 1645CV000252 was
consolidated with 20-P-650.
2
Discussion. 1. Rule 60 (b) motion. In December 2016, a

judge denied Sinapah's motion to file a late appeal of the DUA's

determination of ineligibility as untimely, pursuant to G. L.

c. 151A, § 42. In February 2020, a different judge denied

Sinapah's motion for relief from that order, stating "[t]he

Order was from a decision against the Plaintiff on 12/31/16.

Now more than 4 (four) years later, the Plaintiff once again

attempts to reverse the decision. This lapse of time cannot be

construed as reasonable and is just another effort by the

Plaintiff to overturn a judgment she disagrees with." Although

the judge mistakenly indicated the motion was filed four years

after the initial decision instead of just over three years

later, a lapse of three years to file the motion still cannot be

construed as reasonable in these circumstances. See Owens v.

Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 77 (2006). Accordingly, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the judge's decision.5 See id. at 72;

Franzosa v. Franzosa, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 179, 182 (2020).

2. Ineligibility.6 Sinapah contends that the judge erred

in affirming the DUA's decision deeming her ineligible for

5 We also note that Sinapah did not request an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to vacate and it was in the judge's
discretion to deny the motion without a hearing. See Cicchese
v. Tape Time Corp., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 75 (1989).
6 On July 19, 2017, two months after the judgment entered,

Sinapah filed an extension request to enlarge the time to file
an appeal that a judge allowed for thirty days beginning July
20, 2017. Sinapah then filed a notice of appeal on August 18,
3
unemployment benefits. Our review of the board's decision is

governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L. c. 151A, § 42.

We accord deference to the expertise of the agency and will set

aside DUA's decision only if it is "unsupported by substantial

evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am., Inc. v.

Commissioner of Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447 Mass. 852,

857 (2006).

Here, the review examiner's conclusion that Sinapah did not

have work authorization, and thus was legally unavailable to

work and ineligible for benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 24

(b), was supported by substantial evidence. To be eligible for

benefits under § 24 (b), the individual must be "capable of,

available, and actively seeking work." The hearing examiner

found that Sinapah "entered the United States on a J-1 Visa

valid from December 23, 2013 to December 22, 2018 in a research

program that was scheduled to end on February 1, 2015."

Although the program was eligible for an extension, the

university declined to extend the program "beyond February 1,

2015 and thus, it effectively pulled [Sinapah's] sponsorship and

2017. Although the extension granted exceeded the judge's
authority, see G. L. c. 151A, § 42; Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019), we decline to dismiss the
appeal as untimely where Sinapah, proceeding pro se, adhered to
the enlargement of time permitted by the judge.
4
work authorization." Despite Sinapah's attempt to rectify the

situation and obtain another sponsor, at the time of the

hearing, she had not successfully procured another sponsor and

thus was not authorized to work in the United States past the

expiration of her program on February 1, 2015. We thus discern

no grounds for disturbing DUA's decision under G. L. c. 30A,

§ 14 (7). See Kelley v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,

374 Mass. 823, 823 (1978).

3. District Court motions. Sinapah asserts that the

decision to take no action on her motion to impound the

administrative record was error. The motion to impound was

filed after the record was already assembled for Sinapah's

appeal of the judgment in that case. Relying on G. L. c. 151A,

§ 46 (a), Sinapah asserted that impoundment was required because

§ 46 mandates strict confidentiality of materials related to the

unemployment hearings. However, § 46 (b) (1) permits the

inclusion of the materials in proceedings where the DUA is a

necessary party. See G. L. c. 151A, § 46 (b) (1). Thus, even

if the motion to impound was timely, see Rule 2 (a) (1) of the

Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (motion "must be filed

and ruled upon prior to submission of the actual material sought

to be impounded"), we are satisfied that the judge did not abuse

her discretion. See New England Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of

5
Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462

Mass. 76, 83 (2012).

Likewise, we discern no error in the denials of Sinapah's

motions to litigate using a pseudonym, as well as her motions to

reconsider those decisions. "We have reviewed the materials

. . . and nothing in them compels us to conclude that the

petitioner has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the

customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness

in judicial proceedings" (quotations omitted). Singer v.

Rosenkranz, 453 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2009), quoting Doe v. Bell

Atl. Business Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass.

1995).7

4. Single justice order. A single justice lifted stays of

both appeals before they were consolidated, reasoning that

Sinapah could not demonstrate that the outcome of Federal

litigation would impact her appeals where DUA was not a party to

the Federal case. Because there was no reason to wait to

address Sinapah's claims, it follows that the second single

justice correctly denied Sinapah's motion for a stay of the

consolidated appeal.8

7 To the extent the plaintiff now complains that the judge denied
her requests without a hearing, we note that she did not request
a hearing on these motions.
8 We decline to address Sinapah's cursory and unsubstantiated

contentions that various judges of the District and Appeals
6
Conclusion. The order in the first District Court case,

dated February 25, 2020, is affirmed. The judgment in the

second District Court case, dated May 22, 2017, is affirmed.

The orders in both District Court cases, dated March 9, 2020,

are affirmed. Finally, the single justice order dated June 6,

2022, is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Rubin,
Englander & Brennan, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: June 21, 2023.

Courts are biased against her. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9)
(A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7