United States of America v. Brown et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Case Number 92-81127
Honorable David M. Lawson
v.

JOHN GORDON,

Defendant.
___________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR BO
ND
This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion for bond. In December of 2023,
the Court resentenced the defendant, along with several of his co-defendants, pursuant to the First
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. The Court entered an amended judgment
reducing the defendant’s sentence to 240 months on Counts 1 and 10 of the indictment, to be served
concurrently, and 60 months on Count 11, to be served consecutively. Although the government
appealed the Court’s amended judgment, it did not seek to stay the decision, and the defendant
was released from prison upon the completion of the reduced custodial term. By all accounts, he
has adjusted well on supervision and, despite health challenges, has led a productive life. On
October 14, 2025 — nearly three years after the defendant’s release — the Sixth Circuit vacated
the defendant’s sentence and remanded so that this Court could explain the application of the
sentencing-package doctrine to the defendant’s sentence. The defendant has moved for bond for
the duration of those proceedings. The government was able to file a timely response opposing
the motion, to which the defendant replied. The motion now is fully briefed, and oral argument
will not assist in its resolution. The Court will decide the motions on the papers submitted. E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
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The government challenges this Court’s authority to grant bond in the circumstances of
this case. However, the Court has vetted that issue when granting bond to Gordon’s co-defendant
and is satisfied that it has the authority to consider Gordon’s request. With his health history,
Gordon’s circumstances are perhaps even more compelling than Brown’s, and the relevant factors
overwhelmingly favor granting the defendant’s motion.
I.
In 1995, John Gordon was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine and cocaine base (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He
also was charged with intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), and the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). These crimes were committed during
Gordon’s participation in a violent drug trafficking organization, the “Best Friends” gang, which
began operating in the mid-1980s and was responsible for at least eight homicides.
A jury convicted him at trial on all counts. Consistent with the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines, this Court’s predecessor sentenced the defendant to concurrent life terms on the drug
and intentional killing charges along with a 60-month sentence on the firearm charge. ECF No.
1368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s sentence on appeal. United States v. Polk et al.,
182 F.3d 919, 1999 WL 397922, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999).
Gordon filed multiple post-conviction motions for relief from his life sentence. One of
them, which invoked the First Step Act of 2018, was denied by Judge Cohn after he concluded
that because Gordon’s sentencing guideline range was calculated under the intentional killing
section, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, he was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act. The court of
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appeals reversed, holding that Gordon was categorically eligible for a sentence reduction on his
drug conspiracy conviction on Count 1.
After remand, the Court reviewed arguments from Gordon and three other co-defendants.
On July 20, 2022, the Court granted Gordon’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step
Act of 2018 and scheduled the case for a plenary resentencing hearing. See United States v. Dale,
No. 92-81127, 2022 WL 2841474, at *11 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2022). The government took no
issue with that ruling at the time.
On December 1, 2022, the Court held a resentencing hearing and resentenced Gordon to
240 months in custody on Counts 1 and 10 of the indictment, to be served concurrently. It also
sentenced Gordon to a consecutive 60-month term on Count 11. Resentencing Tr., ECF No. 2572,
PageID.20873. (The Court incorrectly referred on the record to Count 10 as Count 8 and Count 11
as Count 9 during the hearing; a similar error appeared in type, and was corrected by hand, in the
amended original judgment.). During the resentencing hearing, the government moved the Court
to “stay its order granting Mr. Gordon’s motion for a period of 30 days.” Id. at PageID.20875.
The Court temporarily stayed entry of the judgment and directed the government to file a written
motion by December 5, 2022 if it wanted to pursue a stay. No such motion was filed; instead, the
government filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider Gordon’s sentence and sentence him to
time served. Gordon filed a response opposing the motion. The motion for reconsideration was
denied on December 12, 2022. ECF No. 2583.
On October 14, 2025, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Court’s resentencing decision and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision explaining the application of the
sentencing-package doctrine in First Step Act cases. See United States v. Dale, 156 F.4th 757 (6th
Cir. 2025). The court of appeals did not, as the government argues, reinstate the original life-
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sentence judgment or order that the defendants be returned to prison. Instead, the appellate court
made clear that “a district court has the discretion to reduce a sentence imposed for a non-covered
offense when it is part of a sentencing package with a covered offense.” Id. at 767. And in
applying the doctrine, “[t]he operative question is whether there is reason to think that, at the time
of sentencing, the two sentences were interdependent.” Id. at 769 (quoting United States v. Curtis,
66 F.4th 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2023)). After determining that the doctrine applied, the Sixth Circuit
remanded so that this Court could “fully address whether the sentencing-package doctrine truly
applies here.” Id. at 773.
II.
In the motion presently pending before the Court, the defendant asks to remain out of
custody on a bond while the Court decides the issues on remand. The defendant emphasizes that
he is likely entitled to a reduced sentence, as the Court previously concluded, given that his covered
and noncovered offenses were grouped at sentencing. The defendant also maintains that a bond
would preserve the status quo, since he has resided productively in the community since his
December 2022 release from custody, and continued release under supervision would avoid
unnecessary reincarceration in the event the Court resolves his § 404 claim in his favor.
The government filed a response opposing the motion for bond arguing that (1) the “effect”
of the appellate ruling vacating the amended judgment was “reinstatement” of the “lawfully
imposed” term of life imprisonment, and (2) post-judgment release on bond is “not available” for
prisoners under a lawful judgment of sentence, but instead is allowable only where the defendant
has sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the defendant here has not done. The
government further argues that the Court’s recent decision granting a motion for bond by Gordon’s
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co-defendant, to which the government failed to file a response, relied on inapplicable legal
authority and misconstrued governing case law.
III.
The circumstances here are admittedly unique. The Sixth Circuit’s decision vacated the
Court’s sentence imposed at the re-sentencing proceeding, and because the Court sentenced the
defendant to a term of months that he had served already and the government did not seek a stay,
the defendant was released from custody during the pendency of the government’s appeal. It is
not obvious which provision of the United States code governs the defendant’s request for bond
now that the court of appeals has vacated the resentencing decision. The government says that
none of them applies. But one possibility is section 3143 of Title 18 because the defendant now
stands in the position of an individual convicted of a crime whose sentence is contested. That
section sets out differing standards for individuals who have been found guilty and are “awaiting
imposition or execution of sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), (2), and individuals who have been
“sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who ha[ve] filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of
certiorari,” id. § 3143(b).
Under the former subsection, detention is mandatory for individuals like the defendant who
were convicted of certain offenses, including those punishable by a possible life term, unless the
Court “finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted”
or the government recommends no term of incarceration. Id. § 3143(a)(2). The Court also must
find “by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any
other person or the community.” Id. § 3143(a)(2)(B). At least one court in this circuit has adopted
the position that subsection (a) of section 3143 applies to defendants awaiting resentencing. See
United States v. Ednie, No. 15-133, 2017 WL 6503401, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2017).
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However, other courts have expressed doubt that subsection (a) supplies the appropriate
standard. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, explained that subsection (a) applies “to the situation
where a defendant is awaiting sentencing the first time, and does not apply where the defendant is
awaiting resentencing not because there was an infirmity in the original sentence but because the
vacation of a concurrent sentence might lead the sentencing judge to reconsider a sentence not
vacated.” United States v. Holzer, 848 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit has adopted
the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and extended it one step further, holding that subsection (b)
of the statute is “a far better fit” for a defendant awaiting resentencing with no presently pending
appeal. United States v. Olis, 450 F.3d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Edkins v. United States,
No. 13-14421, 2015 WL 871587, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2015) (adopting Olis’s holding that
§ 3143(b) “appl[ies] to defendants . . . who are awaiting resentencing but whose convictions have
been affirmed.”).
Under that subsection, detention is mandatory unless the Court finds by “clear and
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other
person or the community if released” and they have an appeal that “is not for the purpose of delay
and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in” reversal, a new trial, a sentence
that does not include imprisonment, or a term of imprisonment less than the total time already
served “plus the expected duration of the appeal process.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(iv).
This Court joins those courts that have concluded that subsection (b) supplies the applicable
standard under the circumstances but for a slightly different rationale. Courts that have expressed
concerns about applying subsection (a) have explained that the provision embodies a slightly more
lenient standard, driven by the reality that a sentence may be modest or a defendant “needs some
time to get his affairs in order.” Holzer, 848 F.2d at 824. However, that justification has less force
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“where the defendant’s conviction has been upheld and a sentence . . . remanded solely to give the
judge a chance to consider a possible” reduction since “[b]reaking a sentence in the middle does
not promote any end other than reducing the effective penalty by allowing a holiday or, worse,
providing an opportunity to escape.” United States v. Krilich, 178 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1999),
as amended (June 1, 1999) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
As with defendant Brown, this rationale is not a perfect fit for a defendant like Mr. Gordon,
who was convicted of an offense triggering section (a)(2)’s heightened requirements and already
has been released from custody on a resentencing that later was vacated (but not reversed) by the
court of appeals. For such defendants, subsection (b)’s requirements are better suited to serve the
twin purposes of protecting the public and allowing the defendant the opportunity to vet fully his
arguments for relief.
Even if there were doubt that section 3143(b) authorizes a bond here, the Court has the
“inherent authority” to grant a bond under the circumstances. Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 526,
n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that a district court may grant a habeas petitioner bail while it
considers the petition); Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing In re
Wainwright, 518 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)).
In the habeas context, courts have held that a petitioner must show that: (1) the section
2255 motion presents a “substantial claim of law based on the facts surrounding the petition”; and
(2) circumstances which make the motion “exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the
interests of justice.” Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Aronson v. May,
85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (Harlan, J., in chambers)). Of course, the power to release a petitioner on
bond should be exercised sparingly. Ibid. “There will be few occasions where a prisoner will
meet this standard.” Ibid.; see also Wingo v. United States, 341 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Because a habeas petitioner “is appealing a presumptively valid . . . conviction, . . . it will indeed
be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to [bond] prior to a decision on the
merits in the habeas case.” Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993).
It is true that the defendant is seeking relief under section 404 of the First Step Act rather
than through a habeas petition, but the Court does not see any reason its inherent authority to grant
a bond during the pendency of its decision is diminished in this context. As discussed below, the
defendant has presented a substantial claim of law that he is entitled to resentencing. Moreover,
the prospect of the defendant’s return to custody after nearly three years of successful reintegration
to the community presents an exceptional circumstance militating in favor of bond. By all
accounts, the defendant has demonstrated model behavior while on supervised release.
The relevant factors prescribed by section 3143(b) weigh in favor of a bond while the
proceedings on remand play out. First, there is clear evidence that convinces the Court that Gordon
will not flee or pose a danger to the community. The assigned probation officer has conveyed to
the Court his resounding endorsement of Gordon’s compliance and reintegration with the
community since he entered supervised release three years ago. The officer reports that he has
supervised Mr. Gordon without incident since his release from custody in 2022, and his adjustment
to supervision has been excellent. Gordon recently secured full-time employment with the City of
Detroit — Water and Sewage Department (DWSD), and his first day on the job was November
17, 2025. He currently is training to receive a commercial driver license, and upon completing his
training, he will be operating DWSD vehicles. Gordon reportedly has maintained full-time
employment for the majority of his supervised release, working at The Salvation Army and Human
Filers LLC. The only period during which he was not employed full-time was a short duration in
the spring and early summer of 2024, when he experienced medical issues and was instructed by
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his physician to refrain from labor-intensive work until his condition stabilized. During that time,
Gordon adhered fully to his physician’s orders and prioritized his health, which has been fraught
with challenges. While in prison, Gordon suffered renal failure, received a kidney
transplant, and underwent triple-bypass heart surgery. Defense counsel reports that Gordon must
“take a carefully regimented anti-rejection medication cocktail daily,” the disruption of which will
result in the fatal rejection of the transplanted organ. The government asserts that these conditions
can be managed by the Bureau of Prisons, an assertion that must invoke skepticism given the recent
cutbacks and staff reductions imposed by the present administration. Gordon presently is
monitored by his own physicians, who ultimately cleared him to return to work.
Within the last year, Gordon also has established his own residence with assistance from
the Probation Department, using Second Chance Funds to cover a portion of his move-in costs.
Since December 22, 2022, Gordon reportedly has had no compliance issues, reports to the
probation officer as directed, with his most recent in-person contact on November 15, 2025, and
consistently maintains open communication with the probation officer.
Gordon encountered some challenges with his living arrangements, which were no fault of
his own, arising from another family member’s personal circumstances, but he has not allowed
such challenges to hinder his progress or prevent him from achieving the goals he has set for
himself and meeting his obligations to the Court.
The probation officer expressed his view that Gordon has taken full advantage of the
opportunity for community rehabilitation which the Court provided to him in 2022. He has
expressed his gratitude to the assigned probation officer both verbally and through his actions. A
criminal record check indicates no new criminal activity or outstanding warrants. He has a valid
driver’s license and reliable transportation.
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While Gordon frankly acknowledges his involvement in criminal activity 30 years ago, he
is now a clear example of successful correctional rehabilitation. Based on his performance under
supervision, the assigned probation officer has characterized Gordon as “a clear example of
successful correctional rehabilitation” and recommends that continued release on bond be granted.
Second, the proceedings on remand are not pursued for the purpose of delay, and the issues
raised are substantial, as is evident from the opinion of the court of appeals remanding the case.
The defendant has presented strong arguments that the re-sentencing proceedings on remand will
result in a sentence substantially the same as the Court’s prior determination, both because his
covered and noncovered offenses were grouped at sentencing and because of the arguments in his
motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(a). The defendant will have an
opportunity to demonstrate the applicability of the sentencing package doctrine, and the
government will have an opportunity to fix its “failure to timely address the sentencing-package
issue.” Dale, 2025 WL 2911058, at *12. The substantiality of these issues is beyond debate.
Finally, there is a significant likelihood that the resentencing will result in a “reduced
sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the time already served.” 18 U.S.C. §
3143(b)(1)(B)(iv). If Gordon prevails on remand, then it is likely that the previous, appealed
sentence will be reimposed. As for now, the prospect of the defendant’s return to custody after
nearly three years of successful reintegration to the community presents an exceptional
circumstance militating in favor of bail. By all accounts, the defendant has demonstrated model
behavior while on supervised release.
IV.
The defendant’s substantial ties to the community suggest he poses little risk to the safety
of others and is not a flight risk. The defendant also has presented strong arguments that the re-
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sentencing proceedings on remand will result in a sentence substantially the same as the Court’s
prior determination, because his covered and noncovered offenses were grouped at sentencing.
The defendant has demonstrated model behavior while on supervised release. Moreover, the
prospect of the defendant’s return to custody after nearly three years of successful reintegration to
the community presents an exceptional circumstance militating in favor of bond. Disrupting that
progress with reincarceration would be manifestly unjust.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant’s motion for bond (ECF No. 2601) is
GRANTED. The defendant must execute appropriate bond papers and abide by the standard
conditions of pretrial release in this district.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge

Dated: November 21, 2025
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