COLLEEN HALL vs. BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1528
COLLEEN HALL
vs.
BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In 2023, Colleen Hall brought a complaint in the Boston
Municipal Court (BMC) against Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (Bayer), the gravamen of which was a products liability
claim related to her use of an intrauterine device manufactured
by Bayer. That complaint was ultimately dismissed because
Hall's claims were time barred under the statute of limitations.
Hall did not appeal from the dismissal of the complaint; she
only appealed from the denial of her motion for sanctions. The
Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department
(Appellate Division) affirmed the denial of the request for
sanctions. Hall seeks review in this court of that decision.

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After the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
sanctions, Hall filed a motion to correct the record pursuant to
Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019).
A BMC judge denied that motion as untimely. Hall also seeks our
review of that order. We affirm both the Appellate Division's
decision and the order denying the motion to correct the record.
1. Sanctions. In the BMC, Hall sought sanctions to be
imposed against Bayer pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, as
amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 37, as
amended, 423 Mass. 1406 (1996). Those motions were denied, and
the denials were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Hall
claims the Appellate Division "erred" by affirming. We
disagree.
Our review of discovery sanctions is governed by the well-
established abuse of discretion standard. See L.L. v.
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). Where a party
"fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery," a judge
may impose sanctions under Mass. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2), as
amended, 390 Mass. 1208 (1994). A party may be entitled to
expenses based on conduct related to discovery obligations. See
Mass. R. Civ. P. 37 (a) (4), as amended, 417 Mass. 1401 (1994).
Here, as the Appellate Division stated, Hall requested
sanctions against Bayer's counsel for "ongoing
misrepresentations and procedural misconduct . . . and

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obstructive discovery practices." However, Hall failed to
provide any evidence that Bayer intentionally committed
discovery violations, acted in bad faith, or disobeyed a court
order. Instead, she offered objections to certain discovery
requests and to Bayer's responses to her requests, which do not
demonstrate misconduct. In any event, given the convoluted
procedural path this case took, and the fact that the earlier
summary judgment decision was revisited and the case was instead
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, Hall was not
entitled to any discovery.
Hall's claim fares no better under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11,
which we also review for abuse of discretion. See Van Christo
Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 417 (1998). In
pertinent part, Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as appearing in 488
Mass. 1403 (2021), provides that "[t]he signature of any
attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate that the
attorney has read the pleading; that to the best of the
attorney's knowledge, information, and belief there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
A willful violation of the rule may subject an attorney "'to
appropriate disciplinary action,' although the rule is silent as
to the particular disciplinary measures that may be imposed"
(citation omitted). Van Christo Advertising, Inc., supra at
414.

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Hall's arguments in the BMC in support of rule 11 sanctions
were for "ongoing misrepresentations and procedural misconduct
that have caused confusion, delays, and obstructive discovery
practices, resulting in significant prejudice to [Hall]."
However, as the Appellate Division determined, Hall did not
demonstrate that Bayer's counsel made misrepresentations, caused
discovery delays, or engaged in other misconduct.
In the Appellate Division, and here, Hall claims that the
BMC improperly denied the request for sanctions without holding
a hearing, without a written opposition from Bayer,1 and without
findings of fact or a memorandum of decision. Hall claims this
was inconsistent with due process and Mass. R. Civ. P. 78, 365
Mass. 839 (1974). These claims are without merit.
Contrary to Hall's claim, not all requests for rule 11
sanctions will necessitate an evidentiary hearing and detailed
findings. See von Schönau-Riedweg v. Continuum Energy Techs.,
LLC, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 540 (2020). See also Psy-Ed Corp.
v. Klein, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 118 (2004), S.C., 459 Mass. 697
(2011) (rule 11 sanctions imposed without hearing did not
violate due process). The specially assigned BMC judge who
denied the request for sanctions was intimately familiar with
the case, its lengthy procedural history, and the parties. His
1 The BMC ruled on the motion prior to the opposition
deadline.

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summary denial of the motion did not violate due process, rule
78 did not require a hearing to be held,2 and there is no need to
remand the matter as Hall requests.3
2. Motion to correct record. Hall also claims that the
BMC, pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (2), should have corrected
the record to identify the second amended complaint as the
operative complaint. We disagree.
The initial problem with Hall's claim is that she waited to
file this motion until after the Appellate Division affirmed the
denial of her request for sanctions. See Hamed v. Fadili, 408
Mass. 100, 104 (1990) ("It is implicit in [rule 8 (e)] and in
the very nature of the appellate process that any correction to
the record must take place before the appeal has been decided").
Although rule 8 (e) empowers this court to correct the record,
we see little point in doing so where the case has been
2 Rule 78 requires courts to have regular times and places
where motion hearings may be held. It carries no mandate as to
which matters require hearings. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 78.
3 Hall also claims that the Appellate Division failed to
resolve material disputed facts underlying the motion. However,
finding facts and weighing evidence are functions of the trial
court, which do not fall within the appellate office. See
Commonwealth v. Lugo, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 314 (2024).

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dismissed and Hall did not appeal from the order dismissing it.4
The motion to correct the record was properly denied.5,6
Decision and order of
Appellate Division
affirmed.
Order denying motion to
correct record affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Meade &
Hillman, JJ.7),
Clerk
Entered: October 15, 2026.
4 Hall attempts to argue that dismissal was improper, but
that issue is not before us.
5 To the extent that Hall's additional claims rise to the
level of appellate argument, we find nothing in them that
warrants further discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332
Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
6 The parties' requests for attorney's fees are denied.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.