Moore v. Turn Services, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JORDAN MOORE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 24-02312

TURN SERVICES, L.L.C. SECTION: T (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are a Motion for New Trial (R. Doc. 58) filed by Plaintiff, Jordan Moore,
and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (R. Doc. 66) in support of his
Motion for New Trial. Defendant, Turn Services, L.L.C. (“Turn”), opposes both motions, R. Docs.
59, 69, and Plaintiff has filed a reply in support of each, R. Docs. 65, 73. Having considered the
parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (R. Doc. 66) but DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial
(R. Doc. 58).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jordan Moore filed this action against his employer, Turn Services, L.L.C.
(“Turn”), asserting claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq., and under the general
maritime law of the United States arising from multiple, alleged work-related injuries sustained
during his employment as a seaman aboard the M/V American Pharoah (“Pharoah,” or the
“Vessel”). R. Doc. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries to his lower back
during four separate incidents occurring between February 2021 and July 2023, including injuries
allegedly caused by inadequate crewing and a December 22, 2022, collision involving a Turn crew
boat. Id. While Plaintiff contended that Turn was negligent under the Jones Act and that the vessels
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on which he worked were unseaworthy, id., Turn denied liability, disputed causation, and
challenged the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, see R. Doc. 18.
This matter proceeded to a jury trial beginning on September 22, 2025. R. Doc. 49.
Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant Turn,
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and judgment was entered
dismissing Moore’s claims with prejudice. R. Docs. 56, 57.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59. R. Doc. 58. In support, Plaintiff argues that the verdict is against the great weight of the
evidence and that a new trial is warranted because Turn allegedly failed to produce accident reports
during discovery that were later referenced during trial testimony. R. Doc. 58-1, pp. 14-23. Turn
opposes the motion, contending that Plaintiff merely seeks to relitigate factual disputes resolved
by the jury and that he has failed to establish any basis for relief under Rule 59. R. Doc. 59, pp. 1-
10. According to Turn, the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence presented at trial, and
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the purported accident reports do not establish discovery
misconduct warranting a new trial. Id.
After briefing had concluded on the Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Legal Authority in support of that motion, seeking to direct the Court’s
attention to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion in Drema Cambre v. Priority
Management Group, L.L.C. d/b/a Chateau St. James Rehab & Retirement (No. 22-CA-242). R.
Doc. 66. While Plaintiff contends that the factual background of Drema Cambre is highly
analogous and supports the granting of a new trial, R. Doc. 66-2, p. 1, Turn opposes the Motion
for Leave and argues that Drema Cambre is procedurally and factually distinguishable from this

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Specifically, the jury answered “No” to the questions asking whether Turn was negligent under
the Jones Act or whether the Pharoah was unseaworthy. R. Doc. 52, p. 1. Therefore, the jury did
not reach questions of comparative fault or damages. Id. at p. 2
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case and therefore does not alter the Rule 59 analysis, R. Doc. 69. Both Motions are now before
the Court.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Although it was filed second, the Court will first consider Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Authority because, if it is granted, the Court will consider the supplemental
authority in resolving the Motion for New Trial.
a. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (R. Doc. 66)
Plaintiff seeks leave to supplement the briefing on his Motion for New Trial with the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Drema Cambre v. Priority
Management Group, L.L.C. d/b/a Chateau St. James Rehab & Retirement (No. 22-CA-242). R.
Doc. 66. Turn opposes the Motion for Leave, arguing that Drema Cambre is procedurally and
factually distinguishable from the instant matter and therefore does not warrant supplementation
or alter the Court’s Rule 59 analysis. R. Doc. 69, pp. 1-4.
The Court finds that supplementation is appropriate in this case. Drema Cambre was
decided after briefing on the Motion for New Trial had concluded and addresses issues sufficiently
related to those presented here to warrant the Court’s consideration. R. Doc. 66-1 (the Drema
Cambre opinion). Because Turn has had a full opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s supplemental
authority and present its arguments regarding why it does not support granting a new trial, the
Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority. The Court
considers Drema Cambre below in addressing Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial.
b. Motion for New Trial (R. Doc. 58)
Plaintiff’s remaining motion seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), arguing that (1) the
jury’s verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence and (2) Turn’s alleged failure to
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produce accident reports during discovery warrants a new trial. R. Doc. 58, pp. 1-2; R. Doc. 58-1,
pp. 6-17.
i. Applicable Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides that a district court may grant a new trial on
all or some of the issues “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). On a motion for new trial,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2). The decision whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59 “rests within the
sound discretion of the district court, but that discretion is tempered by the deference due to a
jury.” Babin v. Plaquemines Parish, No. 18-7378, 2020 WL 7318079, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 11,
2020) (citing Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008); Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868
F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1989)). “The district court abuses its discretion in denying a new trial only
when there is an ‘absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting Seidman
v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, “[t]he Fifth Circuit
has held that [a district court’s] discretion is even broader when the district court denies, rather
than grants, a motion for new trial.” Id. (citing Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d 456, 460 (5th Cir.
2005)).
While the Federal Rules themselves do not specify what grounds are necessary to support
a decision to grant a new trial, the Fifth Circuit has instructed that “[a] new trial may be granted,
for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages
awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith
v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). A court should not disturb a jury’s
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verdict unless it is against the great weight of the evidence or allowing the verdict to stand would
result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 612-13. See also Seibert v. Jackson Cnty, Mississippi, 851
F.3d 430, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Flores, 981 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Accordingly, although a district court may weigh the evidence when considering a Rule 59 motion,
it should exercise that authority with considerable restraint in light of the deference owed to the
jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues.
ii. Argument #1 – “Great Weight of the Evidence”
Here, Plaintiff first suggests that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the great weight of the
evidence, which he contends established Turn’s negligence under the Jones Act and the
unseaworthiness of the Pharoah. R. Doc. 58-1, pp. 14-17. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the
December 22, 2022, incident aboard the Pharoah could only have resulted from Turn’s negligence,
that the Vessel was inadequately manned during Plaintiff’s August 2022 and July 2023 injuries,
and that the unanimous medical testimony established those incidents aggravated Plaintiff’s
preexisting back condition. Id. Plaintiff therefore argues that no reasonable juror could have
answered “No” to Questions One and Two of the verdict form.
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Id. at pp. 15-19.
The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
evidence, both (1) that Turn was negligent under the Jones Act and (2) that such negligence caused,
in whole or in part, Plaintiff’s injuries. Likewise, Plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the
Pharoah was unseaworthy and that the alleged unseaworthy condition was a proximate cause of
his injuries. The jury concluded that Plaintiff failed to satisfy each of these burdens.

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Question One of the verdict form asked jurors, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Turn Services, L.L.C. was negligent AND such negligence caused, in whole or in part, Jordan
Moore’s injuries?” R. Doc. 52, p. 1. Question Two read, “Do you find by a preponderance of
evidence that the M/V AMERICAN PHAROAH was unseaworthy AND such unseaworthiness
was a proximate cause of Jordan Moore’s injuries?” Id.
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Although Plaintiff identifies evidence that could have supported a verdict in his favor, the
existence of conflicting evidence, by itself, does not warrant the setting aside of the jury’s verdict
under Rule 59. Rather, the Court must determine whether the verdict is against the great weight of
the evidence or whether allowing it to stand would otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice. See
Smith, 773 F.3d at 612-13.
Here, the evidence presented at trial was sharply disputed. The jury heard conflicting
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s injuries, the condition of the Vessel,
and the extent to which these circumstances and conditions were attributable to Turn’s conduct.
Additionally, the parties presented conflicting testimony concerning whether Plaintiff’s later
medical issues were attributable to subsequent incidents or reflected the natural progression of his
preexisting condition. Resolution of those disputes necessarily depended upon the jury’s
assessment of witness credibility and the weight to assign competing testimony. Those are
precisely the types of factual determinations entrusted to the jury and are not appropriately
revisited on a Rule 59 motion.
Having presided over the trial, observed the witnesses firsthand, and considered the
evidence as a whole, the Court cannot conclude that the jury’s answers to Questions One and Two
of the verdict form were against the great weight of the evidence. Instead, the Court finds that the
verdict reflects the jury’s determination that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on liability.
Rule 59 does not permit the Court to substitute its own evaluation of the evidence for that of the
jury simply because Plaintiff disagrees with the verdict. See Smith, 773 F.2d at 612-13. Plaintiff’s
motion largely identifies evidence that the jury could have credited, but the jury was entitled to
accept some testimony, reject other testimony, and make credibility determinations that this Court
will not revisit on a Rule 59 motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established that a new trial is
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warranted on this basis.
iii. Argument #2 – “Newly Discovered Evidence”
Plaintiff’s second argument for a new trial, in which he contends that Turn’s alleged failure
to produce accident reports during discovery warrants a new trial, is similarly unavailing. Here,
Plaintiff argues that trial testimony offered by Turn representative Jason Mitchell established that
responsive accident reports existed despite Turn’s prior discovery responses indicating otherwise.
R. Doc. 58-1, pp. 17-23. Plaintiff therefore characterizes these supposed reports as newly
discovered evidence and argues that Turn’s alleged failure to produce them prevented him from
fully presenting his case at trial. Id.
In opposition, Turn responds that Plaintiff has not identified any newly discovered
evidence within the meaning of Rule 59. R. Doc. 59, pp. 7- 10. Instead, Turn argues that Plaintiff’s
motion rests entirely upon Plaintiff’s preferred interpretation of Mitchell’s testimony. Id. Turn
further argues that the jury heard Mitchell’s testimony, was free to weigh it against the testimony
of Turn’s other witnesses—including Terrell Folse, the last witness to testify, who “indicated that
he had conducted a thorough search of Turn’s records when helping complete Turn’s responses to
Plaintiff’s written discovery, and that there were no accident reports”—and nevertheless returned
a verdict in favor of Turn. Id.
In reply, Plaintiff maintains that “Mitchell was adamantly clear that there were three
accident reports that he had seen” and argues that Turn’s failure to produce those reports
constituted discovery misconduct that materially prejudiced Plaintiff’s presentation of his case. R.
Doc. 65, pp. 1- 5. Plaintiff further contends that Turn improperly relied upon the purported absence
of accident reports during opening statement and throughout trial despite allegedly possessing
responsive documents. Id.
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Once again, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument for a new trial. Rule 59 is not
a vehicle for relitigating factual disputes presented to and resolved by the jury. The testimony upon
which Plaintiff now relies was not discovered after trial but instead was presented during trial,
before the jury. Accordingly, the jury was fully aware of the alleged inconsistency by the time it
deliberated: jurors were afforded the opportunity to hear Mitchell’s testimony, evaluate his
credibility, consider his testimony alongside that of Turn’s other witnesses, and determine what
weight it deserved. Nevertheless, the jurors returned a verdict for Turn.
Similarly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any alleged discovery violation requires a
new trial. Plaintiff has not identified or produced the purported accident reports, established what
information they contain, or otherwise demonstrated that their alleged nondisclosure was likely to
have produced a different result at trial. Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer both the existence
and the significance of documents that remain absent from the record. Such speculation is
insufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of a new trial.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff contends Turn violated its discovery obligations, that
contention does not alter the Rule 59 analysis. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that any alleged failure to disclose rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. Instead, the parties fully litigated the significance of the purportedly missing
accident reports through witness testimony before the jury, which ultimately resolved those factual
disputes in Turn’s favor.
iv. Analysis of Supplemental Authority
Plaintiff’s supplemental authority likewise does not compel a different result. In support of
his Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff relies upon Drema Cambre v. Priority Management Group,
L.L.C., No. 25-CA-242 (La. App. 5 Cir. Dec. 30, 2025), arguing that it supports the granting of a
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new trial where responsive documents are disclosed for the first time during trial. R. Doc. 66, pp.
1- 2; R. Doc. 66-1, pp. 1-5. The Court has reviewed the supplemental authority introduced by
Plaintiff but finds that Drema Cambre involved decidedly different circumstances. There, the state
trial court found willful violations of discovery obligations and prior discovery orders after highly
relevant documents were first disclosed during trial, imposed sanctions striking defendant’s
pleadings, directed liability, and excluded evidence before the jury rendered its verdict. R. Doc.
66-1, p. 2. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed those sanctions and, consequently, the denial of a
motion for new trial. Id. Because Cambre arose under Louisiana procedural law and involved a
materially different posture and findings, it does not alter the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Rule
59 motion. This case presents no comparable finding of willful discovery misconduct, no discovery
sanctions, and no directed determination of liability. Nor did the Court in this matter make any
finding that Turn violated its discovery obligations. Thus, Drema Cambre does not alter the
Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to establish entitlement to relief under Rule 59.
Moreover, even accepting Plaintiff’s characterization of Drema Cambre, the decision does
not stand for the proposition that every alleged discovery violation revealed during trial requires a
new trial. Rather, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed a series of sanctions imposed after the trial
court found willful discovery misconduct and determined that the withheld evidence had
materially prejudiced the proceedings. No comparable findings were made in the instant matter.
Instead, the alleged existence of accident reports was explored before the jury through witness
testimony and the arguments of counsel. The jury nevertheless returned a verdict in Turn’s favor.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the jury’s verdict is against the great
weight of the evidence, that any alleged discovery violation warrants a new trial, or that the
supplemental authority upon which he relies compels a different result. Because Plaintiff has failed
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to establish entitlement to the extraordinary relief contemplated by Rule 59, the Court declines to
disturb the jury’s verdict. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (R.
Doc. 66) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (R. Doc. 58) is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13
th
day of August 2026.
GREG GERARD GUIDRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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