LILAH MCQUILIN-ANCIRA vs. versus CHRISTOPHER ANCIRA

LILAH MCQUILKIN-ANCIRA
VERSUS
CHRISTOPHER ANCIRA
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NO. 2026-CA-0173
COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2021-04090, DIVISION “H-3”
Honorable LaKeisha N. Jefferson, Judge
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Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Rachael D. Johnson)
Renee L. Swanson
RENEE SWANSON, L.L.C.
412 Dolhonde Street
Gretna, LA 70053
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Theon A. Wilson
LAW OFFICES OF THEON A. WILSON
1160 Energy Centre
1100 Poydras Street
Suite 1160
New Orleans, LA 70163
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
REVERSED; REQUEST
FOR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
DAMAGES DENIED
OCTOBER 15, 2026

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Appellant/Plaintiff, Lilah McQuilkin-Ancira (hereinafter “Lilah”), seeks
review of the trial court’s November 21, 2025 judgment, holding her in contempt
of court and awarding attorney fees to Appellee/Defendant, Christopher Ancira
(hereinafter “Christopher”). In his response to Lilah’s appeal, Christopher seeks
frivolous appeal damages. After consideration of the record before this Court and
the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s November 21, 2025 judgment and
deny Christopher’s request for frivolous appeal damages.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lilah and Christopher were married in 2005 and share two children. On May
13, 2021, Lilah filed a petition for divorce requesting joint custody and sought to
be named as the domiciliary parent. On August 10, 2021, the parties entered into a
consent judgment (hereinafter “the 2021 Consent Judgment”), with the following
provisions relevant to this appeal:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
both the [mother] and the [father] are awarded joint and shared
custody of the minor children []. On an interim basis and without
prejudice, neither parent is designated as domiciliary parent of the
minor children.
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IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that both parents shall share information with each other about the
children in a timely manner so as to coordinate and facilitate their
parenting together. This information may include, but is not limited to
medical, educational, social, psychological, and religious aspects of
the children’s lives.
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IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that each parent shall inform the other as soon as possible of all
school, sporting and other special activity notices and cooperate in the
children’s consistent attendance at such events. Neither parent shall
schedule activities during the other parent’s scheduled parenting time,
without notice to the other parent and the agreement of the other
parent in any written medium.
The parties were divorced by judgment dated June 7, 2022.
TGC
JCL
RDJ

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Over the years, the parties were involved in ongoing litigation concerning
modifications to child custody, child support, spousal support and family
reconciliation therapy. In accordance with the 2021 Consent Judgment, Lilah and
Christopher continued to exercise joint and shared custody of the children,
communicating mostly through email and text messages. However, complications
with communication within the family led the parties to attend multiple sessions
with family therapists. Despite family therapy, the parties filed two motions for
contempt. In December 2022, Lilah filed a rule for contempt arguing that
Christopher refused to pay his share of the children’s expenses.1 She also requested
to modify custody and asked that child support be increased as a result of
Christopher’s relocation to Georgia.2 Several months later, Christopher filed a rule
for contempt, alleging intentional and purposeful violation of the 2021 Consent
Judgment.3 He asserted that Lilah perpetuated parental alienation by refusing to co-
parent or “facilitate and encourage a close loving relationship” between him and
the children. On December 5, 2023, both parties ultimately agreed to dismiss their
rules for contempt, with prejudice, and entered into a consent judgment. The
December 5, 2023 consent judgment awarded the parties joint custody, with Lilah
named as the domiciliary parent. The judgment also continued several of the
parties’ motions and exceptions.
In June 2024, Lilah traveled with the children to New York for a vacation.
While there, Lilah and the parties’ seventeen-year-old son visited a college. During
1 Lilah specified that the expenses were for the children’s medical bills, mental health
evaluations and sports related fees.
2 Christopher moved to Georgia in October 2022, but moved back to Louisiana in January 2023.
3 Christopher also filed to modify child support, spousal support and for court-ordered family
reconciliation therapy.

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the trip, Christopher emailed Lilah asking whether she was in New York with their
son. Lilah responded in the affirmative but explained that her attorney advised her
that she was not legally required to inform him that she was in New York.
Christopher sent two more emails that day in which he denied claims of financial
irresponsibility, referenced Lilah’s co-parenting skills and expressed his
disappointment in her involvement with a previous dating partner. Lilah only
responded to Christopher’s email regarding the fact that she and the children were
in New York.
On October 22, 2024, Christopher filed a motion to enforce the judgment of
joint custody, motion for court ordered reconciliation therapy, contempt and
attorney fees. He requested that Lilah be held in contempt for intentionally and
purposefully violating the 2021 Consent Judgment.
At trial, the parties produced multiple emails and text messages to illustrate
their communications concerning the children.4 This included specific
conversations about the children’s upcoming school and sporting events, health,
therapy and out-of-state travel. Christopher testified that he was unaware Lilah and
the children were going to New York and explained that he learned about Lilah
taking their son to New York from a mutual friend. He further testified that Lilah
violated the 2021 Consent Judgment as it relates to co-parenting because Lilah did
not inform him of “anything regarding [the children’s] school events.” Conversely,
Lilah testified that the New York trip was planned as a vacation after one of the
children’s friends invited them to attend a “music video shoot,” with the college
visit added because they were nearby. Lilah testified that the college visit was
4 While multiple issues were brought before the trial court, we are only tasked with reviewing the
ruling regarding contempt.

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simply to view the campus and not determinative of which college their son would
attend. She further explained that she did not inform Christopher that they were
visiting a college while in New York in an effort to reduce further conflict between
them.5 The trial court found Lilah in contempt and assessed her $15,765.75 in
attorney fees. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In cases of civil contempt, “the mover must prove the contempt through a
preponderance of the evidence.” Marullo v. Extreme Motor Sports of New Orleans,
LLC, 2023-0157, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/25/23), 376 So.3d 964, 968 (citing
Streiffer v. Deltatech Constr., LLC, 2019-0990, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/25/20), 294
So.3d 564, 573). When a district court holds a party in civil contempt, the appellate
court will review the ruling under a manifest error standard and, if sufficient
evidence was presented, the appellate court will only reverse the ruling if it can
find the district court abused its discretion. Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Lilah contends the trial court erred in finding her in contempt for
failing to comply with the 2021 Consent Judgment and awarding Christopher
$15,765.75 in attorney fees. She argues that there was insufficient evidence
presented to show that she intentionally, knowingly and purposefully violated the
2021 Consent Judgment.
Constructive Contempt
Contempt is defined as “any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere
with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or
5 Lilah testified that prior to the New York trip, she sought advice about conflict resolution from
her attorney and multiple therapists.

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respect for its authority.” La. C.C.P. art. 221. The classification of contempt is
dichotomous; including direct and constructive contempt. Id. Direct contempt is
either a contempt committed in the presence of the court “or a contumacious
failure to comply with a subpoena or summons.” La. C.C.P. art. 222. Constructive
contempt is defined as “any contempt other than a direct one.” La. C.C.P. art 224.
Constructive contempt includes a party’s “willful disobedience of any lawful
judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court.” La. C.C.P. art 224(2). In
order to hold a party in constructive contempt, the trial court must find that the
party committed the violation “intentionally, purposefully, and without justifiable
excuse.” Johnson v. Johnson, 2023-0566, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/7/24), 390 So.3d
914, 915 (quoting State through Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. Child Support Enf't
v. Knapp, 2016-0979, p. 13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/12/17), 216 So.3d 130, 140).
The basis of Christopher’s rule for contempt centers on his assertion that
Lilah violated the 2021 Consent Judgment by failing to inform him about visiting a
college with the children while they were in New York. “A consent judgment has
binding force from the presumed voluntary acquiescence of the parties, not from
adjudication by the court.” Burrell v. UMC, 2019-1095, 2019-0423, p. 4 (La.App.
4 Cir. 6/10/20), 302 So.3d 93, 96 (quoting Succession of Simmons, 527 So.2d 323,
325 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1988)). In reviewing the consent judgment, we must
consider the intent of the parties. Id., 2019-1095, p. 5, 302 So.3d at 96. This Court
has previously set forth the following:
When reviewing and interpreting a consent judgment, this Court
applies the basic principles of contract interpretation, which begins
with the determination of the common intent of the parties in forming
the contract. La. C.C. art. 2045. The reasonable intention of the parties
to the contract is sought by examining the words of the contract itself.
Prejean v. Guillory, 10-0740, pp. 6-7 (La. 7/2/10), 38 So.3d 274, 279.
“When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no

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absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search
of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046.
Hinds v. Hinds, 2022-0444, p.6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/26/23), 357 So.3d 867, 871
(quoting Jones v. City of New Orleans, 2020-0247, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/14/21),
315 So.3d 963, 966-67). As such, “each provision in the [consent judgment] is
interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning
suggested by the [consent judgment] as a whole.” Bacchus v. Bacchus, 2022-0170,
p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/4/22), 340 So.3d 148, 151 (quoting Nungesser v. Nungesser,
1995-2298, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 694 So.2d 312, 314).
In the case sub judice, Lilah maintains the trial court erred in finding that
Christopher presented sufficient evidence that she intentionally, knowingly, or
purposefully violated the 2021 Consent Judgment. She concedes that she did not
explicitly tell Christopher that their son would be visiting a college, in an effort to
reduce conflict between them. Lilah explained that it was not her intention to
violate their agreement and that she had a justifiable excuse for not informing him
about the college visit. In opposition, Christopher argues that Lilah intentionally
violated the 2021 Consent Judgment, which he interprets as requiring disclosure of
educational information and “all school…and other special activity notices.” He
believes the trip to New York to visit a college is an educational issue which
should have been disclosed to him. The trial court agreed with Christopher, finding
that Lilah’s failure to inform him of the college visit demonstrated an
unwillingness to co-parent and constituted contempt.
Our inquiry requires that we consider whether Christopher presented
sufficient evidence that Lilah violated the 2021 Consent Judgment and that she did
so intentionally, knowingly and without justifiable excuse. Perry v. F.H. Myers

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Constr. Corp., 2023-0064, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/2/23), 377 So.3d 331, 336
(citation omitted). At trial, both parties testified that Lilah did not advise
Christopher of the college visit prior to their trip to New York. However, once
asked, Lilah confirmed that they were in New York and told Christopher, based on
her attorney’s advice, that she was not required to inform him about the trip. We
note that the 2021 Consent Judgment is silent as to whether either parent has an
affirmative duty to advise the other parent of out-of-state travel. The evidence
submitted at trial contains multiple emails and text messages that exhibited Lilah’s
willingness to communicate with Christopher about the children. Given the parties
ongoing communication, Lilah’s failure to notify Christopher of the college visit,
standing alone, does not sufficiently establish willful disobedience of the 2021
Consent Judgment.
We also recognize that the 2021 Consent Judgment fails to define what
constitutes “educational…aspects” of the children’s lives. However, the 2021
Consent Judgment expressly states that the parties must timely share educational
information in order to “coordinate and facilitate their parenting together.” The
trial court held Lilah in contempt for refusing to specifically address the college
visit. We find the trial court was manifestly erroneous in this finding. As stated
above, the 2021 Consent Judgment is vague and does not define educational
aspects. It is implausible to conclude that a college visit, involving neither
enrollment nor any immediate decision-making, constitutes an educational
decision. Christopher also avers that Lilah is in contempt based on the decretal
language requiring her to inform him of all school activities and special events. We
do not find the trip to New York, which included a college visit, as an activity or

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special event held by the child’s school. Therefore, we find this argument without
merit.
Willful disobedience of a court order requires a finding that the act was
intentional, purposeful and without justifiable excuse. We find insufficient
evidence that Lilah intentionally and purposefully sought to thwart Christopher’s
opportunity to co-parent. See Knapp, 2016-0979, pp. 22-23, 216 So.3d at 145
(finding the father’s occasional failure to notify the mother when the child spent
the night at the grandmother’s house did not prove that he willfully disobeyed the
consent judgment). We also take judicial notice of the fact this is the first and only
rule for contempt in five years that the parties have actually litigated. Thus, the
trial court manifestly erred in concluding that Lilah’s failure to inform Christopher
of the college visit constituted willful disobedience of the 2021 Consent Judgment.
See Yokum v. 544 Funky, LLC, 2015-1353 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/16), 202 So.3d
1065 (finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant
willfully violated the injunction, and therefore was not punishable by contempt).6
Frivolous Appeal Damages
Christopher seeks frivolous appeal damages in the form of attorney fees and
costs incurred in connection with this appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 2164 provides for the
award of damages for a frivolous appeal.7 “The statute permitting frivolous appeal
6 Based upon our reversal of the trial court’s ruling, we pretermit discussion of the award of
attorney fees. See La. R.S. 13:4611(1)(g) (in a contempt of court case, the trial court may award
costs and attorney fees but only to a prevailing party).
7 La. C.C.P. art. 2164 provides:
The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper
upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages, including attorney
fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs, and may tax the costs of the
lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its
judgment may be considered equitable.

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damages must be strictly construed in favor of the appellant, as it is penal in
nature.” Hellmers v. Dep't of Fire, 2021-0380, p. 9, (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/21), 331
So.3d 408, 414 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 2008-0060, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir.
5/28/08), 986 So.2d 797, 801). “Appeals are always favored and damages will not
be granted unless the appeal is unquestionably frivolous.” Hellmers, 2021-0380, p.
9, 331 So.3d at 414 (citation omitted). Applying these principles, we cannot
classify this appeal as “unquestionably frivolous.” The record does not support a
finding that Lilah filed this appeal in bad faith or to delay the case. The record also
does not reflect that her counsel lacked a serious belief in the law advocated in this
appeal. See Johnson, 2008-0060, p. 5, (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/28/08), 986 So.2d at 801.
Thus, Christopher’s request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.
DECREE
Based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s November 21,
2025 judgment and deny Christopher’s request for frivolous appeal damages.
REVERSED; REQUEST FOR FRIVOLOUS
APPEAL DAMAGES DENIED

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