USA v. Brown

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
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No. 25-50728
Summary Calendar
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United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

William Jefferson Brown, Jr.,

Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:23-CR-177-1
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Before Clement, Haynes, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
†

Per Curiam:
*

William Jefferson Brown Jr. appeals his conviction for possessing a
firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues
that the district court should have suppressed evidence of the firearm
_____________________
†
Judge Haynes concurs in the judgment only.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 17, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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because it was seized during an unconstitutionally prolonged traffic stop.
Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I
Brown was arrested after a traffic stop that arose from a narcotics
surveillance operation. A detective received a tip from a confidential
informant that narcotics were going to be delivered to and sold from a
residence in Killeen, Texas, so the detective surveilled the residence. The
detective learned that two brothers with extensive criminal history in selling
narcotics lived at the residence. The informant had told the detective that he
would leave the residence via rideshare because the informant was not
allowed to be in the residence during narcotics deliveries. When the detective
arrived at the residence, he observed the informant leave in a rideshare. Soon
after, the detective watched several people park at the residence, walk into
the house, stay for a minute or two, and then drive away. Based on his
experience, the detective believed this behavior was indicative of narcotics
sales.
As part of the operation, the detective dispatched officers to follow
vehicles leaving the residence and stop them if they observed a traffic offense.
The first driver officers stopped after leaving the residence was arrested for
possession of methamphetamine. Shortly after that driver left the residence,
the detective observed Brown park at the residence, exit his vehicle carrying
a backpack, enter the residence, and leave after a few minutes. As Brown
drove off, the detective radioed another officer, who followed Brown in an
unmarked vehicle. That officer saw Brown fail to stop before a stop line and
crosswalk. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c). The officer then
relayed that information to Officer Justin Asmus, a canine officer who was
driving a marked vehicle.
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Officer Asmus initiated a traffic stop. When Officer Asmus asked for
Brown’s license and proof of insurance, Brown immediately handed over his
license, but he had to call his wife for the insurance information. Officer
Asmus then asked Brown to step out of the vehicle and move to the sidewalk
to talk. Brown initially refused, but he eventually exited the vehicle after
calling his wife and arguing with Office Asmus for three minutes. Once out
of the vehicle, Brown engaged Officer Asmus in unrelated conversation for
two minutes while Officer Asmus conducted the traffic stop. Brown’s wife
then sent him proof of insurance, which Brown showed to Officer Asmus.
Officer Asmus asked for consent to search Brown’s vehicle; Brown declined.
Officer Asmus immediately informed Brown that he was going to
conduct a dog sniff. Officer Asmus’s dog alerted to the driver’s side door of
Brown’s vehicle within one minute. Officer Asmus then searched Brown’s
vehicle, in which he found a revolver in Brown’s backpack, but no narcotics.
In all, fourteen minutes elapsed from the time Officer Asmus stopped
Brown’s vehicle to the moment the dog alerted.
Brown, who had previously been convicted of three felonies, was
charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Brown moved to suppress the firearm, arguing, in part, that it
was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because Officer Asmus
unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. After a hearing, the magistrate judge
recommended that the district court deny the motion. The district court
adopted the recommendation over Brown’s objection and denied the motion.
Brown entered a conditional plea agreement, and the district court sentenced
him to 120 months of imprisonment. Brown timely appealed.
II
On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because Officer Asmus did not diligently pursue, or
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otherwise unreasonably prolonged, the traffic stop. We review the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.
United States v. Reyes, 963 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020).
Traffic stops are seizures subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
protection “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. We assess the reasonableness of a traffic stop under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), meaning we must determine if the stop was “justified at
its inception” and “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the [stop] in the first place.” Id. at 20; see
United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013). Brown does not
challenge the initial stop of his vehicle, so we must decide only whether the
duration of the traffic stop was reasonable.
The purpose of a traffic stop is to address a traffic violation, so a stop
“may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez
v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (cleaned up). “Authority for the
seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed.” Id. Such tasks often include “checking the
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against
the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Id. at 355. At bottom, “officers must diligently pursue the
investigation of the traffic violation.” Reyes, 963 F.3d at 487.
That said, an officer may take additional investigative steps unrelated
to the purpose of the traffic stop, but “he may not do so in a way that prolongs
the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. “If the officer develops
reasonable suspicion of [additional criminal] activity ‘in the course of the
stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the
detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled
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or confirmed.’” Reyes, 963 F.3d at 487–88 (quoting United States v. Banuelos-
Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Here, Officer Asmus did not prolong the traffic stop, and he diligently
pursued his investigation of Brown’s alleged traffic violation. Officer Asmus
promptly requested Brown’s license and registration, and he questioned
Brown about his out-of-date driver’s license. Before Officer Asmus initiated
the dog sniff, any delays in the traffic stop were attributable to Brown’s small
talk, arguing, and inability to locate his proof of insurance, not Officer
Asmus’s inaction or delay. And the dog sniff did not “measurably extend the
duration of the stop” because Officer Asmus’s dog was already on the scene
and alerted within one minute. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (quoting Arizona v.
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). Thus, the stop lasted no longer than
necessary to effectuate its purpose. See id. at 354.
Moreover, the dog sniff was independently justified because it was
“supported by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.” Reyes,
963 F.3d at 487. Officer Asmus knew that his colleagues were investigating a
residence associated with narcotics trafficking. He also knew that Brown had
entered the residence carrying a backpack, stayed for a few minutes, and
drove away. When Officer Asmus pulled Brown over, he saw Brown reach
over to secure something in the passenger seat. These factors “by themselves
may appear innocent,” but “in the aggregate,” they provided Officer Asmus
“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.” Id. at
488 (quoting United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir.
1999)).
III
Officer Asmus did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he did
not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop, and the dog sniff was supported by
reasonable suspicion. We AFFIRM.
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