CHRISTOPHER P. LORETI vs. TOWN OF ARLINGTON.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1318
CHRISTOPHER P. LORETI
vs.
TOWN OF ARLINGTON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Christopher P. Loreti, filed a complaint in
the Superior Court against the town of Arlington (town) under
the Massachusetts public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10, seeking
the names and resumes of three withdrawn candidates for the
position of town manager (names and resumes), and an e-mail
message sent by one of the candidates withdrawing from the
process (contested e-mail) (together with the names and resumes,
the "disputed records").1 The judge dismissed the complaint
1 The plaintiff's first public records request (first
request) sought: (1) "Resumes of the 3 Town Manager candidates
who withdrew from consideration after being named finalists by
the Preliminary Screening Committee"; and (2) "Any and all
correspondence from those 3 finalists provided to the
Preliminary Screening Committee or any other town official

2
concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365
Mass. 754 (1974). On the plaintiff's appeal, we consider
whether the requested records are exempt from disclosure under
the privacy exemption set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (c), as amended through St. 2020, c. 253, § 2 (privacy
exemption). We conclude that the names and resumes are exempt
and thus were properly withheld. We further conclude that only
the name and identifying information contained in the contested
e-mail is exempt and the balance of the e-mail must be
disclosed. We therefore vacate so much of the judgment as
dismissed entirely the request for disclosure of the contested
e-mail and order entry of a modified judgment allowing the
request, in part, and ordering production of the contested e-
mail with each instance of the withdrawn candidate's name and e-
mail address redacted. As so modified, the judgment is
affirmed.
explaining why they were withdrawing from consideration for the
Town Manager position."
The plaintiff's second public records request (second
request) sought the resumes of the withdrawn candidates, as well
as "the revised meeting minutes of the Town Manager Screening
Committee for February 7, 2023[,] showing the name of the four
finalists for the position of Town Manager and the results of
the vote or votes taken to select them as finalists. (If such
votes were in Executive Session, then the [roll] call votes on
each.)"

3
Background. We set forth the facts as drawn from the
plaintiff's complaint and accompanying exhibits. See Buffalo-
Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 14
(2018).
1. Screening process. The town formed a preliminary
screening committee (screening committee) to complete an
initial, confidential review of the applicants for the town
manager position.2 Of the twenty applicants, the screening
committee selected four candidates, including one alternate, to
recommend to the select board. Thereafter, the candidates would
be publicly interviewed by the select board. After being
notified of their selection to move forward in the process,
three of the four candidates, including the alternate, withdrew
from consideration (withdrawn candidates). Two of the withdrawn
candidates "did not wish to be identified" as they were both
"chief executive officers of other municipalities."3 With only
one candidate remaining (remaining candidate), the town
consulted the division of open government of the Attorney
General's office to determine whether the select board could
2 The select board was advised prior to posting the town
manager position that "candidates are only going to apply if
they have a level of confidence that their application will be
kept confidential until they [a]re selected as a finalist."
3 The other withdrawn candidate also held a public position.

4
move forward with interviewing the remaining candidate.4 The
town ultimately concluded that the screening committee could
proceed, and the remaining candidate was hired following a
public interview.
2. First request. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff made
his first request. The town declined to produce any responsive
records, citing the privacy exemption. The plaintiff appealed
this decision to the supervisor of records (SOR) of the
Secretary of State's public records division. The town replied,
and the SOR closed the appeal noting that the plaintiff could
appeal from the town's response to the SOR if he was still
dissatisfied. The SOR declined to opine on the plaintiff's
requests related to the executive session and the applicability
of the privacy exemption. The plaintiff again appealed, and the
SOR then determined that the town had not met its burden to show
that the requested correspondence was covered in its entirety by
the privacy exemption. Following the SOR's determination, the
town confirmed that the contested e-mail was the only responsive
record but again declined to produce it as it "expressed
personal information" regarding the candidate's withdrawal that
could "embarrass and harm" the candidate's future employment.
The plaintiff again appealed to the SOR. At the plaintiff's
4 The remaining candidate was an internal applicant, serving
as the deputy town manager at the time of his application.

5
request, the SOR reviewed the contested e-mail in camera and
issued a determination that the contested e-mail could be
withheld by the town pursuant to the privacy exemption, as it
"constitute[d] intimate details of a highly personal nature,"
disclosure of which was "likely to result in personal
embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities." The
SOR declined to reconsider her determinations.
Concurrently, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the
division of open government alleging that the town had violated
the open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18-25. The division of
open government found that the screening committee violated the
open meeting law by "discussing topics in executive session that
were not appropriate for executive session"5 and "by creating
insufficient meeting minutes." The division of open government
ordered the screening committee to amend the minutes for the
executive sessions to include a summary of the discussions and
interviews that occurred therein.
5 In particular, the division of open government concluded
that the screening committee should not have gone into executive
session to discuss how to proceed once three of the four
finalists withdrew from consideration. On the other hand, the
division of open government concluded that the screening
committee "appropriately selected four finalists during an
executive session," and that "re-open[ing] its review of the
applicant pool" after the three finalists withdrew "also was an
appropriate task to undertake in executive session."

6
3. Second request. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed his
second request. In response, the town provided the meeting
minutes for its open and executive sessions during which the
vote to recommend the candidates was taken, but it again
declined to provide the resumes, citing the privacy exemption.
The plaintiff appealed to the SOR, the town responded, and the
SOR did not change her position.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, the plaintiff
filed the complaint at issue here. The town filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6). After a hearing, the judge
dismissed the complaint; this appeal followed.
Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to
dismiss de novo."6 Buffalo-Water 1, LLC, 481 Mass. at 17. In so
doing, "we accept as true the factual allegations in the
complaint and the attached exhibits, draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the
allegations 'plausibly suggest' that the plaintiff is entitled
to relief on that legal claim" (citation omitted). Id.
Here, the plaintiff seeks information from the town under
the public records law. The "primary purpose" of the public
records law "is to give the public broad access to governmental
records." Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of
6 We likewise review issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 556 (2020).

7
Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 382-383 (2002). The categories of
records and documents to which the public must be afforded
access are set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. The
statute establishes a broad definition of public records, with
twenty-three enumerated exemptions.7 See G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Twenty-sixth (a)-(j), (l)-(x), as amended through St. 2025,
c. 16, § 1.8 "Due to the broad scope of the public records law,
in any court proceeding challenging the withholding of a
requested document, 'there shall be a presumption that the
record sought is public, and the burden shall be upon the
custodian to prove with specificity the exemption which
applies.'" Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015),
quoting G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c).
At issue here is the scope of the privacy exemption, which
excludes from the definition of public records, and thus from
mandatory disclosure, "personnel and medical files or
information and any other materials or data relating to a
specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may
7 It is uncontested that the disputed records fall within
the broad definition of the term "public records" set forth in
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.
8 Two amendments to G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, were
enacted during the pendency of this case, neither of which is
relevant to the claims at issue here.

8
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."9 G. L.
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). The inquiry is whether "the public
interest in obtaining information substantially outweighs the
seriousness of any invasion of privacy." Attorney Gen. v.
Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 156 (1979) (Collector of
Lynn). This requires "a balancing between any claimed invasion
of privacy and the interest of the public in disclosure." Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 858
(1995).
When considering the existence of a privacy interest, and
the extent to which it outweighs any public interest, we assess:
"(1) whether disclosure would result in personal embarrassment
to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) whether the
materials sought contain intimate details of a highly personal
nature; and (3) whether the same information is available from
other sources" (footnote omitted). People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources,
477 Mass. 280, 292 (2017). There may also be "case-specific
relevant factors" that contribute to our balancing of the
competing interests. Globe Newspaper Co., 419 Mass. at 858.
9 The parties agree that the question presented in this case
is analyzed under a balancing test, therefore we need not
address the plaintiff's argument that the latest amendment to
the privacy exemption was intended to remove the categorical
exemption of personnel and medical files or information.

9
1. Names and resumes. We conclude that the names and
resumes of the withdrawn candidates fall squarely within the
privacy exemption.10 Each of the withdrawn candidates held
another public position at the time of their application, and
two withdrew, at least in part, to avoid public identification.
While there are cases in which the disclosure of names is not an
unwarranted invasion of privacy, see, e.g., Hastings & Sons
Publ. Co. v. City Treas. of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812, 817-818 (1978)
(requiring disclosure of municipal police officers' names and
payroll records); Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable
County, 443 Mass. 587, 594-595 (2005) (requiring disclosure of
names and addresses of reserve deputy sheriffs); Pottle v.
School Comm. of Braintree, 395 Mass. 861, 866 (1985) (no
invasion of privacy in disclosure of school employees' names and
addresses), this is not one of those cases. Here, the existence
of the names in the meeting minutes (and corresponding
publication of the resumes) communicates to their current
employers that they are actively seeking other employment. See
Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984) ("the same
information about a person, such as his name and address, might
10 The plaintiff specifically concedes that the disclosure
of the resumes would result in the identification of the
withdrawn candidates, even if their names were redacted. And we
agree. Accordingly, we need not address the plaintiff's
contention that resumes are "self-curated promotional material"
that carry no expectation of privacy.

10
be protected from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of
privacy in one context and not in another"). See also Georgiou
v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 67 Mass. App. Ct.
428, 434 (2006) (judge should not discount "the potential
embarrassment or stigma that might attend disclosure"). On
these facts, disclosure of the withdrawn candidates' identities
would no doubt result in "personal embarrassment to an
individual of normal sensibilities." People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc., 477 Mass. at 292. See Torres, 391
Mass. at 9 ("Certainly the expectations of the data subject are
relevant in determining whether disclosure of information might
be an invasion of privacy"). Contrast Somerville v. Supervisor
of Pub. Records of the Commonwealth, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 44
(2025) ("There is nothing in the record here to suggest that
permit holders had a particular expectation of privacy when
transacting business with the city"). The requested information
is also plainly not available from any other source, further
weighing against disclosure. See Pottle, 395 Mass. at 866 (no
privacy interest in school employees' names and addresses where,
among other factors, this information is available from other
sources).
The plaintiff relies largely on Attorney Gen. v. School
Comm. of Northampton, 375 Mass. 127 (1978) (Northampton),
asserting, in essence, that a candidate becomes a "finalist" for

11
a public office at the moment they are recommended by a
screening body for further consideration. He argues that the
mere recommendation triggers mandatory disclosure of the
candidate's identity and credentials due to their diminished
expectation of privacy at that stage. We disagree. In
Northampton, supra at 130, candidates that were considered
"finalists" were discussed at an open meeting by a subsequent
hiring body.11 The court reasoned that "open and public
discussion of [a candidate's] professional competence" is to be
expected when a candidate "reache[s] that level of
consideration," thereby decreasing any privacy interest and
increasing the public interest in disclosure. In contrast, here
the withdrawn candidates were recommended by the screening
committee to the select board, but each then withdrew before
further consideration.12 Gerstein v. Superintendent Search
11 As the plaintiff himself points out, whether the
candidates are considered in an open meeting is not dispositive,
where we review only the issue of the privacy exemption of the
public records law. See Gerstein v. Superintendent Search
Screening Comm., 405 Mass. 465, 474 (1989) ("even though the
screening committee's meetings . . . were open meetings, we
decline to order the disclosure of the identities of those
candidates who were considered only by the screening committee
and not by the school committee"). We note that the plaintiff
has not alleged any violations of the open meeting law.
12 In his brief, the plaintiff contends that the town's
stance here (that the withdrawn candidates were not "finalists"
for the purposes of the privacy exemption) is inconsistent with
the town's statement in its letter to the division of open
government that the screening committee had identified four

12
Screening Comm., 405 Mass. 465, 474 (1989), is instructive.
There, the court "decline[d] to order the disclosure of the
identities of those candidates who were considered only by the
screening committee and not by the school committee." Id.
Gerstein also clarified Northampton, noting, "[w]e suggested in
Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Northampton, . . . that there
are substantial reasons for protecting the identity of
individuals who were candidates only early in the process."
Gerstein, supra.13
We turn next to the public interest in disclosure. It is
well settled that "[t]he public has an interest in knowing
whether public servants are carrying out their duties in an
candidates as "finalists" for recommendation to the select
board. We note that the town's letter to the division of open
government concerned compliance with the open meeting law, an
issue not before us on appeal. Moreover, the label used by a
party is not controlling. Garcia v. Steele, 492 Mass. 322, 330
(2023). See Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 494 Mass. 562, 570 (2024)
(determination of services provided "is not governed by the
label . . . used by the parties to characterize their
relationship").
13 The court also noted that Northampton was decided before
the enactment of G. L. c. 39, § 23B (8), which authorized the
holding of an executive session "[t]o consider and interview
applicants for employment by a preliminary screening committee
. . . if an open meeting will have a detrimental effect in
obtaining qualified applicants," unless the meeting is "to
consider and interview applicants who have passed a prior
preliminary screening." Gerstein, 405 Mass. at 468, quoting
G. L. c. 39, § 23B (8). General Laws c. 39, § 23B (8), is now
codified in G. L. c. 30A, § 21 (a) (8), and slightly reworded in
ways not relevant here.

13
efficient and law-abiding manner." Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass.
at 158. However, beyond this baseline principle, the plaintiff
has not articulated any public interest in disclosure of the
requested records aside from an unsupported allegation that they
might show the town manipulated the process in favor of the
internal candidate. This allegation alone is not sufficient to
outweigh the withdrawn candidates' privacy interests. See
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Pub. Health,
482 Mass. 427, 452 (2019) quoting National Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174, rehearing denied, 541 U.S.
157 (2004) ("Where 'the public interest being asserted is to
show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise
improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester
must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain
disclosure. Rather, the requester must produce evidence that
would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged
[g]overnment impropriety might have occurred'"). In the absence
of a showing that the town has behaved in an inefficient or
unlawful manner in screening applicants, the public interest
does not substantially outweigh the withdrawn candidates'
privacy interests. See George W. Prescott Publ. Co. v. Register
of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 279 (1985) ("the
public has a vital interest in full disclosure of all

14
information which is relevant to . . . alleged misuse of
authority").
2. Contested e-mail. Having reviewed the contested e-mail
in camera, we conclude that the name and e-mail address of the
withdrawn candidate are exempt from disclosure under the privacy
exemption for the reasons set forth above. However, because
"the existence of some exempt information in a document will not
justify cloture as to all of it" and "the right to access
extend[s] to any nonexempt segregable portion of a public
record," we consider the balance of the contested e-mail.
(quotations and citation omitted). Globe Newspaper Co., 419
Mass. at 857-858.
The remaining content of the contested e-mail does not
contain "intimate details" of "a highly personal nature" that
would warrant nondisclosure. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at
157. See id. (public disclosure of tax delinquency lists
results in personal embarrassment but does not amount to
publication of "intimate details" of "a highly personal
nature"). Here, the reason given for withdrawal is generic and
vague and refers to "family considerations"; it does not expose
any personal details that ought to be kept private, and the
redaction of the withdrawn candidate's identity sufficiently
protects any privacy interest. See Globe Newspaper Co., 419
Mass. at 861 (privacy exemption "protects from public scrutiny

15
information that would lead to an unwarranted invasion of
privacy of any person mentioned in the requested materials").
The rest of the contested e-mail, primarily expressing the
withdrawn candidate's gratitude for consideration with no other
identifying or personal details, is not exempt and must be
disclosed.
Conclusion. So much of the judgment as dismissed entirely
the request for disclosure of the contested e-mail is vacated,
and a modified judgment shall enter allowing the request, in
part, and ordering production of the contested e-mail with each
instance of the withdrawn candidate's name and e-mail address
redacted. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.14
So ordered.
By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Shin & Hodgens, JJ.15),
Clerk
Entered: October 15, 2026.
14 We decline both parties' requests for an award of
attorney's fees and costs.
15 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.