Henry v. Hill-Lilly et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LEVAR T. HENRY,
Plaintiff,

v.

JODI HILL-LILLY and ALYSSA
BURROUGHS,
Defendants.
)
)
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)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 3:25-CV-00380 (KAD)

August 14, 2026

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
RE: Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 23, 32)

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:
The self-represented plaintiff, Levar T. Henry, filed this civil rights action for damages
while in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (“DOCCS”) against two employees of the Connecticut Department of Children and
Families (“DCF”): DCF Commissioner Jodi Hill-Lilly and DCF Social Worker Alyssa Burroughs.
Compl., ECF No. 1.
After an initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)(1), the Court permitted Plaintiff to
proceed on his claims of (1) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and substantive due
process violations against Commissioner Hill-Lilly and Social Worker Burroughs; (2) a violation
of his First and Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association against Social Worker
Burroughs; (3) Fourteenth Amendment stigma plus violation against Commissioner Hill-Lilly and
Social Worker Burroughs; and (4) state common-law torts of defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress against Commissioner Hill-Lilly and Social Worker Burroughs. ECF No.
17. The Court dismissed all other claims and clarified that the Initial Review Order permitted
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these claims to proceed without prejudice to Defendants seeking dismissal.
1
Id. at 30.
Defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 23; ECF No. 32.
2
Plaintiff has filed a response to each motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 25; ECF No. 34.
The Court has great sympathy for the Plaintiff, who, with the assistance and support of his
family, has tried his best to be a present father in the life of his daughter, despite navigating
Connecticut’s child protection courts from prison. Plaintiff alleges many errors and otherwise
inappropriate conduct by Defendant Burroughs, and if the allegations are proven, it appears that
the situation involving his daughter could have been handled differently (and better). But, despite
Plaintiff’s many grievances as to how his case was addressed, Plaintiff simply does not adequately
allege the constitutional violations he pursues.
For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
ALLEGATIONS
The Court summarizes the factual allegations from the Complaint which are accepted as
true for purposes of the motions to dismiss.
Since October 2015, Evelyn Verner, the birth mother of Plaintiff’s biological child Jada
(who was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut, in 2015), has been subject to the supervision of DCF
Commissioner Hill-Lilly. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff was determined to be Jada’s biological father
in 2018 after a paternity test. Id. ¶¶ 14–16.

1
Plaintiff’s request for relief sought compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants. IRO at 31.
Any claims for damages against Defendants (both state employees) in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).

2
Both Defendants have provided Plaintiff with the Notice to Self-Represented Litigant as required under
this District’s Local Rule 12(a). See ECF No. 23-1, at 22–26; ECF No. 32-1, at 20–24.
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In January 2019, while in DOCCS custody, Plaintiff petitioned the Connecticut Superior
Court for visitation rights with Jada, and he petitioned the Connecticut Probate Court to have Jada’s
last name changed to Henry. Id. ¶ 17. The Superior Court denied his petition for visitation on
the grounds that it was inappropriate for a child to visit him at the DOCCS prison. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiff wrote to the court to request a notice of appeal, but the court clerk allegedly
insisted he submit a request to reargue his case. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff later explained that he would
be on post-release supervision and needed an order for visitation to leave the State of New York
or he would risk violation of his parole. Id. ¶ 20. The Superior Court left the case open so that
Plaintiff could report to the court on a designated date after his release. Id. Plaintiff was released
from prison in late 2019. See id. ¶ 22.
In February or March 2020, after several court continuances due to Verner’s failure to
appear, the Connecticut Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s petition for visitation. Id. ¶¶ 22–24.
In March 2020, the Connecticut Probate Court granted Plaintiff’s petition to change Jada’s last
name on her birth certificate to Henry, and Plaintiff received a copy of the corrected birth
certificate. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. In May 2020, the Connecticut Superior Court found Verner in
contempt for failing to follow the visitation order. Id. ¶ 27.
In March 2021, Jada informed Plaintiff that she was afraid of a man associated with Verner
known as “Popi.” Id. ¶ 30. An order of protection was pending against Popi and another male
associate of Verner known as “Jefferys.” Id. In March 2021, Plaintiff and his son filed a petition
for custody of Jada that included allegations about Jada’s fear of Popi. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff heard
from his son that Jada’s living conditions were unacceptable. Id. ¶ 33. In June 2021, Verner still
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refused to comply with the Connecticut Superior Court orders. Id. ¶ 40. Nonetheless, DCF and
probation ignored all of the alerts from the court. Id.
On June 19, 2021, Plaintiff was arrested in New York. Id. ¶ 41. In July 2023, Plaintiff
reentered DOCCS custody. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff maintained contact with Jada, speaking to her
twice a week while in DOCCS custody in 2023. Id. ¶¶ 43–44. During his incarceration, Verner
told Plaintiff that DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly “insist[ed]” that there was no person named Levar
Henry in existence. Id. ¶ 44.
In August 2023, Plaintiff filed a DOCCS Proximity to Minor Child Transfer Request
through his Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator. Id. ¶ 45. He listed all of his minor children,
including Jada, on his application. Id. Verner, who was under DCF supervision, approved of the
application. Id. In January 2024, Plaintiff was moved to Sing Sing Correctional Facility in
Westchester County to participate in the program to enhance families. Id.
On July 8, 2024, Plaintiff had a scheduled call with DCF Social Worker Burroughs, who
advised him that Verner was being charged with neglect. Id. ¶ 52. She noted that Verner would
not answer telephone calls from DCF. Id. Plaintiff responded that he had spoken to Verner
recently and that her daughters, Jada and Khloe, were at summer camp. Id. Burroughs was upset
that Plaintiff had this information but she did not. Id.
Later that day, Plaintiff was served with a petition filed by DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly
and Social Worker Burroughs in Connecticut Superior Court. Id. ¶ 54. It charged him with
neglect for permitting a child to live under injurious conditions. Id. DCF Social Worker
Burroughs had not advised Plaintiff during the telephone call that he would be a respondent in the
Neglect Petition. Id.
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Plaintiff alleges that the Petition was authored by Hill-Lilly and Burroughs. Id. ¶ 56. He
claims the Petition damages his reputation because it refers to him as an “alleged father” and states:
The Family has a history with DCF dating back to 2015. There has been a total of
9 reports of which 2 were substantiated due to physical neglect and emotional
neglect.

Id. ¶¶ 55, 57. He complains that DCF Commissioner and Social Worker Burroughs misspelled
his name as “Lever Henry” instead of “Levar Henry” in their sworn statements; referred to his
daughter as “Jada Verner” rather than her legal name “Jada Henry”; and misrepresented that DCF
made “multiple attempts” to contact him at Sing Sing Correctional facility. Id. ¶¶ 56, 58, 59.
Plaintiff’s Freedom of Information requests revealed that Social Worker Burroughs made only one
telephone call to Plaintiff’s facility to schedule the telephone call with Plaintiff on July 8, 2024.
Id. ¶ 61.
In a second call in late July 2024, Burroughs advised Plaintiff that she had tried to call him
at Sing Sing for a year, and Plaintiff informed her that he had not been housed at Sing Sing for a
year. Id. ¶¶ 58, 63. She informed him that Verner had been incarcerated and that there was
nothing he could do about Jada’s custody because he too was incarcerated. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff
asked her to contact his ex-wife to pick up Jada, but Burroughs replied that DCF would not likely
honor his request due to the pending neglect charges. Id. ¶ 69.
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff was served with an Order of Temporary Custody. Id. ¶ 64.
Plaintiff complains that that Commissioner Hill-Lilly’s motion continued to refer to “Jada Verner”
rather than “Jada Henry”; stated that Plaintiff had placed his child in immediate physical danger
due to his DOCCS incarceration since 2021; falsely represented that there were “no court orders
in effect concerning custody or visitation concerning said child[;]” and erroneously indicated that
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Jada was the younger child rather than Khloe (Verner’s other daughter). Id. ¶¶ 64–65. Plaintiff
complains that he is being wrongly named for assaults by the “father of [Verner’s] younger child”
because he is incarcerated in New York and is not a resident of Connecticut. Id. ¶¶ 65, 68.
Plaintiff claims that the falsehoods issued by DCF, including the misstatements about an
inability to contact him, have negatively affected his parental rights concerning Jada and his
relationships with his other minor children. Id. ¶ 67. He was allegedly issued a misbehavior
report by DOCCS due to the false and defamatory statement by DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly and
Social Worker Burroughs. Id. ¶ 71.
DCF placed Jada with people not associated with her family because family did not reside
in Connecticut. Id. ¶ 70. After July 9, 2024, Plaintiff was able to make only two successful
telephone calls to Jada on October 6, 2024, and October 13, 2024. Id. ¶ 72. After Jada was later
moved to another home, Social Worker Burroughs informed Plaintiff he was not allowed to call
or write to his child at her new location because of the pending neglect charges. Id.
On November 4, 2024, Burroughs contacted Plaintiff’s Offender Rehabilitation
Coordinator to advise that Plaintiff could speak with Jada at 4:30 PM on Fridays by making a third-
party telephone call through Burroughs’s telephone number. Id. ¶ 73. Plaintiff informed his
Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator that third-party telephone calls may be prohibited in the
prison. Id. On November 8, 2024, Plaintiff called Burroughs, who advised she and Jada were
stuck in traffic but would see if they could talk; she then never “switched back” to Plaintiff. Id.
¶ 74. On November 15, 2024, Plaintiff again attempted to make contact with Jada, but Burroughs
did not answer the telephone call. Id. Plaintiff claims that DCF has blocked Plaintiff and his
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children from contact with Jada, id. ¶ 75, and DCF is not facilitating his reunification with Jada.
Id. ¶¶ 77, 81–82.
DCF has not responded to his grievances and information requests. Id. ¶ 84. Plaintiff
has not spoken to Jada for several months while she is in DCF care. Id. ¶ 85. Plaintiff claims
DCF is illegally blocking Jada from contact with her father and siblings without cause. Id. ¶¶ 86–
87.
Judicial Notice of Court Decisions
3

The Connecticut Superior Court child protection proceedings as to Jada are integral to
Plaintiff’s claims of Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. Thus, the Court may take
judicial notice of the Superior Court decisions from the matter of In re Jada V., No. F04 CP22-
013852-A (available on Westlaw), and unpublished Superior Court orders for In re Jada V., No.
F04 CP24-14560-A. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Judicial notice is taken “not to prove the truth of
their contents but only to determine what the documents stated.” See Kramer v. Time Warner
Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Glob. Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New
York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006).
In a decision issued on August 25, 2023, the Connecticut Superior Court explained:
On November 29, 2022, the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families
(DCF) filed an Order for Temporary Custody (OTC) and a petition alleging Neglect
on behalf of the minor child Jada V. Jada V. was born . . . [in] 2015 to mother
Evelyn V. and putative father Henry L. Evelyn V. has another younger child
Khloe J. . . . who is not a subject of this petition. Khloe lives with her father.

After a contested hearing on December 15, 2022, the court (Burgdorff, J.) sustained
the Order for Temporary Custody. The neglect petition alleged the statutory
grounds of 1) abandonment by respondent parent; and 2) that the child was

3
A court’s consideration of motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may include material
extrinsic to the complaint if the materials are (1) integral to the complaint, or (2) facts appropriate for judicial notice.
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).
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permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her
wellbeing. DCF is seeking an adjudication of neglect and commitment to the
Department. A psychological evaluation was ordered by the court (McLaughlin,
J.) on April 25, 2023.

In re Jada V., No. F04 CP22-013852-A, 2023 WL 5926738, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
2023).
4
At a trial on July 18, 2023, the court determined “[s]ervice was confirmed for [Plaintiff]
by notice of publication” but he was defaulted for failure to appear. Id. The court noted the
mother, Evelyn V., was present and represented by counsel. Id.
The Superior Court found the following facts were supported by the preponderance of the
evidence:
Jada V. was born . . . [in] 2015 to mother Evelyn V. and father Henry L. The
father’s whereabouts are unknown at this time.
5

This matter came to the attention of DCF on November 18, 2022 after DCF received
a report from the Waterbury police department that Jada’s uncle was requesting
police assistance because Jada had been dropped off to his home on November 11,
2022 and Jada’s mother Evelyn was not responding to his calls to come and pick
her up.

In July 2022, Jada’s mother, Evelyn made a family arrangement with her great-aunt
in New Jersey to take care of Jada during the time that she would be incarcerated
at York Correctional. Evelyn was incarcerated from July 2022 until October 24,
2022. Three weeks after Evelyn was released, on November 11, 2022, Evelyn’s
aunt dropped Jada off at her uncle’s house. Evelyn did not initially know that her
great-aunt was taking Jada back to Connecticut. Evelyn was made aware once
Jada was back in Connecticut, but Evelyn had not yet properly secured suitable
housing. Evelyn informed DCF worker Hernandez that she was living with a
boyfriend in a rooming house and was unable to bring Jada with her. Evelyn was
attempting to obtain her own housing.

4
Although the decision refers to Jada’s mother as Evelyn V. (her first name followed by the initial for her
last name), it refers to Plaintiff as Henry L. (his last name followed by the initial of his first name). This is perhaps
a perpetuation of the types of errors which are alleged to have plagued Jada’s child protection proceedings.

5
Plaintiff’s name is again incorrectly reversed. See supra at n.4. And it is difficult to understand how the
Juvenile Court concluded that Plaintiff’s whereabouts were unknown. Presumably, this was the evidence presented
by DCF. However, as Plaintiff was incarcerated in New York, it would have been a simple endeavor to locate him.
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As it relates to placement, several of Evelyn’s family members were contacted as
possible resources for Jada. However, after DCF completed an assessment of the
recommended family members, none of them were able to be used for placement
because they were either unwilling or they were ruled out. As a result, Jada could
not be placed with any family. Jada is currently placed in a non-relative foster
home.

Id. at *1–2. The court determined the evidence showed “that on or before . . . November 29, 2022,
Jada was neglected in that she was permitted to live under conditions and circumstances injurious
to her well-being” but it was “in the child’s best interest to return the child to the mother’s care
and custody under a 6-month period of protective supervision.” Id. at *3–4.
An unpublished 2025 Connecticut Superior Court decision on a permanency plan for Jada
reveals that DCF filed another Neglect Petition on June 27, 2024, and (consistent with Plaintiff’s
allegations) another Order for Temporary Custody on July 24, 2024; that the Order for Temporary
Custody of Jada was sustained on October 21, 2024, after a contested hearing; and that DCF’s
permanency plan filed in June 2025 called for a transfer of guardianship of Jada. In re Jada V.,
No. F04 CP24-14560-A (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025).
6
The trial on the neglect petition and
proposed permanency plan for Jada took place over three separate days in September and October
2025, with both parents of Jada present and represented by counsel. Id. at 1. The Superior Court
found that the preponderance of the evidence showed the Order of Temporary Custody was issued
in July 2024 because there was no available caregiver for Jada. Her mother was incarcerated
following a fight with her ex-boyfriend; Plaintiff remained incarcerated; and a relative with whom
Jada was residing was no longer available as a “placement resource.” Id. at 3. Jada was first
placed in a non-relative foster home and thereafter a relative foster home. Id. at 6. The Superior

6
This decision is attached to Burroughs’s motion to dismiss at ECF No. 32-3.
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Court ultimately rejected DCF’s permanency plan to transfer guardianship and ordered Jada to be
placed with her mother under a period of protective supervision. Id. at 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards that govern a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are well established.
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
This “plausibility” requirement is “not akin to a probability requirement,” but it “asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; Charles v. Orange County, 925
F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (same). In addition, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” or “to accept as true allegations that are wholly
conclusory.” Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Defendants advance several grounds for dismissal of this action. ECF No. 23-1; ECF No.
32-1. The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 of Title 42 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” “The common
elements to all § 1983 claims are: ‘(1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by a
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person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of must have deprived a
person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.’” Lee v. City of Troy, 520 F. Supp. 3d 191, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Pitchell v.
Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Personal Involvement of Commissioner Hill-Lilly
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Commissioner Hill-Lilly must be
dismissed because the allegations do not plausibly suggest her direct personal involvement in any
alleged constitutional violation. The Court takes judicial notice of information on the DCF
website showing that Hill-Lilly served as its Commissioner from January through September 1,
2025.
7

A plaintiff seeking monetary damages from a defendant must allege facts that establish the
personal involvement of that defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. See Wright v.
Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement
of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under
§ 1983.’” (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991)). This is true
with respect to supervisory officials as well. Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir.
2020) (a plaintiff must “plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation
directly against the official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability” in order to

7
A court may take judicial notice of the dates of appointment or election of a public official. Watley v.
Dep’t of Child. & Fams., No. 3:13-CV-1858 (RNC), 2019 WL 7067043, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2019) (citing
Gladden v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7822 (PKC), 2013 WL 4647193, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (taking
judicial notice of biographical information on government website). Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of
information on the Connecticut government website about Commissioner Hill-Lilly’s appointment. See Governor
Lamont Congratulates DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly on Accepting Position with National Child Advocacy
Organization, CT.gov (Aug. 13, 2015), https://portal.ct.gov/governor/news/press-releases/2025/08-2025/governor-
lamont-congratulates-dcf-commissioner-hill-lilly.
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hold a state official liable for damages under § 1983. “[I]t is not enough for [a plaintiff] to show
that [a defendant] was negligent, or even grossly negligent, in her supervision of the correctional
officers or in failing to act on the information she had”). “A supervisor’s ‘mere knowledge’ . . .
is not sufficient because that knowledge does not amount[] to the supervisor’s violating the
Constitution.” Id. at 616–17 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Jada’s mother, Verner, was under the supervision of
DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 12–13.
8
He also alleges that Verner informed
him that Connecticut DCF Commissioner Hill-Lilly “insist[ed]” that there was no person named
Levar Henry in existence, id. ¶ 44, and in 2024, he was served with a Neglect Petition, in which
Commissioner Hill-Lilly (and Burroughs) misspelled his name, identified Jada by the wrong last
name, referred to him as an “alleged father,” and made misrepresentations about his neglect of
Jada. Id. ¶ 54–55, 57, 64.
Plaintiff appears to have concluded that Commissioner Hill-Lilly herself filed the Neglect
Petition and Order for Temporary Custody. Plaintiff misapprehends the procedural reality of
child protection proceedings. All pleadings filed by the State in the Superior Court for Juvenile
Matters are filed in the name of the Commissioner at the time of filing. See, e.g., In re Teagan
K.-O., 335 Conn. 745 (2020) (noting petition filed by DCF Commissioner); In re Joseph R., No.
U06-CP21-012810-A, 2025 WL 2125278, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 17, 2025) (same). Hill-
Lilly’s position as the commissioner of DCF, standing alone, “is not sufficient to plausibly show

8
The Connecticut Superior Court decisions—No. F04 CP22-013852-A and No. F04 CP24-14560-A—
reflect that Verner was placed under protective supervision, a court disposition providing for continued superior court
jurisdiction over the matter with the ability to modify an original disposition. See Pace v. Montalvo, 186 F. Supp. 2d
90, 99 (D. Conn. 2001) (under protective supervision the “court retains continuing jurisdiction and involvement in the
case”); In re Stanley D., 45 Conn. App. 606, 611 (1997) (noting that the court retains jurisdiction under protective
supervision, and if the court finds parental noncompliance with its orders, the court may modify the original
disposition), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 910 (1997).
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[her] personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.” McCoy v. Admin. for Child.’s
Servs., No. 23-CV-3019 (SJB), 2024 WL 4379584, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2024 WL 4344791 (Sept. 30, 2024).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not describe Hill-Lilly’s direct personal involvement in the child
protection proceedings involving Jada and therefore fail to plausibly allege that she is liable for
any deprivation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Thus, the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for damages against Commissioner Hill-Lilly.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violations
With consideration of the judicially noticed Superior Court decisions, the Court reviews
whether Plaintiff states plausible claims of Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due
process violations against Defendant Burroughs.
Procedural Due Process
The Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process violation out of a concern that he may have sustained a deprivation of his constitutionally
protected parental rights without a hearing. IRO at 15–16.
A procedural due process claim requires: (1) the existence of a protected property or liberty
interest and (2) deprivation of that interest without due process. Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t,
692 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2012). If there was a deprivation of a protected property or liberty
interest by the state, the court must consider the process by which such deprivation occurred and
determine whether that process was constitutionally adequate. See Zinnermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 126 (1990). “The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of
serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” Mathews v.
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Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Notice is reasonable if it is “calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950) (citations omitted).
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the “care, custody, and control of their
children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 759 (2d
Cir. 2000); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the government
has a compelling interest in the welfare of children, and the relationship between parent and child
may be investigated and terminated by the state provided constitutionally adequate procedures are
followed. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). Thus, “[n]otwithstanding the
existence of this constitutional right, the right to family integrity does not include a constitutional
right to be free from child abuse investigations.” Roach v. Clark, No. 5:15-CV-408 (LEK) (ATB),
2015 WL 4067504, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
9

Accordingly, “before parents may be deprived of the care, custody, or management of their
children without their consent, due process—ordinarily a court proceeding resulting in an order
permitting removal—must be accorded to them.” Schweitzer v. Crofton, 580 F. App’x 6, 10 (2d
Cir. 2014) (summary order) (quoting Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Except in emergency circumstances, judicial process
must be provided before removal of the child from his or her parent’s custody. Southerland, 680

9
The due process rights available to plaintiffs in child custody matters have been analyzed under both
procedural and substantive provisions. Trombley v. O’Neill, 929 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95–96 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).
Procedural due process claims challenge the procedure by which a removal is effected, and substantive due process
claims challenge the fact of the removal itself. Id. (citing Bruker v. City of New York, 92 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
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F.3d at 142 (citing Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 759–60 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also K.W. ex rel.
K.A. v. City of New York, No. 24-3042, 2026 WL 1391967, at *13 (2d Cir. May 19, 2026)
(summary order) (same).
The Connecticut General Statutes provide procedural safeguards for child welfare removal
orders.
10
Relevant to this case, Neglect Petition proceedings are governed by Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46b-129, and “are comprised of two parts, adjudication and disposition.” In re Olivia W., 223
Conn. App. 173, 183 (2024). Section 46b-129 sets forth procedures for parental notice and
opportunity to be heard prior to entry of an Order of Temporary Custody. See Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46b-129(a)–(h).
11
Additionally, an Order of Temporary Custody is subject to an immediate
appeal. In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383, 402 (2001).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was served with the 2024 Neglect Petition and Order of
Temporary Custody while he remained incarcerated. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 64. He does not appear to
advance any claim that the Order of Temporary Custody, which was subsequently sustained, was
obtained or sustained in violation of his procedural due process rights. As an incarcerated parent,
he was unavailable to take custody of Jada. Thereafter, however, the court convened a trial on
the underlying neglect petition in conjunction with the permanency plan proposed for Jada.
12
As

10
Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112 sets forth the process and elements DCF must prove for a petition
to terminate parental rights.

11
Section 46b-129(h)provides: “If any parent or guardian fails, after due notice of the hearing scheduled
pursuant to subsection (g) of this section and without good cause, to appear at the scheduled date for a contested
hearing on the order of temporary custody or order to appear, the court may enter or sustain an order of temporary
custody.”

12
When DCF has custody of a child, whether by virtue of an Order of Temporary Custody (as was the case
here) or following an adjudication of a Neglect Petition, DCF is required to do permanency planning and to propose
to the Superior Court a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child. The child’s parents have a right to
be heard as to whether the proposed permanency plan is in the child’s best interests or whether an alternative plan
should be approved.
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reflected in the In re Jada decision, Plaintiff was afforded notice and opportunity to participate in
the hearing on the neglect petition and permanency plan for Jada prior to any adjudication of either,
that he was indeed present, and that he participated in the proceedings and was represented by
counsel. See ECF No. 32-3, at 1.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim of Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process violation to the extent it derives from the Juvenile Court proceedings in 2024 and
2025.
Stigma Plus Deprivation Without Due Process
On initial review, the Court construed Plaintiff’s claim of constitutional defamation to
assert a Fourteenth Amendment “stigma plus” claim on the basis of his asserted temporary loss of
child custody resulting from defamatory statements in the DCF filings and his inability to
challenge the custody proceedings. IRO at 18–19.
13
The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff
was issued a misbehavior report while in DOCCS custody “[a]s a result of the false and defamatory
statements by DCF Hill-Lilly and Burroughs.” Compl. ¶ 71.
While defamation claims usually sound in state rather than constitutional law, a plaintiff
may assert a procedural due process claim on the so-called “stigma plus” theory by alleging “a
stigmatizing statement plus a deprivation of a tangible interest.” Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77, 81
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 2005)); see
DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (“‘Stigma plus’ refers to a claim brought

13
The Court noted Plaintiff satisfied the first element of stigma based on the asserted false statements about
his being Jada’s “alleged father,” his involvement with several incidents of child neglect from 2015–2024, and his
role in acts of assault and child endangerment. IRO at 19 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 54–58, 64, 65, 68).
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17
for injury to one’s reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some ‘tangible interest’
or property right (the plus), without adequate process.”).
“A “stigma-plus” claim is a species of claim for the deprivation of a liberty interest without
due process.” Holley v. Cook, No. 3:20-CV-170 (MPS), 2021 WL 5302107, at *7 (D. Conn. Nov.
15, 2021). “‘Stigma plus’ refers to a claim brought for injury to one’s reputation (the stigma)
coupled with the deprivation of some ‘tangible interest’ . . . (the plus), without adequate process.”
DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)). To establish a stigma-
plus liberty interest, a plaintiff must show two elements: “(1) the utterance of a statement
‘sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved false, and
that he or she claims is false,’ and (2) a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration
of the plaintiff’s status or rights.” Vega, 596 F.3d at 81 (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383
F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)). “Th[e] state-imposed alteration of status or burden must be ‘in
addition to the stigmatizing statement.’” Id.; see also Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 114 (2d
Cir. 1999) (defining “stigma plus” as the “loss of reputation coupled with some other tangible
element” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “However, ‘deleterious effects [flowing] directly
from a sullied reputation,’ standing alone, do not constitute a ‘plus’ under the ‘stigma plus’
doctrine.” Sadallah, 383 F.3d at 38 (citations omitted) (quoting Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,
1001 (2d Cir. 1994)).
For the first element, “a plaintiff generally is required only to raise the falsity of these
stigmatizing statements as an issue, not prove they are false.” Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d
322, 330 (2d Cir. 2004). Defendants maintain that the challenged statements are non-actionable
in this context because, as statements made in court filings, they are privileged. ECF No. 32-1,
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at 9; see Casey v. Pallito, No. 5:12-CV-284, 2016 WL 96157, at *9 (D. Vt. Jan. 7, 2016) (“Because
Defendants’ remaining statements were made in court filings, they are privileged and cannot form
the basis of Plaintiff’s ‘stigma plus’ claim.”); Sharpe v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5494 (BMC),
2013 WL 2356063, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (holding that “[e]ven if these . . . statements
could be considered constitutionally stigmatizing . . . they cannot support a ‘stigma-plus’ claim
because statements made in the course of court proceedings are absolutely privileged under New
York common law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But it is not entirely clear that the state
common-law litigation privilege applies to claims brought under a federal statute such as § 1983.
See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Day & Zimmerman NPS, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 179, 197
(D. Conn. 2017) (noting “the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution likely prevents
[defendant] from prevailing on its argument that Connecticut’s common law litigation privilege
protects it from liability under . . . a federal statute”); see Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S.
277, 284 (1980) (“Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal
statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a
basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that
the proper construction may be enforced.”).
The Court need not decide this issue, because even if the litigation privilege does not apply
to preclude this claim, and even if Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a viable stigma-plus liberty
interest,
14
“the availability of adequate process defeats a stigma-plus claim.” Segal v. City of New

14
Plaintiff alleges that he received a misconduct report as a result of the false statements. The allegedly
defamatory statements along with this state action could, at least arguably, provide a factual basis for the “stigma plus”
due process claim.
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19
York, 459 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Balentine v. Tremblay, 554 F. App’x 58, 61 (2d
Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“[T]he adequacy of the process by which Balentine was placed on
the online registry is an inquiry in the doctrinal analysis distinct from the existence of a ‘stigma-
plus’ liberty or property right.”). Because ultimately, a “stigma plus” claim is still, at its core,
about the process received. As noted, Plaintiff alleges that he was served with the 2024 Neglect
Petition and Order of Temporary Custody. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 64. While he takes issue with the
allegations, he does not challenge the determination that he was unable to have custody of Jada,
nor does he challenge the Court’s sustaining of the Order of Temporary Custody. Thereafter,
while not in custody, Plaintiff received both notice and the opportunity to heard as to the Neglect
Petition, as well as the then-pending proposed permanency plan. Again, as revealed in the 2025
Superior Court In re Jada decision, adequate procedural safeguards of notice and a hearing were
available and implemented prior to the Superior Court’s determination of neglect and the proposed
permanency plan for Jada. See ECF No. 32-3, at 1.
The Court concludes Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support an inference that Defendants
acted to deprive him of constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards in connection with the
2024 Neglect Petition and Order of Temporary Custody, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of
Fourteenth Amendment “stigma plus” deprivation is dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Substantive Due Process Violation Due to Parental Rights Deprivation
To state a substantive due process claim arising out of the deprivation of a protected liberty
or property interest, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that defendant’s “alleged acts . . . were
arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in the constitutional sense, not merely incorrect or
ill-advised.” Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369–70 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations and
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20
internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough that the government act be “incorrect or ill-
advised”; it must be “conscience-shocking.” Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211
(2d Cir. 1995). “Only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the
constitutional sense and therefore unconstitutional.” Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 600 (quotation
marks omitted).
“Parents have a substantive right under the Due Process Clause to remain together with
their children without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.” Trombley,
929 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (quoting Southerland, 680 F.3d at 142). But this right must be balanced by
the “compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in
circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves.”
Id. at 95–96 (quoting McCaul v. Ardsley Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F. App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged egregious interference with his parental rights to support a
substantive due process violation. There is no indication that Plaintiff was arbitrarily deprived of
his parental rights, even with the alleged inaccuracies in DCF’s 2024 Neglect Petition. And while,
if proven, Defendant Burroughs’s conduct in cutting off phone calls; restricting phone contact;
overstating her efforts to engage with Plaintiff while he was incarcerated; and otherwise being
inattentive to Plaintiff’s requests, do not speak well of her competency or professionalism, nor are
they so conscience-shocking as to implicate substantive due process. And as Plaintiff himself
acknowledges in the Complaint, he was incarcerated for much of the time at issue and therefore
unable to serve as Jada’s primary caregiver. See ECF No. 32-3, at 3; see Cox v. Warwick Valley
Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Where there is no actual loss of custody, no
substantive due process claim can lie.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint
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21
fails to allege he sustained a deprivation of his parental rights sufficient to support a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim.
Intimate Association
The Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on a claim for violation of his constitutional right
to intimate association because his factual allegations suggest that Burroughs prevented him from
having contact with Jada. IRO at 18.
“[T]he freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.” Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987). While the right of association derives from both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–19 (1984), the
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause affords protection for the right to engage
in “highly personal relationships” or intimate association, while the First Amendment applies for
claims involving protected speech or retaliation. Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 135–36 (2d Cir.
2002); see, e.g., Mulqueen v. Herkimer Cnty. Child Prot. Servs., No. 6:22-CV-1301 (ATB), 2023
WL 4931679, at *7–8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
756833 (Feb. 23, 2024) (noting First Amendment applies “[w]here a plaintiff is allegedly retaliated
against for the First Amendment activities of a family member and asserts a claim based on
intimate association,” but Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis applies
“[w]here the intimate association right at issue is tied to familial relationships and is independent
of First Amendment retaliation concerns”). But the Supreme Court has observed that “freedom
of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration,” and “[s]ome curtailment
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22
of that freedom must be expected in the prison context.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131
(2003).
15

On review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a claim that
Burroughs violated his right to intimate association under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff
has not alleged that Burroughs retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights,
see, e.g., Garten v. Hochman, No. 08-CV-9425 (PGG), 2010 WL 2465479, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June
16, 2010), and thus, his claim is subject to the analysis under the substantive due process clause.
See Lowery v. Carter, No. 07-CV-7684 (SCR), 2010 WL 4449370, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010)
(“When the right of intimate association does not implicate any First Amendment speech or
retaliation concerns, as is the case here, the court must analyze the case exclusively as a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim.”). As explained above, see supra at pp. 19–20, “[t]o
state a claim for a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state
action was ‘so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would not
countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.’” Uwadiegwu v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of the Cnty. of Suffolk, 91 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Cox v.
Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 2011)), aff’d, 639 F. App’x 13 (2d
Cir. 2016).
As discussed above, the allegations regarding Defendant Burroughs’s conduct do not speak
well of Defendant Burroughs, and they are (and were) certainly upsetting for the Plaintiff, but the

15
Courts in this Circuit have observed that neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has clarified
the exact boundaries of the right to intimate association for incarcerated individuals. See Alvarez v. Bause, No. 9:22-
CV-186 (LEK), 2023 WL 1765415, at *4–5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2023) (discussing case law). Further, there is little
Second Circuit guidance on an inmate’s right to intimate association with their minor children. See id. at *5
(collecting cases). However, district courts in this Circuit have generally applied the Second Circuit’s test for non-
inmates, in which the Court must determine whether the claim falls under the First Amendment or Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process.
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conduct, even if proven, is not arbitrary, egregious, or conscience-shocking enough to support a
claim for a violation of his substantive due process rights. See Uwadiegwu, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 393,
399 (finding no violation of right to intimate association where, inter alia, family court denied
plaintiff of custody and instituted no-contact order). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
claim of constitutional deprivation based on infringement of his right to intimate association with
Jada.
State Law Claims
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and defamation. ECF No. 23-1, at 12–13, 19–20; ECF No. 32-1, at 9–10, 16–
17.
A federal court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
which provides that “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Under § 1367(c),
a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, as relevant here, “the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” “[T]he district court may,
at its discretion, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even where it has
dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.” Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6
Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding, courts regularly decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all federal claims are disposed. See, e.g., Est. of Ferrara
v. United Pub. Serv. Emps. Union, No. 3:18-CV-527 (VAB), 2020 WL 7714542, at *12 (D. Conn.
Dec. 29, 2020); Salatto v. City of Milford, No. 3:08-CV-1071 (MRK), 2012 WL 774612, at *15
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(D. Conn. Mar. 7, 2012); Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001)
(collecting cases). Indeed, “[w]hen all federal claims are dismissed, district courts should
generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.” Collins v.
Feder, No. 3:23-CV-71 (KAD), 2024 WL 5058435, at *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2024).
Accordingly, the Court declines, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. These claims must be dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is free to pursue
these claims in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23 and 32) are
GRANTED. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, and such claims are dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 14th day of August, 2026.
/s/ Kari A. Dooley
KARI A. DOOLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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