Edward J Onken and Tami L Boren

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

In Re )
) Case No. 26-30084
EDWARD J. ONKEN and )
TAMI L. BOREN, )
) Chapter 13
Debtors. )

Before the Court is the Chapter 13 Trustee’s objection to the Debtors’ claim
of exemption in jewelry. For the reasons set forth herein, the objection will be
overruled and the claim of exemption will be allowed.

I. Factual Background
The Debtors, Edward J. Onken and Tami L. Boren, filed their voluntary
petition under Chapter 13 on January 30, 2026. On their schedules filed
February 12, 2026, the Debtors listed ownership of several items and categories
of items of personal property, including various household appliances and
furnishings, electronics, clothing, and pets, as well as a “12g Rock Island Armory
M5 Shotgun” valued at $150 and “Costume Jewelry” valued at $20. The Debtors
claimed exemptions in the items—including the firearm and jewelry—in the
amount of their scheduled values under the newly amended Illinois personal
property exemption provision at 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a). A month later, the
Chapter 13 Trustee filed his objection to the Debtors’ claims of exemption under
735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a) as to the firearm and costume jewelry, arguing that the
claimed exemptions were an improper use of the Illinois exemption provision
O P I N I O N
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reserved for “usual and customary household goods” and “one piece of jewelry
with a value of no more than $5,000.00.”
At a hearing held April 16, 2026, the Chapter 13 Trustee withdrew his
objection to the claim of exemption in the firearm based on the ruling of another
judge in a different case but expressed his intention to stand on his objection to
the claim of exemption in jewelry. The attorney for the Debtors disagreed with
the Trustee’s position that the claim of exemption in jewelry was improper and
asked for an opportunity to research the issue of first impression and file a
written brief in opposition to the Trustee’s objection. The Court granted the
Debtors’ request and also gave the Trustee leave to file his own written brief in
reply, after which time the Court said it would take the issue under advisement.
Both sides timely filed their briefs in support of their respective positions.
The Debtors first noted that the amended Illinois exemption provision
significantly broadened the scope and expanded the protections of the former
provision. And although they seemed to concede that the plain language of the
jewelry provision purported to limit the exemption to a single piece of jewelry,
they argued that the Court should look past the plain meaning because it would
lead to absurd results. The Trustee, on the other hand, points to the plain
language of the jewelry provision, arguing that the statute could not be clearer:
the Debtors “may [each] exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000.”
The Court has reviewed and considered the arguments of the parties. The
matter is now ready for decision.

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II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over proceedings “arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334. All
bankruptcy cases and proceedings filed in the Southern District of Illinois have
been referred to the bankruptcy judges. SDIL-LR Br1001.1; see 28 U.S.C.
§157(a). Matters involving the exemption of property from a bankruptcy estate
are core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(B). The issue before the Court arises
from the Debtors’ bankruptcy itself and from the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and may therefore be constitutionally decided by a bankruptcy judge. See
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 499 (2011).

III. Legal Analysis
A bankruptcy estate “is comprised of . . . all legal and equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case[.]” 11 U.S.C.
§541(a)(1). A debtor is entitled to claim certain exemptions in his or her property,
thereby removing such exempted property from the estate. Payne v. Wood, 775
F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1985). Non-exempt property remains in the estate for the
benefit of creditors. Id. The interplay between the creation of an estate comprised
of property available for the benefit of creditors and a debtor’s right to remove
certain property from that estate by claim of exemption highlights two main but
competing purposes of bankruptcy: the “prompt and effectual administration
and settlement of the bankruptcy estate” and “protecting a debtor’s fresh start.”
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In re Awayda, 574 B.R. 692, 695 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2017) (citing Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At issue in this case are the newly amended exemption provisions of
Illinois related to personal property, which the parties appear to agree are
applicable to the Debtors here.
1
The operable provisions state as follows.
The following personal property, owned by the debtor, is exempt
from judgment, attachment, or distress for rent:

(a) All household goods, including but not limited to, the debtor’s
and the debtor’s dependents’ food, eating and cooking utensils,
bedding, furniture, books, refrigerator, stove, microwave oven,
kitchen appliances, necessary provisions, washing machine,
clothes dryer, vacuum cleaner, yard equipment and household
equipment and tools, all personal possessions, including, but not
limited to, clothing, pets, personal health aids, medications,
computers or similar electronic devices and telephones, except
that a creditor may obtain court permission to levy on any item of
furniture, appliance, electronic device, yard equipment, precious
item, utensils, set of utensils, or any other item exempt under this
subsection that has a resale value of more than $5,000 unless
that item is exempt under another provision of this Section. The
debtor may exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000[.]

735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2026).
Specifically, the dispute here revolves around the final sentence of
subsection (a) stating that a “debtor may exempt one piece of jewelry up to a
value of $5,000[.]” In the Trustee’s view, the words speak for themselves and
plainly limit the availability of the exemption to one piece of jewelry (up to a value
of $5,000) per debtor. The Trustee believes that the existence of this separate
provision addressing jewelry leads to the inference that the broader personal

1
Illinois law controls here because Illinois has opted out of the federal exemptions and requires its residents to use
the Illinois exemptions in bankruptcy cases. 11 U.S.C. §522(b); 735 ILCS 5/12-1201.
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property provisions preceding it have no application and offer no protection for
jewelry beyond that provided for a single piece of jewelry in the final sentence of
the subsection. The Debtors counter that the amendment unquestionably
expanded the scope of exemptions available under the prior version of the statute
and, because the specific mention of jewelry in the final sentence was included
in the same subsection newly providing expansive protections for a debtor’s
household goods and personal possessions, it must be read in conjunction with
those surrounding provisions of the subsection. In so reading subsection (a), and
keeping in mind the expansion of the personal property exemptions in general,
the Debtors contend that the statute is naturally interpreted as ensuring that a
debtor can protect one piece of valuable jewelry while also offering general
protection over all a debtor’s jewelry so long as the value of that other jewelry is
not excessive. They also contend that the Trustee’s interpretation of the plain
meaning of the final sentence of subsection (a), read in isolation from the
surrounding language, would lead to absurd results.
Because it is an Illinois statute that is at issue, the Court must apply the
rules of statutory construction followed in Illinois. In re Hernandez, 918 F.3d
563, 569 (7th Cir. 2019). “The cardinal rule in construing a statute is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislative intent.” Lavery v. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 2025
IL 130033, ¶22, 279 N.E.3d 664, 673 (quoting In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483,
¶22, 102 N.E.3d 182, 187). “The most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language itself.” Id. (quoting Jarquan B.,
2017 IL 121483, ¶22, 102 N.E.3d at 187). “In determining the plain meaning of
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statutory terms, [courts] consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it
addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Id. (quoting
Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29, 919 N.E.2d 333, 338 (2009)). As the Illinois
Supreme Court has explained:
A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and
phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in
isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be
given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be
rendered superfluous. . . . The court may consider the reason for
the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be
achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way
or another. Also, a court presumes that the General Assembly, in
its enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity,
inconvenience, or injustice.

People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶9, 18 N.E.3d 41, 44 (citations omitted). Only
when the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the
apparent intent of the legislature should the words be given effect without further
analysis. Lavery, 2025 IL 130033, ¶22, 279 N.E.3d at 673. “When a statute is
subject to various interpretations, however, a court should look to other sources
for evidence of the legislative intent such as the statute’s legislative history, the
reason for the statute’s enactment, the circumstances that led to its adoption,
and the ends that the legislature wished to achieve.” Matter of Barker, 768 F.2d
191, 195 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 279,
469 N.E.2d 167, 172 (1984)).
There are also special considerations for interpreting the statute at issue
here. When dealing specifically with Illinois exemption law, the Seventh Circuit
and “the courts in Illinois have consistently held that personal property
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exemption statutes should be liberally construed in order to carry out the
legislature’s purpose in enacting them—to protect debtors.” Barker, 768 F.2d at
196 (collecting cases); McClellan v. Powell, 109 Ill. App. 222, 225 (1903)
(Exemption statutes “are not to be strictly construed, but they should receive
such construction as will carry out the obvious purpose of the legislature in
enacting them, to protect the debtor.”). As a result, “where an exemption statute
might be interpreted either favorably or unfavorably vis-à-vis a debtor, [courts]
should interpret the statute in a manner that favors the debtor.” In re Robinson,
811 F.3d 267, 270-71 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Barker, 768 F.2d at 196).

A. The Amendments to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a)
Read as a unit, amended subsection (a) of the Illinois personal property
exemption statute is comprised of three parts. The subsection begins by
providing an expansive exemption in “household goods” and “personal
possessions” and includes nonexclusive lists of examples of each. In the second
half of the opening sentence, subsection (a) creates a way for creditors to
potentially claw back the broad protections offered in the opening clause and
levy on exempt property under certain circumstances. Immediately following the
levy provision in a separate sentence is the third part which is in dispute here
that states “[t]he debtor may exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000.”

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1. The Broad Exemption in All Household Goods and Personal Possessions
Beginning with first half of the opening sentence of subsection (a), it plainly
provides a categorical exemption for “all household goods” and “all personal
possessions” without regard to value or amount. Neither term is defined but both
are accompanied by an illustrative list of nonexclusive examples. The named
examples of “household goods” are “the debtor’s and the debtor’s dependents’
food, eating and cooking utensils, bedding, furniture, books, refrigerator, stove,
microwave oven, kitchen appliances, necessary provisions, washing machine,
clothes dryer, vacuum cleaner, yard equipment and household equipment and
tools[.]” The named examples of “personal possessions” are “clothing, pets,
personal health aids, medications, computers or similar electronic devices and
telephones[.]” Jewelry is not specifically listed as an example of covered items,
but, as the exemption is expressly not limited to the items listed, that in itself is
not a basis for exclusion.
Again, the Illinois statute does not define “personal possessions.”
2
Nor is
there a dictionary definition for “personal possessions.” There are, however, both
legal and common definitions for each of the words that make up the phrase. For
present purposes, “personal” is an adjective used to describe something “of or
affecting a person” or, in relation to property, that which “is not classifiable as
real property.” Personal, B
LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); see also

2
“Household goods” is also not defined in the Illinois statute but has been described, for purposes under the
Bankruptcy Code, as requiring “a functional nexus between the household and the goods found in or around the home
used to support and facilitate daily life within the home and the household.” In re Thomas, 2005 WL 2429963, at *2
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005) (Perkins, J.). The Debtors do not argue that jewelry is a “household good” and, in
this Court’s view, a protracted analysis of the term would not be helpful. The discussion here assumes that jewelry is
not a “household good” and focuses instead whether jewelry is a “personal possession.”
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personal, M
ERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY,
https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/personal (last visited
July 13, 2026) (similar definition). “Possession” is defined as “something that a
person owns or controls,” possession, B
LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024),
with the plural “possessions” commonly understood as referring to “the
aggregate of things owned,” possessions, M
ERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY, https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/possessions (last visited July 13, 2026). Absent any
legislative indication to the contrary, the dictionary definitions of the separate
terms together are certainly broad enough to include jewelry. The question is
whether that conclusion is supported by a contextual analysis of the statute and
any other apparent evidence of legislative intent.
Amended subsection (a) marks an obvious and significant expansion of
the protections offered under its predecessor. The prior version of subsection (a)
provided an exemption in “[t]he necessary wearing apparel, bible, school books,
and family pictures of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents[.]” 735 ILCS 5/12-
1001(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2019) (amended Jan. 1, 2026). The exemption applied
to the listed items regardless of value, see, e.g., Robinson, 811 F.3d at 268
($10,000 first edition Book of Mormon exempt), and through several iterations
had been construed to include at least some items of jewelry, see In re Medina,
2017 WL 5633268, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2017) (wedding or engagement
ring exempt as “necessary wearing apparel”), and In re Deacon, 27 F. Supp. 296
(S.D. Ill.1939) (“one watch, one consistory ring, [and] one diamond shirt stud”
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exempt as “necessary wearing apparel”). For all other personal property, debtors
had to look to other subsections of the Illinois exemption statute for available
protections. To that end, the statute provided specific exemptions for certain
property, like vehicles and tools of the trade up to a prescribed amount, as well
as a catch-all “wild card” exemption for a debtor’s interest in any other property
up to $4,000. See 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b)-(d). The wild card exemption was
commonly used to protect a debtor’s interest in household goods, furniture,
appliances, and the like, as well as pets, electronics, and other items of personal
property that did not fit neatly into one pointed exemption provision or another.
As amended, however, subsection (a) opens with an all-encompassing
exemption in “household goods” and “personal possessions” not limited to the
enumerated examples of protected items. Notably, the illustrative lists of exempt
items are largely comprised of property not covered under the prior version of
subsection (a). Furniture, appliances, electronics, pets and several other items
are now expressly exempt without limit, leaving the $4,000 wild card exemption
available for other use. And given that the first part of amended subsection (a)
clearly expanded the protections of the prior version of the same subsection
under which an exemption in jewelry was widely recognized, it is hardly
surprising that jewelry is not among the enumerated examples of property
exempt under the new provision.
The first part of amended subsection (a) evidences an intent to bolster the
exemption protections available to debtors, seemingly in furtherance of broader
exemption policy. That intent is reflected throughout the 2026 amendments to
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the Illinois exemption statutes. See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (increasing
motor vehicle exemption from $2,400 to $3,600), (d) (increasing tools of the trade
exemption from $1,500 to $2,250), (h)(4) (increasing personal bodily injury
payment exemption from $15,000 to $22,500); see also 735 ILCS 5/12-901
(increasing homestead exemption from $15,000 to $50,000). The result is
undeniable; debtors can exempt more property in greater amounts under the
amended statute than they could have under its predecessor. In the absence of
countervailing evidence of contrary legislative intent, this Court concludes—
based on the obvious effort to expand on the exemptions available to debtors and
the long-established purpose of the exemption statutes that is to protect
debtors—that the opening provision of subsection (a) exempting “all household
goods” and “all personal possessions” plainly includes a debtor’s jewelry.
But that is not the end of the inquiry.

2. The Levy Provision
Despite the all-encompassing protections set forth in the opening provision
of amended subsection (a), it is immediately followed by language, as part of the
same sentence, that operates to potentially limit or claw back the reach of the
exemption protections in certain circumstances. Not found in the prior statute,
the second part of amended subsection (a) now allows creditors to seek
“permission to levy on any item of furniture, appliance, electronic device, yard
equipment, precious item, utensils, set of utensils, or any other item exempt
under this subsection that has a resale value of more than $5,000 unless that
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item is exempt under another provision of this Section.” 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a).
The question, for present purposes, is what the provision means in terms of an
available exemption in jewelry.
In listing some but not all items identified as examples of “household
goods” and “personal possessions” in the first part of the sentence, the second
part of the sentence curiously refers—for the first and only time—to “precious
items” as among the exempt household goods and personal possessions upon
which a creditor may be able to levy. As with other important terms, the
legislature declined to define “precious item” and the statute offers little
guidance, leaving the inference to be drawn that the general, unlimited
exemption for household goods and personal possessions extends to more than
a debtor’s bare necessities and applies broadly to also include a debtor’s
valuables. See precious, M
ERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY,
https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/precious (last visited
July 15, 2026) (defining “precious” as describing something “of great value or
high price”). Jewelry of any meaningful value would surely fall within the
ordinary meaning of “precious item” along with countless other personal
possessions and household goods of value. This provides further evidence that
the general exemption outlined in the first part of subsection (a) covers jewelry.
A deeper dive into the mechanics of the levy provision offers additional support.
The levy provision in subsection (a) is grammatically structured in a way
that allows levy on two distinct categories of items: one consisting of “any item
of furniture, appliance, electronic device, yard equipment, precious item,
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utensils, [or] set of utensils,” and another consisting of “any other item exempt
under this subsection that has a resale value of more than $5,000[.]” According
to the Trustee, the levy exception provision imposes a $5,000 minimum value
requirement on any item exempt under the broad language of subsection (a)
against which a creditor seeks relief. But the Trustee’s reading would make the
listing of particular items in the levy provision meaningless surplusage.
Fundamental principles of statutory interpretation require that statutes be
read—to the extent possible—in a manner that gives effect to every word, clause,
and sentence and that does not render any part superfluous. See Perez, 2014 IL
115927, ¶9, 18 N.E.3d at 44. To give all the words and clauses effect here, the
levy provision in subsection (a) must be read as imposing different requirements
for levy on the first category of listed items and the second category comprised
of “any other item exempt under this subsection”—the former requiring court
permission and the latter requiring a $5,000 minimum resale value in addition
to court permission.
The inference drawn from reading the levy provision this way is that the
legislature saw fit to make it easier to levy on some items than others. A possible
reason for the distinction can be gleaned from what the legislature chose to
include as compared to what it excluded. Again, the first category of items
subject to levy without meeting a $5,000 minimum value requirement consists
of “any item of furniture, appliance, electronic device, yard equipment, precious
item, utensils, [or] set of utensils[.]” Aside from “precious items,” each item
identified is among the enumerated examples of “household goods” and
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“personal possessions” in the first part of the subsection. By contrast, the
following items identified as exempt household goods and personal possessions
in the first part of the sentence are conspicuously omitted from the enumerated
list subject to levy in the second part: food, bedding, books, necessary provisions,
household equipment and tools, clothing, pets, personal health aids, and
medications. As for what separates the two categories, one answer lies in the
Illinois exemption statute’s own history.
The adoption of the first exemption statute in Illinois was prompted by a
“humane principle” which was to “provide support for the debtor and his family
and to prevent them from becoming public charges.” Auto Owners Ins. v.
Berkshire, 225 Ill. App. 3d 695, 699-700, 588 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (1992) (citing
Logston, 103 Ill. 2d at 279-80, 469 N.E.2d at 172-73); Good v. Fogg, 61 Ill. 449,
451 (1871). Historically limited to a small number of items essential to not only
a debtor’s basic needs but also future support and items of sentimental value,
subsection (a) now exempts much more. By and large, the enumerated list in the
levy provision is comprised of items that would fall into a category of things which
would not have been exempt under the prior versions of subsection (a). On the
other side of the divide, the examples of household goods and personal
possessions identified in the broad exemption language but not incorporated into
the category of enumerated items in the levy provision are ones that either have
been traditionally protected under subsection (a) or at least evoke the same sense
of humanity consistent with protecting a debtor’s basic needs and future support
along with items of particular personal or sentimental value.
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All that is to say there appears to be a valid reason for imposing different
standards for two separate categories of items subject to levy under subsection
(a). Regardless, the Illinois legislature is presumed to have acted intentionally
when it included some but not all of the enumerated examples of “household
goods” and “personal possessions” in crafting the levy provision of amended
subsection (a), People v. Reed, 2025 IL 130595, ¶101, 280 N.E. 3d 102, 121, and,
in order to give all words of the statute effect, the only fair reading of subsection
(a) is one that permits levy on some items—including precious items like
jewelry—without imposing a minimum value requirement while imposing a
$5,000 minimum resale value requirement for others.
Given their plain and ordinary meaning, the broad exemption provision
and levy exception provision comprising the first sentence of amended
subsection (a)—each on their own as well as together—must be read as to
encompass jewelry. Having concluded as much, the Court turns to the sentence
that immediately follows the first.

3. The $5,000 Jewelry Exemption
The final, stand-alone sentence upon which the Trustee’s argument here
turns provides that a “debtor may exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of
$5,000[.]” 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a). Read in isolation, the Trustee’s interpretation
of the final sentence of subsection (a) as limiting the availability of an exemption
in jewelry to one piece of $5,000 value or less might have some appeal. But the
sentence comes on the heels of the first two provisions already analyzed and,
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when read in the context of the rest of subsection (a) and the exemption statute
as a whole—as rules of construction require, Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶9, 18
N.E.3d at 44—that same sentence takes on quite a different meaning, one more
favorable to debtors in furtherance of the statute’s underlying purpose,
Robinson, 811 F.3d at 270-71; Barker, 768 F.2d at 196.
As discussed, the first part of subsection (a) creates a baseline by which
“all household goods” and “all personal possessions” of a debtor are exempt
without regard to value. Through the second part of subsection (a)—the levy
provision—the Illinois legislature offers a way for creditors to potentially claw
back some of the broad protections provided in the first part. Then comes the
third part, which, in the context of the broader exemption provisions, this Court
construes as a savings clause of sorts that offers debtors an added layer of
protection for one piece of jewelry to counter a creditor’s prospects of levying on
the exempt property.
Reading the personal property exemption statute as a whole, the statutory
scheme is one that offers protection for different types or items of property,
subject to limitations in amount according to the property’s value. In re Rhodes,
147 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). “Some personal property is exempt
regardless of its value[,]” whereas other “property is exempt subject to a value
limitation.” Id. The practical effect of this scheme is that property exemptions
subject to a value limitation leave property vulnerable to creditors to the extent
its value exceeds the allowed amount of the exemption, whereas property that is
exempt regardless of its value enjoys complete protection from creditor action.
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Amended subsection (a) is unique in that provides a blanket exemption
regardless of the property’s value while also preserving a creditor’s ability to
proceed against the exempt property. But, in crafting the provisions of
subsection (a) in this way, the Illinois legislature created a gap in which debtors,
notwithstanding the blanket protections in the first part of the subsection, could
lose their property to creditor levy without being compensated for the exemption.
Of course, the $5,000 resale value requirement in the levy provision
somewhat softens the potentially harsh results of creditor levy; although debtors
would still not be entitled to compensation for their exemption, it at least gives
debtors some breathing room to meet their basic needs and avoid becoming
public charges. But, as discussed, the $5,000 minimum value requirement does
not apply to precious items and other enumerated property in the levy provision.
And, because precious items are synonymous with value, debtors would
therefore be all but certain to lose their exemption in such items as a matter of
course.
On a certain level, this makes perfect sense. It is not hard to imagine the
potential windfalls and abuses to which broad, unlimited exemption protections
could give rise. Left unrestricted, the exemptions offered in subsection (a) could
allow a debtor to protect any number of high-ticket items, from fine art and rare
collectibles to high-end versions of everyday items. Naturally, the legislature saw
fit to constrain unintended outcomes and even went so far as to name precious
items—of which jewelry is a classic example—as a clear candidate for levy. But
discord would be bound to arise between efforts to curb unintended
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consequences and the traditionally recognized exemption for at least some
jewelry under subsection (a) of the Illinois personal property exemption statute.
See Medina, 2017 WL 5633268, at *4 (wedding or engagement ring exempt);
Deacon, 27 F. Supp. 296 (watch, consistory ring, and diamond shirt stud
exempt). Thus the importance of the final sentence of amended subsection (a).
By following the levy exception provision with language allowing a debtor
to “exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000[,]” the Illinois legislature
made a point to single out jewelry and preserve a debtor’s ability to protect one
piece up to $5,000 in value against creditor levy. In doing so, the legislature
accomplished its obvious goal of broadly expanding the scope of personal
property exemptions while also limiting the potential for unintended windfalls
and abuses through similarly broad language all without writing out of the
statute the widely recognized protections for a given amount of jewelry. In other
words, the final sentence of subsection (a) is a necessary component of the whole
rather than a completely unrelated exemption with no connection to the
surrounding provisions of the same subsection within which it was placed.
The Trustee argues that the “one piece of jewelry” language evinces an
obvious intent to limit debtors to exempting a single piece of jewelry and that
reading subsection (a) as the Court does renders the final sentence meaningless.
But as explained, the Court finds the opposite to be true. Subsection (a) can
and—to give every word and clause effect—must be read as exempting jewelry
under the broader exemption language subject to a creditor’s ability to levy save
for a single piece the debtor specifically elects to protect against such efforts. The
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Trustee’s argument also turns on his understanding of the levy provision as
imposing a $5,000 minimum value requirement on all items without distinction
which this Court has already addressed and rejected. But even if the Court were
incorrect in its reading of the levy provision, the Trustee’s reading would not
make the final sentence of the subsection a nullity.
As explained, the Illinois exemption statutes are constructed in a way that
offers protection for different types or specific items of property, subject to
limitations in amount according to the property’s value. Rhodes, 147 B.R. at 447.
Several subsections of the statute provide for claims of exemption up to a
specified value of an interest in a particular item or category of property. See 735
ILCS 5/12-1001(b) (exempting “[t]he debtor’s equity interest, not to exceed
$4,000 in value, . . . in any other property”); 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (exempting
“[t]he debtor’s interest, not to exceed $3,600 in value, in any one motor vehicle”);
735 ILCS 5/12-1001(d) (exempting “[t]he debtor’s equity interest, not to exceed
$2,250 in value, in . . . tools of the trade of the debtor”). Of course, each of these
exemption provisions expressly state that they protect the debtor’s “interest” or
“equity interest” in certain property, and the jewelry provision in subsection (a)
does not use those words to describe the exemption which might suggest it
should be interpreted differently. See In re Marriage of Paris, 2020 IL App (1st)
181116, ¶38, 164 N.E.3d 41, 50 (citation omitted) (“[W]hen the legislature uses
certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intends a
different meaning.”). Even so, the legislature used different words in drafting
subsections (b), (c), and (d), yet courts applying Illinois personal property
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exemption provisions have long construed the term “interest” in subsection (c)
to mean the same thing as the phrase “equity interest” found in subsections (b)
and (d) of the same section. See, e.g., In re Jennings, 107 B.R. 165, 166 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1989); Medaris v. Commercial Bank of Champaign, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1014,
1016, 497 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1986). That the legislature opted to use slightly
different words in amending subsection (a) is therefore not dispositive of
legislative intent.
Similarly, subsections (b) and (c) are both structured in a way that is
naturally read as exempting the debtor’s interest in certain property rather than
the property itself, whereas the structure of the final sentence of amended
subsection (a) could be read as exempting the property as opposed to the debtor’s
interest therein. This strict construction based on sentence structure is
sometimes referred to as the “last antecedent doctrine.” But as one bankruptcy
court explained in declining to construe subsection (h)(4) of the same statute in
such manner, the last antecedent doctrine “is not to be applied when the intent
of the legislature disclosed by the context and reading of the entire statute
requires a different reading.” Rhodes, 147 B.R. at 446-47 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Like subsection (c), the last sentence in amended subsection (a) provides
an exemption in relation to one item of a specified type of property. And similar
to subsections (c) and (d), as well as subsection (h)(4), the final sentence of
subsection (a) refers to a dollar value as a limitation on the exemption.
Accordingly, while ultimately not determinative of the present dispute, the Court
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reads the final sentence of amended subsection (a) of the Illinois personal
property exemption statute as protecting up to $5,000 of value in any one piece
of jewelry notwithstanding minor differences in the words or syntax used. To do
otherwise would lead to disparity in that debtors whose only jewelry is worth
more than $5,000 would simply be denied any protections under the statute and
would contravene the presumption against absurdity and injustice that
underlies principles of statutory construction; to the extent reasonable, statutes
should be construed to avoid absurd, inconvenient, or unjust consequences. See
Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶9, 18 N.E.3d at 44; In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 514-15,
782 N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (2002); Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill. 2d 477, 486,
588 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (1992).
Ultimately, however the levy provision and $5,000 jewelry provision are
construed to operate in a particular situation, it would not change the fact that
the broad exemption language in subsection (a) plainly covers jewelry.
Construing subsection (a) as generally protecting a debtor’s jewelry subject to
possible levy with court permission but also allowing the debtor to protect up to
$5,000 of value in any one piece of jewelry against such levy best gives effect to
all the words, clauses, and sentences of the subsection and statute as a whole
and avoids rendering any part of the statute meaningless. Because subsection
(a) is appropriately interpreted in such manner, the Court finds that a debtor
may claim more than one piece of jewelry exempt thereunder subject to possible
levy save for a single piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000 at the debtor’s
election.
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B. Application of the Statute
Here, the Debtors claimed an exemption in “Costume Jewelry” they valued
at $20, citing 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a) as authority. Because the Court finds the
exemption proper under the broader exemption language of subsection (a), the
Trustee’s objection based on his reading of the statute as limiting the Debtors to
an exemption in a single piece of jewelry will be overruled.
That said, the Debtors’ schedules give no meaningful information as to the
particular items of jewelry being claimed as exempt. Being that the “Costume
Jewelry” scheduled and claimed exempt is apparently of little value, it may not
be consequential in this case. But, like any other case, the Trustee is not required
to accept the value of property ascribed by the Debtors in their schedules, and,
in the event it is revealed that there is potentially meaningful value to be realized,
the Debtors’ exemption, as claimed, might not be enough to save the jewelry from
the levy provisions of the statute. Further, and notwithstanding state law
exemption provisions, a certain level of specificity is required in completing
bankruptcy schedules. In re Harding, 2023 WL 5525039, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2023). Debtors must provide sufficient detail in their schedules “to put
the trustee on notice of the wisdom of further inquiry,” Payne, 775 F.2d at 206,
and among the possible consequences of not doing so is a limitation on
exemptions they may otherwise be entitled to, In re Rosenzweig, 245 B.R. 836,
841 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
But under the facts as known, the Court finds that the Debtors’ claim of
exemption in jewelry under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a) is proper, and the Trustee’s
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objection based on a narrow reading of the statute that excludes a general
exemption in jewelry will be overruled.

IV. Conclusion
In amending the Illinois personal property exemption statute, the
legislature completely rewrote subsection (a). Adding terms and phraseology not
used elsewhere in the statute to craft a new, multi-faceted exemption provision,
the statute certainly would have benefited from more artful drafting.
Nevertheless, the legislature’s intent to broadly expand the protections
historically available to debtors under subsection (a) is manifest. How the new
statute will operate in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code in different
circumstances is beyond the scope of the decision here and is a question left for
another day. For now, it suffices to answer a threshold question by stating that
the exemption in “all household goods” and “all personal possessions” under
subsection (a) of the Illinois personal property exemption, as amended, is broad
enough to include a debtor’s jewelry.
This Opinion is to serve as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
See written Order.
ENTERED: July 24, 2026
/s/ Mary P. Gorman
_________________________________________
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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