Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-096

1989-096Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL July 31, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 96
The Honorable William W. Bunten
State Representative, 54th District
1701 W. 30th
Topeka, Kansas 66611
Re: Mentally III, Incapacitated and Dependent Persons;
Social Welfare -- Adult Care Homes -- Licensure and
Receivership
Synopsis: Where an owner of a building which is leased by an
adult care home business does not have an express
or implied interest in the business of operating
the adult care home, it is our opinion that the
legislature did not intend to impose a duty upon
the owner to assume such an interest. Rent moneys
owed to such an owner should be paid to the owner
by a receiver unless such moneys are otherwise
subject to valid legal claims. However, where a
landlord has an interest in the operation of the
adult care home and merely seeks to escape
licensure requirements or financial responsibility
for operation of an adult care home business, that
landlord should be on the license and will be
subject to cost recovery procedures set forth at
K.S.A. 39-960 and 39-961. Cited herein: K.S.A.
39-923; 39-926; 39-954; 39-959; 39-960; 39-961;
39-962; 39-963.
Dear Representative Bunten:
You request our opinion concerning interpretation of K.S.A.
39-954 et seq. as it relates to the authority of a
receiver to retain lease payments claimed by a co-licensee
who is not involved in the management of the affairs or
operation of an adult care home but is rather a mere
landlord. You specifically ask that we address these
questions:
"(a) May a lessor, who is not involved in the management of
the affairs or the operation of the adult care nursing home,
be held liable for program deficiencies in a receivership
pursuant to K.S.A. 39-360?
"(b) Whether a lessor who is not involved in the management
of the affairs or the operation of the adult care home, may be
required by the Secretary of Health and Environment to be a
co-licensee under the provisions of 39-954, et seq., so as
to make that lessor liable for program deficiencies in a
receivership pursuant to K.S.A. 39-960?
"(c) May the Secretary of Health and Environment withhold
lease payments to a lessor who is not involved in the
management of the affairs or the operation of the adult care
home, in a receivership pursuant to K.S.A. 39-960?"
We note that these issues have been the subject of litigation
which we understand has been dismissed without prejudice. We
also understand that the district court continues to exercise
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to K.S.A. 39-954 et
seq. and the resulting receivership. Many of the issues
discussed herein cannot be resolved without examination of
specific facts. We cannot act as a fact finder and therefore
defer such fact questions to the proper state agency or the
district court.
You ask whether a lessor may be required to be a co-licensee
pursuant to K.S.A. 39-954 et !fa . K.S.A. 39-926 makes it
unlawful to operate an adult care home without a license.
K.S.A. 39-927 sets forth who must sign the application for a
license:
"An application for a license to operate
an adult care home shall be made in
writing to the licensing agency upon forms
provided by it and shall be in such form
and shall contain such information as the
licensing agency shall require, which may
include affirmative evidence of the
applicant's ability to comply with such
reasonable standards and rules and
regulations as are adopted under the
provisions of this act. The application
shall be signed by the person or persons
seeking to operate an adult care home, as
specified by the licensing agency, or by
a duly authorized agent of any person so
specified. . . ." (Emphasis added).
Thus, anyone seeking to operate an adult care home must sign
the application for licensure. K.S.A. 39-923(a)(13) defines
the term "operate an adult care home":
"(13) "Operate an adult care home" means
to own, lease, establish, maintain,
conduct the affairs of or manage an adult
care home, except that for the purposes
of this definition the word "own" and the
word "lease" shall not include hospital
districts, cities and counties which hold
title to an adult care home purchased or
constructed through the sale of bonds."
(Emphasis added).
A problem arises because, while K.S.A. 39-923(a)(13) defines
operation of an adult care home to mean "to own . . . an adult
care home," it is not clear from the language of the statute
whether "to own an adult care home" means to own an interest
in the building or facility itself or to own an interest in
the business of the adult care home.
The words chosen by the legislature are the most persuasive
evidence of the purpose of the statute. However, if the plain
meaning of the statute is not clear or leads to futile or
unreasonable results, courts may look beyond the words to the
purposes of the act. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. U.S., 628 F.Supp. 1431, mod. on reconsideration 660
F.Supp. 29 (Kan. 1986); State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825
(1987); Ludwick v. Johnson County, 233 Kan. 79 (1983).
When a statute is susceptible to more than one construction,
it must be given the construction which gives expression to
the intent and purpose of the legislature, even though such
construction is not within the strict literal interpretation
of the statute. Reeves v. Board of County Commissioners of
Johnson County, 226 Kan. 397 (1979). In determining
legislative intent, the court may not look to statements made
years after the enactment, but may properly look to historical
background, circumstances pending passage, purposes to be
accomplished, and the effect the statute will have under the
various suggested constructions. Board of Education of
Unified School District 512 v. Vic Regnier Builder's,
Inc., 231 Kan. 731 (1982); State v. Freeman 236 Kan.
274 (1984); State v. Phifer, 241 Kan. 233 (1987). When
a statute is ambiguous, the courts consider and give great
weight to the interpretation of the appropriate administrative
agency. Matzke v. Block, 564 F.Supp. 1157, affd. in
part, rev. in part, 732 F.2d 799 (Kan. 1983); Dennison
V. Topeka Chambers Indus. Dev. Corp., 527 F.Supp. 611,
affd. 724 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1981); Board of County
Commissioners of Johnson County v. Greenshaw, 241 Kan.
119 (1987). However, where an agency interpretation is
clearly erroneous, in contravention of the law, or not
consistent, a court may depart from agency interpretation.
DSG Corp. v. Shelor, 239 Kan. 312 (1986); Appeal of
Sterling Drill Company, 9 Kan.App.2d 367 (1981).
The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)
provides forms to applicants seeking to operate an adult care
home. These forms include a disclosure statement which
requires information concerning the owner of the land and
building. If the applicant and the owner of the land are
different entities, KDHE requires the owner of the property
or building to join in the application for a license. Thus,
KDHE requires such owners to become co-licensees. The
issue thus becomes whether the legislature intended to mandate
that owners of property obtain a license to operate an adult
care home where such owners do not otherwise seek or possess
authority to control, operate or own an interest in the
separate legal entity providing the adult care.
Attorney General Opinion No. 84-66 discussed whether a foreign
corporation licensed to operate and manage an adult care home
in the state of Kansas should register pursuant to K.S.A.
17-7301 et seq. We opined that such corporate
registration was required because of the active part the
company in question took in the operations of the adult care
home and considered the fact that this out-of-state
corporation had entered into a management contract for the
purpose or providing for the day-to-day affairs of the adult
care home. This opinion did not discuss a situation involving
a company that merely owned the building and which did not
otherwise have or seek to exert any control or interest in the
operation of the adult care home. Similarly, in response to a
March 17, 1982 letter from KDHE, this office addressed the
authority to hold principals accountable as licensees. The
principals discussed in this letter were indirectly involved
in the operation of an adult care home through a contract for
the performance of the day-to-day functions by a management
group. We advised that in such a fact situation it seemed
reasonable to require a real estate investment corporation to
be licensed to operate an adult care home. Our advice was
predicated upon the operation of an adult care home by the
agent of the principal, and thus both entities were, to some
degree, engaged in and legally responsible for the operation
of the adult care home. Thus, we believed both entities
should be required to obtain a license to operate that adult
care home because both had a legal interest in the the adult
care home.
Following our 1982 letter, L. 1982, ch. 189, § 1 amended
K.S.A. 39-923(a) to include section (13) as it currently reads
and to define "operate an adult care home" to include "to own
. . an adult care home". Unfortunately, legislative history
in the form of committee meeting reports or minutes is
virtually nonexistent because this amendment was introduced on
April 28, 1982 and final action was taken on the same day.
However, in determining legislative intent, statutory
construction rules permit consideration of the circumstances
and history surrounding the enactment. See State v.
Phifer, 241 Kan. 233 (1987).
It is our understanding that in enacting the 1982 emergency
amendment to K.S.A. 39-923, legislators apparently believed
the amended language countered the problem of the adult care
home property owner who violated standards but was not on the
license. This was regarded as necessary legislation because
some owners of property were suspected of playing a role in
and having an interest in the management and operation of the
home. The amendment required all parties involved in the
ownership and operation of an adult care home business to be
on the license. The question of whether mere ownership of the
building was enough to trigger licensure requirements was not
clearly addressed. KDHE proffers the legal principle
inclusio unius est exclusio alterious as support for the
proposition that if the legislature had not intended for mere
property owners to be liable in receivership, it would have
written into the receivership law the type of exception it
included in K.S.A. 39-923(a)(13) for hospital districts,
cities and counties. We note, however, that other entities
peripherally involved in an adult care home are also not
included in the exception but are nevertheless excluded from
licensure requirements: e.g., health care professionals
providing services; equipment lessors or suppliers who own
property located in the building; employees, residents and
staff at the adult care home. These entities are involved in
the ownership of adult care home property or the daily
operation of the facility, but are not required to be on the
license to operate, perhaps because of their relative lack of
interest or control over business operations.
Licensure by the government is an exercise of police power:
"The right to engage in a legitimate
employment or business receives
recognition as a portion of the individual
freedoms secured by the due process
provisions of the federal and state
constitutions. However, this fact does
not close the door to all legislative
control over the exercise of the right. A
state's police power with regard to the
protection of health, morals, and welfare
of the public includes the right to
regulate, by requiring a license as a
prerequisite to the carrying on of certain
activities, commonly designated as
businesses, occupations, vocations,
trades, or callings.
The right of personal liberty and the
right to earn a livelihood in any lawful
calling and to pursue any lawful trade or
vocation is subject to the governmental
right to require a license where justified
under the police power." 51 Am.Jur.2d
License and Permits, § 14 (1970); See
also 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, §
454 (1984).
License means permission or authority, and a license to do any
particular thing is permission or authority to do that thing.
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Board of County Commissioners
of Kiowa County, State of Kansas, 368 U.S. 146, 82 S.Ct.
282, 7 L.Ed.2d 199 (1961). The legislature may require a
license in order to engage in certain occupations or
businesses. However, statutes restraining the exercise of a
trade, operation or business must not be deemed to extinguish
or restrain private rights unless that is clearly the
legislatively intent. State v. Gillen, 126 Kan. 368
(1928). We must therefore determine whether there is a clear
legislative intent to license the private right to own a
building which is used as an adult care home.
KDHE believes that a license is required in order to own and
lease a building to a non-profit corporation that operates an
adult care home. The state obviously has a legitimate
interest in the care given and the maintenance of adult care
homes. The 1982 amendments to K.S.A. 39-923 et seq.
sought to assure the state, and those residing in adult care
homes, that those entities involved in providing such a
service and maintenance could be held to certain standards.
Prior to 1982, owners of adult care homes were occasionally
using "straw men" as fronts, thus escaping responsibility for
operation and maintenance. It is clear that the legislature
intended to provide a mechanism whereby all the proper
entities were required on a license.
It is not as clear whether a landlord of an adult care home is
such an entity. Determining the future extent and nature of
involvement in operations or maintenance by a facility owner
could be difficult, especially before operations and
maintenance actually commence or if an owner seeks to avoid
such responsibility or hide such a relationship. Thus,
application for license and disclosure forms require
information concerning each person who has a direct or
indirect ownership in an adult care home.
Given the deference afforded to agency interpretation and the
compelling state interest in insuring that all adult care home
operators and owners are held to certain standards, it is our
opinion that K.S.A. 39-923 et !fa . may be read to include
a requirement of licensure for the owner of the building in
which an adult care home is operated. However, such a
requirement is not without limitation. The legislature
clearly intended to require licensure of an owner who uses
another entity to operate his or her business. A landlord
will not necessarily have, seek or be able to exert any
control over a separate legal entity which is completely
independent in its operation of an adult care home occupying
the property.
Requiring a landlord to be on the license could be
characterized as allowing the landlord to permit the tenants
to make this particular specialized use of the property. If
the financial disclosure forms, application for license and
the license itself assure the state that persons connected
with ownership and operation of the adult care home can be
adequately monitored and enables enforcement of compliance
with all applicable standards by those entities possessing
such authority or responsibility, the state may require the
owner of a building to obtain a license. A license for these
purposes is within the scope of state police power. However,
if requiring a landlord to be on a license mandates that the
landlord assume some sort of additional control over or
responsibility for operations, where none was heretofore
intended, sought, or even available, it is our opinion that
this goes beyond the intent of the legislature. Thus, whether
a particular entity has or should have some responsibility
concerning the operation of an adult care home becomes a fact
question dependent upon the extent of legal interest,
involvement or responsibility of each entity. Such fact
questions fall within the province of authority delegated to
KDHE. Therefore, that agency may require an owner of an
adult care home to be on the adult care home license when
there is factual evidence that the owner is using another
entity to operate an adult care home business for which the
owner of the building is or should be responsible.
The second issue is whether the receiver and KDHE must pay
rent to a landlord, or whether such payments may be suspended
or denied because of costs incurred by the state due to the
receivership status of the adult care home.
If an adult care home is unable to continue for one or more of
the reasons enumerated under K.S.A. 39-954 et sue ., a
court may appoint a receiver, who essentially runs the adult
care home until the fulfillment of one of the circumstances
listed under K.S.A. 39-963. A receiver is "a ministerial
officer, agent, creature, hand or arm of, and temporary
occupant and caretaker of the court and he represents the
court appointing him and he is the medium through which the
court acts." Blacks Law Dictionary 1140 (5th ed. 1979);
see also Cates v. Musgrove, 190 Kan. 609 (1962);
W-V Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, 234 Kan. 354 (1983). The receiver remains
subject to the supervision of the district court under K.S.A.
39-962, and we note that the court appointing this receiver
has continuing jurisdiction and authority to advise, supervise
and authorize a receiver to either retain or pay over rent
moneys claimed by an owner of the adult care home property.
This review by the court provides due process notice and
hearing opportunity.
In addition to those authorized or imposed by the district
court, K.S.A. 39-959 sets forth the powers and duties of a
receiver:
"A receiver appointed in accordance with
the provisions of this act shall have the
following powers and duties:
(a) Conduct the day to day business
operations of the adult care home;
(b) reimburse the owner or licensee, as
appropriate, a fair monthly rental for the
adult care home, taking into account all
relevant factors, including the condition
of such adult care home and set-offs
arising from improvements made by the
receiver;
(c) give fair compensation to the owner
or licensee, as appropriate, for all
property taken or used during the course
of the receivership if such person has not
previously received compensation for the
property being taken or used;
• • •
(g) honor all existing leases, mortgage,
chattel mortgage and security
interests." (Emphasis added).
Thus, when appropriate and taking into account all relevant
factors, the receiver is clearly authorized to pay the owner
or licensee a fair monthly rental. The receiver also has the
power and duty to honor all existing leases. We note the two
separate provisions discussing these reimbursements. This may
indicate that some persons having a mortgage or lease
arrangement with an adult care home may differ from the owner
or licensee; e.g. the building or equipment lessor; the bank
holding a mortgage, etc.
Subsection (g) of K.S.A. 39-954 requires the receiver to honor
all existing leases, and thus a receiver may step into the
preexisting contractual relationship as a party. Subsection
(b) permits reimbursement to an owner or licensee to be
affected by certain factors. Thus, one issue becomes whether
the entity claiming a payment from a receiver is an owner or
licensee. The factual determinations discussed under the
first issue impact upon this question. If an owner is
required to be on an license, K.S.A. 39-959(b) permits
consideration of all relevant factors and rent payments may be
withheld "when appropriate". "Appropriate" is not defined by
statute and what is appropriate must therefore be determined
in light of all relevant factors. If an owner is not or
should not be on a license, K.S.A. 39-954(g) allows the
receiver to make rent payments, subject to any restrictions
imposed by the district court or by restrictions on funds
available to the receiver. However, K.S.A. 39-954 discusses
the power and authority of the receiver, not KDHE. While
the statutes permit the state to fund the costs of
receivership, KDHE is a separate entity. Thus, the
obligation of the state to pay rent moneys to a landlord must
be established pursuant to other authority.
The third issue concerns liability for costs and necessarily
involves elements discussed under the first two issues. In
addition to retention of reimbursement as authorized by K.S.A.
39-959(b), K.S.A. 39-960 and 39-961 discuss costs incurred as
a result of an adult care home going into receivership. Both
the secretary of KDHE and the secretary of the Social and
Rehabilitation Services (SRS) are statutorily authorized to
recover costs resulting from expenditures by the state due to
the receiver's operation of the adult care home. These
amounts "shall be owed by the owner or licensee . . . and
until repaid shall constitute a lien against all nonexempt
personal and real property of the owner or licensee." Thus, a
lien arises by operation of law and creates a right or claim
which the state, as creditor, has in order to secure the
payment of a debt or obligation. See Blacks Law Dictionary
832 (5th ed. 1979). K.S.A. 39-963 authorizes the court to
make additional orders to recover costs and expenses incurred
pursuant to receivership. These statutes evidence a clear
legislative intent to allow and facilitate recovery of costs
incurred by the state. However, determining from whom such
costs may be recovered requires analysis of the statutory
language and legislative intent.
While K.S.A. 39-959 remains unchanged from the original 1978
enactment, K.S.A. 39-960 and 39-961 were added to the act
pursuant to L. 1984, ch. 158 (1984 Senate Bill No. 656).
Testimony received on Senate Bill No. 656 from KDHE and
SRS indicates that these agencies saw this amendment as a
means by which the state could recover costs of a receivership
when costs paid by the state exceeded the revenue generated by
the adult care home. These agencies believed that the
amendment allowed payments made by the state to be recovered
from the owner or licensee. Testimony does not evidence a
discussion of whether "the owner" included a "mere landlord"
or rather, was directed at an owner who sought to escape
responsibility by using another entity to operate the
business. Testimony before the committee does exhibit a
strong desire to recover costs expended by the state due to an
adult care home going into receivership. T he state was
obviously seeking a method by which to impose and recover a
debt. When the adult care home goes into receivership because
of insolvency, recovery of debt from the bankrupt business
becomes problematic if not impossible.
Liability for or the obligation to pay a debt may be created
in many ways: by contract (implied or express); through a
judgment; or through enforcement of a statutory obligation.
See 26 C.J.S. Debt S 2 (1956). There has not been a
Judicial order concerning the payment of this obligation.
Therefore, the possible theories upon which this debt may be
based are contractual or statutory.
The landlord in question has a lease agreement with the
tenant, but the contract does not express contractual
agreement by the owner to assume responsibility for debts.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to imply such contractual
liability. Financial responsibility for a debt may be
implied or arise because of special relationships; i.e.
parents may be held liable for the actions of their children,
masters or principals for the actions of their servants or
agents and partners for their co-partners. These
relationships are either based on consensual agreement, joint
action or ability to control. These types of relationships
will not necessarily exist between a landlord and tenant
unless there is joint action, the landlord expressly or
impliedly agrees to be financially responsible for the debts
of a tenant or the landlord exercises some control over the
business of the tenant.
The agreement in question does not expressly seek to assume or
exert any control or interest in the day-to-day operation, or
other business aspects of the adult care home. However, joint
action or ability to control may be implied from facts outside
the scope of the agreement. Such a fact determination must be
made by the appropriate authority. If joint action or ability
to control is not evidenced, individual liability must be
present. Individual liability may exist if there is some
indication that the landlord agreed to assume liability for
debts owed to the state.
A surety contract represents a type of agreement whereby one
entity agrees to assume liability for a debt. Surety is
defined as "one who undertakes to pay money or to do any other
act in the event that his principle failed therein." Blacks
Law Dictionary 1293 (5th ed. 1979). See also U.S. v.
Gonzales, 541 F.Supp. 783 (Kan. 1982). A bond is a
contract, and a surety is bound to the extent it has agreed to
be bound. Fink v. Allen, 11 Kan.App.2d 2—(1985).
Introduced in the same year as Senate Bill No. 656, 1984 House
Bill No. 2368 did not pass. This bill sought to require a
surety bond in order to protect against financial failure of
an adult care home. If this bill had been enacted, the costs
incurred by the receiver could be in part recovered from the
surety. The failure of this bill could mean that such
financial surety was not intended or required by the
legislature or that the legislators believed that other
enactments provided for such assurances.
If a landlord agrees to pay the debts of a tenant, creditors
of that tenant may look to the landlord for payment.
Requiring a landlord to be on a license could arguably imply a
consensual agreement on the part of a landlord to act as
surety for that tenant. Where a surety contract does not
exist and cannot be implied, recovery for costs must be
predicated upon other authority. From the facts available to
us, there does not appear to be an express or implied contract
between these parties whereby the landlord promised the tenant
or creditors that he would assume responsibility for the debts
owed to the state.
Thus, the issue becomes whether the statutes create an
obligation on the part of the landlord. K.S.A. 39-960 and
39-961 establish a statutory obligation on the part of the
owner or licensee of an adult care home. As previously
discussed, the legislature clearly intended to impose some
liability upon those owners of adult care homes who sought to
escape responsibility through the use of another entity who
conducted the day-to-day operations of the adult care home in
which the facility owner had a legal interest. Legislative
history indicates that K.S.A. 39-960 and 39-961 were enacted
with the support of the state agencies as a counter to
situations wherein a for-profit entity reaped the benefits of
owning or operating an adult care home but escaped the
responsibilities connected with this type of business.
Personal and real property become subject to a lien pursuant
to these statutes until amounts owed are paid by the owner
or licensee. The statutes seek, in effect, to "pierce the
corporate veil" and insure financial responsibility on the
part of those who directly or indirectly have an interest in
the adult care home. Thus, the statutes dictate that an owner
of an adult care home may be individually or jointly liable
for the costs incurred by the state as a result of the adult
care home going into receivership.
While a landlord may own the building which houses an adult
care home, not all such landlords own or operate any part of
the business conducted on their property. Some property
owners may neither seek nor possess responsibility for the
activities conducted on their premises, nor will they always
have the prerequisite capability to conduct such a business.
Thus, there may be no joint undertaking. However, licensing
procedures may notify a landlord that, if they choose to
permit a tenant to make a certain use of their property, they
are acquiescing to assumption of some responsibility for the
actions of the tenant. Such statutory imposition of
responsibility for the obligations and debts of a separate
legal entity not connected with or controlled by the debtor
resembles absolute liability principles.
The federal government has legislatively created absolute
liability in certain situations involving environmental
protection: 43 U.S.C.S. § 1814(d) requires the owner or
operator of a vessel from which a pollutant discharges to pay
all removal costs incurred by federal or state governments or
agencies; 33 U.S.C.S. § 497 enacted the refuse act which is a
criminal strict liability statute providing for attachment of
the liability without regard to the question of mistake or
innocence. However, a defendant may show that someone else is
responsible for the discharge, and thus escape strict
liability. See 61A Am.Jur.2d Pollution Control, § 214
(1981); 42 U.S.C.S. § 6973 and § 7003 amended the solid waste
disposal act and, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), owners of
landfill property purchased several years after all dumping of
hazardous materials have ceased can be held liable for costs.
United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1073 (1981). This
liability can be assessed unless the subsequent owners "could
not reasonably be expected to have actual knowledge of the
presence of hazardous waste at such facility or site and of
its potential for release." Id. at 1074. Moreover,
legislative history concerning enactment of CERCLA indicates
that, in the interests of fairness, courts may apply common
law joint and several liability on a case by case basis.
United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F.Supp.
1249, 1256 (1984). Thus, legislation can dictate liability
without fault or negligence.
However, absolute liability, while not requiring proof of
negligence, is a judicial doctrine which imposes liability
upon proof of statutory violation. See United States v. A
& F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F.Supp. 1249 (Iii. 1984). When
an adult care home goes into receivership for insolvency
reasons, a statutory violation has not necessarily occurred.
Additionally, absolute or strict liability is premised on some
degree of involvement. Persons who have absolutely no
connection with an adult care home would not be subject to the
terms of the statute or absolute liability. The issue becomes
whether the legislature intended to impose absolute liability
upon a landlord who rents to a non-profit tenant when that
for-profit landlord's only connection with the adult care home
is ownership of the specially built building and collection of
rent moneys.
It is our opinion that legislative history does not support
the imposition of strict or absolute liability against owners
of property in which adult care homes are operated. Rather,
K.S.A. 39-954 et seq. gives the state a statutory cause of
action allowing recovery of costs from owners, operators or
licensees who have some express or implied duty concerning the
adult care home. The extent to which a specific entity is
actually responsible for the finances or operations of an
adult care home requires a determination concerning the nature
of the relationship between the entity owning the building and
the entity operating the adult care home. Such fact questions
are properly addressed by the appropriate state agency or a
court of law.
Where an owner of a building which is leased by an adult care
home business does not have an express or implied interest in
the business of operating the adult care home, it is our
opinion that the legislature did not intend to impose a duty
upon the owner to assume such an interest. However, where a
landlord merely seeks to escape licensure requirements or
financial responsibility for operation of an adult care home
business in which the landlord has an interest, that landlord
is required to be on the license and will be subject to cost
recovery procedures set forth at K.S.A. 39-960 and 39-961.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
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