Harding v. C-Dive, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROGERNICK HARDING CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 24-2814

C-DIVE, LLC, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion
1
to remand the above-captioned matter filed by
plaintiff Rogernick Harding (“plaintiff”). Defendants C-Dive, LLC (“C-Dive”); Sea
Support Services, LLC (“Sea Support”); and Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company,
LLC (“Transco”)
2
(collectively, “defendants”), each filed an opposition.
3
Plaintiff did
not file a reply. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter concerns personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in the course of
his employment.
4
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, while he was being transferred
in a personnel basket by crane to the vessel MELINDA B. ADAMS, the crane operator
caused the basket carrying plaintiff to strike an appurtenance of the MELINDA B.
ADAMS, an accident which resulted in personal injuries to plaintiff.
5
Plaintiff further
alleges that the crane was located on a platform operated by Transco.
6
Plaintiff

1
R. Doc. No. 11.
2
Transco is incorrectly named in the state court petition as the Williams Field
Services Company, LLC.
3
R. Doc. Nos. 17–19.
4
R. Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 6.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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subsequently filed a petition in the 32nd Judicial District Court for Terrebonne
Parish, which alleged claims for negligence and unseaworthiness.
7

Transco subsequently removed the lawsuit to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a).
8
The notice of removal asserted federal jurisdiction pursuant to 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(b)(1), which grants federal courts original jurisdiction over cases arising out
of operations involving the production of minerals on the Outer Continental Shelf.
9

The notice also alleges facts in support of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1349(b)(1).
The notice states that, at the time of the accident, the MELINDA B. ADAMS
was providing services and personnel in connection with operations to abandon a 12-
inch subsea pipeline between the Main Pass 259 and Main Pass 261 platforms, which
are located off the coast of Louisiana on the Outer Continental Shelf.
10
Further, the
operations in which the MELINDA B. ADAMS was involved concerned the
exploration, development, or production of minerals on the Outer Continental Shelf.
11

Plaintiff’s motion asserts that remand is appropriate because § 1349(b)(1) does
not apply to the facts of this case and does not provide an independent basis for
removal even if it does apply.
12
C-Dive, Sea Support, and Transco each filed an
opposition to plaintiff’s motion.
13
Each of defendants’ motion asserts that § 1349(b)(1)

7
Id. ¶ 5.
8
R. Doc. No. 1.
9
Id. ¶ 5.
10
Id. ¶ 7.
11
Id.
12
R. Doc. No. 11-1, at 5–6.
13
R. Doc. Nos. 17–19.
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provides an independent basis for removal because it vests the district court with
original jurisdiction.
14

Transco’s opposition attaches a declaration by Chad Brown (“Brown”), a project
manager for Transco with respect Transco’s pipeline-abandonment project.
15
In his
declaration, Brown asserts the following facts. Transco regularly engages in the
exploration and production of oil and gas on the Outer Continental Shelf.
16
At the
time of plaintiff’s accident, Transco was conducting operations to abandon a 12-inch
subsea pipeline between the Main Pass 259 and Main Pass 261 platforms located on
the Outer Continental Shelf.
17
The abandonment involved the removal of
hydrocarbons from the system and the disconnection of the pipeline to the Main Pass
261A platform, on which plaintiff worked.
18
To complete this project, Transco
contracted with C-Dive, which in turn contracted with Legends PPS, plaintiff’s
employer.
19
Attached to Brown’s declaration is a copy of that part of the contract
between Transco and C-Dive outlining the scope of work.
20

II. STANDARD OF LAW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “[d]efendants may generally remove a case
from state court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over it.” In
re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2014). “The defendants bear the

14
R. Doc. No. 17, at 3–4; R. Doc. No. 18, at 4–6; R. Doc. No. 19, at 3.
15
R. Doc. No. 18-1, ¶ 1.
16
Id. ¶ 2.
17
Id. ¶ 3.
18
Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
19
Id. ¶ 5.
20
Id. at 3–4.
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burden of establishing the basis for removal, and operative facts and pleadings are
evaluated at the time of removal.” Id. at 162–63.
Defendants invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) to establish this Court’s original
jurisdiction in the above-captioned case.
21
That statute vests federal district courts
with original jurisdiction over “cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection
with . . . any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves
exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf.” 42 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit has held that
this jurisdictional grant is “broad.” See In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 162. “A
plaintiff does not need to expressly invoke § 1349(b)(1) in order for it to apply.” Barker
v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 2013).
To determine jurisdiction pursuant to § 1349(b)(1), courts assess whether “(1)
the activities that caused the injury constituted an operation conducted on the Outer
Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals, and (2)
the case arises out of, or in connection with the operation.” See id. at 163 (internal
quotation marks omitted). An “operation” for the purposes of § 1349(b)(1) entails “the
doing of some physical act on the [Outer Continental Shelf].” See EP Operating Ltd.
P’ship v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, the exploration
and production of minerals “encompass the full range of oil and gas activity from
locating mineral resources through the construction, operation, servicing and
maintenance of facilities to produce those resources.” Id. at 568. Accordingly, the first

21
See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5.
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prong is satisfied if a physical act on the Outer Continental Shelf that relates to oil
and gas activity is established.
With respect to prong two, § 1349(b)(1) requires only a “but-for” connection
between an operation and the cause of action to establish federal jurisdiction. See In
re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163. “The but-for test does not include a purposive
element . . . .” Id. Further, jurisdiction does not depend on the situs of the injury. See
id. at 164 (explaining that “the statute precludes an artificial limit based on situs”).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court concludes that defendants have established jurisdiction pursuant to
43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) and, therefore, the basis of their removal. The statements in
Brown’s declaration—necessarily uncontroverted because plaintiff has not even filed
a reply to them—satisfy both prongs of the test for determining jurisdiction pursuant
to § 1349(b)(1).
With respect to the first prong, the Court considers whether the activities that
caused plaintiff’s injury constituted an operation that falls within the full range of oil
and gas activity. See id. at 163. Brown’s declaration makes clear that the project with
which plaintiff was involved entailed removing pipelines used to transport oil or gas
located on the Outer Continental Shelf.
22
This project was conducted by Transco,
which is in the business of exploring and producing oil and gas on the Outer
Continental Shelf.
23
Plaintiff’s employer was contracted to assist on this project.
24

22
R. Doc. No. 18-1, ¶¶ 3–4.
23
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
24
Id. ¶ 5.
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Together, these facts establish that the project at issue constituted an operation for
the purposes of § 1349(b)(1).
With respect to the second prong, the Court must determine whether there is
a but-for connection between Transco’s operation and the cause of action. See id. This
connection is clearly present: If not for Transco’s operation, plaintiff would not have
been in the personnel basket in which he was injured. Cf. Peralta v. Supreme Offshore
Servs., Inc., No. 23-cv-1395, 2025 WL 545930, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2025) (Papillon,
J.) (holding that a but-for connection was present where the plaintiff was injured
swinging from a platform to a vessel during a project to abandon a span of pipeline).
Since defendants have met their burden of establishing both a requisite operation
and a causal connection therewith, the Court concludes it has original jurisdiction
over this controversy pursuant to § 1349(b)(1). Accordingly, § 1349(b)(1) serves as a
proper basis for the removal of this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (authorizing the
removal of “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction”).
Plaintiff argues, however, that § 1349(b)(1) does not provide a basis for removal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) even if it provides this Court with original jurisdiction
over the instant controversy.
25
Specifically, he asserts that the saving-to-suitors
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) precludes removal because his claims arise under
maritime law.
26
That view has been squarely rejected by the Fifth Circuit. It has

25
R. Doc. No. 11-1, at 5–6.
26
Id.
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stated that “[m]aritime law . . . has no effect on the removal of [a § 1349] action.”
Barker, 713 F.3d at 220. Accordingly, the removal of this action was proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) even if, as plaintiff contends, maritime law applies.
27

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 20, 2025.

_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27
The Court notes that the parties dispute whether maritime law applies. See, e.g.,
R. Doc. No. 18, at 8–14 (arguing that maritime law does not apply). The sole issue
before this Court is whether the above-captioned case should be remanded.
Accordingly, whether maritime law applies is not decided.
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