Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1992-039

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 23, 1992
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 92- 39
The Honorable Ross 0. Doyen
State Senator, Twenty-Third District
State Capitol, Room 422-S
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Drainage and Levees--Watershed Districts; Taxation
and Bonded Indebtedness--Use of Watershed District
- Funds
Synopsis: Membership dues for watershed district association
may not be paid from the watershed district's
general fund. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1991 Supp.
24-1219.
Dear Senator Doyen:
As state senator for the twenty-third district, you inquire
whether the state watershed district association dues may be
paid from the general fund of a watershed district pursuant to
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 24-1219.
The state association of Kansas watersheds is a non-profit
organization that promotes the interests of watershed
districts throughout the state. Membership in the association
is not compulsory and not all watershed districts are members.
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 24-1219(b) authorizes the watershed
district to levy a tax to create a general fund for the
payment of "engineering, legal, clerical, land and interest in
land, installation maintenance, operation and other
administrative expenses. . . ."

The statute lists how the general fund moneys may be spent.
At issue is whether the dues come under the category of "other
administrative expenses". In our opinion they do not because
the language has been construed to include only expenses
directly related to the operation of a watershed district and
the works of improvement undertaken by it.
Barton v. Turkey Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200
Kan. 489 (1968), was an action to enjoin a watershed
district and members of its board of directors from putting
into operation the proposed method of the general plan of
improvement for flood control. At issue was whether the
method of financing adopted by the district was valid.
Construing the language "operation and other administrative
expenses" the court states:
"We cannot accept the appellants' logic in
construing the provisions of the second
paragraph [now subsection (b)] in 24-1219,
supra. In construing statutes,
qualifying words, phrases and clauses are
ordinarily confined to the last
antecedent, or to the words and phrases
immediately preceding. The last
antecedent, within the meaning of this
rule, has been regarded as the last word
which can be made an antecedent without
impairing the meaning of the sentence.
(50 Am.Jr., Statutes § 269.)
"While the foregoing rule of statutory
construction is not inflexible, it clearly
has application to the construction of
24-1219, supra, which does provide the
purposes for which the general fund is to
be created; that is, 'for the payment of
engineering, legal, clerical, land and
interests in land, installation
maintenance, operation and other
administrative expenses.'
"Applying the ordinary meaning to all of
the language used in this section, the
legislature clearly intended that the fund
created by the general tax levy could be
used for the purchase of land and interest
in lands, as well as engineering, legal,
clerical and other costs. Under the

foregoing rule of construction,
'operation' is the last word which the
phrase 'other administrative expenses'
qualifies. . . .
"The ordinary meaning of the language in
the second paragraph in 24-1219, supra,suggeststhatiswastailor-madebythe
legislature to fit works of improvement
undertaken by a watershed district in
cooperation with the federal government
under the Federal Watershed Protection and
Flood Prevention Act as exemplified by the
facts in the instant case." 200 Kan.
504.
Applying the rule of statutory construction cited above the
court finds that the phrase "other administrative expenses"
qualifies "operation" and thus the phrase in question
authorizes the expenditure of general fund moneys when the
administrative expenses are related to the works of
improvement undertaken by the district. It is therefore our
opinion that moneys from the general fund established by
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 24-1219 may not be used to pay dues to the
state watershed district association because payment of the
dues is not within the purposes for which the tax moneys are
levied nor within the general purpose for which the watershed
district was organized. See K.S.A. 24-1209 general powers
and duties of a watershed district.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Guen Easley
Assistant Attorney General
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