Canyon v. Entergy Operations, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SAMUEL CANYON CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-1721

ENTERGY OPERATIONS INC. SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Entergy Operations, Inc.’s Third Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 43). For the following reasons, the
Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Samuel Canyon
from his employment as a supervisor in the radiation protection department
at Defendant Entergy Operations, Inc.’s nuclear power plant, Waterford 3, in
Killona, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated on May 19, 2025
in retaliation for raising concerns about environmental safety. Plaintiff alleges
that his termination was in violation of the Louisiana Environmental
Whistleblower Act (“LEWA”).
This Court previously granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, holding
that Plaintiff’s LEWA claim was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(“AEA”). The AEA grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over
radiological safety at commercial nuclear power plants, and the Court found
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that the allegations of Plaintiff’s original Complaint expressly related to
radiological safety. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was
terminated in retaliation for reporting safety violations such as the
unmonitored release of radioactive water, the use of radiation detection
equipment by unqualified personnel, and a chilled work environment that
discouraged employees of the radiation protection department from filing
adverse condition reports.
Although it dismissed his claim as preempted, the Court allowed
Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to the extent that he could state a claim that
did not implicate radiological safety. Plaintiff filed his First Amended
Complaint on January 20, 2026, and Defendant moved for dismissal. However,
Defendant’s Motion was denied as moot after Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint on March 19, 2026. Now before the Court is Defendant’s Third
Motion to Dismiss to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure
to state a claim.
1
Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
2
A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
3

1
On August 6, 2026, the Court allowed Plaintiff to supplement his Second Amended
Complaint to add a claim under the Energy Reorganization Act. Those new allegations do not
affect the LEWA claim or Defendant’s Third Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s LEWA claim.
2
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
3
Id.
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A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
4
The court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
5
To be legally
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
plaintiff’s claims are true.
6
If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief,
the court must dismiss the claim.
7
The court’s review is limited to the
complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.
8

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint now alleges that he was
terminated on May 19, 2025 in violation of the LEWA on the basis of two
specific Conditions Reports that he filed with Defendant on February 26, 2025
and April 1, 2025, respectively. The LEWA provides that:
A. No firm, business, private or public corporation, partnership,
individual employer, or federal, state, or local governmental
agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an employee,
acting in good faith, who does any of the following:
(1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or another
employer with whom there is a business relationship, that the

4
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
5
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
6
Id.
7
Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
8
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
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employee reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental
law, rule, or regulation.
(2) Provides information to, or testifies before any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any
environmental violation by the employer, or another employer
with whom there is a business relationship, of an environmental
law, rule, or regulation.
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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the LEWA, Plaintiff must
allege “(1) that he engaged in an activity protected by the LEWA, (2) that an
adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
10

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff cannot show that he engaged in activity
protected by the LEWA because the Conditions Reports cited by Plaintiff do
not allege any violation of environmental law or even raise environmental
concerns. Defendant attaches the Conditions Reports to its Motion, and this
Court considers them in resolving this Motion because they “are central to the
claim and referenced by the complaint.”
11
Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify a specific environmental law that he
reasonably believed was being violated. The Court agrees on both points.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges only that the February 26,
2025 Conditions Report (“the February Conditions Report”) complained about
non-compliance with Entergy’s Respiratory Protection Program requirements.
A review of the February Conditions Report reveals that it raised concerns
regarding compliance with the requirement for a designated Respiratory

9
LA. REV. STAT. § 30:2027.
10
Burch v. Holcim US, Inc., No. CV 24-1165, 2025 WL 721210, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 5,
2025).
11
Collins, 224 F.3d at 498.
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Protection Program Administrator (“RPPA”) in conformity with company
policy and regulations set forth by Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”).
The February Conditions Report raised concerns that the company would be
subject to regulatory enforcement actions if OSHA or the NRC discovered the
noncompliance. The Report also suggested that management’s disregard of the
RPPA requirement “may become systemic and degrade nuclear safety.”
12
The
February Conditions Report, therefore, was concerned with compliance with
rules and regulations related to proper respiratory protection and does not
reference any environmental concerns. Accordingly, the Court cannot say that
the February Conditions Report can support an allegation that Plaintiff
reasonably believed that Defendant was violating an environmental law, rule,
or regulation. The February Conditions Report can only be interpreted as
raising concerns over the violation of regulations concerning worker safety.
Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the April 1, 2025 Conditions Report (“the
April Conditions Report”) complained about the use of proper respiratory
protection in relation to work with lead-containing materials. According to the
Second Amended Complaint, the work being performed involved the
disturbance of lead-containing materials, and Plaintiff “reasonably believed
that improper sequencing, handling, or disposal of disturbed lead-containing
materials created risk of environmental release through ventilation pathways,
ingress and egress points, or waste management processes.”
13
In fact, the April
Conditions Report makes no such complaint. Instead, it complains that a

12
Doc. 43-1 at 2.
13
Doc. 41 at 3.
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respiratory protection permit was improperly approved on a task that did not
allow respiratory protection. Stated differently, Plaintiff complained that a
supervisor mandated the use of respiratory protection during a project in
which the Radiological Work Permit did not allow respiratory protection
because of the low radioactivity levels. Here again, the April Conditions Report
did not raise any environmental concerns and certainly does not support an
allegation that Plaintiff reasonably believed that Defendant was violating an
environmental law, rule, or regulation. “Any complaint regarding an
employment practice which might have some hypothetical consequence on the
environment does not amount to a reasonable belief that the practice is against
the law.”
14
The only reasonable belief supported by the April Conditions Report
is a reasonable belief that the Radiological Work Permit associated with the
particular task was being violated.
15

Finally, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not identify a
particular environmental law, rule, or regulation that he reasonably believed
Defendant was violating. Instead, Plaintiff alleges generally that he
reasonably believed that Defendant was violating “the Louisiana
Environmental Quality Act, La. R.S. 30:2001 et seq., and regulations
promulgated by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality under
LAC Title 33 governing the emission of hazardous air pollutants, control of
particulate matter, handling and disposal of hazardous contaminants, and
protection of ambient air quality.”
16
This vague and overbroad allegation does

14
Roberts v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., 447 F. App’x 599, 602 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation
modified).
15
Further, Congress has given the NRC exclusive jurisdiction over radiological safety.
42 U.S.C. § 5851.
16
Doc. 41 at 3.
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not put Defendant on notice as to what environmental rule is at issue. The
Court finds therefore that Plaintiff has not alleged a claim under the LEWA.
When granting a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must consider whether
the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint. Though “[l]eave to
amend should be freely given,” a court may decline to give such leave as long
at the denial is justified on grounds of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”
17
Because
Plaintiff has amended his LEWA claims three times and still failed to state a
claim, this Court finds that additional leave to amend is not warranted.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s LEWA
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 13th day of August, 2026.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17
U.S. ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 363 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir.
2004).
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