COMMONWEALTH vs. DERRICK TRIMBLE.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-763
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
DERRICK TRIMBLE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the Dorchester Division of the
Boston Municipal Court, the defendant, Derrick Trimble, was
convicted of carrying a firearm without a license, possession of
ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card, and
carrying a loaded firearm without a license.1 On appeal, the
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that he did not have a firearm license, and the judge erred in
admitting a certified copy of the defendant's prior felony
conviction and portions of a postarrest video. He also claims
error in the jury instructions. We affirm.
1 The jury found the defendant not guilty of discharging a
firearm within 500 feet of a building and assault by means of a
dangerous weapon.

2
Background. On December 16, 2019, police responded to a
call for shots fired on Walk Hill Street in Mattapan. At the
scene, witnesses directed the officers' attention to a person on
the second-floor porch of 5XX Walk Hill Street. Inside, the
officers found the defendant, the same man that they saw on the
porch.
Detective Peter McCarthy testified that, on arrival, he saw
a black Mercedes in the middle of the road with the driver's
side door open and bullet holes in the rear. The front
passenger window was down and there was no driver. The Mercedes
had bullet holes in the back rear window and the back rear
bumper and a bullet fragment on the back seat. During the
investigation, officers determined that the Mercedes belonged to
the defendant.
In the backyard, Officer Sean O'Brien noticed a
"subterranean trash disposal" in the ground with a flap lid. He
opened the flap and saw a firearm with five spent shell casings
in the cylinder.
Following his arrest, the defendant made several statements
at the police station, all of which were recorded on the
officer's body-worn camera. Among other things, the defendant
stated, "I'll be back, bitch," "I guarantee you, when I get
outta this, in about a couple years you'll see me again bitch
because I'm gonna terrorize Mattapan, bitch," "wait til I get

3
out bitch I'll be back," "I need another pistol . . . so I can
kill you, bitch. Yes, I don't give a fuck. I need guns! I need
guns!" and "you know I'm a problem since I've been up here."
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine
to admit a certified copy of the defendant's prior felony
conviction (prior conviction) to prove that he did not have a
license to carry a firearm or an FID card.2 The Commonwealth
explained that there were two Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) employees available for the entire state to
testify, and it was not feasible for either to appear without
continuing the trial. The defendant objected, arguing that it
would be unduly prejudicial. The judge allowed the motion
provided that "the certification is going to be admitted in a
generalized amorphous way. In other words, the actual charge
. . . is going to be redacted and a follow up curative
instruction is going to be given to the jury . . . ."
At trial the Commonwealth also introduced copies of the
defendant's registry of motor vehicles (RMV) records and the
postarrest video.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of evidence. a. Prior
conviction. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
2 The prior conviction was a 2009 conviction for
distribution of a class B substance. See G. L. c. 94C,
§ 32A (a).

4
evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 836
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677
(1979). "Proof of the essential elements of the crime may be
based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, . . .
and the inferences a jury may draw need only be reasonable and
possible and need not be necessary or inescapable."
Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791 (2022), quoting
Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021).
To sustain a conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) for
carrying a firearm without a license, the Commonwealth must
prove that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) had in his possession
(3) a firearm (4) without a valid license to carry. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 604 (2018). Following
Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690, S.C., 493 Mass. 1
(2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024), the burden is on
the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant lacked a firearm
license.
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence that he did not have a firearm
license or an FID card. He contends that the only evidence
offered by the Commonwealth was the inadmissible prior

5
conviction. Relying on Commonwealth v. Collins, 496 Mass. 151,
163 (2025), the defendant argues that the Commonwealth's failure
to introduce a CJIS witness rendered the evidence insufficient
and suggests that the Commonwealth should have sought a
continuance. We are not persuaded.
The Commonwealth "has a right to try its case in its own
way." Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 466 Mass. 475, 482 n.9 (2013),
quoting Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 451 (1988), and
we discern no error in the approach taken here. Whether the
Commonwealth had alternative means to prove its case is not the
issue. There was no obligation for the Commonwealth to seek a
continuance, nor for the judge to sua sponte grant one. See
Collins, 496 Mass. at 158. One permissible way for the
Commonwealth to prove that the defendant did not have a firearm
license is through the admission of a certified copy of a
defendant's prior felony conviction. Id. at 157-159. That is
precisely what happened here. The defendant's argument that the
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden because it did not
present contemporaneous testimony regarding the prior conviction
fails for the same reasons. Finally, the date of the prior
conviction predated the offenses at issue here, adding further
support to the inference that the defendant was ineligible to
have a firearm license or an FID card on the date of the
offenses. See id. at 161.

6
b. Common identity. The defendant next contends that the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that the
defendant was the same Derrick Trimble who committed the prior
drug offense.3 We are not persuaded.
The docket sheet for the prior conviction included the
defendant's name and address at 5XX Walk Hill Street, #2,
Mattapan, MA 02126. The three-page RMV record included the
defendant's name and address, date of birth, and a photograph of
the defendant. More specifically, the RMV records listed the
defendant's addresses in descending order. The address of 5XX
Walk Hill Street, #2, Mattapan was listed as the defendant's
address on January 18, 2019, and again on October 31, 2005, with
no other address listed during that time frame. The defendant
was arrested at this address, and the Mercedes found at this
address belonged to the defendant. And, because the prior
conviction was in 2008, the jury could conclude from all these
facts that the defendant was the same Derrick Trimble with the
prior conviction.
The jury could also compare the defendant's appearance at
trial with the RMV photograph and the depiction of him in body-
3 The evidence does not support the defendant's suggestion
that it was his father on the RMV records. The first page of
the RMV records contains a photograph of the defendant. The
jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Derrick
Trimble was the individual on the felony conviction.

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worn camera footage. This too served to corroborate the RMV
record, and the prior conviction. See Collins, 496 Mass. at
162.
2. Jury instructions. The defendant next argues that the
judge's instructions concerning the prior conviction removed the
question of licensure from the jury.4 Because there was no
objection, we review to determine whether any error created a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth
v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422, 425 (2003). "A substantial risk of
a miscarriage of justice exists when we have 'a serious doubt
whether the result of the trial might have been different had
the error not been made.'" Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass.
290, 297 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675,
687 (2002).
Here, the jury were instructed that they "heard that
evidence was admitted that the defendant was previously
convicted of a crime" and that they may consider that evidence
for the purpose of deciding whether the Commonwealth met its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not have a valid firearm license at the time of the alleged
offenses. Additionally, the jury were instructed that they must
4 The judge gave limiting instructions to the jury at the
time of admission of the prior conviction and at the close of
the evidence.

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not consider the prior conviction to be "any indication of guilt
on these charges," and that they were to determine the facts of
the case and that anything the judge said was not evidence.
"The jury are presumed to follow the judge's instructions."
Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 549 (2014), citing
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 681 (2013). Viewing
the instructions as a whole, we conclude they did not remove the
question of licensure from the jury, nor did they create a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
3. Postarrest video footage. The defendant argues that
the judge erred in admitting the postarrest video footage,
contending that it was more prejudicial than probative and not
relevant. We disagree.
We review a judge's evidentiary ruling for abuse of
discretion and will affirm unless the judge made a clear error
of judgment "such that the decision falls outside the range of
reasonable alternatives." L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169,
185 n.27 (2014). "Whether evidence is relevant and whether its
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect are matters entrusted to the trial judge's broad
discretion and are not disturbed absent palpable error."
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 192 (2010), quoting
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001).

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In the postarrest video footage, the defendant said, among
other things, that he needed another firearm. These statements
were admissions and relevant to proving that the defendant
knowingly possessed the firearm. And while prejudicial,
evidence by its design is meant to be prejudicial, and only
unfair prejudice must be avoided. See Commonwealth v. Kindell,
84 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 187-188 (2013).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, "[t]he Commonwealth
is entitled to 'show the whole transaction of which the crime
was a part,' including uncharged conduct after the crime was
committed." Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 148 (2023),
quoting Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 489 (1988). In
admitting a portion of the postarrest video footage, it avoided
"presenting a fragmented and misleading version of events" to
the jury. Commonwealth v. Steeves, 490 Mass. 270, 277 (2022),
quoting Commonwealth v. Aduayi, 488 Mass. 658, 671 (2021). And,
any prejudice was mitigated by the judge's contemporaneous
instructions that explained that the defendant's statements,
particularly "about certain acts allegedly committed by the
defendant," could not be used to "conclude that if the defendant
committed these acts, that he must also have committed the
offenses for which he has been charged" and that "[i]t would be
extremely unfair to consider this evidence for those purposes."
This shows that the judge "carefully weighed the probative value

10
and prejudicial effect of the evidence introduced at trial."
Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 386 (2020). Moreover, the
jury acquitted the defendant of some charges related to these
statements. See Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 740 n.17
(2011).
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Shin & Hodgens, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: October 13, 2026.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.