Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-074

1988-074Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL. June 2, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 74
The Honorable Don Montgomery
State Senator, Twenty-First District
1218 Main
Sabetha, Kansas 66534-1835
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Animals and Nuisances --
Unlawful Sales or Injections of Live Brucella
Abortus Strain 19 Vaccine or Animal Rabies Vaccine;
Constitutionality of Amendment by 1988 Substitute
for House Bill No. 2219
Livestock and Domestic Animals -- Animal Dealers --
Licensure and Registration of Certain Persons
Dealing in Animals; Constitutionality of 1988
Substitute for House Bill No. 2219
Synopsis: 1988 Substitute for House Bill No. 2219 does not
violate Art. 2, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution
which prohibits a bill from containing more than
one subject. The Kansas courts have ruled that a
statute should not be declared invalid under this
provision unless invalidity is manifest. It is not
clearly manifest that H.B. 2219 contains more than
one subject, as both bills that were combined in
the final version of H.B. 2219 concern animal
welfare. None of the circumstances for which Art.
2, § 16 was designed to prevent are present in this
case. Further, the title of H.B. 2219 clearly
expresses the subject matter and gives fair notice
of the content of the bill as constitutionally
required. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
21-1213; 1988 Substitute for House Bill No. 2219;
Kan. Const. Art. 2, § 16.
Dear Senator Montgomery:
As State Senator for the Twenty-First District, you request
our opinion regarding the constitutionality of 1988 Substitute
for House Bill No. 2219. Specifically, you inquire whether
the bill contains more than one subject. You also express
concern that the title of the bill does not adequately reflect
the scope of legislation contained in the bill.
Article 2, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution provides:
"No bill shall contain more than one
subject, except appropriation bills and
bills for revision or codification of
statutes. The subject of each bill shall
be expressed in its title. No law shall
be revived or amended, unless the new act
contain the entire act revived or the
section or sections amended, and the
section or sections so amended shall be
repealed. The provisions of this section
shall be liberally construed to effectuate
the acts of the legislature."
The title of 1988 Substitute for House Bill No. 2219, as
signed into law by the governor on April 14, 1988, reads as
follows:
"AN ACT concerning animal health and
welfare; relating to licensure and
registration of certain persons dealing in
animals; prohibiting certain acts
regarding certain animal vaccines and
providing penalties for violations;
amending K.S.A. 47-1701, 47-1702, 47-1703,
47-1704, 14-1706, 14-1707, 47-1709,
47-1712 and 47-1715 and K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 21-1213 and repealing the existing
sections; also repealing K.S.A. 47-1705,
47-1714 and 47-1716."
Sections one through thirteen of the bill amend statutes in
chapter 47, article 17 of the Kansas statutes concerning
animal dealers, and enact several new sections. These
provisions relate to the licensure and registration of certain
persons who deal in animals, and have been referred to as the
"puppy mill" bill. Section 14 of H.B. 2219 amends K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 21-1213 concerning the sale and purchase of animal
rabies vaccine and live brucella abortus strain 19 vaccine.
The first question is whether 1988 Substitute for H.B. 2219
contains two subjects as prohibited by the Kansas
Constitution. H.B. 2219 as originally introduced into the
1987 session of the legislature only amended K.S.A. 1986
Supp. 21-1213 concerning animal vaccines. On February 23,
1988, the House Committee on Federal and State Affairs
recommended that a substitute bill be passed. The substitute
bill amended K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 21-1213 in a different manner
to better reflect that the bill limited the purchase of
certain animal vaccines to licensed veterinarians and the sale
of the vaccines to licensed veterinarians and manufacturers of
the vaccines. See Attorney General Opinion No. 86-24. The
House of Representatives passed the substitute bill on a vote
of 122 yeas and 1 nay.
The "puppy mill" bill originated in the 1988 session in Senate
Bill No. 563. The Senate Committee on Federal and State
Affairs amended several provisions of the bill. Included was
an amendment which provided that federally licensed facilities
would be inspected by Kansas officials once a year while all
other animal dealers must be inspected twice a year. 1988
S.B. 563, § 9(b), as amended by Senate Committee; 1988 Senate
Journal, p. 1088. S.B. 563 was then amended on the floor of
the Senate by the Committee of the Whole. A substantial
amendment was made by defining "animal dealer" to exclude
persons licensed under federal law. S.B. 563 § 1 (e), as
amended by Senate Committee of the Whole; 1988 Senate Journal,
p. 1155. The bill unanimously passed the Senate, 40-0. 1988
Senate Journal, p. 1162.
S.B. 563, as amended, was referred to the House Committee on
Federal and State Affairs. On March 15 the Committee voted to
recommend that the bill be not passed. 1988 House Journal, p.
1655. It is our understanding that the Committee took this
action not because members were opposed to licensure and
registration of persons dealing with animals, but because they
were in favor of such legislation. Committee members
recommended S.B. 563 unfavorably because they were opposed to
the Senate amendments exempting federally licensed facilities
from state regulation. The House Federal and State Affairs
Committee had been active in pursuing legislation in this
area. See 1987 House Bill No. 2220; 1988 House Bill No.
2747.
On March 30th, Substitute for H.B. 2219 was before the
Senate Committee of the Whole on general orders. During
discussion the Committee voted to amend the bill by
essentially adding S.B. 563 as the first thirteen sections.
1988 Senate Journal, p. 1379. The amendments did not exempt
federally licensed facilities from state regulation. 1988
Substitute for H.B. 2219 § 2, as amended by Senate Committee
of the Whole. The bill passed the Senate 21 yeas to 16 nays.
1988 Senate Journal, p. 1401. The House concurred in the
Senate's amendments to the bill by a vote of 85 yeas and 37
nays. 1988 House Journal, p. 1888.
The Kansas courts have interpreted the constitutional
prohibition against two subjects in one bill on a number of
occasions. The Supreme Court in State ex rel. Stephan v.
Thiessen, 228 Kan. 136 (1980), discussed the requirements
of Art. 2, § 16:
"'In order to correctly interpret that
provision of § 16, article 2 of the
constitution, which provides that "No bill
shall contain more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title,"
its object must be taken into
consideration; and the provision must not
be construed or enforced in any narrow or
technical spirit, but must be construed
liberally on the one side, so as to guard
against the abuse intended to be prevented
by it, and liberally on the other side, so
as not to embarrass or obstruct needed
legislation.'
"'Under this provision of the
constitution, the title of an act may be
as broad and comprehensive as the
legislature may choose to make it; or it
may be as narrow and restricted as the
legislature may choose to make it. It may
be so broad and comprehensive as to
include innumerable minor subjects,
provided all these minor subjects are
capable of being so combined and united as
to form only one grand and comprehensive
subject; or it may be so narrow and
restricted as to include only the smallest
and minutest subject.'
"'And while the title to an act may
include more than one subject, provided
all can be so united and combined as to
form only one single, entire, but more
extended subject; yet, neither the title
to the act nor the act itself can contain
more than one subject, unless all the
subjects which it contains can be so
united and combined as to form only one
single subject.'
"'Where a section of an act is assailed as
being in contravention of said provision
of § 16, article 2 of the constitution, it
is sufficient if it is germane to the
single subject expressed in the title and
included therein, provided the act itself
does not contain more than this single
subject.'
"'Where an act contains two separate and
independent subjects, having no connection
with each other, and the title to the act
is broad enough to cover both, held,
that probably, as a general rule, the act
is unconstitutional and void.'" 228
Kan. at 143, quoting State v.
Barrett, 27 Kan. 213, Syl. 11 3-10
(1882).
In State v. Reeves, 233 Kan. 972 (1983), the court relied
on 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 125, in determining what
constitutes more than one subject in an act:
"'The constitutional prohibition of more
than one subject in an act does not impose
any limitation on the comprehensive-
ness of the subject, which may be as
comprehensive as the legislature chooses
to make it, provided it constitutes, in
the constitutional sense, a single subject
and not several. To constitute plurality
of subject, an act must embrace two or
more dissimilar and discordant subjects,
that by no fair intendment can be
considered as having any legitimate
connection with or relation to each
other. Within the meaning of the
constitutional provision, matters which
apparently constitute distinct and
separate subjects are not so where they
are not incongruous and diverse to each
other. Generally speaking, the courts are
agreed that a statute may include every
matter germane, referable, auxiliary,
incidental, or subsidiary to, and not
inconsistent with, or foreign to, the
general subject or object of the act. The
constitutional provision is not intended,
nor should it be so construed as, to
prevent the legislature from embracing in
one act all matters properly connected
with one general subject or object, but
the term "subject" or "object" as used in
these provisions is to be given a broad
and extended meaning, so as to allow the
legislature full scope to include in one
act all matters fairly, reasonably,
naturally, logically, properly, or
directly or indirectly connected with, or
related to, each other or the same subject
or object. It has been said that there
can be no surer test of compliance with
the constitutional requirement of
singleness of subject than that none of
the provisions of an act can be read as
relating or germane to any other subject
than the one named in the title.'" 233
Kan. at 978. (Emphasis added).
It has been held that Art. 2, § 16 "should not be construed
narrowly or technically to invalidate proper and needful
legislation . . . and that where the subject of the
registration is germane to other provisions, the act is not
objectionable as containing more than one subject. . . ."
State ex rel., v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 176 Kan. 683,
697 (1954). In Garter Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Kansas
City, 219 Kan. 620, 622 (1976), the court said that the
purposes of Art. 2 § 16
"include the prevention of a matter of
legislative merit from being tied to an
unworthy matter, the prevention of
hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation,
the prevention of surreptitious
legislation, and the lessening of improper
influences which may result from
intermixing objects of legislation in the
same act which have no relation to each
other."
In State ex rel. Stephan v. Thiessen, the court was asked
whether 1978 House Bill No. 3129 (L. 1978, ch. 323) violated
the one-subject rule. The first four sections of the bill
enacted new statutes concerning release on recognizance and
supervised released programs. The remaining two-thirds of the
bill dealt with the Kansas law enforcement training center and
its funding. 1978 H.B. 3129 as introduced contained only the
sections relating to recognizance programs while the
provisions relating to the training center were included in
Substitute H.B. 2984. After the later bill was defeated by
the Senate, the two bills were merged. The court ruled that
the bill was unconstitutional:
"These are two separate subjects which
cannot lawfully be united under the broad
title 'crimes.' Significantly, no crimes
are defined in the act and no provision in
the act amends or alters the Kansas
Criminal Code which is located in Chapter
21 of the Kansas statutes." 228 Kan. at
143-44.
It is important to note that the court in its opinion cited in
full the text of then-Governor Robert F. Bennett's message
to the House of Representatives explaining why he did not sign
the bill. In part, the message stated:
"'House Bill 3129, as it was finally
presented to me, is a good example of the
combination of two separate subjects, one
strongly supported and one strongly
opposed, in an effort to force through by
rider a proposal which had difficulty in
passage on its own merits. The original
proposal was supported with near
unanimity. When the new proposal was
added, the vote in both houses became
badly divided, leaving to conjecture
whether or not the new proposal could have
been passed on its own merits or whether
it received its support only as the result
of the procedure used. I am of the strong
opinion that the interests of the people
are better served when both the
Legislature and the Governor are allowed
to make clear-cut decisions as opposed to
the "either/or" judgment required and
typified in this bill.'" Id. at 141-42.
In the situation before us, the legislation in question
resulted as one bill was amended into another. It is
significant that before the combination neither bill had been
defeated by either house of the legislature. (S.B. 563 was
recommended unfavorably by the House Committee as a tactic to
save certain provisions of the proposed legislation.) In
Thiessen the court noted that a "matter of legislative
merit" was tied to an "unworthy matter." In that case the
purpose of amending one bill into another was to log-roll
legislation - using a popular bill to force adoption of an
unpopular bill. None of the purposes for which Art. 2, § 16
was enacted are present in this case. See supra this
opinion p. 6. In addition, both the bills combined in the
final version of H.B. 2219 concern animal welfare. The
Supreme Court has stated:
"It has further been held that a court
should not declare a statute violative of
art. 2, § 16, of the Kansas Constitution
unless invalidity is manifest. State v.
Roseberry, 222 Kan. 715, 717, 567
P.2d 883 (1977). See also 73 Am. Jur.
2d, Statutes § 123; 82 C.J.S., Statutes §
218, p. 362." State v. Reeves, 233
Kan. at 978.
The rule of construction to be followed in construing Art. 2,
§ 16 was stated by the Court as follows:
"[P]rovisions of the constitution are to
be liberally construed to give to the
lawmaking power all freedom not positively
prohibited by the constitution, and an act
under consideration is to be given liberal
construction, with all doubts resolved in
favor of its constitutionality for the
purpose of carrying into effect the will
of the legislature." Brickell v. Board
of Education, 211 Kan. 905, 912
(1973). See Kansas Tobacco-Candy
Distributors & Vendors, Inc. v.
McDonald, 214 Kan. 67, 69 (1974);
Westover v. Schaffer, 205 Kan. 62
(1970).
Given the purpose of Art. 2, § 16, and the court's
interpretation of this provision, we cannot say that is
clearly manifest that H.B. 2219 contains two subjects as
prohibited by the constitution.
You also ask whether the title of 1988 Substitute for House
Bill No. 2219 adequately reflects the scope of legislation
contained in the bill. The Kansas Constitution requires that
"[t]he subject of each bill shall be expressed in its title."
The guidelines and principles to be followed in applying this
constitutional provision were stated by the court in Kansas
Tobacco-Candy Distributors & Vendors, Inc. v. McDonald, 214
Kan. at 69:
"It is not necessary that the title be a
synopsis or abstract of the entire act in
all its details. It is sufficient if the
title indicates clearly, though in general
terms, the scope of the act. The purpose
of the title is to direct the mind to the
contents of a bill or of an act, so that
members of the legislature and the public
may be fairly informed and not deceived or
misled as to what it embraces. We must
uphold a legislative enactment if we can
reasonably do so." (Emphasis added).
See State v. Lackey, 232 Kan. 478,
481 (1983); State ex rel., Tomasic v.
Kansas City, Kansas Port Authority, 230
Kan. 404, 419 (1981); Westover v.
Schaffer, 205 Kan. at 63.
The court will liberally construe a title to uphold the
constitutionality of an act. Brickell v. Board of
Education, 211 Kan. at 905, Syl. 91 2.
The title of Substitute for H.B. 2219 states that it relates
"to licensure and registration of certain persons dealing in
animals" and prohibits "certain acts regarding certain animal
vaccines and providing penalties for violations." The title
in question expresses the subject matter and gives fair notice
of the content of the bill. Therefore, we must conclude that
the subject of 1988 Substitute for H.B. 2219 is clearly
expressed in its title as constitutionally required.
In summary, it is our opinion that 1988 Substitute for House
Bill No. 2219 does not violate Art. 2, § 16 of the Kansas
Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Rita L. Noll
Assistant Attorney General
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