Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-066

1987-066Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 9, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 66
Thomas J. Burgardt
Finney County Counselor
Box M
Garden City, Kansas 67846
Re: Domestic Relations -- Family Planning Centers --
Parental Consent for Family Planning Services for
Minors
Synopsis: In that minors are protected by the United States
Constitution and possess constitutional rights,
absolute prohibitions on family planning
(contraceptive) services for minors are
unconstitutional. However, because activities of
minors may constitutionally be regulated more
strictly than those of adults, reasonable parental
consultation restrictions, such as notice, may be
placed on a minor's decision of whether or not to
use contraceptive devices. Mandatory parental
consent requirements for all contraceptive services
to minors are unconstitutional. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 23-501; 38-101; 38-123; 38-123b; K.S.A. 1986
Supp. 65-2891; K.S.A. 65-2892; 65-2892a.
*
Dear Mr. Burgardt:
As County Counselor for Finney County, you inquire as to
whether the Finney County Health Department can provide
family planning services to minors without parental consent.
Several statutes have been enacted in Kansas granting certain
minors the authority to consent to specific medical
treatment. K.S.A. 38-123 (medical care of unmarried, pregnant
minor); 38-123b (medical care); K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 65-2891
(emergency care); K.S.A. 65-2892 (venereal disease); 65-2892a
(drug abuse). By contrast, K.S.A. 23-501, the statute which
allows for the establishment and maintenance of family
planning centers, contains no language which would authorize a
minor to give consent for the receipt of family planning
services. The statute provides:
"Such family planning centers, upon
request of any person who is over eighteen
(18) years of age and who is married or
who has been referred to said center by a
person licensed to practice medicine and
surgery and who resides in this state, may
furnish and disseminate information
concerning, and means and methods of
planned parenthood, including such
contraceptive devices as recommended by
the secretary of health and environment."
While the issue of requiring parental consent for
contraceptive services to minors has never been considered in
the Kansas courts, the United States Supreme Court and several
federal circuit courts have considered the issue. For
purposes of this opinion, a minor is any person, married or
single, who has not yet reached the age of eighteen (18)
years. See K.S.A. 38-101 [persons sixteen (16) years of age
or over who are or have been married shall be considered of
the age of majority only for matters relating to contracts,
property rights, liabilities and the capacity to sue and be
sued.]
A landmark Supreme Court decision which considered the
constitutional rights of minors, as distinguished from those
of adults, is Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2nd 788
(1976). In determining the validity of a parental consent
requirement in a Missouri abortion statute, the court stated
that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id. at
74. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct.
1779, 44 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).
At the same time, however, the Danforth court recognized
the long-standing principle that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than
those of adults, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74, citing Prince v. Massachusetts,
328 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). Thus, the
court concluded that the validity of a state's restriction on
the privacy rights of minors must be determined in a balancing
test. The restriction will only be valid if it serves a
"significant state interest . . . that is not present in the
case of an adult." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. • In this instance, the parental
consent provision was declared unconstitutional because the
restriction on minors' rights was not justified by a
significant state interest.
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,
97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977), addressed the
constitutionality of a New York statute prohibiting the sale
or distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to persons
under 16. Following the Danforth decision, the Carey
court found it particularly significant that the right to
privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation
extends to minors as well as to adults. Id. at 693. Thus,
the court stated that "state restrictions inhibiting privacy
rights of minors are valid only if they serve 'any significant
state interest . . . that is not present in the case of an
adult.'" Id., citing Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49
L.Ed.2d 788 (1976).
As noted previously in this opinion, the Danforth decision
found that no such interest justified a state requirement of
parental consent for an abortion. The Carey court
reasoned that since the State may not impose a blanket
prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental
consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy,
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
supra at 74, "the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition
of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori
foreclosed." Carey v. Population Services International,
supra, 431 U.S. at 694. As in the Danforth decision, the
Carey court found that any possible significant state
interest served by the statute (i.e. restricting minors'
access to contraceptives as a deterrent to early sexual
behavior) was not sufficient to justify the state's blanket
prohibition on the availability of contraceptives to persons
under 16. Id. at 694-695. Thus, the court struck down the
statute as unconstitutional.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 995 S.Ct. 3035, 61
L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (Bellotti II) (plurality opinion),
again considered the constitutional rights of minors when
examining the validity of an alternative parental/judicial
consent requirement in a Massachusetts abortion statute. The
court set forth three guidelines to consider when dealing with
the constitutional rights of minors, as distinguished from
those of adults. First, although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as adults, "the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's
vulnerability and their needs for 'concern . . . sympathy, and
. . . paternal attention.'" Id. at 635, citing McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 16 L.Ed.2d
647 (1971). Second, the States may validly limit the freedom
of children to choose for themselves in the making of
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences. Bellotti II, supra, at 635. And
finally, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of
their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. Id. at 637.
In light of these guidelines, the Bellotti II court
concluded that legal restrictions on minors, and especially
those restrictions which are supportive of the parental role,
"may be important to the child's chances for the full growth
and maturity that make participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding." 443 U.S. at 638-639. Thus, while
acknowledging its previous prohibition on an absolute parental
veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy,
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), the Supreme
Court determined that "parental notice and consent are
qualifications that typically may be imposed by the state on a
minor's right to make important decisions." Bellotti
II, supra, 443 U.S. at 640.
Applying this policy to the Massachusetts abortion statute,
the court held that if the State decides to require parental
consent for a minor's abortion, it must also provide an
alternative procedure whereby judicial authorization for an
abortion can be obtained, thus preventing the minor's decision
from being subject to the blanket third-party veto power
struck down as unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, 428 U.S. at 74. In
this instance, the statute was struck down as
unconstitutional, with four members of the court reasoning it
was unconstitutional because the statute's alternative
parental/judicial consent requirement still vested absolute
veto power over a minor's abortion decision in the hands of a
third party. Bellotti II, supra, 443 U.S. at 651.
After considering the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions,
we reach the following conclusions regarding the provision of
contraceptive services to minors in Kansas. First, it is
clear that absolute prohibitions on the availability of
contraceptives for minors are unconstitutional. Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96
S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 694, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52
L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). See also Doe v. Irwin, 428 F.
Supp. 1198, 1215 (W.D. Mich. 1977). As stated plainly by
the Danforth court, minors are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. 428 U.S. at
74.
Second, we believe that restrictions other than a blanket veto
by a third party over a minor's decision of whether or not to
use contraceptive devices could pass constitutional muster.
As stated in Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640, "immature
minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices
that take account of both immediate and long-range
consequences." Further, the court recognized in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 73,
that "parental discretion, too, has been protected from
unwarranted or unreasonable interference from the State."
The issue of contraceptive use by minors is an area of
unquestioned parental discretion. While the Danforth
opinion held that blanket veto power in the hands of a third
party over a minor's right to use contraceptives is
unconstitutional, we believe the court implicitly recognized
(428 U.S. at 75) that minors may well be immature, and thus
restrictions other than a blanket veto could be constitutional.
In our judgment, the encouragement of minors to seek the help
and advice of their parents is a valid constitutional claim.
It is important to respect the position of parents who have
brought teenagers to the point at which decisions regarding
the use of contraceptive devices will be made. A requirement
of notice would afford parents the opportunity to alert a
minor to the dangers, problems and consequences of sexual
activity. Once aware, a decision may be reached in joint
consultation with the parents, or a minor may prevail without
parental consent. In either event, however, the value of
family involvement would be afforded the minor.
We believe that when the conflicting interests of the
government and the family collide, every caution must be
exercised in protecting parental and familial values. Thus,
in our opinion, a state reasonably may impose parental
consultation requirements, such as notice, on the availability
of contraceptive services for minors. See, Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. at 640; Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. at
1215. The validity of any restriction on the rights of minors
to obtain contraceptives may be determined through a balancing
test, where the restriction will be valid if it serves a
"significant state interest . . . that is not present in the
case of an adult." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
Finally, it is apparent that mandatory parental consent
requirements for all contraceptive services to minors are
unconstitutional. See, City of Akron v. Akron Center, 462
U.S. 416, 76 L.Ed.2d 687, 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983); Jane Does v.
State of Utah Dept. of Health, 776 F.2d 253, 256 (10th
Circuit 1985). Such a requirement would give a parent the
blanket veto power over a minor's procreation choices which
was struck down as unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; See also,
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at
694; Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 651.
In summary, because minors are protected by the United States
Constitution and possess constitutional rights, absolute
prohibitions on family planning (contraceptive) services for
minors are unconstitutional. However, since activities of
minors may constitutionally be regulated more strictly than
those of adults, reasonable parental consultation
restrictions, such as notice, may be placed on a minor's
decision of whether or not to use contraceptive devices.
Mandatory parental consent requirements for all contraceptive
services to minors are unconstitutional.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:BPA:bas

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