KIM et al v. PIERRE et al

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SENG LONG KIM, : CIVIL ACTION
et al., :
Plaintiffs, :
:
v. :
:
JOHNY M. PIERRE , : No. 25-cv-141
et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. August 17, 2026
The instant case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Interstate 95 (“I-
95”) in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs bring claims for negligence stemming
from injuries Plaintiffs each sustained in the crash. Id. Presently before the Court is Defendants
Johny Pierre and Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (the “Motion”). ECF No. 79.
1
For the reasons discussed below, the Motion (ECF No.
79) will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1
Also before the Court is Defendants’ unopposed Motion to Amend/Correct the Memorandum of
Law filed in support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 93. The Motion to
Amend/Correct (ECF No. 93) seeks to amend/correct typographical errors in the Memorandum of
Law filed at ECF No. 79-1. Id. at 1. Specifically, Defendants’ original Memorandum of Law was
erroneously titled “Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Independent Medical Examinations, Follow-Up Depositions, and Trial Date.” Id.; ECF No. 79-1
at 1. In addition, the Memorandum of Law featured paragraph numbering in Part II, “Standard of
Review.” ECF No. 93 at 1; ECF No. 79-1 at 3–4. For obvious reasons, neither of these
typographical errors altered the substance of Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, as they
themselves conclude. See ECF No. 93 at 1 (“This memorandum simply corrects two typographical
errors and does not change the substance of the Motion in any way.”). Apart from these
typographical errors, the Memoranda are identical. The Court had already considered Defendants’
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment at the time the Motion to Amend/Correct had been filed.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Amend/Correct (ECF No. 93) is denied as moot.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On January 9, 2025, Plaintiffs Seng Long Kim, Srey Pov Art, and Som Art Hy
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated the above-captioned action by filing a Complaint against
Defendants Johny M. Pierre (“Mr. Pierre”), Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC, Star
Laundry, Inc., Clean World Laundry Corp., Star Logistics Services, LLC, and Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc.
2
ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint sets forth tort claims for reckless and negligent conduct
and loss of consortium stemming from a motor vehicle accident that took place on Interstate-95
South, on September 20, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 19–26, 37–44.
On May 28, 2026, Mr. Pierre and Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC (hereinafter
“Defendants”) filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 56. ECF No. 79. The same day, Defendants filed a Motion to Preclude the
Expert Testimony of Keith A. Bergman, P.E. ECF No. 81. The Court granted in part and denied
in part Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Bergman.
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ECF No. 99.
The Parties have fully briefed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 79,
83, 85–86.
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The motion will be decided on the basis of the Parties’ submissions without oral
argument.

2
Plaintiffs also named John/Jane Does 1–5 and ABC/123 Corporations 1–5, representing
unidentified individual and corporate defendants, as Defendants to this action. ECF No. 1 at 4.
Since filing the Complaint, the Parties have stipulated to dismissal of Defendant Ryder on June
23, 2025. ECF No. 44.

3
The Court excluded his legal conclusions but permitted his other testimony regarding Mr. Pierre’s
perception of the road based on the speed he was traveling. See id.; see also ECF No. 98.

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Supra note 1.
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B. Factual Background
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1. Mr. Pierre’s Employment with Star Logistics
Mr. Pierre began working for Star Logistics and Hospitality Services LLC in 2023.
6
ECF
No. 86-1 at 6–7.
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Initially, Mr. Pierre worked in the “inside” doing washing, ironing, and
“pull[ing]” sheets. Id. After some time, he moved from “inside” to working on the trucks. Id. at
8. Once Mr. Pierre began working on the trucks, he was given special training, including training
on how to operate the commercial trucks when approaching an accident or emergency-response
scene. ECF No. 83-2 ¶ 16; ECF No. 86-1 at 8–9, 45–46. The parties otherwise contest the factual

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The following facts are taken from Defendants’ Proposed Material Facts (ECF No. 79-3) and
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Proposed Material Facts (ECF No. 83-1) to the extent those
facts are well-supported by pinpoint citations to the record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1); see also
Ullrich v. U.S. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 457 F. App’x 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Rule 56 explicitly
requires the party asserting the absence or existence of a genuinely disputed fact to support that
assertion by citing to specific parts of the record.” (citing F
ED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1))). Where either
Party has denied a fact but has failed to properly dispute that fact, the Court has deemed that fact
undisputed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact
or fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion
of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
the motion[.]”)

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While Plaintiffs make passing references to Defendants’ previous, inconsistent responses
regarding Mr. Pierre’s employer during discovery, see ECF No. 83-3 at 1–2 n.1 (“Mr. Pierre claims
he was ‘employed by Star Laundry’ in his answers to Interrogatories and Mr. Pillot, Star Laundry’s
corporate designee, testified to the same”), and that Plaintiffs have been unable to discovery the
asset information or corporate structure of the defendant entities, see id. (“Plaintiffs have been
unable to obtain the appropriate asset or wage information to gather more evidence regarding Mr.
Pierre’s proper employer for purposes of this matter at this Honorable Court held in an Order dated
January 29, 2026 that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the asset information until the issue regarding
punitive damages is decided on summary judgment.”), there is no dispute over who employed Mr.
Pierre at the time of the motor vehicle accident. That is, the Parties do not dispute that Star
Logistics and Hospitality Services LLC was Mr. Pierre’s employer at the time of the accident.
ECF No. 79-1 at 1 n.1; ECF No. 79-3 ¶ 3; ECF No. 83-1 ¶ 3. Further, Star Logistics and Hospitality
Services, LLC has provided Mr. Pierre’s W-2 to demonstrate that he was their employee at the
time of the accident. ECF No. 85-17 at 2. Accordingly, the Court will refer to Star Logistics and
Hospitality Services, LLC as Mr. Pierre’s employer.

7
Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF headers.
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circumstances surrounding Mr. Pierre’s hiring and employment. See, e.g., ECF No. 83-1 ¶11; 83-
2 ¶ 17.
2. The Motor Vehicle Accident
On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff Seng Long Kim was driving southbound on I-95 in
Bensalem, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 80 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs Srey Pov Art and Som Art Hy were
passengers in Kim’s vehicle. Id. Also on the road was Mr. Pierre, who was driving a commercial
motor vehicle. Id. ¶ 1; ECF No. 79-3 ¶ 3.
Prior to the accident, Mr. Pierre’s vehicle was approaching an emergency response scene
on the southbound lanes of I-95 due to an unrelated motor vehicle accident. ECF No. 83-1 ¶ 4.
Traffic was stopped for approximately thirty (30) minutes due to an unrelated motor vehicle
accident that had occurred approximately a quarter of a mile south. ECF No. 83-1 ¶ 5; 83-5 at 37,
49, 55. So, hazard and safety warnings, including brake and emergency lights, first responders,
and stopped vehicles, were visible. Id. Immediately prior to the collision, Mr. Pierre was reaching
to secure an unfastened water bottle in the vehicle. ECF No. 83-1 ¶ 6. At some point, Mr. Pierre,
driving the commercial vehicle, struck the rear of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. There is no evidence that
Mr. Pierre was using his cellphone at the time of the accident. ECF No. 80 ¶ 3. Mr. Pierre was
travelling at approximately forty-five miles per hour. ECF No. 83-5 at 3.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact[,] ” and that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
F
ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

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Plaintiffs point to Defendants’ answer to Interrogatories in which Mr. Pierre stated that he “is not
exactly sure [how fast he was going] but recalls traveling about 45 mph prior to the accident.”
ECF No. 83-5 at 3.
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governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party[,]” there exists a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. The most important question for a court to consider is “whether a fair-
minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.” Id. at
252. It is the responsibility of the moving party to inform the district court of the evidence that
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986).
In evaluating the evidence, “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in . . . favor” of the
nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant cannot rely on unsupported
allegations but must “provide some evidence” which shows that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). If the entire record “could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” the court should grant summary
judgment, as “there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ECF No.
79. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages in its entirety and
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ direct claim of negligence and recklessness against Star Logistics and
Hospitality Services, LLC. Id. at 2. Defendants argue that no reasonable fact finder could award
punitive damages on the basis that Mr. Pierre acted or failed to act with conscious disregard of the
risk of colliding with Plaintiffs. ECF No. 79 at 8; ECF No. 79-1 at 13. Defendants further argue
that Plaintiffs’ direct claims of negligence and recklessness against Star Logistics and Hospitality
Services, LLC should be dismissed as a duplicative claim because it has conceded that Mr. Pierre
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was their employee at the time of the accident, and because Plaintiffs cannot sustain a punitive
damages claim against it. ECF No. 79-1 at 10–13.
A. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Punitive
Damages Claim Will Be Denied
First, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages
against Mr. Pierre. ECF No. 79-1 at 4–9. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not marshalled
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder, presented with all the evidence, could
award punitive damages against Mr. Pierre because Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient facts
that support their claim that Mr. Pierre’s actions or inactions were reckless. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiffs
oppose, arguing that to the contrary, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Mr. Pierre’s
state of mind at the time of the accident, and that there are facts from which a reasonable fact finder
could determine that Mr. Pierre subjectively appreciated and consciously disregarded the risk of
harm to the public associated with his conduct. ECF No. 83-3 at 5–20.
The Court’s analysis begins with the applicable caselaw. In Pennsylvania, punitive
damages are awarded “to punish a tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or others like
him from similar conduct.”
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Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005).
Accordingly, punitive damages are only available to punish tortfeasors who act with “evil motive
or [with] reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Id. (quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742,
747 (Pa. 1984)).
An award of punitive damages where the Plaintiff maintains that the defendant has acted
recklessly is proper where the plaintiff has marshalled evidence “sufficient to establish that (1) a
defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and

9
Pennsylvania state law governs the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims. See
Wright v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 439, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“State law governs the
legal standard for punitive damages”).
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that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.” Id. at
772 (citing Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1097–98 (Pa. 1985)) (emphasis
added). The risk of harm must be “substantially greater than that which is necessary to make [the
defendant’s] conduct negligent.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005) (citing
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 771). As relevant here, “[t]he defendant’s subjective
appreciation and conscious disregard . . . can be proved by circumstantial evidence[,] ” including
the defendant’s training or experience, regardless if the defendant admits knowledge of a danger.
Livingston v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 208 A.3d 1122, 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019); see Burke v.
TransAm Trucking, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 647, 655 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that “[i]t would not
be unreasonable for a jury to find that [defendant], with his experience and training, consciously
appreciated the risk of harm from driving fifty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour
zone around a curve and consciously disregarded or was indifferent to that risk”). But merely
demonstrating that the defendant generally understood a risk or had knowledge of similar past
risks is itself insufficient to raise a question of fact in favor of punitive damages. See Shipman v.
Aquatherm L.P., No. 17-5416, 2020 WL 1984903, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020) (finding that “[a]
defendant’s mere knowledge of other accidents . . . is insufficient to support a claim for punitive
damages” (quoting Dyvex Indus., Inc. v. Agilex Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., No. 12-CV-0979,
2018 WL 827518, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Calhoun v. Van Loon, No. 12-CV-458, 2014 WL 3428876, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2014) (finding
that evidence that a defendant “had been involved, and has continued to be involved . . . in several
accidents, and that [defendant] knew he broke the company rules” was “insufficient to raise a
question of fact as to whether [defendant] acted outrageously and in conscious disregard of the
risks of his conduct”).
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1. Summary Judgment Will Be Denied as to Plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages
Claim Against Mr. Pierre
First, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ punitive
damages claim against Mr. Pierre individually. ECF No. 79-1 at 4–9. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs cannot sufficiently support their proposition that Mr. Pierre had the requisite subjective
awareness of the risk of collision and that he consciously disregarded that risk when he acted or
failed to act in relation to his collision with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. at 6–9.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Pierre was subjectively aware of the risk of harm
to Plaintiffs and the public from distracted driving and that he consciously disregarded the risk.
ECF No. 83-3 at 5–8. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Pierre’s subjective appreciation of the risk of harm
can be inferred from his experience and training. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs point to numerous pieces of
evidence in the record that support an award of punitive damages against Mr. Pierre, including his
own deposition testimony and deposition testimony of Star Logistics and Hospitality Services,
LLC’s corporate designee, Michael Pillot, regarding the nature of Mr. Pierre’s training and past
experience driving trucks like the one he was driving at the time of the accident and that Mr. Pierre
was “specifically instructed” on the dangers of distracted driving, following too closely, and
reacting to emergency vehicles. Id. at 8–11. Plaintiffs also argue that Mr. Pierre consciously
disregarded the risks of distracted driving. Plaintiffs specifically argue that Mr. Pierre’s conduct
constituted “prolonged conscious inaction in the face of escalating and unmistakable danger[.]”
Id. at 5.
Upon a diligent review of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have marshalled
sufficient evidence supporting Mr. Pierre’s subjective awareness of the significant risk that his
driving posed to Plaintiffs (and other motorists) and his conscious disregard of that risk.
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First, Plaintiffs have gathered sufficient evidence that Mr. Pierre had subjective awareness
of the risk of his driving. The record demonstrates that Mr. Pierre was experienced and trained by
his employer on how to drive the kind of vehicle he was operating. ECF No. 83-2 ¶ 16; ECF No.
86-1 at 8–9, 45–46. Specifically, Mr. Pierre testified during his deposition that he had several
years of experience driving “big box trucks,” ECF No. 86-1 at 6, before he began working at Star
Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC. Id. at 6–7. Mr. Pierre testified that he was trained on
“how” to drive the trucks he would be driving for Star Logistics and Hospitality, LLC. Id. at 9.
This included written materials as well as in-person instruction. See id. Mr. Pierre testified that
he had driven the same “kind” of truck that he was driving on the day of the accident. Id. Mr.
Pierre’s testimony also suggests that he understands that the actions he took were dangerous. ECF
No. 83-3 at 6–7, 15 (acknowledging that operating the vehicle distracted and with a loose water
bottle was dangerous); ECF No. 86 at 4 (calling his conduct reckless when shown video footage
of the accident). While his exact speed is disputed, Mr. Pierre was driving approximately forty-
five mph while approaching an emergency-response area when he remembers reaching for the
bottle of water. ECF No. 79-5 at 2; ECF No. 83-2 at 3, 7 (claiming that Mr. Pierre was speeding
ten mph over the speed limit); ECF No. 85 at 6 (claiming that he remembers travelling around
forty-five mph, ten mph below the speed limit).
Moreover, the expert testimony of Keith A. Bergman that Mr. Pierre had time to perceive
the conditions on the road ahead of him could be credited to find that Mr. Pierre subjectively
perceived the risk of his driving. ECF No. 81-4 at 27. Bergman opines in his expert report that
Mr. Pierre’s driving was inattentive. See id. Bergman further opines that Mr. Pierre had sufficient
time to observe the traffic ahead but still collided with Plaintiffs while traveling at a speed of 45
miles per hour. See id. This evidence, if credited by a jury, supports a finding that Mr. Pierre was
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aware of the risk of harm that his driving created by driving at high speeds and not coming to a
stop.
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Next, Plaintiffs have gathered sufficient evidence that Mr. Pierre consciously disregarded
that risk. There is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could determine that
Mr. Pierre acted or failed to act in conscious disregard of the known risk of colliding with
Plaintiffs’ vehicle due to (1) his speed, (2) his conduct in relation to reaching for the water bottle,
(3) his proximity to emergency vehicles and stopped traffic, and (4) his previous experience and
training as a commercial truck driver. See Burke, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (finding that a reasonable
jury may find defendant-employee’s “conduct was in conscious disregard to known risks” based
on his training and experience as a truck driver and the fact that he was travelling fifty-five mph
(twenty mph above the speed limit) around a curve).
The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that Mr. Pierre was required to take deliberate
acts and that an inquiry into Mr. Pierre’s state of mind is inherently insufficient. Punitive damages
are not reserved for only “evil motive[s],” but may be awarded where the defendant has acted
recklessly, or, where there have been deliberate acts or a “fail[ure] to act, as the case may be, in
conscious disregard of that risk.” Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 770, 772 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). This is a case about distracted driving. The driver’s failure to apply the
brakes, to look at the roadway, etc., are all “fail[ures] to act.” Id. at 772 (citation omitted).

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The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that finding a jury question as to Mr. Pierre’s state of
mind here means that every plaintiff bringing a negligence claim stemming for motor vehicle
accident will prevail at summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages on this basis. ECF
No. 85 at 3–4. Of course, the Court’s determination that a jury question exists is specific to the
facts of this case. As discussed, the record contains evidence that Mr. Pierre had sufficient time
to perceive the stopped traffic and emergency vehicles ahead of him. See, e.g., ECF No. 81-4 at
27. Accordingly, in determining whether Mr. Pierre acted recklessly, an inquiry into his state of
mind as the driver of the vehicle that initiated the motor vehicle accident, is required to determine
the issue of punitive damages.
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Evidence that tends to show Mr. Pierre’s awareness of his surroundings prior to and during the
accident, ECF No. 83-5 at 37, his awareness of how to operate the truck he was driving, ECF No.
86-1 at 8–9, 45–46, his experience driving the truck before, Id. at 12, and the testimony that he had
ample time to see the traffic ahead of him but nonetheless collided with Plaintiffs vehicle at 45
mph, ECF No. 81-4 at 27, could be credited by a jury as evidence that Mr. Pierre disregarded the
risk of distracted driving a commercial truck on a highway while traveling at moderate speeds.
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied in
part as to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against Defendant Mr. Pierre. Accordingly, the issue
of whether punitive damages may be awarded to Plaintiffs for Mr. Pierre’s conduct will proceed
to trial.
2. Summary Judgment Will Be Denied as to Plaintiffs’ Claim Against Star
Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC’s for Vicarious Liability
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim
for punitive damages against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC on the basis that
Plaintiffs cannot sustain a punitive damages claim against Mr. Pierre.
Under Pennsylvania law, “[p] unitive damages may be awarded on the basis of vicarious
liability.” Burke, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (quoting Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1240 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, “an employer may be
vicariously liable for the reckless conduct of an employee without proof that the employer’s
conduct also satisfies the standard for punitive damages.” Fields v. Lebert, No. 24-447, 2025 WL
2404247, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2025) (citing Livingston, 208 A.3d at 1132). Where the record
is sufficient such that the defendant-employee’s conduct supports an award of punitive damages,
the defendant-employer’s vicarious liability for employee’s conduct is also a question for the jury.
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Id. In other words, the availability of punitive damages for the acts of the employer is dependent
on the availability of punitive damages for the acts of the employee.
Here, the Court has denied summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim
against Mr. Pierre. Supra Part (IV)(A)(1). It is undisputed that Mr. Pierre was operating the motor
vehicle that collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle in the course and scope of his employment for Star
Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC. ECF No. 85 at 21. So, Plaintiffs may proceed with a
theory of vicarious liability against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC for punitive
damages on the basis of Mr. Pierre’s conduct. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against Star Logistics and Hospitality
Services, LLC under a theory of vicarious liability theory must also be denied. See Fields, 2025
WL 2404247, at *5. The claim will proceed to trial.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Direct Claims of
Negligence and Recklessness Against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services,
LLC Will Be Granted
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ direct claims of negligence
and punitive damages against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC. ECF No. 79-1 at 10.
Plaintiffs have brought claims for negligence and recklessness against Star Logistics and
Hospitality Services, LLC for negligently, carelessly, and recklessly hiring, training, supervising,
and entrustment of Defendant Pierre. ECF No. 1. ¶¶ 12, 21.
As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot maintain claims for corporate negligence against a
defendant-employer if the plaintiff has asserted a claim against the same defendant on the theory
of vicarious liability and that defendant-employer has admitted to an agency relationship with the
employee at the time of the accident. Fields, 2025 WL 2404247, at *5 (citing Sterner v. Titus
Transp., LP, No. 10-2027, 2013 WL 6506591, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2013)). “The rationale
is that the employer’s liability is a derivative claim fixed by a determination of the employee’s
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negligence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is an exception to this rule,
however, which allows a plaintiff to maintain both vicarious and direct liability claims against the
same defendant when a plaintiff has “a viable claim for punitive damages against the
supervisor/employer defendant.” Id. at *6 (quoting Sterner, 2013 WL 6506591, at *3) (collecting
cases). Punitive damages claims, however, may only proceed against the employer where a jury
can conclude that the employer had an appreciation of the risk that defendant would engage in the
specific conduct he or she did. ECF No. 79 at 11; Felkner v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 13-2189,
2014 WL 1013474, at *5 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2014) (finding that “the salient issue is whether
[defendant-employer] had an appreciation of the risk that the [defendant-employee] would engage
in the specific conduct that occurred” (emphasis added)). For example, “[i]n determining if
punitive damages could be brought against [a] trucking company for negligent supervision, the
[Burke] [c]ourt looked to see if the trucking company had a subjective appreciation of the risk that
the driver would speed, which was the danger the plaintiff had been faced with” in that case. Id.
(citing Burke, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 656).
Applying that principle here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not gathered sufficient
evidence to support a punitive damages claim against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services,
LLC’s based on the entity’s own “reckless” conduct. Plaintiffs submit that Star Logistics and
Hospitality Services, LLC operated in noncompliance with mandatory federal and state laws and
regulations, including the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) and the New
Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (“NJMVC”). ECF No. 83-3 at 22–25. But even assuming that
Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC violated the regulations that Plaintiffs claim they did
by failing to verify and maintain various records, these failures are unrelated to Mr. Pierre’s alleged
failure to drive safely. Plaintiffs argue that these hiring and record-keeping regulations generally
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protect the public by, for example, informing employers of the driver’s felon status. ECF No. 83-
3 at 23. But Plaintiffs have not claimed that Mr. Pierre is a felon. So, Star Logistics and Hospitality
Services, LLC’s alleged violations of the FMSCA and the NJMVC are not sufficiently related to
the specific conduct which caused the accident.
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Thus, Plaintiffs do not have a viable claim for punitive damages against Star Logistics and
Hospitality Services, LLC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not bring a direct claim for negligence
against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC. Plaintiffs’ direct claims for negligence and
recklessness against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC are dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 79) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 79) is
GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ direct claims of negligence and punitive damages as to Star Logistics
and Hospitality Services, LLC. Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages will proceed to trial against
Mr. Pierre and against Star Logistics and Hospitality Services, LLC on the basis of vicarious
liability. An appropriate Order will follow.

11
Plaintiffs argue that motions for summary judgment are frequently denied when defendant-
employers operate in violation of numerous regulations or with inadequate training programs.
ECF No. 83-1 at 22. But those cases involve situations where noncompliance was closely related
to the risk to which plaintiffs were actually exposed, and are thus distinct from the present case,
where the alleged violations are insufficiently linked to Mr. Pierre’s distracted driving. See Fields,
2025 WL 2404247, at *6–7 (finding that a jury may determine defendant-employer acted
recklessly where defendant-employee received no training on how to back-up a tractor-trailer,
which was the specific cause of the accident); Stemrich v. Zabiyaka, No. 12-CV-1409, 2014 WL
670919, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2014) (denying summary judgment where defendant-employer,
in violation of numerous regulations, failed to verify defendant-employee’s application, which
excluded numerous existing accidents and violations, and failed to audit his driving logs, which
included fraudulent statements about his hours logged, both of which were designed to maintain
safety on roads and related to the accident); Esteras v. TRW, Inc., No. CV-03-1906, 2006 WL
2474049, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2006) (denying summary judgment where defendant-
employer failed to maintain the truck defendant-employee drove, and “the cause of the accident
[was] the rusted, corroded and otherwise worn drag link and a lack of grease in the joint”).
Case 2:25-cv-00141-CFK Document 107 Filed 08/17/26 Page 14 of 15

15

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE

Case 2:25-cv-00141-CFK Document 107 Filed 08/17/26 Page 15 of 15