Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-170

1988-170Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 20, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION 88-170
Linda S. Trigg
Seward County Attorney
415 North Washington
Liberal, Kansas 67901
Re: Corporations--Agricultural Corporations--
Limitations; Nonfarming Business Exception
Synopsis: Exception number three exempts farmland acquired by
a corporation in the acreage as is necessary for
the operation of a nonfarming business from the
general prohibition against corporate ownership of
agricultural land found in K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
17-5904(a). For reasons discussed herein, the
acquisition of the land in question is not
essential to Hancock's business of lending and
finance and thus cannot be acquired under this
exemption. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
17-5904, as amended by L. 1988, ch. 99, §56.
*
Dear Ms. Trigg:
As Seward County Attorney you request our opinion regarding
exception number three to the general prohibition against the
corporate ownership of farmland found at K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
17-5904, as amended by L. 1988, ch. 99, §56. Specifically,
you inquire whether agricultural land to be purchased under
the nonfarming business exception must be essential to a
corporation's nonfarming business.
You indicate that the John Hancock Corporation (Hancock)
acquired farmland through foreclosure and wants to purchase
the adjacent property in order to enhance the value and
marketability of the real estate it presently owns. You
further state that the corporation in question is not in the
business of farming, will not farm this land and will only
collect rent.
As you succinctly state, exception number three exempts
farmland acquired by a corporation in the operation of a
nonfarming business, so long as the corporation does not
directly or indirectly farm the land. However, because the
language of the statutory exception is limited to
"[a]gricultural land acquired by a corporation in such
acreage as is necessary for the operation of a nonfarming
business" (emphasis added), you question whether the land must
be essential for the operation of Hancock's nonfarming
business of lending and finance in order for the corporation
to qualify under this exception.
The general prohibition against certain corporate ownership of
farmland is found at K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 17-5904, as amended and
states:
"(a) No corporation, trust, limited
partnership or corporate partnership,
other than a family farm corporation,
authorized farm corporation, limited
agricultural partnership, family trust,
authorized trust or testamentary trust
shall, either directly or indirectly, own,
acquire or otherwise obtain or lease any
agricultural land in this state. The
restrictions provided in this section do
not apply to the following:
"(3) Agricultural land acquired by a
corporation in such acreage as is
necessary for the operation of a
nonfarming business. Such land may not
be used for farming except under lease to
one or more natural persons, a family farm
corporation, authorized farm corporation,
family trust, authorized trust or
testamentary trust. The corporation shall
not engage, either directly or indirectly,
in the farming operation and shall not
receive any financial benefit, other than
rent, from the farming operation."
Given no case law interpreting the exception, we find guidance
in statutory construction. A fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature
governs when the intent can be ascertained from both the
statute and general consideration of the entire act. State
v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825 (1987). Statutes are to be
construed in the context of the purpose to be accomplished by
the act. State v. Phifer, 241 Kan. 233 (1987); State
ex rel., Stephan v. Brotherhood Bank and Trust Co., 8 Kan.
App.2d 57 (1987).
The act expressly limits the ownership of agricultural land to
certain corporate entities. Corporations being creatures of
statute can also be limited in the scope and nature of the
business in which they engage. While the exception in
question allows corporations to own land acquired for a
nonfarming use, it limits the acquisition of land to that
necessary to the operation of the nonfarming business.
Moreover, examining the historical background of the act we
find that K.S.A. 17-5901(a) (repealed in 1981) prohibited all
but certain corporations from "engag[ing] in . . .
agricultural or horticulture business." Clearly, the repeal
of K.S.A. 17-5901(a) supports the contention that the overall
purpose of the act is to broadly limit the corporate ownership
of agricultural land rather than to narrowly prohibit certain
corporations from engaging in farming.
Thus, in conclusion, it is our opinion that exception number
three, that exempts the acquisition of farmland from the
prohibition against certain corporate ownership of farmland,
requires that the acquisition of the land be essential to the
nonfarming business. As such, because acquisition of the
land in question is not essential to Hancock's business of
finance and lending, the corporation cannot acquire such land
under this exception.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Guen Easley
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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