Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-142

1987-142Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 28, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 142
Mary S. Martin
Coffeyville City Attorney
7th & Walnut, Box 498
Coffeyville, Kansas 67337
Re: Soldiers, Sailors and Patriotic Emblems--Memorials,
Monuments and Grave Markers--Disposal of Memorial
Building and Land or Diversion of Use of Building,
When
Synopsis: Moneys derived from the issuance of bonds or levy
of a tax under K.S.A. 73-402 constitute a special
fund held in trust for the construction of a
memorial monument. The trust character of such a
special fund is impressed upon a memorial building
produced therefrom, and upon insurance proceeds
realized upon destruction of the memorial.
Accordingly, the procedure for disposal of a
memorial building, set forth in K.S.A. 73-446,
applies to insurance proceeds realized from
destruction of such a building.
In the absence of a charter ordinance adopted
pursuant to Article 12, Section 5 of the Kansas
Constitution, a memorial building constructed
pursuant to K.S.A. 73-401 et !pa . may not be
used for a purely commercial enterprise. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 73-401; 73-402; 73-404; 73-407;
73-446.
Dear Ms. Martin:
You request our opinion regarding the use of insurance
proceeds from the former Coffeyville Memorial Hall. You
have provided the following background regarding this matter:
"The City Clerk's records show that Memorial Hall was built
with funds from July 12, 1921, special election bonds. The
hall burned in July, 1980, and the remains of the structure
were razed. The insurance proceeds were $715,000.00 and were
deposited in a local bank; the funds now total about
$1,137,668.00.
"An April 5, 1983, bond election for a new Memorial Hall was
turned down by Coffeyville voters."
Your first question is whether K.S.A. 73-446 applies to
insurance proceeds from the Coffeyville Memorial Hall. That
statute provides as follows:
"Any city which has a memorial building
constructed under the authority of article
4 of chapter 73 of the Kansas Statutes
Annotated may:
"(1) Dispose of the building and the land
upon which situated, or any part of such
land, or
"(2) If no bonds issued therefor are
outstanding, may divert the use of said
building to a city hall or building for
the accommodation of its officers and
general business of the city and for such
purposes may make such alterations,
repairs or changes as may be necessary, in
the following manner: The city council or
commission shall adopt a resolution
setting forth that in its judgment the
building is improperly designed to be of
use to the community, or that the
community no longer needs the building
because of conditions to be set forth in
the resolution, or that the building is
used so little that the cost of
maintenance and operation is excessive,
and that the city has an opportunity to
sell said building and the land on which
situated or a part of such land, for cash
at a price to be stated, and that the city
will sell such building and the land or a
part of the land, according to the terms
of the proposition, after a certain date
to be stated in said resolution, unless
within twenty (20) days after the
publication of the resolution a petition
addressed to the governing body and signed
by not less that fifty-one percent (51%)
of the number of qualified electors as
shown by the registration books on the day
of the publication of the resolution, or
in case of a city having no registration,
then according to an estimate of the
number of qualified electors on the day of
publication of the resolution as prepared
and certified to by the city clerk, shall
be filed with the city clerk requesting
that the matter be voted upon at a special
election, or at the next regular city
election if such election will fall within
ninety (90) days after the publication of
the resolution.
"If no sufficient petition is filed within
the required time, or if a sufficient
petition is filed and an election is held
and majority of the votes cast are in
favor of the proposition, the council or
commission may proceed with the disposal
of the property or the diversion of the
use of the building according to the
proposition set out in the resolution.
The consideration received for the
building and land disposed of under this
section shall be applied on the payment of
any outstanding bonds issued for the
memorial, or, in the event no bonds are
outstanding, it shall be transferred to
the general fund, or be placed in a
special fund for the purchase and
construction of another building more
appropriate for the use of the city. A
special election shall be noticed and held
in the same manner and with the same form
of ballot as in the case of bond elections
under the provisions of K.S.A. 10-120, or
any amendments thereto, the first
publication of the notice to be in the
week following the determination of the
sufficiency of the petition and without
further action than said determination."
K.S.A. 73-402 provides for a petition and election on the
question of issuing bonds or levying a tax for the
construction of a military monument, which monument may
consist of a building (K.S.A. 73-401). If a majority of the
voters are in favor of the erection of a memorial, it is
provided that bonds shall be issued or a tax levied, and the
memorial shall be constructed by the city governing body.
K.S.A. 73-402, 73-404.
It is generally held that a fund raised by a municipality for
a special purpose is a trust fund, and that the municipality
may not use or divert such a fund for other than the special
purpose for which it was collected. 15 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations §39.45 (3d ed.); 56 Am.Jur.2d
Municipal Corporations §582. In accordance with this
rule, and subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 73-446, it is
our opinion that moneys derived from the issuance of bonds or
levy of a tax under K.S.A. 73-402 constitute a special fund
held in trust for the construction of a memorial monument.
Additionally, in our judgment, the trust character of such a
special fund is impressed upon a memorial building produced
therefrom, and upon insurance proceeds realized upon
destruction of the memorial. 65 A.L.R. 1124. Accordingly,
the procedure for disposal of a memorial building, set forth
in K.S.A. 73-446, applies to insurance proceeds realized from
destruction of such a building.
Your second question is whether the incidental use of a
memorial hall for conventions or display shows (such as car
and boat shows) is permissible under the provisions of K.S.A.
73-401 et seq. In this regard, K.S.A. 73-407 prescribes
that the management and control of a city memorial building
shall be vested in a board of three trustees appointed by the
mayor, and grants the following authority to said trustees:
"The board of trustees shall have full
authority to lease all or any part of said
building for hire to any person or persons
desiring to lease the same for a term not
to exceed one year at a time and fix the
rate and terms upon which the charge shall
be made and collected therefor."
The Kansas Supreme Court has construed the above-quoted
statutory provision as not authorizing the lease of a memorial
building for the conduct of a purely commercial enterprise:
"We note, first, that the entire statute
providing for the erection and maintenance
of these memorials is not a statute
designed in any sense as a money making
scheme. The purpose of the statute was to
give the people an opportunity to express
in some substantial, tangible way their
great appreciation of the patriotism of
those who, by special service, gave so
much in time, energy and talent to our
country in its times of need, and the
legislature was careful to provide in the
statute that not only the cost of
constructing the memorial, but the cost of
its maintenance, even though special taxes
for maintenance were necessary, should be
borne by the public. The thoughts which
prompted it were the opposite of those
involved in commercial enterprise for
gain.
"We conclude that the amendment to the
statute in 1929 authorizing the trustees
to lease the auditorium, or a part
thereof, for not more than one year did
not authorize the lease of the building,
or any part thereof, for the conduct of a
purely commercial enterprise, and if the
statute were so construed as to grant such
authority it would be void as against the
public policy of this state."
Glen W. Dickinson Theaters v.
Lambert, 136 Kan. 498, 501, 502
(1932).
In accordance with the ruling in the Lambert case, it is
our opinion that in the absence of a charter ordinance adopted
pursuant to article 12, section 5 of the Kansas Constitution,
a memorial building constructed pursuant to K.S.A. 73-401 et
seq. may not be used for a purely commercial enterprise.
It would seem that the use of a memorial hall for conventions
or display shows would fall within the category of a "purely
commercial enterprise."
In passing, we note that K.S.A. 73-401 is subject to charter
ordinance. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1 (1973).
Additionally, it should be noted that dicta in the
Lambert case, to the effect that the public policy of this
state prohibits the use a memorial building for a purely
commercial enterprise, no longer retains its efficacy. See
Attorney General Opinion No. 61-302 (copy enclosed).
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:TRH:jm
6 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
',he monies in their general funds in securities, perhaps it is not out
of order to suggest that the best policy to pursue, in the absence of
standards for investments set by the legislature, is to invest in sound
governmental issues.
Since cities are given freedom to govern themselves except where
specifically restricted by the legislature, and since there is no state
law at present which specifically prohibits a city from investing
the monies in its general funds in government or other securities,
it is the opinion of this office that under the "Home Rule Amend-
ment" cities have power to invest their surplus general fund monies
in interest bearing securities; however the investment of such funds
in corporate or personal securities would constitute the use of
public funds to promote private interests and should not be counte-
nanced.
OPINION ( 61-302), August 24, 1961, to W. H. Alward, City Attoniey,
Herington, Kan.
Re: SAME—Home Rule, Leasing of Municipal Property
QUESTION; May the City of Herington lease to a private corporation for
profit a portion of its municipal airport property, a reasonable rental to be
charged which will be devoted to operation and improvement of the airport?
ANSWER: Yes.
The City of Herington requests our opinion concerning its au-
thority to lease to a private corporation for profit a portion of the
municipal airport property received by the city from the United
States. Under the terms of the proposed lease, a reasonable rental
will be charged for the property, which will be devoted to operation
and improvement of the airport. It has been determined that the
airport property sought to be leased is surplus and not necessary to
the operation of the airport for the benefit of the public. We under-
stand that you ask no question regarding limitations on such a lease
which might arise because of federal statutes or rules.
In the past, this office consistently has been of the opinion that
Kansas cities could not lease municipally owned real property to
private persons or corporations for use in private enterprises without
specific statutory authority. (See Darby v. Otterman, 122 Kan. 603 ;
State, ex rel., v. City of Independence, 123 Kan. 766; Electric Theatre
Co. v. Darby, 123 Kan. 225; State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127
Kan. 663; Dickinson Theatres v. Lambert, 136 Kan. 49S; Attorney
General's Opinion to Mr. C. W. Brenneisen, Jr., City Attorney, Kan-
CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES 77
sas City, Kansas, dated February 7, 1958; Attorney General's Opinion
to Mr. Donald Sands, City Attorney, Holton, Kansas, dated April 4,
1956; Attorney General's Opinion to '1r. Marvin Meyer, City At-
torney, Oberlin, Kansas, dated April 13, 1961.) The rationale of
these opinions was that Kansas cities had only such powers as were
specifically granted by the Legislature, with such implied powers
as were necessary to implement specifically granted powers. There
is no specific statutory authorization for the City of Herington to
lease its airport as proposed.
On July 1, 1961, the "Home Rule" amendment to the Kansas
Constitution became effective. Under the terms of the amendment,
cities "are . . . empowered to determine their local affairs and
government . . . subject only to enactments of the legislature
. . . applicable uniformly to all cities, or all cities of the same
class. (Art. 12, sec. 5b, Kansas Constitution. ) As we stated in our
Opinion No. 61-279, dated July 21, 1961, this language "can only
be interpreted to mean that cities now possess the authority to do all
things not specifically restricted or prohibited by the legislature or
which contravene public policy."
There is no statutory prohibition effective under the Home Rule
amendment which prohibits the City of Herington from leasing
municipally owned property. However, in determining the au-
thority of municipalities to lease municipally-owned property to
private persons or corporations for use in private business, the Court
in the past has construed statutes which would admit of that inter-
pretation as not granting the authority because of the public policy
of the State that its governmental units not engage directly or in-
directly in private business for profit. In Dickinson Theatres v.
Lambert, 136 Kan. 498, the trustees of a city memorial building,
empowered "to lease all or any part of said building for hire to any
person or persons desiring to lease the same for a term not to
exceed one year . . ." (Laws of 1929, chapter 252, section 8)
were enjoined from leasing the building to a private person for
operation for profit as a theatre. "If the statute were so construed
as to grant such authority it would be void as against the public
policy of this state." (1. c. p. 502.) This policy earlier in the opin-
ion was stated as follows:
"It has been the policy of our government to exalt the individual rather
than the state (State v. Kelly, 71 Kan. 811, 836, 81 Pac. 450) and to have the
various units of our government perform governmental functions, leaving to
individuals commercial enterprises for profit." (1. c. p. 502.) See also State,
ex rel., v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 126 Kan. 43.
TS OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Yet, in State, ex rel., v. City of Pittsburg, Kan ( No.
42631, Opinion filed August 1, 1961) a case challenging validity of
chapter Si, Laws of 1961, which empowers cities to issue revenue
bonds, the proceeds of which are to be used to purchase, construct,
maintain and equip buildings for agricultural, commercial, industrial
and manufacturing facilities and to lease such buildings to any
person, firm or corporation, the Court upheld the validity of the
statute against an objection that the act was unconstitutional and
violated the public policy of the State because revenue bonds could
be issued thereunder for other than public purposes. The Court
said
"In section 1 of the act the legislature. in effect, has said that the encourage-
ment of industrial development so as to promote the general welfare of the
citizens of the state, is a public purpose and the public policy."
The effect of the Home Rule amendment was not considered by
the Court. In Miller v. Jackson, 166 Kan. 13S, 141, the Court stated
that questions of public policy are for legislative determination; in
State v. Brady, 156 Kan. 831, S43. the Court stated that "Courts are
not arbitors of public policy . . . We cannot usurp . . .
the legislative power of establishing public policy . . ."; in Noel
v. The Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 763, the Court recog-
nized that public policy of the state is expressed by its constitution.
The Home Rule amendment clearly states that cities are em-
powered to determine their local affairs. In Higgins v. Cardinal
Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, the Court said:
"A constitution must be interpreted liberally to carry into effect the principles
of government which it embodies. It deals broadly with general subjects, and
its language should not be interpreted in any narrow, refined or subtle sense,
but should be held to mean what the words imply to the common understanding
of men. (State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641.) The constitution is
not to be construed in a technical manner, but in ascertaining its meaning the
courts consider the circumstances attending its adoption and what appears to
have been the understanding of the people when they adopted it. (Citations
omitted. )
"Story was quoted with approval in State v. Sessions, supra, as follows:
" 'Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for
niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or
for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are
instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human
life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understanding. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people
must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot be
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss.'
( 1 Story on the Constitution, 5th Ed., § 451.)"
CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES 79
In our opinion, the basic policy of the state expressed by the
voters in adoption of the Home Rule amendment is to grant cities
the power to determine their local affairs, subject only to certain
restrictive acts of the legislature. The language of the amendment
clearly so states, and we believe is so understood. The question
of leasing a portion of your municipally owned airport is a local
affair, and we know of no restrictive legislation which prohibits the
City of Herington from doing so on such terms as the governing body
deems best.
This is not to say that under authority of the Home Rule amend-
ment Kansas cities now may directly engage in what is commonly
accepted as private business. In our opinion, the Court would find
such activity contrary to our scheme of government, as was found in
State, ex rel., v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, supra. And perhaps
it would be better policy for a city to sell property no longer needed
for public purposes, but such local policy questions are for local gov-
erning bodies to determine.
It is our opinion that the Home Rule amendment grants the City
of Herington authority to lease portions of its existing municipal
airport found to be surplus by the governing body to a private person
or corporation for a reasonable rental which will be devoted to main-
taining the airport facility.
OPINION ( 62-41 ), April 5, 1962, to John S. O'Brien, City Attorney,
Independence, Kan.
Re: SAME—Home Rule, Search Warrants, Authority to Provide
for by Ordinance
Question: May a city, under authority of the Home Rule Amendment
(Kansas Constitution, article 12, section 5), enact an ordinance providing for
the issuance of search warrants by the police judge upon the complaint under
oath of a city police officer? ANSWER: Yes.
A public offense in Kansas is an act or omission for which a
penalty is provided by a state statute (G. S. 1949, 62-102) and a
police judge has no jurisdiction in violations of state statutes. G. S.
1949, 13-601, 14-801, 15-503; State v. Davis, 26 Kan. 205, 207 (1881 ).
Yet, in those instances provided by statute where a search warrant
may be issued, a police judge may issue the same. See e. g., C. S.
1949, 62-201, 62-1802. It is thus manifest there is nothing inherently
against the public policy of the State in a police judge issuing a
search warrant when the proper safeguards are provided.
Formerly the police judge's authority, as a city officer, had to be

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