CourtListener 3464030•Opinion Number
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Dear Mr. Reneau:
This office has received your request concerning an opinion regarding the legality of one-party consent to audiotaped conversations. Specifically, you asked whether there are any measures Louisiana Tech University may take under state and/or federal law to discourage one-party consent audiotaped conversations without infringing on individual rights.
The controlling decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of one-party consent audiotaped conversations was rendered in State v. Reeves, 427 So.2d 403 (La. 1983). On the rehearing of the case, the court held that the use of electronic surveillance equipment, hidden from view on the person of a consenting party to a conversation, does not invade the privacy of the other party or parties to the conversation within the meaning of the Louisiana constitutional provision relating to a person's privacy rights.
In this case, Reeves, the defendant in a criminal case, was involved in a conversation which was surreptitiously taped by an acquaintance of Reeves. The conversation regarding Reeves' allegedly illegal activity, and the tape was subsequently turned over to authorities who arrested Reeves based on the conversation. Reeves argued that the seizure of his oral communication violated Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. The Supreme Court held that by entering into a conversation, a person should realize that any party to the communication may violate the confidence of the communicator by disclosing to others. The court stated, "Though the violation of a confidence is rarely contemplated by the declarant, his knowledge of the risk (disclosure) is ever present and destroys his subjective expectation that the communication will forever remain a secret (private)." Reeves, 427 So.2d 416 (La. 1983).
The state statute most applicable to this situation is Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1303 which states in pertinent part:
C. (4) It shall not be unlawful under this Chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception, unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of the state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Thus, one-party consent audiotaped conversations are allowed by both the Louisiana Constitution and the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
The Louisiana statute on this subject was patterned after the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2511 which states in pertinent part:
(2)(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.
The statute clearly reads that a party may record another person's conversation as long as one of the parties has consented to the recording.
It is the opinion of this office therefore, that one-party consent audio taping of conversations is legal under the applicable Louisiana and federal law, as long as the taping is not done for the purpose of committing any criminal, tortious or other injurious act.
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact this office.
Sincerely,
Richard P. Ieyoub Attorney General
By: James C. Hrdlicka Assistant Attorney General La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 96-183, 1996 WL 462329
(La.A.G.)
Dear Mr. Frey:
This office is in receipt of your request for an opinion of the Attorney General. In particular, you asked the following questions:
1.) Does federal and state law prohibit tape recording third-party telephone conversations of one spouse by another spouse when the latter spouse is not residing in the marital home, and does so without the knowledge or consent of the former spouse or third party?
2.) Further, may third parties living within the marital home tape record telephone conversations without a spouse's knowledge or consent?
The questions presented are guided by LSA-R.S. 15:1303, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 96-183, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, and Gaubert v.Gaubert, 1999 WL 10384 (E.D. La.).
In answering this very question, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in Gaubert held that, where a spouse, who is no longer residing in the marital home, intentionally and without the consent of the spouse still remaining in the home, places or uses a recording device to tape record conversations made to and from the telephone in the home, he is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), (a), (c), and (d). Louisiana's relevant statute in this matter, patterned after the federal law, is the Electronic Surveillance Act (LSA R.S. 15:1301et seq). The Gaubert court stated that the husband is not absolved of liability under § 2511(1), which prohibits the intentional interception of any "wire, oral, or electronic communication," or the intentional use or disclosure of the contents of such intercepted communication.
Section 2511(2)(d) reads in pertinent part, "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under the color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States or any State." As interpreted by the court, none of the six statutory exceptions listed in § 2511, creates an exception for nonconsensual interspousal wiretapping. "The plain language of the statute does not provide a specific exception that would permit one spouse to intentionally intercept and record the private telephone conversations of the other spouse."Gaubert at 1. The court in reaching its decision noted thatSimpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), is distinguishable, wherein the Fifth Circuit expressed reservations about its holding and specifically limited the holding to the facts of that case. In Simpson, the couple was living together in the marital home, and there were no pending divorce proceedings.
Further, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 96-183 states, "The statute clearly reads that a party may record another person's conversation as long as one of the parties has consented to the recording. Thus, where there is no consent by either party to the conversation, any recording by a third party is unlawful." Hence this opinion answers your second question, in that any recordings made by a third party without the consent of either party to the conversation is illegal. A copy of that opinion is enclosed for your review.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this Attorney General that both federal and state laws prohibit one spouse from intercepting telephone communications of the other spouse, absent consent by one party to the conversation. This office further recognizes that La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 96-183 answered your second question by holding that any recording made by a third party without the consent of either party to the conversation is illegal.
If this office may be of further assistance in the future, please do not hesitate to contact us again. With warmest regards, I remain
Sincerely,
RICHARD P. IEYOUB Attorney General
BY: _______________________________________________ KATHLEEN PETERSEN Assistant Attorney General
OPINION NUMBER 96-183
May 9, 1996
15-A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 CRIMINAL LAW LSA-R.S. 15:1303, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, State v. Reeves, 427 So.2d (La. 1983)
One-party consent to audio taping of conversations is legal under the applicable Louisiana and federal law, as long as the taping is not done for the purpose of committing any criminal, tortious or other injurious act.
President Daniel D. Reneau Louisiana Tech University Post Office Box 3168 Ruston, LA 71272
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