Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-060

1988-060Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL May 2, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 60
William R. Halvorsen
Marshall County Attorney
Marshall County Courthouse
Marysville, Kansas 66508
Re: Taxation--Mortgage Registration and Intangibles;
Mortgage Registration--Entities Subject Thereto;
Bank for Cooperatives
Synopsis: Banks for cooperatives are not so closely connected
to the federal government to entitle them to
constitutional immunity from state taxation, nor
are they exempt from payment of mortgage
registration tax by virtue of 12 U.S.C.A. §2134
(West Supp. 1988). Language in Attorney General
Opinion No. 87-190 indicating a contrary conclusion
for production credit associations is hereby
withdrawn. Cited herein: K.S.A. 79-3101; K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 79-3102; 12 U.S.C.A. §§2002, 2013, 2023,
2031, 2055, 2077, 2091, 2121, 2130, 2134 (West
Supp. 1988); Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678
(1985); Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988).
*
Dear Mr. Halvorsen:
As Marshall County Attorney you request our opinion regarding
whether the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives must pay mortgage
registration fees. You inform us that the bank has taken the
position that it should be exempt by virtue of its status as
an instrumentality of the federal government and pursuant to
12 U.S.C.A. §2134 which specifically exempts banks for
cooperatives from the imposition of certain state and local
taxes.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 79-3102(a) provides as follows:
"Before any mortgage of real property, or
renewal or extension of such a mortgage,
is received and filed for record, there
shall be paid to the register of deeds of
the county in which such property or any
part thereof is situated a registration
fee of $.25 for each $100 and major
fraction thereof of the principal debt or
obligation which is secured by such
mortgage, and upon which no prior
registration fee has been paid."
The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the mortgage
registration fee is in fact a tax rather than a fee charged
for the administration work necessary in recording the
mortgage. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Anderson, 145 Kan.
209, 210 (1937). Since the mortgage registration fee is a
tax, the issue becomes whether the state may impose such a tax
on banks for cooperatives.
Legal counsel for the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives informs us
that the bank is a bank for cooperatives established under the
Farm Credit Act of 1933, as amended. Prior to the 1988
amendments to the Farm Credit Act (Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101
Stat. 1568), the structure of the Farm Credit System could be
described as follows:
"The Farm Credit System is a network of
borrower-owned cooperatives organized to
provide loans to farmers and their
marketing and supply cooperatives. It was
established by Congress beginning in 1916
to meet the unique credit needs and
problems of agricultural producers. All
Government and seed money advanced was
paid back to the U.S. Treasury as of
1968. The System consists of twelve Farm
Credit Districts that cover the
continental United States as well as
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Each
district has a Federal land Bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, and a
bank of cooperatives:
"The Federal land Banks make long-term
loans, primarily for real estate purposes,
through Federal land bank associations.
The Federal Intermediate credit banks
provide short-and intermediate-term credit
to production credit a s sociations and
other qualified financial institutions
serving the production and operating needs
of farmers and ranchers.
"The banks for cooperatives make loans to
agricultural, aquatic, and rural utility
cooperatives and provide financial
services to cooperatives engaged in
international trade. A thirteenth bank
for cooperatives, the Central bank for
Cooperatives, located in Denver, Colorado,
participates with the district banks in
loans that exceed district lending
limits. The System is regulated by the
Farm Credit Administration (FCA), an
independent regulatory agency of the U.S.
Government.
"Money to finance loans made by Farm
Credit banks and associations comes
primarily from the sales of Farm Credit
securities in the Nation's money and
capital markets. . . .
"Until 1977, the three banking groups of
the Farm Credit System sold their
securities separately. But in 1977,
consolidated system-wide bonds and notes
were introduced to combine the financial
strength of the System. These securities
are the joint and several obligations of
all 37 Farm Credit Banks, making each bank
individually liable." H. Rep. No.
99-425, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2587, 2591, 2592.
"System entities are not Government owned
or controlled, however the System is a
'Government sponsored entity' that affords
it a preferred place in the Nation's money
markets. System debt issuances however
are not guaranteed by the Federal
Government.
"System institutions are governed by
boards of directors elected from and by
System stockholders. In order to borrow
from the System, a farmer must acquire
stock equal to a set percentage of the
loan." H. Rep. No. 100-295(I), 1987
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2723,
2726.
The Farm Credit Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat.
1678 (1985), provided for the reorganization and strengthening
of the Farm Credit Administration making it an "arm's-length
regulator" of Farm Credit System activities. The Agricultural
Credit Act, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988),
mandates an overhaul of the System organization so that it
will be more efficient and competitive. See H. Rep. No.
100-295(I), 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2723, 2725.
Reorganization of Farm Credit System institutions pursuant to
Pub. L. No. 100-233, §401 is to become effective six months
after the date of enactment of these amendments, or July 6,
1988. For purposes of the issue addressed in this opinion,
however, we do not believe these prospective amendments are
relevant.
Two arguments are raised by the bank in support of its
contention that it is exempt from payment of mortgage
registration fees. We will address these arguments separately.
First, the bank contends that it is a federal instrumentality
and as such is entitled to constitutional immunity from state
taxation. 12 U.S.C.A. §2121 (West Supp. 1988) provides that
each bank for cooperatives and its obligations are
instrumentalities of the United States. In the past, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that federal
instrumentalities in general, and federal land banks in
particular, are immune from taxation by virtue of the
perception that they perform governmental functions. See,
e.g., Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Crosland, 261
U.S. 374, 43 S.Ct. 385, 67 L.Ed. 703 (1923); Federal Land
Bank of Saint Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62
S.Ct. 1, 86 L.Ed. 65 (1941); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v.
Board of County Commissioners, 368 U.S. 146, 82 S.Ct. 282, 7
L.Ed.2d 199 (1961). However, in 1982 the Supreme Court
clarified the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation:
"With the famous declaration that 'the
power to tax involves the power to
destroy,' McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat
316, 431, 4 L Ed 579 (1819), Chief Justice
Marshall announced for the Court the
doctrine of federal immunity from state
taxation. In so doing he introduced the
Court to what has become a 'much litigated
and often confused field,' United States v
City of Detroit, 355 US 466, 473, 2 L Ed
2d 424, 78 S Ct 474 (1958), one that has
been marked from the beginning by
inconsistent decisions and excessively
delicate distinctions.
"We have concluded that the confusing
nature of our precedents counsels a return
to the underlying constitutional
principle. The one constant here, of
course, is simple enough to express: a
State may not, consistent with the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, Art VI,
cl 2, lay a tax 'directly upon the
United States.' Mayo v United States,
319 US 441, 447, 87 L Ed 1504, 63 S Ct
1137, 147 ALR 761 (1943). While '[o]ne
could, and perhaps should, read
M'Culloch . . . simply for the principle
that the Constitution prohibits a State
from taxing discriminatorily a federally
established instrumentality,' First
Agricultural Bank v State Tax Comm'n,
392 US 339, 350, 20 L Ed 2d 1138, 88 S Ct
2173 (1968) (dissenting opinion), the
Court has never questioned the propriety
of absolute federal immunity from state
taxation.
"But the limits on the immunity doctrine
are, for present purposes, as significant
as the rule itself. Thus, immunity may
not be conferred simply because the tax
has an effect on the United States, or
even because the Federal Government
shoulders the entire economic burden of
the levy.
"Similarly, immunity cannot be conferred
simply because the state tax falls on the
earnings of a contractor providing
services to the Government. . . . Indeed,
immunity cannot be conferred simply
because the tax is paid with Government
funds;
"What the Court's cases leave room for,
then, is the conclusion that tax immunity
is appropriate in only one circumstance:
when the levy falls on the United States
• itself, or on any agency or
instrumentality so closely connected to
the Government that the two cannot
realistically be viewed as separate
entities, at least insofar as the
activity being taxed is concerned. This
view, we believe, comports with the
principal purpose of the immunity
doctrine, that of forestalling 'clashing
sovereignty,' McCulloch v Maryland, 4
Wheat, at 430, 4 L Ed 579, by preventing
the States from laying demands directly on
the Federal Government. See City of
Detroit v Murray Corp. 355 US, at 504-505,
2 L Ed 2d 441, 78 S Ct 458 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). As the federal
structure--along with the workings of the
tax immunity doctrine--has evolved, this
command has taken on essentially symbolic
importance, as the visible 'consequence of
that [federal] supremacy which the
constitution has declared.' McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, at 436, 4 L Ed 579.
At the same time, a narrow approach to
governmental tax immunity accords with
competing constitutional imperatives, by
giving full range to each sovereign's
taxing authority. See Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. at 483, 83 L
Ed 927, 59 S Ct 595, 120 ALR 1466.
"Thus, a finding of constitutional tax
immunity requires something more than the
invocation of traditional agency notions:
to resist the State's taxing power, a
private taxpayer must actually 'stand in
the Government's shoes.' City of Detroit
v Murray Corp. 355 US, at 503, 2 L Ed 2d
441, 78 S Ct 458 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.)." United States v. New Mexico, 455
U.S. 720, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580,
589, 591, 593 (1982). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we must determine whether a bank for cooperatives is an
"instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that
the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities."
The Bismarck Court, supra, implied that all activities of
federal corporations constitute governmental action. 314 U.S.
at 102. "However, this statement from a 1941 case seems to be
in conflict with . . . the general trend to restrict the
parameters of what constitutes governmental action." LPR
Land Holdings v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 651 F.Supp.
287, 292 (E.D. Mich. 1987). Since the Court's holding in
Bismarck, various jurisdictions have concluded that federal
land banks and production credit associations are more like
private corporations than federal agencies for various
purposes. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of Columbia v.
Cotton, 410 F.Supp. 169 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (federally
chartered corporation is not an "agency" unless the government
has a substantial proprietary interest in it, or at least
exercises considerable control over operation and policy of
the corporation; held federal land bank was meant to be
private, rather than governmental, corporation for purposes of
federal district court jurisdiction); DeLaigle v. Federal
Land Bank of Columbia, 568 F.Supp. 1432 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(federal land bank was private corporation without sufficient
governmental involvement to support cause fo action under
federal due process clause); Birbeck v. Southern New
England Production Credit Association, 606 F.Supp. 1030
(D.Conn. 1985) (production credit association considered
private entity rather than governmental agency for purposes of
invoking federal due process clause); Federal Land Bank of
St. Louis v. Keiser, 628 F.Supp. 769 (D.C. Ill. 1986)
(federally chartered land bank not "agency" of federal
government for purposes of removal jurisdiction); Redd v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 661 F.Supp. 861 (E.D. Mo.
1987) (acts of federal land bank not acts of federal
government for purposes of 5th Amend. due process). The
Supreme Court of Kansas has expressly adopted this line of
decisions for purposes of determining entitlement to due
process. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Read, 237 Kan.
751, 755 (1985).
While the above-cited cases pertain to the identity of federal
land banks and production credit associations for purposes
other than taxation, we find them relevant in that they stand
for the proposition that these Farm Credit System institutions
are entities separate and distinct from the federal government
in many respects, and that heavy federal regulation alone is
not sufficient to transform a private entity into an arm of
the federal government for all purposes. The Farm Credit Act
and amendments further evidence the separation between Farm
Credit System institutions and the federal government. These
institutions are owned and controlled by System borrowers, not
the government. 12 U.S.C.A. §52013, 2031, 2091, 2130 (West
Supp. 1988). The Farm Credit Administration, a federal
agency, now functions as an arm's-length regulator of the
System rather than supervising day to day System management.
12 U.S.C.A. §2002 (West Supp. 1988).
Based on the current structure of the Farm Credit System and
the foregoing case law, it is our opinion that Farm Credit
System institutions, including banks for cooperatives, are not
so closely connected to the federal government as to afford
them constitutional immunity from state taxation. In so
concluding, we acknowledge the Kansas Supreme Court's holding
in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 209
(1937), and find it distinguishable. In Anderson the court
held that "as operated at the present time the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation is an instrumentality of the federal
government comparable to the United States Bank dealt with
in McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat 316. The
United States supreme court has held that such
instrumentalities were not required to pay tax on mortgages
offered for registration." (Emphasis added.) We submit that,
as currently operated, banks for cooperatives, federal land
banks and production credit associations are not federal
instrumentalities comparable to the United States bank dealt
with in McCulloch v. Maryland.
This is not to say that Congress could not, if it so chose,
grant immunity to these institutions through properly enacted
legislation. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 737,
71 L.Ed.2d at 594. Congress has in fact done so for federal
land banks. 12 U.S.C.A. §2055, codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §2023
(West Supp. 1988) beginning six months after January 6, 1988.
Legal counsel for the Wichita Bank for Cooperatives contends
that the bank has similarly been granted exempt status by 12
U.S.C.A. §2134 which provides:
"Each bank for cooperatives and its
obligations are instrumentalities of the
United States and as such any and all
notes, debentures, and other obligations
issued by such bank shall be exempt both
as to principal and interest from all
taxation (except surtaxes, estate,
inheritance, and gift taxes) now or
hereafter imposed by the United States or
any State, territorial, or local taxing
authority, except that interest on such
obligations shall be subject to Federal
income taxation in the hands of the
holder." (West Supp. 1988).
While this provision exempts the bank's obligations from
taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance and gift
taxes), it does not exempt the bank's assets. A mortgage
which secures a note evidencing a loan made by the bank is not
an obligation of the bank, but an asset. It is therefore our
opinion that 12 U.S.C.A. §2134 does not operate to exempt the
Wichita Bank for Cooperatives from payment of the mortgage
registration tax.
You point out that this office reached a contrary conclusion
in regard to production credit associations. Attorney General
Opinion No. 87-190. Given the close similarity which exists
in the federal statutes between production credit associations
and banks for cooperatives [the taxation provisions are nearly
identical, 12 U.S.C.A. §§2077 and 2134 (West Supp. 1988)1, we
withdraw the language in Attorney General Opinion No. 87-190
which indicates a contrary conclusion for production credit
associations.
In conclusion, banks for cooperatives are not so closely
connected to the federal government to entitle them to
constitutional immunity from state taxation, nor are they
exempt from payment of mortgage registration tax by virtue of
12 U.S.C.A. §2134 (West Supp. 1988). Language in Attorney
General Opinion No. 87-190 indicating a contrary conclusion
for production credit associations is hereby withdrawn.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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