Kansas Attorney General Opinion 2015-003

January 28, 2015
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 2015- 3
The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
State Senator, 14th District
17120 Udall Rd.
Altoona, KS 66710
Re: 	Cities 	and 	Municipalities‒Miscellaneous 	Provisions‒Firearms 	and
Ammunition; Regulation by City or County, Limitations
State Departments; Public Officers and Employees‒Firearms‒Personal
and Family Protection Act
Synopsis: 	The 	Personal 	and 	Family 	Protection 	Act 	(PFPA) 	allows 	state 	and
municipal buildings, public schools, public postsecondary institutions, state
or municipal-owned adult care homes, community mental health centers,
indigent 	health 	care 	clinics, 	state 	or 	municipal-owned 	medical 	care
facilities, the Kansas State School for the Deaf and the Kansas State
School for the Blind to regulate, restrict or prohibit concealed carry inside
those institutions’ buildings.
The PFPA does not permit a city, county or other political subdivision to
regulate, restrict or prohibit concealed carry on the grounds of public
buildings.
A public employer may not prohibit an employee from storing a firearm in
the 	employee’s 	personal 	vehicle, 	even 	while 	the 	vehicle 	is 	on 	the
employer’s premises. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-16,124(a) generally prohibits
cities and counties from regulating the carrying or storage of firearms, but
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-16,124(d) allows a city or county to adopt an
ordinance, resolution, regulation or personnel policy consistent with the
PFPA.
The federal Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) prohibits a person
without a valid concealed carry license from carrying a firearm inside a

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Page 2
school zone. A person with a valid Kansas concealed carry license may
carry a firearm into a school zone without violating the GFSZA, but the
PFPA still allows public school districts to prohibit concealed carry by
posting signage on a school district building.
The extent to which a person possesses a constitutional right to carry a
firearm in public is unclear following the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions 	in 	District 	of 	Columbia 	v. 	Heller 	and 	McDonald 	v. 	City 	of
Chicago. Cited herein: K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-7c10; K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-
16,124; 21-6301; 21-6309; 75-7c01; 75-7c10; 75-7c17; 75-7c20; 75-4514;
75-6102; K.A.R. 1-49-11; K.A.R. 16-11-7; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, § 4;
U.S. Const., Am. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 921; 18 U.S.C. § 922.
* 	* 	*
Dear Senator Knox:
As State Senator for the 14 th District, you ask for our opinion regarding the statutory
authority for certain public institutions 1 to regulate the possession and storage of
firearms on such institution’s property. You further ask: “under what circumstances can
governmental entities limit the 2nd Amendment rights of persons?”
Kansas law expressly allows each of the public institutions you reference in your letter
to regulate the possession and carrying of firearms on such institution’s property to
some degree. “Kansas statutes are presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be
resolved in favor of their validity.”2 In addition, federal law restricts the carrying of any
firearm 	on 	certain 	property, 	and 	federal 	law 	enjoys 	a 	similar 	presumption 	of
constitutionality. 3
Concealed Carry Inside Public Buildings
Prior to July 1, 2013, concealed carry could be prohibited inside a public building simply
by posting the building with specific signs at public entrances to indicate that concealed
carry is not allowed inside. 4 In 2014, the Kansas Legislature enacted a statute, now
codified at K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20, that generally requires state and municipal
1 You ask about the following public institutions: state or municipal localities or properties; public
preschools and K-12 schools; public postsecondary education institutions as defined in K.S.A. 74-3201b
and their grounds; state or municipal-owned adult care homes as defined in K.S.A. 39-923; community
mental health centers organized pursuant to K.S.A. 19-4001 et seq.; indigent health care clinics as
defined by K.S.A. 65-7402; state or municipal-owned medical care facilities as defined by K.S.A. 65-425;
the Kansas State School for the Deaf and its grounds; and the Kansas State School for the Blind and its
grounds.
2 In re Weisgerber, 285 Kan. 98, 102 (2007).
3 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“A statute is presumed constitutional . . . .”).
4 See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75-7c10(a).

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
Page 3
buildings to allow persons licensed under the Personal and Family Protection Act 5
(PFPA) to carry a concealed handgun into such buildings.
The 2014 amendments have four exceptions to the new general rule that concealed
carry is permitted inside state and municipal buildings. First, the provisions of K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 75-7c20 expressly do not apply to the Kansas State School for the Blind
and the Kansas State School for the Deaf. 6 This means that those institutions are not
required to permit concealed carry inside school buildings, and may prohibit concealed
carry by posting signs at exterior entrances to the building in accordance with K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 75-7c10. 7
Second, 	public 	school 	districts 	are 	expressly 	excluded 	from 	the 	definition 	of
“municipality” for the purposes of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20, 8 and therefore the
provisions of that statute do not apply to any public school district building. Public school
districts are not required to allow concealed carry inside district buildings and may
prohibit concealed carry by posting the building in accordance with K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
75-7c10.
Third, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20 allows state and local governments to exempt any or
all of their buildings from the provisions of that statute for a specific period of time. The
state or a municipality may exempt any of its buildings from the provisions of K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 75-7c20 until January 1, 2014, and thereafter for a period of four years.9
Also, public postsecondary education institutions, state or municipal-owned adult care
homes, community mental health centers, indigent health care clinics and state or
municipal-owned medical care facilities may exempt any building of such institution from
the provisions of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20 for a single period of four years. 10 An
exempt building may prohibit concealed carry by posting the building in accordance with
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c10.
Fourth, concealed carry may be prohibited inside any building that is not exempt from
the 	provisions 	of 	K.S.A. 	2014 	Supp. 	75-7c20 	if 	adequate 	security 	measures 	are
provided and the building is posted as prohibiting concealed carry. 11
We note that another statute, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-16,124(a), generally prohibits a city
or 	county 	from 	enacting 	any 	local 	rule 	governing 	the 	transportation 	of 	firearms.
5 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c01 et seq.
6 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(k).
7 See also K.A.R. 16-11-7, which prescribes the location, size and other characteristics of such signs.
8 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(l)(2) (“The terms ‘municipality’ and ‘municipal’ are interchangeable and have
the same meaning as the term ‘municipality’ is defined in K.S.A. 75-6102, and amendments thereto, but
does not include school districts.”).
9 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(i).
10 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(j).
11 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(a). “Adequate security measures” is defined as “the use of electronic
equipment and personnel at public entrances to detect and restrict the carrying of any weapons into the
state or municipal building, including, but not limited to, metal detectors, metal detector wands or any
other equipment used for similar purposes to ensure that weapons are not permitted to be carried into
such building by members of the public.” K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(m)(1).

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
Page 4
However, subsection (d)(2) of that statute expressly allows a city or county to adopt an
ordinance, resolution or regulation pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20. This means
that notwithstanding the general prohibition against local regulation of concealed carry,
a city or county may exercise an exemption under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20.
Concealed Carry on the Grounds of Public Buildings
The 	PFPA 	prohibits 	a 	city, 	county 	or 	other 	political 	subdivision 	from 	regulating,
restricting or prohibiting concealed carry except as provided in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-
6309(e), 75-7c10(b) and 75-7c20. 12 None of those statutes authorize a city, county or
other political subdivision to regulate, restrict or prohibit concealed carry on the grounds
of public buildings. 13 Therefore, a city, county or other political subdivision may not
regulate, restrict or prohibit licensed concealed carry on the grounds of public buildings.
Storage of Firearms on Public Property
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-16,124(a) prohibits a city or county from adopting or enforcing
any local rule governing the storage of firearms.
In addition, the PFPA provides that a public employer may not adopt personnel policies
that prohibit the possession of a handgun in a private means of conveyance, even if
parked on the employer’s premises. 14 This means that a public employer cannot ban an
employee from transporting a handgun in the employee’s personal vehicle and storing
the handgun inside that vehicle in the public employer’s parking lot.
Open Carry
As we noted in Attorney General Opinion No. 2014-14, “[t]here is no state statute that
prohibits the open carry of legal firearms, including rifles or shotguns, by persons who
are otherwise legally allowed to possess firearms.” We refer you to that opinion for
discussion regarding the current ability of state agencies and municipalities to limit or
prohibit open carry inside public buildings.
State Government Buildings
With respect to state-owned and leased buildings, it is a crime for a person who does
not possess a valid concealed carry license to possess a firearm within a “capitol
complex” building, which includes the Docking, Landon, Curtis and Eisenhower state
office buildings, Memorial Hall, the Kansas Judicial Center and the State Capitol
building. 15 Concealed carry licensees may carry a concealed handgun into those
12 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c17(a).
13 See Attorney General Opinion No. 2014-06 (“A community college may not ban the carrying of
concealed handguns by persons licensed to do so on the grounds of a community college”).
14 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c10(b)(1).
15 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6309(a)(1) and (e). See also K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-4514.

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
Page 5
buildings unless the building is exempt or has adequate security measures and is
posted as described above. 16
A concealed carry licensee may not openly carry a handgun into a capitol complex
building because licensees are only permitted to “possess a handgun as authorized
under the personal and family protection act” inside those buildings. 17 The PFPA
pertains only to concealed carry and does not confer upon licensees the authority to
openly carry a handgun into public buildings.
In addition, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6309(a)(4) allows the Secretary of Administration to
designate by rules and regulations any other state-owned or leased building in which it
is unlawful to possess a firearm. Currently, that regulation states that firearms are
prohibited inside “all state-owned or leased buildings in which the agency or agencies
occupying the building have conspicuously placed signs clearly stating that firearms are
prohibited within that building.”18 However, a concealed carry licensee may carry a
concealed firearm into state-owned or leased building as authorized under the PFPA. 19
Gun-Free School Zones Act
The 	federal 	Gun-Free 	School 	Zones 	Act 	(GFSZA) 	generally 	prohibits 	knowingly
possessing any firearm in a school zone. 20 “School zone” is defined as in or on the
ground of a public, parochial or private primary or secondary school, or within a distance
of 1,000 feet from the grounds of such a school, although the law does not apply to
private property not part of the school grounds.21
There are two exceptions to the GFSZA that are relevant to your inquiry. First, it is not a
violation of the GFSZA for a person licensed by the State of Kansas to carry a firearm to
possess a firearm in a school zone. 22 This means that Kansas concealed carry licensee
may carry a firearm in a school zone without violating the GFSZA. In addition, Kansas
law excepts concealed carry licensees from the general prohibition against possessing
a firearm on school grounds.23
However, it is important to remember that the PFPA expressly excludes public school
district buildings from the provisions that generally require public buildings to allow
concealed carry. Thus, even if a concealed carry licensee may carry a firearm inside a
school zone without violating federal law, Kansas law allows public school districts to
exclude concealed carry from any or all of the district’s buildings simply by posting the
16 Even if adequate security measures are provided and the building is posted, it is not a violation of the
PFPA for a person who has authority to enter the building through a restricted access entrance to carry a
concealed handgun into the building. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-7c20(d).
17 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6309(e).
18 K.A.R. 1-49-11.
19 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6309(e).
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2).
21 18 U.S.A. § 921(a)(25) and (26).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
23 K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6301(i)(5).

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
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building as prohibiting concealed carry. A concealed carry licensee violates the PFPA
by carrying a firearm into a public school building posted as prohibiting concealed carry.
The second exception to the GFSZA is the possession of a firearm in a school zone
when that firearm is not loaded and in a locked container or locked firearms rack in a
motor vehicle. Any person who may lawfully possess a firearm, even a person without a
concealed carry license, may carry a locked, unloaded firearm in a vehicle in a school
zone without violating the GFSZA.
Constitutional Issues
Turning to constitutional concerns, 24 the courts have yet to determine the extent to
which a person possesses a constitutional right to carry a firearm in public. In District of
Columbia 	v. 	Heller, 25 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	the 	Second
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense, noting that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right.”26
The 	law 	at 	issue 	in 	Heller 	banned 	handgun 	possession 	and 	required 	District 	of
Columbia residents to keep lawfully-owned firearms in an inoperable condition. The
Court held that this law violated the Second Amendment because it “ban[s] from the
home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s
home and family” 27 and “makes it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core
lawful purpose of self-defense.” 28 The Court noted that the “need for the defense of self,
family, and property is most acute” in the home.29
However, the Court added that the right to keep and bear arms “was not a right to keep
and 	carry 	any 	weapon 	whatsoever 	in 	any 	manner 	whatsoever 	and 	for 	whatever
purpose.” 30 The Court stated that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited,” and acknowledged “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings . . . .”31 The Court characterized such
prohibitions as “presumptively lawful.”32
Following Heller, the United States Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago33
held that the Second Amendment is “fully applicable to the States,” 34 meaning that
24 See U.S. Const., Am. 2; Kan. Const., B. of R., § 4.
25 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
26 Id. at 628.
27 Id. at 628-29 (internal quotations omitted).
28 Id. at 630.
29 Id. at 628.
30 Id. at 626.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 637 n. 26.
33 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
34 Id. at 3026.

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
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states, cities and other political subdivisions are subject to the Second Amendment’s
limitations on regulating the possession and carrying of firearms. Since Heller and
McDonald, a number of state and federal courts have attempted to apply the Supreme
Court’s reasoning to a variety of laws restricting the ability of law-abiding citizens to
possess or carry firearms.
Although Heller makes it clear that the government cannot eliminate the ability of law-
abiding citizens to keep operable firearms at home for self-defense, the Court also
acknowledged the presumed validity of “longstanding prohibitions” on the possession
and carrying of firearms. Courts across the country have struggled to correctly interpret
and apply Heller:
“[T]here may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places
beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what the
criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of scrutiny might
apply to them, or any one of a number of other questions.”35
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, whose jurisdiction includes Kansas, has provided
some guidance on how to evaluate Second Amendment challenges to firearms laws
post-Heller and McDonald. The Court applies a two-part test to Second Amendment
cases: first, the court determines “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”36 If the law
does not impose a burden, or if the conduct in question is not within the scope of the
Second Amendment, the law is constitutional. If the challenged law does impose a
burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, the court “must apply some
level of heightened scrutiny” to the law. 37 The level of scrutiny required depends upon
“the type of law challenged and the type of [Second Amendment restriction] at issue.”38
Since Heller, the 10th Circuit has consistently upheld provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
that prohibit the possession of any firearm by certain classes of persons:
Section 922(g), a part of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968, forbids
gun possession by nine classes of individuals: felons, fugitives, addicts or
users of controlled substances, the mentally ill, illegal and non-immigrant
aliens, the dishonorably discharged, renouncers of their citizenship, those
subject to court orders for harassing, stalking, or threatening intimate
partners or their children, and those convicted for misdemeanor domestic
violence. No Second Amendment challenge since Heller to any of these
provisions has succeeded. 39
35 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4 th Cir. 2011).
36 United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 (10 th Cir. 2010).
37 Id. at 801.
38 Id. (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3 rd Cir. 2010)).
39 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10 th Cir. 2012) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(5), which prohibits the possession of firearms by illegal aliens, does not violate the Second
Amendment).

The Honorable Forrest J. Knox
Page 8
Given this pattern, we anticipate that the 10 th Circuit will continue to uphold § 922(g)
against Second Amendment challenges absent further guidance to the contrary by the
United States Supreme Court.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has considered only one post-Heller case involving
restrictions on the carrying of firearms by law-abiding citizens. Peterson v. Martinez 40
examined whether a Colorado law prohibiting the issuance of state concealed carry
licenses to nonresidents violates the Second Amendment. Applying the two-part test
described above, the Court held that “the Second Amendment does not confer a right to
carry concealed weapons.” 41 Based on this recent decision, it is likely that a Second
Amendment challenge to current state or local restrictions on concealed carry would be
unsuccessful in the 10th Circuit.
With respect to Kansas courts, since Heller, McDonald, and Peterson, the Kansas
Supreme Court has not considered any cases that examine the extent to which the
State of Kansas or its political subdivisions may limit the right of law-abiding citizens to
carry firearms. Thus, we cannot predict how the Kansas Supreme Court would view
state or local restrictions on the carrying of firearms in light of those holdings.
Unfortunately, given the paucity of controlling legal authority, we are presently unable to
clearly 	define 	the 	extent 	to 	which 	state 	and 	local 	governments 	can 	restrict 	the
possession or carrying of firearms outside the home. However, unless and until the 10 th
Circuit reverses its holding that the Second Amendment does not confer a right to
concealed carry, federal district courts in Kansas will be bound by that holding. If the
Kansas Supreme Court has occasion to examine state or local restrictions on the
carrying of firearms, it is bound to follow Heller and McDonald, but not the 10th Circuit’s
reasoning in Peterson.
Sincerely,
Derek Schmidt
Attorney General
Sarah Fertig
Assistant Attorney General
DS:AA:SF:sb
40 707 F.3d 1197 (10 th Cir. 2014).
41 Id. at 1211.