Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-030

1988-030Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 3, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 30
The Honorable Ben Foster
State Representative, Eighty-Fifth District
State Capitol, Room 156-E
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Contracts and Promises--Interest and
Charges--Interest; Late Payment Charges
Consumer Credit Code--General Provisions and
Definitions; Definitions--Finance Charge; Late
Payment Charges
Synopsis: The assessment by a cable television company of
a reasonable late payment charge which reflects the
cost of collection of delinquent accounts is not
"interest" pursuant to K.S.A. 16-201 et !2.1.,
nor is it a "finance charge" as defined by K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 16a-1-301(18) of the uniform consumer
credit code. This conclusion assumes that actual
efforts to collect are undertaken and the
delinquent subscribers are not given alternative
options for payment. Cited herein: K.S.A. 16-201
et seq.; K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16a-1-301; 15
U.S.C.A. §1602; 12 C.F.R. §226.8.
*
Dear Representative Foster:
As State Representative for the Eighty-Fifth District, you
request our opinion of whether a late payment charge imposed
on a cable television subscriber's delinquent account
constitutes "interest" or a "finance charge" pursuant to
Kansas usury laws (K.S.A. 16-201 et seq.) or the uniform
consumer credit code (UCCC), K.S.A. 16a-1-101 et seq.
The information you have provided describes the late payment
charge as follows:
1. The cable television service in question is provided to
subscribers on a monthly basis.
2. Invoices are sent in advance for the following month's
service and are payable within ten days of receipt.
3. Any subscriber with a past due balance on the date the
next month's invoice is produced is assessed a late
payment charge of 5% of the past due balance.
4. The late payment charge reflects the additional
operational and administrative costs associated with a
subscriber's failure to make timely payment for cable
service, including:
a. costs of paper, postage, computer time and manpower
for past due notices generated and mailed to delinquent
subscribers;
b. cost of manpower in attempts to collect by telephone;
c. costs of manpower and travel expenses associated with
collections by technicians sent to disconnect service.
5. Though it is not clear, it appears that at least some of
these costs are accrued prior to the assessment of the
late payment charge.
6. The cable company offers no option of payment by
installments, no written agreement is entered into with
the subscriber, and failure to pay in full will eventually
lead to termination of services.
"Interest" has been defined by the Kansas Supreme Court as
"compensation allowed by law or by agreement of the parties
for the use or forbearance of money." Jones v. Kansas Gas
and Electric Co., 222 Kan. 390, 397 (1977). In the Jones
case, the court indicated that a reasonable late fee which
reflects the costs of collection is not "interest." 222
Kan. at 397. See Clark, Interest Rates in Kansas: The
Decline and Fall of Ezekiel, 49 J.B.A.K. 81, 96 (1980). In
support of this conclusion, the court cites Ferguson v.
Electric Power Board of Chatanooga, Tennessee, 378 F.Supp.
787, (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1403
(6th Cir. 1975). In Ferguson, an electricity
distributor's practice of billing on a "net" and "gross" rate
basis, the gross rate being 10% in excess of the net rate and
payable if the customer does not pay the net bill within ten
days of the billing date, was held not to be a violation of
Tennessee's usury laws because the 10% was a delinquent charge
and not interest. 378 F.Supp. at 790. In construing a
definition of interest similar to that accepted by the Kansas
courts, the court in Ferguson, citing Wilson v. Dealy,
434 S.W.2d 835 (Tenn. 1968), held that "a charge imposed
because of late payment of a debt comes within the definition
of 'interest' only where it is paid 'as consideration for the
creditor's forbearance of asserting his right of
collection'." 378 F.Supp. at 790. Since the electricity
distributor continued in its attempts to collect the
delinquent amount, it did not forbear its right of collection
and thus the charge was not considered interest.
Based on these authorities and the information given, we must
conclude that the late payment charge does not constitute
interest for purposes of Kansas usury statutes. The charge is
not in consideration for forbearance of the cable company's
right to collect, nor is it merely compensation for the
extension of credit. The cable company considers the account
delinquent and proceeds with efforts to collect, payments by
installments or at a later time are not options, and the
charge assessed reflects the costs of collection.
In Bright v. Ball Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 616 F.2d
328 (7th Cir. 1980), it was held that a bona fide late
payment charge does not constitute a "finance charge" within
the meaning of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§S1601 et seq., and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. .5226.8(a):
"Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)
distinguishes between 'late payment' and
'finance' charges:
"A late payment, delinquency, default,
reinstatement, or other such charge is not
a finance charge if imposed for actual
unanticipated late payment, delinquency,
default, or other such occurrence.
"In an effort to clarify the difference
between a 'late payment charge' and a
'finance charge,' the Federal Reserve
Board has issued an interpretive rule. 12
C.F.R. § 226.401. In this rule, which has
been held valid, Kroll v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 352 F.Supp. 357, 363
(N.D.I11.1972), the Board considered a
vendor which billed its customers so that
the full bill was due within a stipulated
period after billing, with no installment
payment option. If the bill was not paid
in full by the end of the period, the
vendor imposed a periodic charge on the
unpaid balance until fully paid. The
Board stated:
"When in the ordinary course of business a
vendor's billings are not paid in full
within that stipulated period of time, and
under such circumstances the vendor does
not, in fact, regard such accounts in
default, but continues or will continue to
extend credit and imposes charges
periodically for delaying payment of such
accounts from time to time until paid, the
charge so imposed comes within the
definition of a 'finance charge'. This
rule indicates that whether a charge
ostensibly imposed for late payment is a
'finance charge' depends on whether the
vendor regards accounts not paid within
the required period to be in default and
whether the vendor continues to extend
credit to the customer in default. See
Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317
F.Supp. 194, 196 (D.De1.1970).
"Whether or not the vendor considers its
customers' accounts delinquent must be
judged by its actions taken as a whole.
[Citations omitted.] Particularly
relevant is whether the vendor continued
to extend credit to its customers after
the time of default, though the continued
extension of credit under exigent
circumstances should not defeat a finding
that the charges are in fact 'late
payment' charges. [Citations omitted.]
"Also particularly relevant is whether the
vendor takes 'commercially reasonable'
efforts to correct the delinquency
situation both through clear notification
to its customer that the customer is
delinquent, [citations omitted] and
through efforts to collect the delinquent
account [citations omitted]." 616 F.2d at
336, 337.
In applying these rules, the Bright court held that because
Ball Memorial Hospital made commercially reasonable efforts to
collect delinquent accounts (sending notices that payment is
overdue, attempting to make contact by telephone in an effort
to collect on the accounts, and eventually referring the
delinquent accounts to a collection agency), the charges
assessed were bona fide late payment charges and thus not
finance charges.
The court in Bright states further that "[s]ince the
charges assessed against appellant's accounts were bona fide
'late payment' charges, their imposition did not constitute
the consummation of a credit transaction. . . ." 616 F.2d at
338. Though this case was determining whether the charges in
question were finance charges pursuant to the Truth in Lending
Act, we find its arguments and conclusions convincing in a
determination of whether similar charges are finance charges
for purposes of the UCCC. The definition of "credit" and
"creditor" in the Truth and Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 551602(e)
and 1602(f), are virtually identical to the UCCC definitions
of these terms. "Credit" is defined as "the right granted by
a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur
debt and defer its payment." K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
16a-1-301(14). A right to defer payment is not considered as
granted if the creditor actively pursues collection procedures
rather than offering the option of paying in installments or
at a later date. "Creditor" is defined as "a person who
regularly extends credit in a consumer credit transaction
which is payable by a written agreement in more than four
installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is
or may be required. . . ." K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16a-1-301(16)
(emphasis added). If there is no extension of credit, or if
there is an extension of credit which is not payable by
written agreement in more than four installments or which does
not require payment of a finance charge, then the entity to
whom money is owed is not deemed to be a creditor for purposes
of the UCCC. As we stated previously, the assessment of a
reasonable late payment charge and initiation of commercially
reasonable collection procedures indicate that the customer
has not been granted the right to defer payment and thus
there is no extension of credit as defined by the UCCC.
Further, "finance charge" is defined at K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
16a-1-301(18) as "the sum of: (i) all charges payable
directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly as
an incident to or as a condition of the extension of credit,
including. . . . (b) the term does not include: (i) . . .
delinquency charges. . . ." Though these definitions are
somewhat circular, it would appear that late payment charges
are not finance charges for purposes of the UCCC.
You have also inquired as to what circumstances would subject
the cable television company's practice of imposing a late
payment charge to the provisions of the UCCC. Professor
Barkley Clark's article on interest rates in Kansas is
instructive on this point:
"If [a creditor] wants to collect such
late charges, however, it is very
important that delinquent [subscribers]
not be 'carried along' by acquiescence.
If no collection efforts are undertaken
when a [subscriber] goes into default, a
court would be disposed to treat the
arrangement as an open-end credit plan
subject to the Kansas rate ceilings and
the disclosure requirements of Truth in
Lending. The creditor must make
commercially reasonable efforts to correct
the delinquency situation through clear
notification to its [subscriber] and
through continuing efforts to collect the
unpaid bill. The late charge should be
set forth clearly on all billings (or at
least periodically) and should be set at a
level which is removed from standard
interest charge impositions. A late
charge of two to five percent per month is
fairly standard among some vendors. The
billing statement should make it clear
that bills are to be paid in cash within a
specified period of time after receipt,
and that the firm does not extend credit.
If the firm can then demonstrate that
reasonable efforts are indeed made to keep
accounts current, a court would be
hard-pressed to hold that the late charge
was disguised interest or was
unreasonable. The moral of this story is
that the Kansas ceilings described earlier
in this article do not apply at all if the
charge imposed does not constitute
'interest.'" Clark, Interest Rates in
Kansas: The Decline and Fall of
Ezekiel, 49 J.B.A.K. 81, 96 (1980).
In conclusion, the assessment by a cable television company of
a reasonable late payment charge which reflects the costs of
collection of delinquent accounts is not "interest" pursuant
to K.S.A. 16-201 et seq.., nor is it a "finance charge"
as defined by K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16a-1-301(18) of the uniform
consumer credit code. This conclusion assumes that actual
efforts to collect are undertaken and the delinquent
subscribers are not given alternative options for payment.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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