MICHAEL J. MURPHY, JR V. AMANDA MURPHY — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION OTHER

RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1062-MR
MICHAEL MURPHY APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE A. CHRISTINE WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-CI-502957
AMANDA MURPHY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, L. JONES, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.
MOYNAHAN, JUDGE: Michael Murphy (“Michael”), appeals a May 27, 2025,
post-dissolution order of the Jefferson Family Court. He takes issue with: (1) the
family court’s refusal to modify his maintenance obligation to his former wife,
Amanda Murphy (“Amanda”); (2) the fact that the family court “left undisturbed”
his obligations to pay his children’s private school tuition and uninsured medical

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costs; (3) the family court’s decision to hold him in contempt for his nonpayment
of maintenance, child support, and other child-related expense arrearages he owed
Amanda; (4) how the family court calculated two judgments representing those
arrearages; and (5) the family court’s award of attorney fees to Amanda’s counsel.
We will address each of these points and the facts relevant to them in turn. As set
forth below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1. The family court properly refused to modify Michael’s maintenance
obligation to Amanda.
Michael and Amanda were married July 9, 2005, and divorced by
Decree of Dissolution entered August 10, 2022, in Glynn County, Georgia.1 The
Decree was registered in Kentucky2 on October 6, 2023. It incorporated an
agreement that fully settled all of Michael’s and Amanda’s marital rights (the
1 The parties’ settlement agreement, as incorporated into their Decree of Dissolution, contained a
provision specifying it was to be governed and enforced consistently with Georgia law.
However, a contractual choice-of-law provision does not affect subject matter jurisdiction and is
akin to an affirmative defense; if it is not raised prior to trial, it is waived. See Curry v.
Cincinnati Equitable Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Ky. App. 1992); see also Employer’s
Liability Corp. v. Webb, 283 Ky. 115, 140 S.W.2d 825, 826 (1940) (“[T]he law of a sister state,
if relied upon, must be both plead and proven.”). Michael and Amanda have never pressed this
choice-of-law issue, and all their filings in this litigation have cited and relied exclusively upon
Kentucky law. They have accordingly waived this choice-of-law issue, and we need not
consider it further.
2 Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 426.955 provides that a foreign judgment, properly registered
in Kentucky, “has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be
enforced or satisfied in like manner.”

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“Settlement Agreement”). Two pertinent terms of the Agreement provided in
relevant part:
14. ALIMONY
The Husband [Michael] shall pay to the Wife [Amanda]
the sum of Two Thousand [Dollars] ($2,000.00) per
month as permanent periodic alimony, commencing on
the first (1st) day of the month immediately following the
month in which this Settlement Agreement is executed
by the parties, and shall continue each and every month
thereafter for a period of sixty (60) months. The
Husband will be paying alimony to the Wife for five (5)
years from the date the parties sign the Settlement
Agreement or until the Wife remarries, dies, or the
Husband dies, whichever occurs first. . . .
. . .
30. AMENDMENT OR MODIFICATION
Once effective, this Settlement Agreement may be
amended or modified only by written instrument signed
by both of the parties and acknowledged before a person
authorized to take acknowledgements and made an order
of this Court which shall be equally binding as if made
initially and in full force and effect.
There is no dispute that “alimony,” as the parties used the term in their
Settlement Agreement, is what Kentucky law deems “maintenance.” Michael
asked the family court to modify or terminate this obligation because, he argued, a
substantial change of circumstances (i.e., his subsequent change of employment
and consequent reduction of income) had made it unconscionable for him to
continue fulfilling it. The family court denied his motion after determining

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Michael had failed to demonstrate that his continuing obligation to pay Amanda
maintenance had become unconscionable. Michael now asserts the family court’s
denial of his motion was an abuse of its discretion, and in support of that
contention he reasserts his “change of circumstances” argument.
However, Michael’s argument is irrelevant. This is so, as Amanda
argued below and continues to argue on appeal, because the “amendment or
modification” provision set forth above effectively precluded the family court from
altering Michael’s maintenance obligation pursuant to the terms of the Separation
Agreement. Specifically, KRS 403.250(1) provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6) of KRS
403.180, the provisions of any decree respecting
maintenance may be modified only upon a showing of
changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as
to make the terms unconscionable. . . .
(Emphasis added.) In turn, KRS 403.180(6) provides:
Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or
visitation of children, the decree may expressly preclude
or limit modification of terms if the separation agreement
so provides. Otherwise, terms of a separation agreement
are automatically modified by modification of the decree.
(Emphasis added.)
We discussed the effect of these statutory provisions in Jaburg v.
Jaburg, 558 S.W.3d 11 (Ky. App. 2018). There, the parties entered a settlement
agreement that, like the “amendment or modification” provision set forth above,

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stated that “[n]o modification or waiver of any of the terms of this Agreement shall
be valid unless in writing and executed by the Parties hereto.” Id. at 12 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Like Michael, the appellant in that matter nevertheless
sought to discontinue his maintenance obligation set forth in the written agreement
based upon unconscionability rather than upon a written agreement with his
appellee former spouse. The family court granted the appellant’s request on that
basis, and we subsequently reversed, explaining:
Under KRS 403.180(6), the parties to a dissolution of a
marriage “may expressly preclude or limit modification
of terms if the separation agreement so provides.” By
including such a clause in the separation agreement, “the
parties may settle their affairs with a finality beyond the
reach of the court’s continuing equitable jurisdiction
elsewhere provided.” Brown v. Brown, 796 S.W.2d 5, 8
(Ky. 1990).
In this case, the family court found that changed
circumstances under KRS 403.250(1) provide an
exception to the mandate in KRS 403.180(6) that the
parties may expressly preclude modification of their
separation agreement. That is not the law. Changed
circumstances rendering the terms of a maintenance
award unconscionable is the only ground upon which a
court has authority to modify any maintenance award.
However, the clear language of KRS 403.250(1)
prohibits a court from invoking this limited authority
when the parties have a separation agreement pursuant to
KRS 403.180(6) that expressly precluded subsequent
modification of the terms of their separation agreement.
The family court’s finding it could modify the Settlement
Agreement despite the presence of non-modification
clauses was erroneous.

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Id. at 13-14.
There is no meaningful difference between the non-modification
clause at issue in Jaburg and the one at issue here, and there is no reason to give
the clause at issue here any other effect. Absent a written agreement from Amanda
– and no such agreement existed here – Michael was not entitled to modify or
terminate his maintenance obligation to her. Accordingly, on this alternate basis,
we affirm the family court’s ultimate decision to deny Michael’s motion to modify
maintenance. See Wells v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 720, 721-22 (Ky. 2017)
(citation omitted) (“Even if a lower court reaches its judgment for the wrong
reason, we may affirm a correct result upon any ground supported by the record.”).
2. The family court did not commit palpable error by refraining from
modifying Michael’s obligations regarding his children’s private school
tuition and uninsured medical costs.
Next, Michael argues the family court erred in not modifying other
obligations related to child support. He elaborates:
The trial court’s modification of the current child
support obligation pursuant to the Kentucky Child
Support Guidelines is not at issue,[3] but it did not go far
enough: it ruled that he had 67% of the combined
monthly income but left undisturbed the provision that he
pay 100% of the children’s out-of-pocket medical
expenses. . . .
3 The family court granted Michael’s motion to reduce his child support obligation. It reduced
the amount he was required to pay to $1,291.00 per month.

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The trial court also left undisturbed the provision
that he be responsible for private school tuition as long as
they were attending private school. [] This is a
considerable expense; given that the oldest of the two
children started attending Trinity High School in 2024,
$1,738/mo. . . . and that the younger son is attending Our
Lady of Lourdes.
There was no proof in the record that the public
schools of Jefferson County are inadequate for
educational purposes for these children nor that any of
the children suffer a handicap that would make public
schools unsuitable.
Appellant Brief (“Appt. Br.”) at 7-8.
The “provisions” Michael is referencing are set forth in Paragraph 9,
and Child Support Addendum Paragraph 10, of the Settlement Agreement he and
Amanda incorporated into their divorce decree. Paragraph 9 provides:
PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION FOR THE
CHILDREN.
The Husband shall be responsible for all costs and
expenses of private school for the two (2) minor children
as long as they are attending private school. The
Husband shall pay said tuition in a timely manner and
said payments shall be paid through FACTS.
Child Support Addendum Paragraph 10 provides, in relevant part:
Uninsured Health Care Expenses – The Husband shall
pay one hundred (100) percent of all uninsured health
care expenses incurred on behalf of the children
including co-pays and deductibles. “Uninsured health
care expenses” means uninsured medical expenses
including, but not limited to, health insurance,
copayments, deductibles, and such other costs as are

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reasonably necessary for orthodontic, dental treatment,
asthma treatments, physical therapy, vision care, and any
acute or chronic medical or health problem or mental
health illness, including counseling and other medical or
mental health expenses, that are not covered by
insurance.
At the forefront of our analysis on this point, we must ask the question
as to whether Michael has properly preserved the issues of tuition and uninsured
medical expenses for the children for our review. To answer, we begin with the
three motions “to modify Petitioner’s child support and maintenance obligations”
Michael filed in this matter. In his first such motion, filed April 2, 2024, Michael
did not discuss his tuition or uninsured health care expense obligations. Instead, he
broadly explained that the Settlement Agreement obligated him to pay
“$12,869.22/mo., including $2,000/mo. in child support, $2000/mo. in
maintenance, and $6,106/mo. for [Amanda’s] marital share in his share in his
father’s car dealership[;]” he asserted that his income had since declined, creating
“such a change in circumstances as to render the obligations set forth in the
Settlement Agreement unconscionable[;]” and that (without providing specifics) he
wanted the family court “to modify Petitioner’s child support and maintenance
obligations.” See (Record at 108-12.)
In his second motion, filed April 16, 2024, Michael also made no
request to be absolved of his tuition or uninsured health care expense obligations,

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or to have those obligations modified. Instead, he restated much of his prior
motion and then concluded by stating:
The Bankruptcy Court judge has suggested that the
parties go to mediation, which Petitioner would be
agreeable to; it would also help if not everything was due
on the 1st of the month. If the total child support and
maintenance was reduced to $2,000 month [sic] and he
continued to pay the other miscellaneous expenses-
Respondent’s car payment and insurance, life insurance
for the children, the children’s Verizon bill, Catholic
school tuition (will increase when the oldest go to Trinity
next year) but not car repairs-his burden would be more
bearable.
(Record at 142.)
In his third motion, filed July 22, 2024, Michael made no request to be
absolved of his uninsured health care expense obligation, or to have that obligation
modified. But he explained that the children’s tuition was set to increase beyond
$2,000 per month in the near term. He then concluded his motion, not by
requesting the family court to make a specified ruling or order, but by making a
suggestion:
I suggest the following: child support pursuant to the
Guidelines; Respondent to pay for her vehicle and
insurance or let me surrender it and she gets her own;
Respondent to pay for vehicular maintenance and repairs;
Respondent to put the children on her health insurance;
and Petitioner to continue paying for the children’s
Verizon phones, Catholic school tuition, and life
insurance. (I have three life insurance policies for the
benefit of the children, totaling $750,000.) An
alternative which would free up some money for

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Respondent would be for the children to switch to public
schools.
(Record at 237.) (emphasis added).
At the evidentiary hearing relating to his motions, Michael noted that
the Settlement Agreement obligated him to pay 100% of the children’s uninsured
medical expenses and their tuition. He produced evidence supporting that the
children’s tuition expenses currently totaled $2,100 per month. However, Michael
made no argument and adduced no testimony indicating he wished to reduce or
terminate those obligations, or to have his children switch to public schools. To
the contrary, he testified that he wanted the children to attend private schools.4
And, when the family court asked Michael at the conclusion of the hearing to
specify the relief he was asking for, Michael, by and through his counsel,
continued to offer no specifics:
COURT: I want to know what, as his counsel, what are
you arguing for the court to put into place with regard to,
what are you asking the court to modify child support to?
What are you asking to modify maintenance to? Are you
asking to terminate? I need you to tell me what your
client’s asking for by your motions.
AMANDA’S COUNSEL: The motion was to modify.
COURT: I want the specific numbers he’s asking to
modify to.
4 See (Video Record, (“V.R.”) January 22, 2025, Hearing at 2:45:00 – 2:45:10 p.m.)

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MICHAEL’S COUNSEL: Your honor, what my client
thinks would be reasonable would be to –
COURT: I’m not asking what your client thinks would be
reasonable. I’m asking, under the law, what do you
believe the court should do. It can be based in part on
what your client is asking for, but you’re the attorney, I
assume you’ve run some numbers. What numbers are
you asking me to use? What numbers do you believe the
law supports me, you know, modifying child support and
maintenance to?
MICHAEL’S COUNSEL: Your honor, I would have to, I
would have to run several child support worksheets using
different numbers. Like I’ve said, maintenance, it would
be income for the respondent, and then there’s also an
argument, based on her testimony, that her income could
be higher. So, I would, I would have to run several sets
of numbers.
COURT: Alright.
(V.R. January 22, 2025, Hearing at 4:46:43 – 4:49:10 p.m.) Despite
acknowledging that he “would have to run several sets of numbers” before he
could provide the family court specifics regarding the relief he was seeking,
Michael filed nothing with the family court following the evidentiary hearing
through when the family court entered its May 27, 2025, order.
It is clear from the record on appeal that Michael never made a motion
(i.e., a written or oral application specifically requesting the family court to make a
ruling) relating to those obligations prior to when the family court rendered its
May 27, 2025, order.

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After the family court rendered its May 27, 2025, order is a somewhat
different story. On June 6, 2025, Michael filed a CR5 59.05 motion to, in part,
“terminate certain child support expenses not mandated by the Guidelines[.]”
(Record at 343.) There, Michael equivocally argued that if his obligations to pay
100% of the children’s out-of-pocket medical expenses and the children’s private
school tuition could be terminated, then what he was otherwise paying in
maintenance and child support would, in his view, be conscionable:
The duration of maintenance is not unconscionable, but
the amount of the obligation, taking into account his
current actual income and his other obligations, is,
although if some of these other obligations can be
terminated, the conclusion would be different.
With respect to child support, this Court correctly
realized that there has been a change in circumstances,
but did not go far enough in applying the Kentucky Child
Support Guidelines. If he has 67% of the household
income, he should only be responsible for 67% of the
extraordinary medical expenses, not 100%. (If the Court
reduces the maintenance obligation, child support would
need to be recalculated.) Paying for the children’s cell
phones, 50% of the extracurricular activities, and private
school tuition are not mandated by Kentucky child
support law. (The children do not have special needs that
cannot be met by JCPS [Jefferson County Public
Schools].)
(Record at 345.) In other words, Michael’s CR 59.05 motion was the first instance
where Michael made an explicit request for the family court to make a specified
5 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

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ruling about whether, or to what extent, he should remain obligated to pay 100% of
the children’s out-of-pocket medical expenses and the children’s private school
tuition. That said, any obligation Michael may have had towards paying child
expenses had no bearing upon Michael’s maintenance obligations which were, as
discussed, non-modifiable. Furthermore, Michael did not specifically ask the
family court to consider his tuition obligations in its calculation of his court-
ordered child support responsibilities.
If Michael wanted the family court to address those issues, he should
have made a specific prejudgment request to that effect, not a post-judgment CR
59.05 request, because “a party cannot invoke CR 59.05 to raise arguments and to
introduce evidence that should have been presented during the proceedings before
the entry of judgment.” Wheeler v. City of Pioneer Village, 723 S.W.3d 764, 772
(Ky. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Michael accordingly
failed to preserve as appellate issues whether, or to what extent, he should remain
obligated to pay 100% of the children’s out-of-pocket medical expenses and the
children’s private school tuition; we therefore choose to review this issue for
manifest injustice only, or in other words palpable error. CR 61.02; see Elery v.
Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 98 (Ky. 2012); see also Mo–Jack Distrib., LLC v.
Tamarak Snacks, LLC, 476 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Ky. App. 2015) (citations omitted).

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A reviewing court may reach a palpable error regardless of the
grounds argued to the trial court. See Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582, 589
(Ky. 2011), as modified (Sep. 20, 2011) (noting that palpable error is an exception
to the can-of-worms rule). The difference is that palpable error carries a very high
standard of review. For an error to be palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain,
obvious, and readily noticeable. A palpable error:
“[M]ust involve prejudice more egregious than that
occurring in reversible error[.]” A palpable error must be
so grave in nature that if it were uncorrected, it would
seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. Thus,
what a palpable error analysis boils down to is whether
the reviewing court believes there is a substantial
possibility that the result in the case would have been
different without the error. If not, the error cannot be
palpable.
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Ernst v.
Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744 (Ky. 2005), overruled on other grounds by
Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2018)) (citation omitted).
As mentioned above, Michael does not contest the family court’s
ruling related to the reduction of his child support payment. He only contests the
family court’s decision to not modify his obligations for unreimbursed medical
expenses and tuition costs. Generally, the courts have held that ordering a parent
to be fully responsible for specific childcare costs, such as school tuition and
unreimbursed medical expenses, in addition to the obligation amount calculated

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under the child support guidelines constitutes a deviation from the guidelines.
KRS 403.211. However, an explicit agreement between the parties that one parent
is to be responsible for a specific expense has been a basis for such a deviation.
See Ridgeway v. Warren, 605 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Ky. App. 2020) (citing KRS
403.211).
In this case, the parties explicitly agreed in the Settlement Agreement
that Michael would be fully responsible for the children’s private school tuition,
which the family court recognized in its May 27, 2025, order. Notably, the family
court did not explicitly mention the agreement for Michael to be fully responsible
for the unreimbursed medical expenses in the appealed orders; however, the
problem remains, as indicated above, that Michael failed to raise this issue until the
first time in his post-judgment CR 59.05 motion, even though he acknowledged the
agreement for him to pay those expenses during the hearing below. Considering
the family court’s other findings as discussed in herein, it is clear it gave due
consideration to the parties’ financial circumstances and the children’s needs, and
in light of Michael’s failure to raise the specific issue regarding the unreimbursed
medical expenses and tuition until well after the contested hearing occurred, we
cannot say the family court engaged in a palpable error in refraining to modify
those terms.

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3. The family court did not commit clear error by holding Michael in
contempt for his nonpayment of maintenance, child support, and other child-
related expense arrearages he owed Amanda.
The family court found in its May 27, 2025, order that Michael owed
Amanda the following arrearage amounts: (1) $24,000.00 (for past-due
maintenance); (2) $5,900.00 (for past-due child support); (3) $2,117.41 (for the
children’s unpaid, uninsured medical expenses); and (4) $1,205.25 (for unpaid
expenses relating to the children’s extracurricular activities). See (Record at 329.)
These findings were consistent with Michael’s admissions at the evidentiary
hearing and are uncontested. Based upon those findings and Michael’s further
admission that his arrearages began to accrue in July 2023, the family court held
Michael in civil contempt. Michael now claims the family court’s contempt
determination was erroneous because, as he represents, it was “impossible” for him
to avoid incurring those arrearages.
As explained in Crowder v. Rearden, 296 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Ky. App.
2009):
A trial court has inherent power to punish individuals for
contempt, and nearly unfettered discretion in issuing
contempt citations. We will reverse a finding of
contempt only if the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the sentence. Abuse of discretion is defined as
conduct by a court that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Contempt is the willful disobedience of—or open
disrespect for—the rules or orders of a court. Contempt

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may be either civil or criminal, depending upon the
reason for the contempt citation. Civil contempt, the
focus of this appeal, is the failure . . . to do something
under order of court, generally for the benefit of a party
litigant. Thus, courts have inherent power to impose a
sanction for a civil contempt to enforce compliance with
their lawful orders.
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Michael does not dispute that his arrearages were caused by his
violations of what constituted a valid court order. He argues instead that the family
court should have excused his violations because it was “impossible” for him to
satisfy those arrearages. To be sure, “[a] party cannot be punished for contempt
for failure to perform an act which is impossible.” Campbell Cnty. v. Ky.
Corrections Cabinet, 762 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Ky. 1988) (citation omitted). However,
that affirmative defense has caveats. “Impossibility” (i.e., an inability to comply
with a court order) “must be shown clearly and categorically by the defendant.”
Id. (citation omitted). “Defendants so claiming must also prove they took all
reasonable steps within their power to [e]nsure compliance with the orders.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The defendant must prove “lack of
fault to successfully defeat the contempt charge.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, after considering what Michael adduced of his income and
expenses, the running theme of the family court’s contempt findings was that
Michael had failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence proving he had taken

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all reasonable steps within his power to insure compliance with his court-ordered
obligations, or that he was not at fault for placing himself in the position where he
was unable to comply. We can only reverse if the family court’s findings in that
regard were clearly erroneous. Id.; see also CR 52.01. In this context, “the test of
whether its finding is clearly erroneous is . . . whether the evidence adduced is so
conclusive as to compel a finding in [Michael’s] favor as a matter of law.”
Morrison v. Trailmobile Trailers, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ky. 1975) (citations
omitted).
With that standard in mind, we begin with the evidence relevant to
Michael’s income. His tax returns indicated his gross income was $1,174,273.00
in 2021, $734,543.00 in 2022, and $146,211.00 in 2023. According to Michael,
two factors caused the sharp decrease in his income during that time frame, the
first of which was his decision to sell his 25% ownership stake in his father’s
closely held S-Corporation car dealership business in Georgia, Hometown Motors
IV d/b/a Mike Murphy Kia (“Hometown Motors”). It is unknown what the fair
market value of his 25% interest should have been, but Michael indicated at the
evidentiary hearing that his 25% ownership stake had provided him well over a
hundred thousand dollars of income annually;6 Michael and Amanda stipulated in
6 When asked what he was earning when he entered the August 22, 2022, Settlement Agreement
with Amanda, Michael testified:

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their Settlement Agreement that Amanda’s marital share of Michael’s ownership
interest in Hometown Motors was worth $523,619.37;7 and Amanda testified that
during the months prior to the Spring of 2023 – when Michael’s father ultimately
sold Hometown Motors for an undisclosed sum – Michael had repeatedly informed
her that the business was “on the hook to be sold for $16 million.”8 Nevertheless,
Michael testified that months prior to that sale (i.e., during or shortly before
August 2022, when Michael executed the Settlement Agreement with Amanda), he
sold his 25% ownership stake back to his father’s S-Corporation for $437,000.00.
The family court was not convinced that this evidence compellingly demonstrated
that Michael lacked fault for the sharp decline in his income.
MICHAEL: Well, my W-2 earnings were 400-and-some-odd-thousand dollars a
year. Um, I had tax returns, for example my 2021 tax return, was over a million
dollars. Um, my 2022 tax return was approximately $700,000. Um, but I was
also part owner at that time, but in order to –
COUNSEL: By part owner, can you be more specific?
MICHAEL: Sure. I was, I was 25% owner of the business, so these, these taxable
incomes included the S-Corp income. So, so I was earning, you know I was
getting, um, W-2 earnings from being the general manager of the dealership, but I
was also get, had S-Corp earnings from being part owner of the dealership.
(V.R. January 22, 2025, Hearing at 1:47:10 – 1:48:10 p.m.)
7 See Paragraph 15 of August 11, 2022, Settlement Agreement (Record at 30.)
8 (V.R. January 22, 2025, Hearing at 4:37:11 – 4:37:26 p.m.)

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On appeal, all that Michael states about this point is that “he had to
sell his share in his father’s business, thereby obviating future S corporation
income[.]” (Appt. Br. at 9.) During the evidentiary hearing, he somewhat
elaborated on this point by citing Paragraph 13.A) of his Settlement Agreement
with Amanda, which had required him to pay Amanda “for her portion of the
equity of the house a one-time non-taxable lump sum payment of FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($400,000) on or before August 11, 2022.”
But, Michael provided no indication that he consulted with Amanda about
forestalling that obligation before he chose to liquidate this revenue-generating
asset (that Amanda had a marital share in).
Other evidence of record also undercuts the notion that Michael
lacked other sources of revenue from which he could have paid that amount
instead. Specifically, one of the exhibits Amanda produced was a post-divorce text
message she received from Michael during what she testified was late 2022 or
2023, in which Michael stated, with respect to the parties’ marital home that he had
received pursuant to the parties’ Settlement Agreement:
I can’t afford [the home] right now. The market is
shifting down it seems like. I owe 1.2 million on it now
because I took out another 500k loan against it. Paid off
the other HELOC [home equity line of credit] and ran up
another 300k partying and I don’t need the space.
(Emphasis added.)

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Moreover, Michael produced nothing demonstrating how the
$437,000.00 price that he sold his shares for was calculated or supporting that this
price was objectively reasonable. He only offered self-serving testimony that
$437,000.00 was the actual price that his father’s closely held company had paid
him for his ownership stake; that his father’s company did not secretly pay him a
higher price for his ownership stake; and that his father was not secretly holding
additional ownership stake sale proceeds for him in an effort to hide them from
Amanda.9 It is unnecessary to comment more on the evidence set forth above
beyond stating our agreement that it falls short of compellingly demonstrating
Michael was not at fault for reducing his income by hundreds of thousands of
dollars annually and, thus, placing himself in the position where he was unable to
comply with his obligations. See Morrison, 526 S.W.2d at 824.
9 See (V.R. January 22, 2025, Hearing at 2:53:35 – 2:54:00 p.m.)
COUNSEL: And, you got four hundred thousand, ballpark, for your share of the
business which, our position is it’s worth four million. And you said there’s no
agreement between you and your father to settle up after this is over?
MICHAEL: No, sir.
COUNSEL: Did he, didn’t he force you, didn’t he pressure you to enter an
agreement with Amanda to get it over with?
MICHAEL: He wanted it over with, yes.
COUNSEL: And then after it was over with, you sold your shares?
MICHAEL: Before it was over with, I sold my shares.

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As for the second factor that caused his decrease in income during that
time frame, Michael testified it was his firing from his father’s car dealership
business in December 2022. Michael was the general manager of Hometown
Motors, a position that had earned him an annual salary of about $450,000.00 per
year. Michael testified that his problems with alcoholism and substance abuse
were what had caused his father to fire him, and that he had been unable to work,
earn income, and satisfy his obligations from October 2022 through February 2023
while he was attending two inpatient drug treatment programs and one outpatient
program. At the time of the January 22, 2025, evidentiary hearing, Michael was
employed as the general sales manager at a car dealership in Louisville making a
gross annual income of approximately $152,000.00 per year.
The family court considered Michael’s testimony about this second
factor but found it fell short. To that end, the family court explained in its
dispositive order that it “recognizes Michael’s substance use disorder and applauds
his current sobriety but fails to conclude that his past poor choices should be
allowed to manufacture a change of circumstances making his financial obligations
unconscionable.” (Record at 331.)
On appeal, all that Michael states about this point is that “[h]is
substance abuse disorder is an illness which deserves some consideration in this
context[.]” (Appt. Br. at 9.) However, he offers no legal authority supporting any

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assertion he might be making that his alleged alcoholism and drug addiction issues
rendered him not at fault for reducing his income by hundreds of thousands of
dollars annually and placing himself in the position where he was unable to comply
with his obligations. Furthermore, the evidence he adduced supporting that he had
serious problems with alcoholism and drug addiction – which consisted entirely of
his own self-serving testimony to that effect – was less than compelling. He
produced no records of any treatment he may have received for those issues. After
Michael applied for unemployment benefits due to his firing, the sole reason given
by Hometown Motors for his firing was “[i]nability to perform [duties],”10 and the
Georgia Department of Labor subsequently awarded Michael benefits after
determining Michael’s firing had been unjustified.11 And Amanda, who was
married to him for seventeen (17) years, testified she had never seen Michael high
on drugs, and “maybe saw him drink twice” and just use prescription medicine.12
As for the evidence relevant to Michael’s expenses, the Settlement
Agreement required Michael to pay $2,000.00 per month in child support; $2,000
per month in maintenance; half of the children’s extracurricular activity expenses;
100% of the children’s uninsured medical expenses; private school tuition for his
10 See December 22, 2022, separation notice from Hometown Motors (Record at 62.)
11 See December 30, 2022, claim determination of the Georgia Department of Labor (Record
at 63.)
12 See (V.R. January 22, 2025, Hearing at 4:38:18 – 4:38:27 p.m.)

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two children ($2,100.00 per month at the time of the hearing); and $6,106.00 per
month toward what he owes Amanda for what they agreed was her marital share of
his ownership interest in Hometown Motors. The latter two of those obligations
are not at issue in this appeal because Michael did not default on his tuition
obligations; and, while Michael has largely failed to pay Amanda anything for her
marital share of his Hometown Motors ownership interest, he was not held in
contempt for that reason because his marital property obligation is currently a
subject of Michael’s ongoing Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.
As for the remainder of those obligations (which are at issue), Michael
has paid Amanda no maintenance since July 2023; and he started incurring his
other arrearages in November 2023. The family court was also unconvinced that
Michael had taken all reasonable steps within his power to ensure compliance with
those obligations. In its dispositive order, the family court considered the totality
of the evidence and explained:
Despite his assertion regarding his reduced
employability Michael’s bank records reflect that he
spent lavishly during 2023. Michael stopped being
current on all of his financial responsibilities in July 2023
during the same month he purchased a plane ticket for his
paramour for nearly $1,000.00. During 2023, Michael
incurred many personal extravagant expenses including
his residence at the Omni Residencies with a monthly
rent of $3,400 for 7 months, frequently dining at
expensive restaurants, routinely using DoorDash, and
spending monies on his paramour including nearly
$2,000.00 at Victoria’s Secret and Coach in 2023.

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Michael began employment at Oxmoor Kia in February
2023 before transitioning to his current role at Louisville
Mitsubishi in 2024. Despite his reduced income, his
frivolous spending habits continued. In January 2024,
bank statements reflect he spent over $1,000.00 in
Apple/website subscriptions, over $1,300 in dining out
costs, and $169.00 in streaming services. Despite these
expenses, he made no effort to satisfy his maintenance
obligation.
(Record at 329-30.)
The evidence in this matter clearly established
Michael failed to timely pay his maintenance obligation
as well as other sums owed. Although Michael insists
that his income has diminished and that there was no
ability to satisfy his obligation, the Court is unconvinced
by this testimony. From 2021 through 2023, Michael
earned over 2 million dollars. He was aware of his
outstanding obligations, which are minimal compared to
the amounts he received. Although he managed his
finances poorly and suffered from substance use disorder,
this does not negate his agreed upon obligations.
Michael currently makes at least $152,000.00 annually
but has failed to make any effort to satisfy his
maintenance obligation for nearly a year. During this
time, however, he has indulged in spending habits
inconsistent with someone struggling financially.
Although Michael retained the ability to make
substantial efforts toward his maintenance payments, he
chose not to do so. Additionally, arrearages totaling
$3,322.66 have accrued due to uninsured medical
expenses and extracurricular activity fees which Michael
failed to satisfy. Based on the above, the Court
concludes Michael is in contempt for failing to pay his
maintenance obligation as well as the children’s medical
and extracurricular activity expenses. Additionally, the
Court shall issue a common law judgment of $5,900 for
unpaid child support expenses.

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(Record at 337.)
To the extent Michael takes issue with the family court’s analysis, his
contentions are perfunctory. First, he notes that “an analysis of [his] bank
statements,” which he produced at the evidentiary hearing, “does not show any
payments to or for his former girlfriend after August 2023.” (Appt. Br. at 5.)
Second, he believes that by indicating he earned over two million dollars from
2021 through 2023, the family court unfairly ignored his sharp decline in income
during that period. Third, and without citation to the record, Michael argues he
“deserves some consideration” for “his endeavors to reduce living expenses and to
even sell personal property ($885.98 from Ebay in December 2024.)” (Appt. Br. at
9.) These contentions are either inconsequential or duplicative of points we have
already addressed. Michael fails to convince this Court that the family court
clearly erred in rejecting his “impossibility” defense and holding him in contempt.
CR 52.01. Accordingly, we affirm in this respect.
4. The family court miscalculated two of its judgments against Michael
representing his arrearages.
The family court found that Michael owed Amanda the following
arrearage amounts: (1) $24,000.00 (for past-due maintenance); (2) $5,900.00 (for
past-due child support); (3) $2,117.41 (for the children’s unpaid, uninsured
medical expenses); and (4) $1,205.25 (for unpaid expenses relating to the

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children’s extracurricular activities). On appeal, Michael does not contest the
accuracy of those figures. He does, however, contest what the family court did
with them. He notes that the sum of those figures is $33,222.66, but that the
family court, after it ostensibly added those figures up and split them between three
separate arrearage judgments, ultimately required him to pay $36,605.32. The
family court’s judgments were as follows:
4. CONTEMPT: Respondent, AMANDA MURPHY’s,
motion to hold Petitioner, MICHAEL MURPHY, in
contempt for failure to timely satisfy maintenance and
the children’s medical and extracurricular activity fees is
GRANTED. Respondent, AMANDA MURPHY, is
awarded a Common Law Judgment against Petitioner,
MICHAEL MURPHY, in the amount of $27,382.66
(TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO DOLLARS AND
SIXTY-SIX CENTS) for accrued payments. Interest
will continue to accrue on the amount due at the statutory
rate of 6%.
5. CONTEMPT re: CHILD SUPPORT: Respondent,
AMANDA MURPHY’s, motion to hold Petitioner,
MICHAEL MURPHY, in contempt for failure to pay
child support is GRANTED. Respondent, AMANDA
MURPHY, is awarded a Common Law Judgment against
Petitioner, MICHAEL MURPHY, in the amount of
$5,900.00 (FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
DOLLARS) for accrued payments. This judgment shall
accrue interest, in the amount of 12% per annum,
pursuant to KRS 360.040.
6. CONTEMPT re: UNINSURED MEDICAL AND
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITY FEES: Respondent,
AMANDA MURPHY’s, motion to hold Petitioner,
MICHAEL MURPHY, in contempt for failure to pay the

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children’s uninsured medical and extracurricular activity
fees is GRANTED. Respondent, AMANDA MURPHY,
is awarded a Common Law Judgment against Petitioner,
MICHAEL MURPHY, in the amount of $3,322.66
(THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-
TWO DOLLARS AND SIXTY-SIX CENTS) for
accrued payments. This judgment shall accrue interest,
in the amount of 6% per annum, pursuant to KRS
360.040.
(Record at 339-340.) (Italics added.)
We have added italics to emphasize two obvious problems. First, in
the judgment set forth in Paragraph 4 above, the family court added $24,000 (for
past-due maintenance), $2,117.41 (for the children’s unpaid, uninsured medical
expenses), and $1,205.25 (for unpaid expenses relating to the children’s
extracurricular activities) and arrived at an incorrect total of $27,382.66. The total
should have been $27,322.66. Second, as set forth in Paragraph 6 above, the
family court held Michael responsible for a judgment of $3,322.66 – which it
calculated by adding $2,117.41 (for the children’s unpaid, uninsured medical
expenses) with $1,205.25 (for unpaid expenses relating to the children’s
extracurricular activities). This judgment was duplicative. As indicated, the
family court had already added what Michael owed for those arrearages into the
judgment set forth in Paragraph 4. All told, the family court erroneously held
Michael liable for $3,382.66 (i.e., the difference between the $36,605.32 it

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required him to pay and the $33,222.66 warranted by the family court’s own
factual findings).
Amanda concedes that the family court made these miscalculations
but notes that Michael did not notify the family court about them. Michael
concedes he did not notify the family court about these miscalculations but
requests review under our palpable error standard.13 We will grant Michael’s
request, and in this instance, determine the family court’s above-stated errors were
palpable. In clear contravention of its own findings of fact, and based upon
apparent mathematical mistakes, the family court held Michael responsible for an
unsubstantiated and unwarranted sum, i.e., $3,382.66. Accordingly, we will
correct this palpable error by vacating the judgment that the family court entered
pursuant to Paragraph 6 of its order, and by remanding with directions for the
family court to revise the judgment it entered pursuant to Paragraph 4 to the
principal amount of $27,322.66.
13 Michael raised this miscalculation issue in his opening brief and then requested palpable error
review of it in his reply brief after Amanda pointed out that he had failed to notify the family
court about this error. To be clear, Michael’s request for palpable error review was adequately
presented to this Court. Generally, an appellant is not obliged to anticipate that the appellee will
challenge preservation, and once the appellee does he is free to reply to the appellee by arguing
that, even if unpreserved, the error is one that may be noticed as palpable. See Commonwealth v.
Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Ky. 2009).

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5. The family court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees to
Amanda’s counsel.
The family court ordered Michael to pay $5,000 of Amanda’s
attorney’s fees directly to her attorney, Dennis Sims.14 On appeal, Michael argues
the attorney fees were improper “considering [his] substantial reduction in income
since the divorce settlement” and because, in his words, “It cannot be fairly said
that [he] engaged in obstructive or dilatory tactics during this litigation; the trial
court did grant his motion for reduction of child support.” (Appt. Br. at 10.) This
is the extent of his argument.
We disagree. Under KRS 403.220, a family court may order one
party to pay a “reasonable amount” of attorney fees of the other party, if the
parties’ resources are disparate and/or “to sanction or discourage conduct and
tactics which waste the court’s and attorneys’ time.” Rumpel v. Rumpel, 438
S.W.3d 354, 363 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We
14 Sims, ostensibly on behalf of Amanda, argues we lack particular case jurisdiction to address
the propriety of his direct attorney’s fee because Michael’s notice of appeal did not specifically
name him as an appellee. His argument is meritless. While attorneys who directly receive
awards of attorney’s fees (such as Sims) are considered indispensable parties to any subsequent
appeal contesting the award, Michael’s failure to specifically name Sims as an appellee did not
automatically divest us of particular case jurisdiction because “the failure to name an
indispensable party is no longer automatically fatal to an appeal.” Mahl v. Mahl, 671 S.W.3d
140, 151 (Ky. 2023). Michael’s notice of appeal substantially complied with our prior rules of
appellate procedure because Michael “timely filed the notice of appeal and included an argument
about the validity of the attorney’s fee awarded to [Sims]. [Sims] was listed in the distribution
list and thus had adequate notice of the appeal.” Id. Under our current rules of appellate
procedure, Michael’s failure to specifically name Sims as an appellee is even less of an issue
because the operative rule, Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2(A)(2), automatically
joins all parties who have not been dismissed from the proceedings below in an appeal. Id.

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review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Sexton v. Sexton, 125
S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004) (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when a
decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citation
omitted).
Here, the family court considered the financial disparity between
Michael and Amanda: Irrespective of Michael’s substantial reduction in income
since the divorce settlement, Michael’s annual income was $152,000; Amanda’s
annual income as a schoolteacher was $40,000; and, while Michael repeatedly
noted at the evidentiary hearing that maintenance qualified as additional income,
Michael conceded he was not paying Amanda maintenance. Michael directs this
Court to no additional evidence – compelling or otherwise – of the parties’
respective financial resources.15 The family court’s contempt finding was proper.
Furthermore, the family court only ordered Michael to pay a small fraction of
15 Below, Michael claimed Amanda was “underemployed” and should have additional income
imputed to her because she teaches at what was once both children’s private school, Our Lady of
Lourdes. (Since their eldest child graduated and now attends a private high school, only their
youngest is currently attending.) Michael argued Amanda could seek employment and
potentially receive a higher salary teaching at Jefferson County Public Schools instead. The
family court rejected this claim. It noted that while Amanda’s salary was lower than what she
might otherwise receive teaching at a public school, her private teaching position had allowed
the children to receive a substantial reduction in their tuition at Our Lady of Lourdes and
continued to provide her a schedule that coincided with the children’s schedules and permitted
her to provide them before and after school care and transportation. To be clear, this point is not
germane to our analysis because Michael has not raised it as a point of contention on appeal.

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Amanda’s $29,286 attorney fee bill – a bill Michael has never claimed to be
unreasonable. There is nothing arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
about this $5,000 attorney fee award. As such, we find no abuse of discretion and
affirm in this respect.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, REVERSE IN PART,
and REMAND for the reasons expressed above.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
W. Bronson Howell
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Gregory Troutman
Louisville, Kentucky
Wm. Dennis Sims
Louisville, Kentucky

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