Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-095

1988-095Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL July 8, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88-95
Joe F. Jenkins, II
Chairman, Abstracter's Board of Examiners
Title Building, 727 Ann Ave.
Kansas City, Kansas 66101-3066
Re: Insurance -- General Provisions Relative to
Casualty, , Surety and Fidelity Companies -- Purpose
of Act; Casualty Insurance Defined -- Title
Insurance; Constitutionality
Synopsis: The act relating to insurance, concerning captive
insurance companies and the regulation of certain
title insurance rates, does not violate the
provisions of the Kansas Constitution regarding the
effective date of a bill, the single-subject
requirement, or uniformity of application. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 40-252; K.S.A.
40-1111, as amended by L. 1988, ch. 156, §19;
K.A.R. 1987 Supp. 40-1-9; L. 1988, ch. 156; Kan.
Const., Art. 2, §§16, 17, 19; Kan. Const.,
Art. 2, §17 (1859).
*
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
As Chairman for the Abstracter's Board of Examiners, you have
requested our opinion concerning K.S.A. 40-1111, as amended by
1988 S.B. 489 (L. 1988, ch. 156). Specifically, you have
asked whether the law violates three provisions of the Kansas
Constitution, namely, Article 2, §§16, 17 and 19. This new
law regulates captive insurance companies and certain title
insurance rates.
At the outset, we note that the "constitutionality of a
statute is presumed, and all doubts must be resolved in favor
of its validity. Before a statute may be stricken down, it
must clearly appear the statute violates the Constitution."
Kansas Malpractice Victim's Coalition v. Bell, Kan.
(Case No. 61,945) (1988) slip opinion, at page 11. See
Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 195 Kan. 748, 760
(1965); Parker v. Continental Casualty Co., 191 Kan. 674,
680 (1963).
Your first inquiry is whether the act has two effective dates
and therefore violates Article 2, §19 of the Kansas
Constitution, which states,
"No act shall take effect until the
enacting bill is published as provided by
law." Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 19.
This section has been construed to mean that an entire bill
must take effect at the same time. Parker, 191 Kan. at
677-680; Comm'rs of Miami Co. v. Hiner, 54 Kan. 334,
336 (1894); Finnegan v. Sale, 54 Kan. 420, 421 (1894).
Even though an act must take effect in its entirely at a
singular, definite time, the legislature may, as a matter of
policy, determine that certain provisions of the act should
become actively operative at different times. As held in
State v. Newbold, 56 Kan. 71 (1895), the legislature
would undoubtedly have the power to pass amendments becoming
operative at different times by making separate enactments
with various effective dates. However, the court held that no
"single reason exists why this may not be done by a single
act." 56 Kan. at 73. We believe that the act in question
is not invalid as violating Article 2, §19. By the terms of
the act, it is effective after publication. L. 1988, ch. 156,
§21. While the provisions of sections 19 and 20 are not
operative until July 1, 1989, those sections are laws of this
state as of the date published in the statute book.
Your second inquiry is whether the act contains more than one
subject in violation of Article 2, §16 of the Kansas
Constitution. The two-subject analysis was recently set forth
and fully explained in Kansas Attorney General Opinion No.
88-74, wherein we stated that a statute should not be declared
invalid under Article 2, §19, unless invalidity is manifest.
The purposes of the constitutional provision include
"prevention of hodge-podge or
log-rolling legislation, the prevention of
surreptitious legislation, and the
lessening of improper influences which may
result from intermixing objects of
legislation in the same act which have no
relation to each other." Garter
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Kansas City,
219 Kan. 620, 622 (1976).
We opined that legislation concerning the regulation of animal
dealers and the prohibition of certain acts regarding certain
animal vaccines could properly be enacted in the same bill, as
both subjects relate to animal health. For the same reasons,
we believe that provisions concerning captive insurance
companies and the regulation of title insurance rates may be
enacted in the same bill, as both subjects relate to the
regulation of insurance by the Kansas Department of Insurance.
Your third inquiry is whether the act is unconstitutional,
since section 19(b), regarding title insurance, applies only
in counties having a population of more than 150,000. Section
19 amends K.S.A. 40-1111, adding title insurance to the
definition of casualty insurance for purposes of rate
regulation. Subsection 19(d) provides that "premium", for
purposes of regulating rates and for determining the
applicable premium tax, includes all "charges made in
connection with issuance, sale and servicing of title
insurance policies. . . ." L. 1988, ch. 156, § 19(d). These
changes are not considered part of the premium for the tax
imposed by K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 40-252, which is in
contravention of K.A.R. 1987 Supp. 40-1-9. In short, only
the risk portion of the premium is subject to the premium tax,
but other charges are subject to regulation. These
considerations apply only in counties having a population of
more than 150,000. You ask whether the distinction between
counties violates Article 2, §17.
Bearing in mind the presumption of constitutionality, we note
that the courts in this state have not announced a clear test
for construing legislative acts in light of that
constitutional provision. In Edwards County Comm'rs v.
Simmons, 159 Kan. 41 (1944), the Court held that an act
applying only to public utility corporations operating in not
more than four counties did not violate Article 2, §17. It
was held that, in order to strike the statute on that ground,
the court would have to find such classification "arbitrary,
fictitious, and wholly without substantial basis." 159 Kan.
at 51. In State ex rel., v. Russell, 119 Kan. 266 (1925),
the court held that an act differentiating counties by
population for purposes of relocating the county seat did not
violate section 17 of Article 2 (1859). While section 17 has
undergone revisions since its original adoption, the first
sentence, upon which Russell was decided, and upon which the
non-uniformity issue arises, has not changed. That sentence
states,
"All laws of a general nature shall have
a uniform operation throughout the
state. . . ." Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 17.
In Russell, the court noted,
"The classification of the statute now
under consideration is based on
population. The statute may now apply to
only one county; next year it may apply to
two; in the future, it will apply to any
county which comes within its provisions.
For that reason, the statute is general
and operates uniformly in all counties to
which it applies. It does not violate
section 17 of article 2 of the
constitution of this state." 119 Kan.
at 268.
Since we cannot say that the classification of counties in L.
1988, Ch. 156 is arbitrary, fictitious, and wholly without
substantial basis, and since the statute operates uniformly in
all counties in which it applies, we believe that the
presumption of constitutionality controls, and the act does
not violate Article 2, §17 of the Kansas Constitution.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the act relating to
insurance concerning captive insurance companies and the
regulation of certain title insurance rates does not violate
the provisions of the Kansas Constitution regarding the
effective date of a bill, the single-subject requirement, or
uniformity of application.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mark W. Stafford
Assistant Attorney General
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