Eric Skoglund v. State Street Bank & Trust Company.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-37

ERIC SKOGLUND

vs.

STATE STREET BANK & TRUST COMPANY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Eric Skoglund, appeals from the entry of

summary judgment against him in the Superior Court. Skoglund

argues that throughout the proceedings he experienced judicial

bias and deceptive attorney practices, and that the judge failed

to adequately address his case. Skoglund does not, however,

argue in his brief any facts relating to the merits of the

judgment. For essentially the reasons set forth in the judge's

memorandum and order, we agree that summary judgment for

defendant State Street Corporation (State Street)1 was proper.

1While Skoglund's initial complaint named "State Street
Bank & Trust Company" as the defendant, his civil action cover
sheet (and all the pleadings) identified "State Street Boston
Corporation," an entity once related to State Street Corporation
but dissolved before Skoglund filed the complaint. State Street
As nothing raised in Skoglund's brief warrants disturbance of

the judgment, we affirm.

Discussion. Skoglund argues that he has been subjected to

judicial bias throughout the adjudication of this case. He

argues that when the judge asked him "[a]nything else?" twice

during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the judge

was disrespectful and showed bias. We disagree. The judge did

not interrupt Skoglund and granted him appropriate opportunities

to conclude his presentation.

Skoglund additionally argues that State Street was

improperly favored when allowed to file its motion for summary

judgment when no Superior Court Rule 9C(a) conference had taken

place. However, Skoglund was contacted prior to the filing of

the motion and failed to respond to State Street. Therefore,

pursuant to Rule 9C(a), the motion was properly filed with the

certificate attesting that reasonable efforts to confer had been

made, and we discern no bias against Skoglund.2

Skoglund also argues that State Street's attorneys engaged

in "deceptive attorney practices" by not responding to his

informed the court that the plaintiff's employer was State
Street Bank & Trust Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of State
Street Corporation.

2 We do not address Skoglund's allegations of judicial bias
at other stages of the litigation as none of those allegations
bear on the ultimate judgment.

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discovery requests related to claims that had been dismissed.

We disagree. The order on the motion to dismiss allowed limited

discovery, confined to the issues of comparators for the gender

discrimination claim and detrimental reliance for the

misrepresentation claim. When Skoglund sought discovery

unrelated to these two issues, State Street correctly objected

and declined to provide responses. In addition, Skoglund argues

that State Street's attorney engaged in deceptive practices

when, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, she (1)

made statements regarding the networking meeting and interviews

that Skoglund believed to be untruthful, and (2) stated that

because Skoglund had not disagreed with the statement of facts

accompanying the motion for summary judgment, the facts were

deemed admitted. After review of the record, we conclude that

the attorney did not make intentionally untruthful statements

and merely clarified her client's positions. Moreover, Rule

9A(b)(5)(iii)(A) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2023),

stated that on a motion for summary judgment, if the nonmoving

party fails to object to a fact in the statement of material

facts, the fact is deemed admitted. The attorney's reliance on

this rule in her presentation to the judge was not deceptive.

Finally, Skoglund argues that the Superior Court failed "to

adequately address the original case." First, he argues that he

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submitted a change of address but that he did not receive notice

of a hearing on his motion for reconsideration; however, no

hearing was held on this motion, and therefore no scheduling

notice was sent to the parties. Second, Skoglund notes his

concern that there was no progress on his case for a year, but

he does not explain how this timeline prejudiced him. Finally,

he argues that he did not receive sufficient notice of the

status conference held on March 27, 2024. After review of the

record, we note that Skoglund requested the status conference by

e-mail message on March 18, 2024, and the Superior Court

scheduled the conference in response to his request by replying

to his e-mail message on March 19, 2024. The notice was

adequate given the circumstances.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Sacks & Allen, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: February 2, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4