Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-131

1987-131Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
September 3, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 131
Philip B. Wolfe
Nichols & Wolfe, Chartered
Suite 1120, Bank IV Tower
534 Kansas Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66603-3406
Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas--Corporations--
Cities' Powers of Home Rule; Authority to Abate or
Defer Special Assessments Levied under K.S.A.
12-6a01 et seq.
Synopsis: The home rule amendment to the Kansas Constitution
authorizes a city to implement a program to relieve
or defer special assessments based upon criteria
established by the city if such a program may be
incorporated into the framework of the legislative
act which the city is using to authorize the
special assessments and is not in conflict with
that statutory framework. When special assessments
have been lawfully levied on property benefited by
municipal improvements and bonds issued in
anticipation of payment of those assessments, all
as authorized by K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq., a
city's use of home rule authority to "abate" or
relieve those assessments well after completion of
the prescribed statutory process for authorizing
the improvements and assessments conflicts with the
provisions of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 12-6a01; 12-6a04; 12-6a06; 12-6a07;
12-6a14; Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5.
Dear Mr. Wolfe:
As bond counsel to the City of Topeka, and on the City's
behalf, you have requested an opinion regarding authority for
the city governing body to abate or relieve special
assessments levied on property in a benefit district for
improvements accomplished and financed pursuant to K.S.A.
12-6a01 et seq .
We are informed that the proposed abatements will be available
only when the landowner responsible for the special
assessments has promised to maintain what the city defines as
a "qualifying business" and provide for a certain, unspecified
number of jobs. We note at the outset that we do not have a
copy of a proposed city ordinance establishing the city's
policy for the abatements, and thus our comments regarding the
proposed abatements are based solely on the descriptions
contained in your letter requesting this opinion and our
conversations concerning the proposal.
The assessments which the city proposes to abate were levied
under the authority of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq., which
authorizes Kansas cities to construct various improvements and
to finance such improvements by levying special assessments
against the benefited property. Such assessments may be
payable in annual installments for up to 20 years and in that
situation the cost of the improvement is paid by the issuance
of bonds by the city. K.S.A. 12-6a14(c). The City of Topeka
has issued bonds to pay for the improvements here in
question. The outstanding bonds are general obligations of
the city, payable from the special assessments, and further
secured by the city's obligation to levy ad valorem taxes
against all the taxable property in the city should such
special assessments prove insufficient to pay principal and
interest on the bonds. Thus, if the city abates or relieves
the obligation of certain landowners to pay the special
assessments, the bonds issued to pay such assessments, to the
extent of the abatement, will be payable by the city as a
whole.
Your question thus concerns a city's authority to provide for
abatement when special assessments have been lawfully levied
and bonds issued in anticipation of the payment of special
assessments. K.S.A. 12-6a01 et !La . does not authorize
the abatement of lawfully levied special assessments for any
reason and we are not aware of other Kansas statutes which do
so. The general rule concerning the abatement of special
assessments, like the rule concerning the abatement of general
taxes, is that a municipality may not remit, abate, cancel, or
compromise assessments legally levied unless specifically
authorized to do so by law. State, ex rel., Donsante v.
Pethtel, 158 Ohio St. 35, 106 N.E.2d 626 (1952);
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §38.338 (3d ed.,
1987); Annotation, 28 A.L.R.2d 1425. Having stated this
general rule, and noting that no Kansas statutes appear to
authorize a city to abate lawfully levied special assessments,
we turn to whether such abatements may be authorized by the
city under the home rule amendment of the Kansas Constitution.
Pursuant to Article 12, Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution,
cities in Kansas have the power to determine their local
affairs through ordinance without specific authorization in
the form of a legislative enactment. The home rule amendment
places some limitations on the exercise of this power
providing, in relevant parts:
"Cities are hereby empowered to determine
their local affairs and government . . .
by ordinance passed by the governing body
. . . subject only to enactments of the
legislature of statewide concern
applicable uniformly to all cities, to
other enactments of the legislature
applicable uniformly to all cities, to
enactments of the legislature applicable
uniformly to all cities of the same class
limiting or prohibiting the levying of any
tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction
and to enactments of the legislature
prescribing limits of indebtedness." Art.
12, §5(b).
The first, third and fourth limitations of home rule powers
stated in Art. 12, Sec. 5 do not appear to prevent the
action proposed by the City of Topeka. First, there is no
uniformly applicable enactment of the legislature of
statewide concern which would preclude city action in this
instance. Nor does it appear that any enactment applicable to
cities of the same class "limiting or prohibiting the levying
of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction" exists to
invoke the third limitation of city home rule powers.
Finally, the proposed city action does not attempt to exempt
the city from statutory limitations on indebtedness and thus
is not precluded by the fourth limitation of the amendment.
All of which leaves us with the more difficult question of
whether the uniformly applicable K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq.,
under which the improvements and assessments in question were
authorized, prevents the exercise of home rule under the
circumstances described in your letter.
The home rule amendment requires a liberal construction of the
powers granted therein for the purpose of granting cities the
largest measure of self-government. Where the legislature has
acted in some area, a city's power to act in the same area
should be upheld unless the legislature has clearly preempted
the field so as to preclude city action. The measure for
determining whether city action is precluded is whether an
"actual conflict" exists between the city ordinance and state
statute. If no such conflict exists the city ordinance should
be permitted to stand. Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1,
7 (1973). Conversely, of course, if there is a conflict,
under the limitations of the home rule amendment, the city
ordinance gives way to the state statute. The frequently
stated test for determining whether conflict exists is whether
the city ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute
prohibits, or prohibits that which the statute authorizes.
City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 501 (1975).
K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. applies uniformly to all Kansas
cities and is concerned with the provision of municipal
improvements financed, at least in part, by the levy of
special assessments on specially benefited property. As we
said in Attorney General Opinion No. 87-56, the statute does
not provide the exclusive methodology for accomplishing such
improvements and, in fact, states that it is intended as a
"complete alternative to all other methods provided by law."
Thus, as we concluded in Attorney General Opinion No. 87-56,
K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. does not preclude the exercise of
home rule powers on the subject of providing for municipal
improvements to be financed by assessments on specially
benefited property. K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq., is, however,
a uniformly applicable statute which is not subject to
exemption or alteration by a city charter ordinance enacted
under the home rule amendment, Art. 5, §(c)(1). Thus, if the
city chooses to utilize the provisions of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et
sec.. to accomplish improvements and levy special
assessments, it is bound by the uniformly applicable
provisions of the statute.
It is our understanding that the City of Topeka does not
propose to enact a home rule charter ordinance exempting from
portions of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. and enacting
substitute provisions therefor. Instead, the city proposes to
enact a "pure" home rule ordinance authorizing the abatement
of special assessments levied under K.S.A. 12-6a01 et
seq. Attorney General Schneider, in Opinion No. 78-3
(enclosed), addressed a similar proposal and concluded the
home rule amendment authorized a city to undertake a program
for the indefinite deferral of special assessments levied
under K.S.A. 12-6a01 et (based upon economic
hardship criteria established by the city) in improvement
districts in areas containing owner-occupied residential
property. The cost of such deferred assessments is borne by
the city at large through the issuance of bonds paid by
general ad valorem taxation. Under that program the deferred
assessments become payable upon the transfer of the property
to a non-eligible owner or if the use of the property
changes. The deferred assessments abate after a period of 25
years.
Under the deferral program discussed in Opinion No. 78-3
(utilized in the City of Wichita) the resolution creating the
improvement district contains provision for the indefinite
deferral of certain assessments according to the criteria
established by the city. A property owner has 20 days after
the mailing of a statement of assessment to make application
for the deferral. The ordinances levying the special
assessments for which a deferral has been granted must state
that the assessments are deferred in accordance with city
ordinances and thus, the deferral is noted when the
assessments are certified to the county clerk. [Cf.
K.S.A. 13-10,137 concerning delay of assessments in cities of
the first class.]
Attorney General Opinion No. 78-3 concluded that nothing in
the indefinite deferral program described above conflicted
with the procedures established by K.S.A. 12-6a01 et
seq. and thus, the city could utilize its constitutional
powers of home rule to supply the necessary legal authority
for the deferral program. The opinion stated:
"Thus, in this instance, the city may
provide by local legislation additional
steps and procedures in the assessment
process which are not now provided but,
not in conflict with, the existing act
under which it proposes to continue to
make general public improvements."
(Emphasis added.)
We continue to agree with the conclusions of Opinion No. 78-3
and find the abatement proposal (as described to us) made by
the City of Topeka both analogous and distinguishable. The
analogous point consists largely of the fact that in both
instances the cities in question use home rule authority to
provide relief from the payment of special assessments based
upon criteria established by the city which is not included in
the statutory provisions for apportioning the costs of an
improvement. In our opinion, such an exercise of home rule is
consistent with the statutory authority which the city is also
relying upon to accomplish the improvements and levy
assessments. The basis upon which relief from assessments may
be offered is certainly within the authority of a city
governing body to provide, consistent, of course, with the
general constraints of the public purpose doctrine.
Thus, our concern with the proposal described in your letter
is not with the concept but more with timing and semantics.
On the latter point, it would appear the city may more
appropriately refer to its plan as one for the indefinite
deferral of assessments, as we understand the continued
"abatements" would be conditioned upon a property owner's
continued compliance with the city's criteria qualifying it
for "abatement". Presumably, should a property cease to
qualify the city would require payment of the special
assessments. To "abate" generally means to permanently cancel
or nullify and, in tax practice, often presupposes an
erroneous assessment or levy which is corrected by abatement
or cancellation. See generally, Ballentine's Law
Dictionary, (3d Edition 1969); Words and Phrases, "Abate;
Abatement" (Permanent Edition, 1969). This does not appear to
be what the city proposes to do. If such assessments were
abated or nullified and at some future date the property in
question failed to meet city criteria the city would be in the
unenviable position of attempting to levy abated assessments
anew. If deferred, the original assessments would be in place
and could become payable when the property no longer qualified
for deferral.
The other difficulty with the City of Topeka's proposal
concerns timing and the requirement that a city's use of home
rule authority not conflict with the state law which the city
uses to authorize the levy of special assessments. The timing
problem and hence, the potential conflict, arise from the
City's proposal (as described to us) to consider the
"abatement" of assessments levied in conformity with K.S.A.
12-6a01 et !La . after the statutory process for making
such assessments is complete. Given the procedures required
by K.S.A. 12-6a01 et sea., it is our opinion that such
after-the-fact abatement or deferral presents a conflict
with statutory procedures as well as a potential for abuse.
K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. prescribes uniformly applicable
and rather extensive procedures to be followed by a city to
accomplish improvements under its authority. Upon initiation
of an improvement, K.S.A. 12-6a04 requires a city governing
body to make findings as to the advisability and nature of a
proposed improvement, the estimated cost, the boundaries of
the improvement district, the method of assessment, and the
apportionment of cost, if any, between the improvement
district and the city at large. K.S.A. 12-6a06 provides for
the adoption of a resolution authorizing the improvement, in
accordance with the findings made under §12-6a04, which is
effective only upon publication in the official city
newspaper. If an improvement is initiated by a petition of
landowners in the benefit district, the city may proceed with
authorizing resolutions without providing notice and public
hearing as provided in §12-6a04. If, however, the improvement
is initiated by the city, §12-6a04 provides for published
public notice and a public hearing on matters relating to the
improvement including the apportionment of cost between the
benefit district and the city at large. Moreover, K.S.A.
12-6a06 provides that city initiated improvements will not be
made if, within 20 days of publication of a resolution
approving the improvement, 51% of the resident landowners in
the improvement district protest the making of the improvement.
In our opinion, the purpose of such requirements is to provide
the governing body, the potentially affected landowners, and
other interested residents of the city with adequate
information about the proposed improvement, its benefits and
cost, and the apportionment of its costs as between the city
at large and the benefited property. The statutory process
provides the city governing body with the opportunity to
apportion the costs of an improvement in view of the benefits
which appear to accrue to the improvement district and the
city at large. In our opinion the city may rely on home rule
powers to mandate the consideration of the city's own criteria
for relieving certain property of assessments based upon a
city policy determination regarding the benefits such
improvement will provide to the city at large and the benefit
district. Here home rule powers provide the authority to
incorporate additional criteria into the existing statutory
process as long as such additions do not conflict with the
statutory procedures.
It is our opinion, however, that to provide for relief from
assessments and thereby transfer the obligation for the costs
of an improvement from the benefited landowners to the city at
large after special assessments have been levied against
those landowners in accordance with the city governing body's
original determinations pursuant to K.S.A. 12-6a04 and 12-6a06
presents a conflict with the statutory procedures. In that
case the city has made a policy determination regarding the
benefits of the improvement and the proper apportionment of
cost according to prescribed statutory procedures. No
criteria for abatement or deferral of special assessments was
made part of the original determinations required of the city
by K.S.A. 12-6a04 and 12-6a06. We do not believe that the
city's home rule authority permits an after-the-fact policy
determination made outside the prescribed statutory
procedures. If this were permissible the limitations of the
home rule amendment making cities subject to uniformly
applicable enactments of the legislature would become
meaningless. A city could use the provisions of a uniformly
applicable statute to authorize a particular activity and,
that accomplished, argue the city's "pure" home rule authority
permits subsequent alteration of determinations made under the
statute without regard to the statutory process. This does
not mean that a city is precluded from using home rule
authority to expand the authority of a uniformly applicable
statute, nor is a city precluded from using home rule
authority in conjunction with a uniformly applicable statute.
Such use of home rule powers, however, must be consistent with
the uniformly applicable statute which the city is also
relying upon to authorize a particular undertaking.
It is our opinion that the method of relieving special
assessments proposed by the City of Topeka creates a conflict
with the uniform provisions of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq.
because it would allow the city to make an after-the-fact
policy determination regarding benefits and apportionment of
costs without regard to the prescribed statutory procedures
for making that determination. Unlike the indefinite deferral
program described in Opinion No. 78-3, the Topeka proposal
would not be incorporated into the statutory proceedings
authorizing the improvements and assessments, but instead
would be grafted onto to the accomplished proceedings well
after their completion. As noted above, we believe the
procedures for initiating an improvement and apportioning
costs prescribed by K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. exist to
provide that all persons potentially affected by a proposed
improvement may be adequately informed of issues relating to
the advisability, costs, and benefits of such an improvement.
If consideration of the policy supporting deferral or
abatement of some assessments and the fact that some
assessments may be relieved under this policy is not
incorporated into the statutory process and is instead grafted
on after completion of the process, the purpose of the
statutory process is defeated. The city governing body has
provided itself with the ability to make after-the-fact
policy determinations which, by ignoring the statutory process
for making such determinations, creates a conflict with the
statute. As noted earlier, such conflict precludes the use of
home rule powers to implement the program. Were the program
incorporated into the statutory proceedings and thus made a
factor which is known and considered at the time a project is
authorized and its costs apportioned we believe it would be an
appropriate use of the city's home rule power. In that case
the home rule amendment would supply the necessary authority
to provide for relief from special assessments under certain
circumstances without creating a conflict with the statutes on
which the city is relying for authority to make the
improvements and levy the assessments.
We are not unmindful of the argument, presented in your
letter, that K.S.A. 12-6a07(b) may be read as contemplating
the action proposed by the City. K.S.A. 12-6a07 provides in
its entirety:
"(a) The city may pay such portion of the
cost of the improvement as the governing
body may determine, but not more than
ninety-five percent (95%) of the total
cost thereof. The share of the cost to be
paid by the city at large shall be paid in
the manner provided by K.S.A. 12-6a14.
"(b) If any property deemed benefited
shall by reason of any provision of law be
exempt from payment of special assessments
therefor, such assessment shall,
nevertheless, be computed and shall be
paid by the city at large." (Emphasis
added.)
It is our opinion that the language of paragraph (b) does not
contemplate the abatement or deferral of special assessments.
K.S.A. 12-6a07(b) refers to benefited property which is
"exempt from the payment of special assessments." (Emphasis
added.) An exemption would prevent any levy of special
assessment at the outset. The property included in the city's
proposal is not exempted from special assessments by any
provision of law; the need for abatement from the lawfully
levied assessments makes this abundantly clear. Moreover, it
does not appear that an exemption is what the city is
contemplating as relief from special assessments is
conditional, based upon the property owners continued
compliance with the city's criteria qualifying the property
for relief from special assessments. Thus, the assessments
must be levied.
In our opinion K.S.A. 12-6a07(b) addresses the circumstances
where property in a benefit district is not subject to special
assessments. In such a case the charges attributable to that
property are computed (but not assessed or levied) and paid by
the city at large. The intent of the provision is to prevent
an exemption of certain property from special assessment from
resulting in nonexempt properties carrying the cost of
benefits received by exempt properties. See Garvey
Elevators Inc. v. City of Wichita, 238 Kan. 682, 689
(1986). We do not read K.S.A. 12-6a07 as authority for the
abatement of lawfully levied special assessments.
We conclude thus, the home rule amendment to the Kansas
Constitution authorizes a city to implement a program to
relieve or defer special assessments based upon criteria
established by the city if such a program may be incorporated
into the framework of the legislative act which the city is
using to authorize the special assessments and is not in
conflict with that statutory framework. When special
assessments have been lawfully levied on property benefited by
municipal improvements and bonds issued in anticipation of
payment of those assessments, all as authorized by K.S.A.
12-6a01 et seq., a city's use of home rule authority to
"abate" or relieve those assessments well after completion of
the prescribed statutory process for authorizing the
improvements and assessments is inconsistent with the
provisions of K.S.A. 12-6a01 et e22.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Mary F! Carson
Assistant Attorney General
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