DEMETRIUS NORTHERN-ALLISON V. JOHN SEYMOUR, ET AL. — OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY REVERSING AND REMANDING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2026 TO BE PUBLISHED Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0325-DG DEMETRIUS NORTHERN-ALLISON APPELLANT ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2022-CA-0379 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CI-001963 JOHN SEYMOUR; DAVID LEDBETTER; MARK GRANHOLM; AND WILLIAM PEARSON APPELLEES OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY REVERSING AND REMANDING This case is before the Court upon discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellees. Both lower courts determined the Appellant’s, Demetrius Northern-Allison, plea of guilty to resisting arrest pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) collaterally estopped him from arguing the Appellees acted in bad faith, for purposes of their claim for qualified official immunity, in his tort suit alleging state law claims of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery. Upon review, we conclude the claims are not precluded, and a genuine issue of material fact exists that, absent some further evidence, requires a jury

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2 trial for resolution. The Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Facts and Procedural Posture On April 14, 2017, officers of the Louisville Metro Police Department, including their Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, executed a search warrant on the residence of Northern-Allison. Thirty-two officers total were involved, with an ambulance waiting to respond a few blocks away. It was around 10:00 pm. Northern-Allison contends he did not hear police knock and announce their presence prior to hearing the glass shattering on the security door of his home.1 Once he heard the glass shatter, Northern-Allison rushed to the basement where his daughters, aged five and seven at the time, were playing. His son, aged four at the time, was upstairs in his bedroom. As Northern- Allison came upstairs with daughters in hand, he could hear the police announcing themselves and ordering him to open the door. He alleges he shouted back to inform the officers of the children’s presence and begged them not to hurt him in front of his children. He proceeded to take his daughters to his son’s room and secure them there. Northern-Allison returned to the first floor of the home and noticed police had opened the main door but were still struggling to open the security door. Police again ordered him to open it. Northern-Allison instead closed the main 1 The Appellees dispute this and aver the warrant was not a “no-knock” warrant.

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3 door, retrieved cocaine from a bookshelf nearby, and went to flush it down the toilet. Having attempted to destroy the evidence, Northern-Allison returned to the front door and opened it for police. They ordered him to get down on his knees and raise his hands, which he complied with. Although several guns were later found in the home, there is no testimony that Northern-Allison carried a weapon on his person, nor is there any testimony that police believed him to be holding a weapon as they entered. There is also no testimony that Northern-Allison was making threats of violence of any kind to the police officers at this point. Northern-Allison alleges that as he was on his knees, hands raised, one officer struck him with butt of his rifle which shattered his orbital bone and disfigured his eye socket. It is undisputed that Northern-Allison required multiple reconstructive surgeries as a result of this injury. A biomedical engineering expert, Mari S. Truman, has testified by deposition that his injury was the result of blunt force trauma “most likely” inflicted by a rifle butt or similar object, although she did concede she cannot rule out the possibility that it was inflicted by several fist strikes to the area. After officers got Northern-Allison to the ground, they proceeded to try and cuff him. At this point, the record is undisputed that Northern-Allison resisted arrest by physically struggling with the officers. Officer Granholm, for example, testified Northern-Allison’s aggression went “from nothing to very high” after one of his arms was cuffed. Officer Granholm also testified he could feel Northern-Allison’s hand on his gun. Northern-Allison concedes he did

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4 resist arrest at this point. Several officers, including the Appellees, assisted Officer Granholm in subduing Northern-Allison and this did involve the use of physical force, including punches and knees to Northern-Allison’s body. After being subdued and no longer presenting a threat, Northern-Allison contended the officers continued to strike him, choke him, and shove his body into the broken glass on the floor. The Appellees argued that once he was secured, they proceeded to take him to the ambulance standing by and were even careful about ensuring he did not step in the broken glass as he walked outside.2 Subsequently, Northern-Allison was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance, tampering with physical evidence, and resisting arrest. After initially pleading not guilty, he later filed a motion to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to Alford, supra. His motion stated that he had discussed the facts underlying the charges with his attorney. He also stated he was aware of and had discussed all possible defenses and knew that he had a right to produce evidence in his favor. The trial court accepted the Alford plea on the basis that it was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and that Northern-Allison had acknowledged “there was a factual basis for it.” Almost a year after the search warrant was executed, Northern-Allison filed a civil suit against the Appellees. He made claims of excessive force, civil 2 Northern-Allison conceded at oral argument that once he began resisting arrest, all subsequent events were within the meaning of the Alford plea. In other words, only the conduct prior to his resisting arrest forms the basis for his civil allegations. Consequently, we will not address any claim for excessive force, civil assault, or civil battery after the resisting arrest occurred.

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5 assault, and civil battery. In 2019, the Appellees filed for summary judgment, arguing his Alford plea barred his claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court of Appeals reversed that ruling on the grounds that Northern-Allison had alleged state law claims and not federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Northern-Allison v. Seymour, No. 2020-CA-0637-MR, 2021 WL 1164438, at *2 (Ky. App. Mar. 26, 2021).3 Back in the trial court, the parties engaged in further discovery. In late 2021, the Appellees filed a new motion for summary judgment. They argued Northern-Allison could not show they acted in bad faith. The trial court held, “the Plaintiff pleading guilty to Resisting Arrest demonstrates that the officers were acting reasonably and in good faith.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It engaged in a thorough analysis of the facts and law. Particularly, it took a painstaking inquiry into each element of collateral estoppel, which we commend. Of particular note is its conclusion that Northern-Allison’s Alford plea “necessarily, albeit implicitly, acknowledged Appellees’ good faith performance of their duty to arrest him, and the concomitant inconsistency of a claim he acted in self-defense; that acknowledgment was integral to his knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to the charge he resisted arrest.” The court further held his “solemn admission in open court that he is in fact guilty of resisting arrest necessarily implicated the statutory defense comprised of the same facts he 3 This precise issue is not before us, but we do note that we have previously held Heck has no application outside Section 1983 claims. Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Ky. 2007).

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6 subsequently alleged in his civil complaint, [that] then served to effectively adjudicate the defense in favor of Appellees by his own admissions.” Judge Easton dissented, albeit with “some hesitation.” He took issue with the majority’s ruling that, in his opinion, extends the crime of resisting arrest, which may occur at any given time during an interaction with police, to subsume any improper use of excessive force, which may also occur at any time during an interaction with the police. But the prior conviction simply determined that, at a specific point, the Appellant resisted arrest without any claim of justification. That is not necessarily the same question to be addressed in this civil suit. Excessive force may have occurred before or after the resisting arrest event. Northern-Allison sought discretionary review, and it was granted. The chief issue before this Court is whether an Alford plea to resisting arrest collaterally estops a plaintiff from arguing the officers acted in bad faith, for purposes of the defendants’ claim of qualified official immunity, in a subsequent civil action alleging state law claims of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery. We now proceed to the merits. II. Standards of Review Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR4 56.03. “A motion for summary judgment at the trial court, and on appeal, presents only a question of law thus, we review de novo and give no deference to the lower courts.” Normandy Farm, LLC v. Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 129, 135 (Ky. 2024). “The record must be viewed in a 4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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7 light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Only when it appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor should the motion for summary judgment be granted.” Id. at 482. “The denial of a claim of immunity is immediately appealable.” Sheehy v. Volentine, 706 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Ky. 2024). It, too, is reviewed de novo. Id. Qualified official immunity “applies only to the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions ... (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee's authority.” Id. (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001)). III. Analysis A. Principles of Collateral Estoppel Collateral estoppel “allows the use of an earlier judgment by one not a party to the original action to preclude relitigation of matters litigated in the earlier action.” Miller v. Admin. Off. of Cts., 361 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Ky. 2011). It has six elements: (1) at least one party to be bound in the second case must have been a party in the first case; (2) “the issue in the second case must be the same as the issue in the first case”; (3) “the issue must have been actually litigated”; (4) “the issue was actually decided in that action”; and (5) “the decision on the issue in the prior action must have been necessary to the court's judgment” and adverse to the party to be bound. Id. at 872 (quoting Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Pol'y Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Ky. 1998)). When collateral estoppel is asserted, the matter at issue

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8 must have been “material or essential” to the prior judgment. Sedley v. City of W. Buechel, 461 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Ky. 1970). Collateral estoppel will not be applied unless the party against whom it is asserted had a realistic opportunity for “full and fair litigation” of the matter in the prior case. Id. B. Effect of Alford Plea in Kentucky Law In North Carolina v. Alford, the trial court accepted the guilty plea of the defendant despite him stating under oath that “he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so.” 400 U.S. at 28. The defendant subsequently collaterally attacked the plea, alleging the specter of the death penalty rendered it tainted by fear and coercion. Id. at 29. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the plea, holding, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. Id. at 37. At its inception then, Alford establishes that not every Alford plea will be accompanied by express admission of guilt; rather, it may be an admission only of a “strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State[.]” Id. at 38. Because of this admission, an Alford plea’s “validity cannot be seriously questioned.” Id. But the lack of an express admission of guilt to the underlying factual predicates establishing the elements of the charged crime has

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9 significance when considering whether an Alford plea will have preclusive effect for purposes of collateral estoppel. What are the precise consequences of an Alford plea is a question that can have various answers depending on what state one is in. There is no uniformity in the law. For Kentucky’s part, we have held, “[a]n Alford plea is a ‘plea of guilty,’ regardless of any denial of underlying facts, and clearly constitutes a criminal conviction.” Pettiway v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1993). We also stated the “[Kentucky Rules of Evidence] 803(22) and 410 exclude the introduction of an Alford plea as an admission against interest[.]” Id. KRE 803(22) and 410 do not speak of Alford pleas; they speak of pleas of nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere literally means “I do not contest it” and operates also as a plea of guilty to every essential element of the indictment. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961). “[T]his plea does not create an estoppel; but, like the plea of guilty, it is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case.” Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926). We, therefore, read Pettiway as establishing Alford pleas are generally an equivalent to a plea of guilty and its consequences but there are exceptions where an Alford plea will be treated as more akin to pleas of nolo contendere and its consequences.5 5 Technically speaking, pleas of nolo contendere are not authorized under our law. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 8.08; Commonwealth v. Hillhaven Corp., 687 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ky. App. 1984). But like the Supreme Court of the United States, we are presently “concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of state law.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 38.

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10 Thus, we hold that when considering whether an Alford plea for resisting arrest bars a subsequent civil suit for purposes of collateral estoppel, courts must evaluate the plea colloquy when the Alford plea was accepted in order to determine whether there was an express admission of guilt to the underlying facts forming the elements of the crime charged. Without such an express admission, the Alford plea is more akin to the plea of nolo contendere and constitutes only an admission that the Commonwealth had a strong factual basis for the charge. C. Application The Court of Appeals below correctly undertook an analysis of all six elements of collateral estoppel to determine its applicability, but we need only discuss the element we conclude is not satisfied to reverse.6 The issue of whether the Appellees used excessive force against Northern-Allison by striking him in the head with the butt of a gun after he opened the door to his home and was on his knees with raised hands and then threw him to the ground covered with shards of glass was not actually litigated in the Alford plea. We agree with Judge Easton’s dissent that the Alford plea “simply determined that, at a specific point . . . [Northern-Allison] resisted arrest without any claim of justification. That is not necessarily the same question to be addressed in this civil suit.” 6 Our choice not to consider the full panoply of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning should not be taken as an endorsement of those aspects of its opinion that we have declined to discuss.

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11 The Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively upon the case of Moffett v. Shaw, No. 2014-CA-000774-MR, 2016 WL 426689 (Ky. App. Jan. 29, 2016) for its conclusion. In all candor, we are not bound by this decision since it is unpublished and from an inferior court. But Moffett fortuitously offers a good example of the rule we just announced regarding Alford pleas and collateral estoppel. The factual background of Moffett is adequately explained thusly, Edgar Yanez and Manning Shaw were in a vehicle that collided with Ezra Moffett, Jr.'s vehicle. Tragically, Moffett died of his injuries. Following the accident, a criminal indictment was filed against Yanez. Subsequently, he entered a guilty plea in the criminal proceeding wherein he unequivocally admitted to being the driver of the vehicle. However, in this action, he now maintains that Shaw was the driver. Id. at *1. The plaintiff, Moffett’s Estate, contended that Yanez’ denial created a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment whereas Shaw argued Yanez had made a judicial admission that called for application of collateral estoppel. Id. Yanez had initially denied that he was the driver of the vehicle at his original sentencing hearing. Id. at *2. The trial judge refused to accept the Alford plea unless Yanez admitted he drove the vehicle. Subsequently, at the next hearing on February 10, 2014, wherein he admitted guilt, Yanez was asked twice by the trial court if he drove the vehicle and he twice affirmed. Id. Reading Moffett does not reveal that it held the Alford plea, in and of itself, was a judicial admission. Instead, the question for the court was “whether Yanez's statement on February 10, 2014, that he was the driver of the vehicle, which struck and killed Moffett, is a judicial admission.” Id. at *3.

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12 Accordingly, after the requisite analysis, the court did hold “it is indisputable that Yanez admitted to driving the vehicle, and therefore, any question regarding who was driver of the vehicle has been answered.” Id. at *4. Moffett shows the court inquired into what was said during the plea colloquy to determine collateral estoppel’s applicability, rather than simply looking to the Alford plea itself. Only by evaluating Yanez’ words was the court able to say that he had made an express admission to a predicate fact underlying the criminal charge, which collaterally estopped him from denying he was the driver of the vehicle in the subsequent civil litigation. It was the statement made, and not the Alford plea, that was dispositive. In this case, Northern-Allison filed a motion in the criminal case to enter an Alford plea and stated, “I have reviewed a copy of the indictment and told my attorney all the facts known to me concerning my charges. I believe he/she is fully informed about my case. We have fully discussed, and I understand, the charges and any possible defenses.” He also stated he was aware he had a right to produce evidence in his defense. The trial court accepted his plea upon the condition that it was knowing, voluntary, and his acknowledgment “that there was a factual basis for it.” The Court of Appeals held Northern-Allison’s Alford plea to resisting arrest “necessarily, albeit implicitly, acknowledged Appellees’ good faith performance of their duty to arrest him[.]” We disagree. First, the court’s reliance on the implicative is because there is no explicit statement from Northern-Allison that the police did not use excessive force against him at any time or even an express admission of the

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13 underlying factual predicates for a conviction for resisting arrest. The trial court itself acknowledged that he only conceded there was a factual basis to support the charge. The statement that Northern-Allison was aware of and had discussed any possible defenses with his attorney was not an admission that such defenses were invalid or unwarranted. That statement was only an acknowledgment of his knowledge of them for purposes of ensuring his Alford plea was knowing and voluntary. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Second, we do not agree Northern-Allison’s plea necessarily and implicitly required a concession that the Appellees acted in good faith at all times or that their conduct was at all times otherwise in compliance with the law. Such a rule could operate on two levels, universally and particularly. The former is not true by the simple hypothetical that a defendant could resist arrest and, once he has been restrained and any threat rendered null, the officer could proceed to punch or kick him. An Alford plea to resisting arrest would not negate any claim of excessive force in that scenario because the factual predicates for each are different. In order for an Alford plea to implicitly and necessarily concede the officers acted lawfully, there must be a confluence of facts such that the charge for resisting arrest and the civil claim for excessive force share the same factual predicates. In other words, the particulars of the case must always be analyzed. In this case, Northern-Allison alleges one instance of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery. He alleges that he opened the door for the officers (admittedly after dithering and disposing of evidence) and was on his knees with his hands

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14 raised. An officer then proceeded to strike him with the butt of his rifle in the face, shattering his orbital bone. Northern-Allison admits that once he was thrown to the ground into broken glass after being struck, he did engage in conduct that could be construed as resisting arrest. The excessive force does not share the same factual predicates for the resisting arrest conviction. The resisting arrest statute is unambiguous that only conduct that uses or threatens the use of “physical force or violence against the peace officer or another” or conduct “creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another” can predicate a charge for resisting arrest. KRS 520.090(1). Disconcertingly, the Appellees’ brief argues that Northern-Allison was resisting arrest by failing to comply with their orders to open the door and by moving his daughters from the basement to an upstairs bedroom.7 We reject this. While we understand the fear that can be engendered in officers when a suspect is not complying with their orders and moving about the home they are trying to enter, failing to comply with police orders to open a door does not satisfy the statute. It neither uses nor threatens the use of physical force nor does it, in and of itself, create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the officers. A parent moving their children to a safe room to 7 In their brief they state, “Instead of complying with the officers’ orders, Northern-Allison resisted. He testified that, as soon as he heard the glass break, he headed downstairs to retrieve his daughters from the basement. As he returned to the first floor with his daughters in his arms, he heard police officers instructing him to open the door. At this point, officers were still struggling to open the security door but could see inside enough to identify Northern-Allison. Northern-Allison admittedly ignored their request and proceeded upstairs with his daughters.”

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15 protect them from a doubtlessly violent, traumatic, and potentially harmful experience also does not satisfy the statute for the same reasons.8 There is also no testimony from the officers that, when they did finally enter the home, Northern-Allison was armed in any manner. There is no dispute of fact that when police entered, he went to his knees with hands raised. There is no testimony that Northern-Allison was making threats of physical force against them at that time. Therefore, there was no conduct that Northern-Allison engaged in at that point that would predicate a resisting arrest charge; hence his Alford plea cannot be said to have necessarily conceded the police were acting in good faith or in compliance with the law when he alleges that an officer struck him with a rifle butt on the face with such violence as to break his orbital bone. The officers’ accounts support this. Officer Granholm, for instance, stated that Northern-Allison’s “aggression towards me went from nothing to very high,” (emphasis added) but this was after he had already placed handcuffs on one of his arms. The other officers give consistent accounts that Northern-Allison only began resisting arrest after he was already on the ground and in the process of being handcuffed. D. Good Faith Independent of the Alford Plea 8 It is also undisputed that police officers threw a flash bang into the basement after Northern-Allison removed his daughters from it, thus proving his instinct to move them was a good one. While we cannot condone a person not complying with police orders, neither will we condemn a parent acting upon the natural instinct to safeguard their children.

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16 Our inquiry is not yet at an end. The officers argue that even if the lower courts erred on this point, they still are entitled to qualified official immunity because they acted in good faith. There is no dispute that the officers were acting within the scope of their duties, performing a discretionary function, and within the scope of their authority. Consequently, the burden on Northern- Allison in opposing summary judgment was “to establish by direct or circumstantial evidence that the discretionary act was not performed in good faith.” Sheehy, 706 S.W.3d at 237 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523). Northern-Allison’s claim is that the police acted in bad faith when striking him with a rifle butt on his face, breaking his orbital bone. He has met his burden. His testimony and the officers’ testimony support that he had not engaged in conduct constituting resisting arrest by that point. Northern-Allison has an expert who will testify that his broken orbital bone was produced by blunt force trauma “most likely” from the butt of a rifle. A jury could accept Northern-Allison’s account, his expert’s testimony, and conclude that striking him with the butt of a rifle with such force as to break his orbital bone constituted gratuitous violence. City of Paintsville v. Haney, 718 S.W.3d 812, 832 (Ky. 2025). Therefore, the Appellees are not entitled to qualified official immunity. IV. Conclusion We hold that when considering a claim for collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil suit, there is no per se rule that an Alford plea satisfies or does not satisfy its requirements. The issue is not the Alford plea itself, but

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17 what was said during the plea colloquy. If the defendant at the plea colloquy made express admissions to the underlying factual elements predicating the charge, then collateral estoppel can apply as the Alford plea would function more like a regular plea of guilty. If the defendant at the plea colloquy only acknowledged the Commonwealth had a strong factual basis for the charge, then collateral estoppel is inappropriate as the Alford plea then functions more like a plea of nolo contendere. Accordingly, the Alford plea to resisting arrest entered by Northern- Allison in the prior criminal case does not bar him from arguing the Appellees acted in bad faith during the course of his arrest as he only acknowledged the Commonwealth had a factual basis for the charge. Secondly, the factual predicates for the resisting arrest charge are not the same as the factual predicates for his civil claims of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery. Insofar as Northern-Allison has alleged the officers acted in bad faith when they struck his face with the butt of a rifle, his claim is good, and the Appellees are not entitled to qualified official immunity. There exists a genuine issue of material fact that, absent some further evidence being disclosed, must be submitted to a jury. The Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., sitting. All concur. Goodwine, J., not sitting.

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18 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Sara E. Collins Sam Aguiar Sam Aguiar Injury Lawyers, PLLC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Kathryn M. Goodwin John S. Harrison Peter F. Ervin Susan K. Rivera Jefferson County Attorney’s Office

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