Johnson v. Town of Prosper, Texas, et al.

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

LEONARD JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,
v.

THE TOWN OF PROSPER, TEXAS,
et. al.,

Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-650
Judge Mazzant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Town of Prosper’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #9) .
Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should
be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Prosper, Texas (“the
To w n”), as well as two officials for the Prosper Police Department—Defendants Lieutenant Paul
Boothe and Chief Doug Kowalski (Dkt. #1 at pp. 20–24). The suit arises from events surrounding
Plaintiff ’s investigation, arrest, and indictment for the offense of impersonating a public servant
under T
EX. PENAL CODE § 37.11(a)(1). Plaintiff claims that his Texas Public Information Act
requests using a pseudonym and email address, and his subsequent email correspondence with
To w n officials on matters of public concern, prompted his alleged retaliatory arrest (Dkt. #1
at ¶ 140).
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This Court’s Order on a related Motion to Dismiss by Co-Defendants Boothe and Kowalski details Plaintiff ’s
investigation, arrest, and indictment more thoroughly (See Dkt. #25). Accordingly, this Order will focus on facts
uniquely pertaining to the Town.
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According to the Complaint, the full To w n Council met as a body and directed Defendant
Kowalski to investigate the identity of the individual behind the pseudonymous email account (Dkt.
#1 at ¶ 38). Plaintiff contends that this directive constituted official municipal policy and was
undertaken to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights (Dkt. #1 at
¶ 138). He further alleges that the Town ratified Plaintiff ’s subsequent investigation and arrest,
which he asserts occurred without probable cause (Dkt. #1 at ¶ ¶ 139–40).
The Town disputes Plaintiff ’s characterization of the events, asserting that the
investigation was not initiated by the full Town Council but rather by a single councilmember, Jeff
Hodges, who expressed concern that someone misused his name to request public information
(Dkt. #9 at p. 3; see Dkt. #8-5 at p. 3). The Town further argues that Plaintiff ’s Complaint does not
include any additional factual allegations concerning the Town’s policymaking conduct beyond
those contained in Paragraph 38 (Dkt. #9 at p. 4; see Dkt. #1 at ¶ 38). Plaintiff ’s remaining assertions
regarding municipal liability, in the Town’s view, are conclusory in nature (Dkt. #9 at p. 6).
On September 19, 2023, the Town filed its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #9). On October 24,
2023, Plaintiff filed its Consolidated Response in Opposition (Dkt. #16) to this and a related Motion
(See Dkt. #8). The Court now considers whether Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim for relief
against the Town under Rule 12(b)(6) in view of the applicable municipal liability standards.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short
and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” F
ED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each
claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
plaintiff ’s complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City
of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the
complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ʻshow[n]’—ʻthat the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting F
ED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and
disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine
if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ʻsimply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or
elements.’” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This
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evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ʻstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
ANALYSIS
After reviewing Plaintiff ’s Complaint and the arguments presented in the briefs, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, dismissal
is unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Town of Prosper’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #9)
is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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