LENOX FARMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. MOHAMED KASSEM & another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-907
LENOX FARMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
vs.
MOHAMED KASSEM & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The putative intervener, Sandra Frommer, appeals from an
order of a Housing Court judge denying her renewed motion to
intervene in a summary process case concerning the property that
she asserts she occupies.2 Concluding that Frommer has not shown
that she demonstrated the requirements for intervention, we
affirm.
1 Danny Abouelkhier. Sandra Frommer, putative intervener,
on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son.
2 The motion also requested a protective order and the
removal of a no-trespass order. As we affirm the denial of
intervention, the judge properly did not grant the other relief
requested by Frommer, though of course those requests could be
brought again in an action in which she was a party.

2
1. Standard of review. "An 'interlocutory order denying
intervention as of right under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a), 365
Mass. 769 (1974), is immediately appealable.'" Reznik v.
Garaffo, 466 Mass. 1034, 1035 (2013), quoting Care & Protection
of Richard, 456 Mass. 1002, 1002 (2010). "Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
. . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action," and
the applicant "is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede [the applicant's]
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties." Mass.
R. Civ. P. 24 (a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974). "A judge has
discretion in determining whether an intervening party has
demonstrated facts that entitle him or her to intervention as of
right, and we accordingly review the judge's factual findings
for clear error." Galbi v. Cellco Partnership, 101 Mass. App.
Ct. 260, 262 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. &
Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011). "It is only after the
subsidiary facts have been determined that an appellate court
then determines as a matter of law whether the circumstances are
sufficient to meet the requirements of intervention as of
right." Reilly v. Hopedale, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 384 (2023).

3
2. Application. The judge denied Frommer's original
motion to intervene after a hearing because "the intervenor was
unable to provide any evidence of a tenancy with the Plaintiff,
including the lack of a signed lease, evidence of payment of
rent and/or written communications from the Plaintiff
demonstrating a tenancy agreement." The judge denied the
renewed motion based on the earlier denial.3 Frommer has failed
to provide us with a transcript of the February 18, 2025,
hearing where her original motion to intervene was heard.
Accordingly, we have no way of determining whether she
established an interest relating to the subject of the action,
that a disposition would impair that interest, or that her
motion was timely. "[I]t is an appellant's duty to produce an
appendix containing all portions of the record relevant to the
issues raised on appeal." Lodigiani v. Paré, 103 Mass. App. Ct.
140, 141 n.3 (2023). "That a transcript must be submitted to
support a claim that the evidence was insufficient is not some
hypertechnical requirement, but a reflection of the fact that
resolution of such a claim requires the reviewing court to see
the entirety of the evidence that was presented." Covell v.
Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782 (2003).
3 We assume, with some skepticism, see McGrath v. McGrath,
65 Mass. App. Ct. 670, 672 (2006), that Frommer may appeal the
denial of the renewed motion despite her failure to appeal the
denial of the original motion to intervene.

4
Nothing in the record available to us demonstrates that
Frommer established an entitlement to intervention. Although
she certainly has an interest in her own right to reside in the
property, the judge had no power to evict her from the property
in this Housing Court action in which she was not named. See
21st Mtge. Corp. v. DeMustchine, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 793
(2022).
It is true that, in theory, the judge could have eventually
determined that the defendants' tenancy should be terminated
because of Frommer's unauthorized presence in the apartment. In
fact, he made no such finding and forestalled dismissing the
matter altogether only because of this appeal. Even had he made
such a finding, it would have had no force against Frommer. See
21st Mtge. Corp., 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 793.
Regarding the effect of the disposition of the Housing
Court case against the defendants on Frommer's interests, there
would be none. The plaintiff would have to (and indeed did)
file a separate action to evict Frommer. In that action, the
plaintiff would be entitled to rely only on the judge's findings
on Frommer's motion to intervene, the only proceeding in which
she was a full participant.4 See Ahearn v. Vose, 64 Mass. App.
4 Indeed, that is what appears to have happened. To the
extent the judge in that case overstepped, that may be
adjudicated in the appeal of the preliminary injunction in that
case in 26-P-420.

5
Ct. 403, 415 n.14 (2005). The judge would not be able to rely
on any other factual findings in this case. See Care &
Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 282 (2009). Accordingly,
Frommer has failed to demonstrate that the motion judge erred.5
3. Conclusion. The order dated June 9, 2025, denying
Frommer's renewed motion to intervene and motion to remove no-
trespass order with request for protective order is affirmed.
The appeal from the single justice order entered on October 1,
2025, is dismissed as moot.
So ordered.
By the Court (Desmond,
Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.6),
Clerk
Entered: October 15, 2026.
5 Frommer also filed a notice of appeal from the single
justice's order denying her motion for a stay pending appeal.
Frommer makes no argument about that stay in her brief, but it
is not evident whether she was ever instructed to include
argument concerning that appeal in her brief. See Rule
15.0(b)(2) of the Rules of the Appeals Court, appearing in 97
Mass. App. Ct. 1010 (2020). In any event, the affirmance of the
denial of the renewed motion to intervene makes that appeal
moot. See Vorontsova v. Waronzov, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 23 n.9
(2009).
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.