Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-034

1988-034Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 11, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 34
The Honorable Joan Wagnon
State Representative, Fifty-Fifth District
State Capitol, Room 278-W
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Public Health--Emergency Medical Services;
Regulation of Ambulance Service--Legislative
Members of Newly Created Board
Constitution of the State of Kansas--
Legislative--Ability to Sit on Executive Boards
Synopsis While there is no express provision in the Kansas
Constitution that prohibits the legislature from
appointing its members to administrative boards or
commissions, the separation of powers doctrine
prohibits the legislature from usurping the powers
of another governmental branch. In view of the
case law history of this doctrine and the facts
with which we have been presented, we cannot
conclusively say that legislative membership on the
emergency medical services board is
unconstitutional under the separation of powers
doctrine. Cited herein: K.S.A. 65-4316; 74-2127;
Kan. Const., Art. 2, §14; 1988 House Bill No.
2639.
Dear Representative Wagnon:
As State Representative for the Fifty-Fifth District, you
inquire whether legislative membership on an executive board
is constitutional. Specifically, you ask whether the
appointment of four legislators to the emergency medical
services board is constitutional in light of the board's
rule-making authority and other executive functions.
You indicate that the House Local Government Committee held
hearings on 1988 House Bill No. 2639, a bill which would
abolish the Bureau of Emergency Medical Services, K.S.A.
74-2127, and the Emergency Medical Services Council, K.S.A.
65-4316, and create a new Division of Emergency Medical
Services and a new Emergency Medical Services Board. The
proposed statute calls for the appointment of four legislators
to serve on the thirteen member board and charges the board
with the duty of adopting rules and regulations. 1988 House
Bill No. 2639, sec. 10(a).
While there is no express provision in the Kansas Constitution
that prohibits the legislature from appointing its members to
administrative boards or commissions, Parcell v. State of
Kansas, 468 F.Supp. 1274, 1278 (1979), the separation of
powers doctrine prohibits one branch of government from
usurping the powers of another branch. State ex rel., v.
Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 289, 290 (1976). State ex rel.
Stephan, v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45,
59 (1984), Clark v. Ivy, 240 Kan. 195, 201 (1986). The
implied constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
between each of the three departments of state government --
legislative, executive and judicial -- "is designed to avoid a
dangerous concentration of power and to allow the respective
powers to be assigned to the department best fitted to
exercise them." Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 805
(1975), citing Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426
(1973). [See Van Sickle for an analysis of the
constitutional separation of powers doctrine.] Parcell v.
State of Kansas, 468 F.Supp. at 1280, citing State ex rel.,
v. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 288-89.
Historically the Kansas Supreme Court applied the doctrine
strictly, prohibiting one department from performing any
duties traditionally assigned to a different department,
thereby keeping the functions of the three departments as
distinct and separate as possible. See State v. Johnson,
61 Kan. 803 (1900). Recognizing that modern administrative
bodies or commissions may perform functions that blend all
three departments, recent case law has modified the doctrine.
Clark v. Ivy, 240 Kan. 195 (1986), citing State ex rel.,
Stephan v. House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 59-60
(1984).
The blend of power exercised by some administrative agencies
is the basis for finding no violation of the separation of
powers in two cases involving legislative members serving on
administrative boards. State, ex rel., v. Turnpike
Authority, 176 Kan. 683 (1954) (two legislators may
constitutionally perform delegable legislative duties as
ex-officio members of the Authority); State, ex rel., v.
Fadely, 180 Kan. 652 (1957) (four legislators on a six
member finance council may perform what one concurring opinion
depicts as the "quasi-legislative" duties of the council. 180
Kan. at 701). However, when confronted with a statute
requiring the governor to appoint seven legislators to a seven
member commission that exercised purely executive powers, the
Kansas Supreme Court found a usurpation of the executive
department by the legislative in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. State, ex rel., v. State Office
Building Commission, 185 Kan. 563 (1959).
The leading Kansas case on the separation of powers doctrine
also involves members of the legislature serving on an
executive body. In State ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan.
285 (1986), a quo warranto action seeking to oust legislative
members of the state finance council from the exercise of
powers and responsibilities placed on them by statute, the
Kansas Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality of
appointing eight legislators to the nine member board. The
Court finds that a usurpation of powers exists when there is a
significant interference by one department with the operations
of another department and sets forth factors to be considered:
"First is the essential nature of the
power being exercised. Is the power
exclusively executive or legislative or is
it a blend of the two? A second factor is
the degree of control by the legislative
department in the exercise of the power.
Is there a coercive influence or a mere
cooperative venture? A third
consideration of importance is the nature
of the objective sought to be attained by
the legislature. Is the intent of the
legislature to cooperate with the
executive by furnishing some special
expertise of one or more of its members or
is the objective of the legislature
obviously one of establishing its
superiority over the executive department
in an area essentially executive in
nature? A fourth consideration could be
the practical result of the blending of
powers as shown by actual experience over
a period of time where such evidence is
available. We do not wish to imply that
these are the only factors which should be
considered but it seems to us that they
have special significance in determining
whether a usurpation of powers has been
demonstrated." State ex rel., v.
Bennett, 219 Kan. at 290.
In order to determine whether there exists an unconstitutional
usurpation of power by the legislature in appointing
legislators to the Emergency Medical Services Board, we must
examine the administrative body's duties using the above
quoted criteria. In other words, we must apply the criteria
to all the specific facts and circumstances presented. See
also Leck v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 785 (1975); State
v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652 (1957).
The task of classifying the powers of an administrative body
or commission as executive or legislative in nature is a
difficult one. Bennett, 219 Kan. at 297. We therefore
look to Bennett for guidance. In Bennett the court
concluded that the statutory duties and powers granted to the
state finance council to supervise the operations of the
department of administration and its divisions was purely an
exercise of executive power. The court determined that the
legislature had enacted the law in general terms and delegated
the power to execute it to an administrative body in the
executive department, and that the legislature had vested the
power to execute the law in a body controlled by legislators
thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers. 219
Kan. 298.
While the adoption of rules is essentially executive in
nature, State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 297-98
(1976); State, ex rel., Stephan v. House of Representatives,
236 Kan. 45, 60 (1984), the four legislative members do not
control the 13-member body vested with the power to execute
the law. (However, we recognize that four persons would
constitute a majority of a quorum and thus could be
controlling in certain circumstances). Furthermore,
examination of the other duties of the board helps us to
conclude that there is a blending of legislative with
executive powers. See Parcell v. State of Kansas, 468
F.Supp. 1274, 1278 (1979) where powers similar to those we are
reviewing were found to be a blending of executive and
legislative functions. Because of this blend of powers, we
cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that the intent
of the legislature is other than to cooperate with the
executive by furnishing legislative expertise. Unfortunately,
we have no information as to the practical result of this
blending of powers because the proposed agency has yet to
perform its functions. Taking all of these facts into
consideration, we cannot conclusively opine that the
legislative membership on the Emergency Medical Services Board
is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine.
In conclusion, the Kansas separation of powers cases evince
the following general principles: a statute is presumed
constitutional unless it clearly violates the constitution;
the legislature may by statute appoint members to boards
created by the legislature; there is no express constitutional
provision that prohibits the legislature from appointing its
own members to such boards; the separation of powers doctrine
does not prevent legislative membership on administrative
boards where their service provides cooperation (i.e. is not
controlling over a purely executive function); the doctrine
prohibits one department of government from usurping the
functions of another; and the facts and circumstances
presented determine whether a usurpation of power exists.
Bennett, supra, 219 Kan. at 289-290; Clark v. Ivy,
240 Kan. 195, 201 (1986). Therefore, with reservations and
in an attempt to uphold these general principles, it is our
opinion that under the facts and circumstances presented the
legislative membership on the Emergency Medical Services Board
is not unconstitutional under the separation of powers
doctrine.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Guen Easley
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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