COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN PRICE.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1236
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
STEVEN PRICE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Steven Price, appeals from a conviction,
after a jury trial in the District Court, of reckless operation
of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). We conclude that
evidence that the defendant sped through a very busy
intersection, nearly causing a collision, provided sufficient
evidence of reckless operation. Further concluding that the
handling of the identification evidence and instructions was
proper where, at a prior hearing, the trooper recognized the
defendant in a courtroom containing at least twenty persons
before the case was called, we affirm.
1. Sufficiency. "[W]e consider the evidence introduced at
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and

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determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Lagotic, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 405, 407 (2023),
quoting Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 216
(2019). "The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be
reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or
inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295,
303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713,
cert. denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014). To prove the defendant
guilty of reckless operation, the Commonwealth had to prove that
the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public way in a
reckless manner. See Commonwealth v. Maraj, 105 Mass. App. Ct.
258, 263 (2025). To show recklessness, the Commonwealth had to
demonstrate that "'a high degree of likelihood that substantial
harm will result to another' flowed from the intentional
conduct." Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 Mass. 416, 423 (2019),
quoting Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 (2010).
Here, the defendant accelerated quickly enough to "kick up
a bunch of dust and debris." He then ran through an
intersection without slowing down, forcing another vehicle "to
hit its brakes and swerve to avoid" the defendant's vehicle. He
was going approximately fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five
miles per hour zone. "It was commuter traffic at that time, and

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there's multiple businesses in that area, people coming in and
out and entering and exiting . . . , and that intersection is
very busy at that time of day." The jury could reasonably find
that the defendant's speeding through the busy intersection
during commuter traffic created a high degree of likelihood of
substantial harm. See Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass. 770,
781-782 (2025) (sufficient evidence of reckless operation where
defendant was "tailgating . . . , traveling at excessive speeds,
and weaving through traffic without signaling" prior to crash);
Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770, 770 (1965) (sufficient
evidence of reckless operation where defendant "went to the left
of a traffic island marked 'Keep Right' and twice weaved from
left to right on the road," passed two vehicles, and then
collided with a third); Maraj, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 259
(defendant drove "at a high rate of speed," "passed through an
intersection without stopping at a stop sign," and then crashed
into house). Cf. Commonwealth v. Moore, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 40,
45-46 (2017) (leading "police on a high-speed chase through busy
city streets at rush hour, driving dangerously and erratically
and committing serious traffic violations before running the red
light at the intersection" created "plain and strong likelihood
of death").

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We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence that
the defendant operated the motor vehicle. The trooper received
the defendant's name and date and birth from the driver and
obtained a computer image of the defendant that matched the
driver's appearance. The trooper then identified the defendant
in court. The jury were entitled to credit the trooper's
testimony. See Commonwealth v. Nordstrom, 100 Mass. App. Ct.
493, 498 (2021).
2. Identification. Several months prior to trial, a judge
allowed the defendant's motion for an in-court nonsuggestive
identification procedure. On the day of that court hearing, the
trooper recognized the defendant while the defendant was sitting
in the courtroom prior to the case being called. There were at
least twenty people in the courtroom. The case was then called,
at which point the trooper saw the defendant join counsel at
counsel table. While the defendant was at counsel table, the
trooper identified the defendant from the stand.
On the morning of trial, the trial judge held a voir dire
of the trooper and denied the defendant's motion to exclude the
prior in-court identification. As it turned out, the
Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence of the prior in-
court identification; rather, it was the defendant who

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introduced that evidence in an apparent attempt to discredit the
trooper's identification on the day of trial.
It is hard to see how the defendant can object to his own
introduction of the prior identification. See Commonwealth v.
Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 557 n.6 (2015). In any event, we
discern no error. There was nothing suggestive about the
trooper's identification of the defendant before the case was
called from a crowd of at least twenty persons. See
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241 (2014), quoting
United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368-1369 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987) (identification of
defendant who "'sit[s] somewhere in the courtroom other than the
defense table'" is "alternative, less suggestive identification
procedure[]"). This was not a one-on-one identification, see
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279-281 (2006), and the
defendant provided no reason why other circumstances made it
suggestive. The judge, who credited the trooper's testimony,
had no reason to find that the subsequent in-court
identification was improper. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470
Mass. 255, 265 (2014) (in-court identification proper after
unequivocal nonsuggestive identification). Similarly, in light
of the nonsuggestive prior identification, there was no error in

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the admission of the trooper's in-court identification at trial.
See id.
3. Identification instruction. "Trial judges are accorded
considerable discretion in framing jury instructions, both in
determining the precise phraseology used and the appropriate
degree of elaboration." Commonwealth v. Rogers, 96 Mass. App.
Ct. 781, 784 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Newell, 55 Mass.
App. Ct. 119, 131 (2002). Here, both parties explicitly agreed
that the portion of the identification instruction regarding
express certainty should be omitted and approved the judge's
language regarding the prior courtroom identification.
Accordingly, we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage
of justice. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 725,
732 (2024). We discern none.
Although the trooper expressed complete certainty at the
prior hearing, she expressed no level of certainty regarding the
identification before the jury. Similarly, as there was no
prior showup identification, the judge properly omitted any
reference to such in the identification instruction. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 490 Mass. 171, 188-189 (2022) (within
judge's discretion to omit portion of identification instruction

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not relevant to case). There was no substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Desmond,
Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.1),
Clerk
Entered: October 9, 2026.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.