Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-150

1989-150Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 27, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 150
The Honorable James D. Braden
State Representative, Sixty-Fourth District
1122 Fifth Street, P.O. Box 58
Clay Center, Kansas 67432-0058
The Honorable Clyde D. Graeber
State Representative, Forty-First District
1900 Kingman
Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-4230
Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas--Finance and
Taxation--Classification; Excise Tax on Inventories
Synopsis: An excise tax imposed on merchants, manufacturers,
livestock producers and feedlot operators for the
privilege of doing business in the state is not a
tax on the property of these persons and thus is
not violative of article 11, section 1(b)(2) which
exempts merchants' and manufacturers' inventories
and livestock from property taxation. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 79-100lb; 79-1005 (repealed L.
1988, ch. 375, § 9); K.S.A. 79-3612; 79-3617; 1989
House Bill No. 2003, as amended by the House
Committee of the Whole; Kan. Const., Art. 11, §
1.
Dear Representative Braden: •
You request our opinion regarding the constitutionality of
statutorily imposing an excise tax on merchants' and
manufacturers' inventories and livestock. Specifically yo
inquire whether such a tax would in effect be a property tax
on inventories and livestock which are exempted from property
tax pursuant to the Kansas Constitution. Kan. Const.,
art. 11, § 1(b)(2).
"The proposition that the courts will
examine a tax and determine its nature as
a property tax or excise for itself, no
matter by what name it is designated by
the legislative body in the statute
imposing it, is well settled. If the tax
is in fact imposed on property, no matter
what it may be called, it is a property
tax, and courts will look through form to
substance, and will prevent that from
being done by indirection which could not
be accomplished directly." 71 Am.Jur.2d
State and Local Taxation S25 (1973 ).
See also Wheeler v. Weightman, 96
Kan. 50, 66 (1965).
We must therefore look to the operation and affect of a
particular tax to determine its nature.
A property tax is generally defined as a tax levied on
property, real or personal, the amount being dependent on the
value of the property. Black's Law Dictionary 1097 (5th Ed.
1979). "An excise tax is a charge imposed upon the
performance of an act, enjoyment of a privilege, or the right
to engage in an occupation." Director of Taxation v. Kansas
Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 236 Kan. 450, 451 (1984).
House Bill No. 2003, proposed in the 1989 Special Session of
the Legislature and as amended by the House Committee of the
Whole, sought to impose a one-time excise tax on merchants,
manufacturers, feedlot operators and livestock producers
"for the privilege of doing business within the state." The
tax was to be based on the value of the average inventory of
personal property maintained or held during 1989, as
established for federal income tax reporting purposes or,
alternatively, on the appraised value of average inventory of
such property established in 1988. The collection provisions
in House Bill No. 2003 are identical to those established for
collection of sales taxes. See K.S.A. 79-3612; 79-3617.
By its terms, the tax imposed by House Bill 2003 is on certain
individuals for the privilege of doing business, and not on
the inventories or livestock directly. While the legislative
See Also Callaway v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan.
646, 654 (1973); Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U.S. 217,
12 S.Ct. 121, 35 L.Ed. 994 (1891). In Director of Taxation
v. Kansas Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 236 Kan. 450 (1984),
the court found the mineral severance tax to be an excise tax
imposed on the privilege of severing specified minerals from
the earth and water of this state. 236 Kan. at 450. The
court made this finding even though the mineral severance tax
was calculated by using the gross value of the mineral
severed. 236 Kan. at 453, 454. In City of Newton v.
Atchison, 31 Kan. 151 (1883), the court held that a tax
which is in its terms a license tax upon merchants does not
become a property tax merely because it is graduated by the
average amount of stock held by the merchant and thus
proportioned in the same manner as a property tax. The court
held that the tax was on the privilege of doing business in
the state, and that the taxpayer could avoid the tax by
reducing or disposing of his stock. As pointed out in
Weightman, 96 Kan. at 76, if the taxing entity had
"penalized these avenues of escape in such a way that it would
have been utterly disastrous to turn to them, it would be
nonsense to say, if he paid the fee, that he exercised a
voluntary choice to pay in order that he might enjoy the
privilege of merchandising." Otherwise, however, the tax
would be considered an excise rather than a property tax.
In conclusion, an excise tax imposed on merchants,
manufacturers, livestock producers and feedlot operators for
the privilege of doing business in the state is not a tax on
the property of these persons and thus is not violative of
article 11, section 1(b)(2) which exempts merchants' and
manufacturers' inventories and livestock from property
taxation.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.