Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-062

1987-062Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 3, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 62
The Honorable Vernon L. Williams
State Representative, Ninety-First District
State Capitol, Room 431-N
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities -- Public
Employees Retirement Systems; Kansas Public
Employees Retirement System -- Investment of
KPERS funds; Divestiture of Investments in
Companies Doing Business in the Republic of South
Africa
Constitution of the United States -- Article Six;
Miscellaneous Provisions -- Supremacy Clause;
Federal and State Legislation Concerning the
Republic of South Africa
Synopsis: K.S.A. 74-4921(4)(a) provides that the Board of
Trustees of the Kansas Public Employees Retirement
System (KPERS) may "[dispose] of as investments
of the fund every kind of investment which men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence . . . dispose
of for their own account." It is our opinion that
the prudent person standard does not permit the
KPERS Board of Trustees to make divestiture
decisions solely on the basis of moral or political
beliefs.
The preemption doctrine, derived from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution,
invalidates state laws which conflict with or are
contrary to the purpose of federal laws. For the
reasons outlined in this opinion, we conclude that,
even though federal legislation has been enacted
applying sanctions to the Republic of South Africa,
the preemption doctrine does not in this instance
preclude state and local governments from taking
action requiring divestiture of investments in
companies doing business in South Africa. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 17-5004; 58-1201; 74-4904; 74-4921;
H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 1086
(1986); U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
*
Dear Representative Williams:
As State Representative for the Ninety--First District and
Chairperson of the House Committee on Pensions, Investments
and Benefits, you request our opinion on two questions
concerning divestiture by the state of investments in
companies doing business in the Republic of South Africa:
1. Does the Board of Trustees of the Kansas Public Employees
Retirement System have authority to use the assets of the
system as a means to achieve political or moral objectives
without regard to the economic impact on the fund?
2. Does federal legislation applying sanctions on South
Africa preempt state and local actions requiring
divestiture?
"Divestment" is defined as "the sale by investors of the
securities of business with South African contacts."
Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of
"South African" Securities, 65 Neb. L. Rev. 209, 211
(1986). The "divestment movement" is "the use of economic
pressure to battle apartheid" by persuading "state and local
governments to liquidate existing investments and to prevent
new investments in corporations or financial institutions
doing business in or with South Africa." Note, State and
Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid:
An Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Divestment
Campaign, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 543, 544 (1985).
The Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) is
administered by a board of trustees (trustees). K.S.A.
74-4904. The standard of care the trustees must exercise in
managing and investing the fund is specified by statute:
"In investing and reinvesting moneys in
the fund and in acquiring, retaining,
managing and disposing of investments of
the fund there shall be exercised the
judgment and care under the circumstances
then prevailing, which men of _precedence,
discretion and intelligence exercise in
the management of their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation but in regard to
the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income as well as
the probable safety of their capital.
Within the limitations of the foregoing
standard and subject to clause (b) of this
subsection, there may be acquired,
retained, managed and disposed of as
investments of the fund every kind of
investment which men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence acquire,
retain, manage and dispose of for their
own account." K.S.A. 74-4921(4)(a).
(Emphasis added).
"Prudent person" is defined in the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act as follows:
"'[P]rudent person' means a trustee
whose exercise of trust powers is
reasonable and equitable in view of the
interests of income or principal
beneficiaries, or both, and in view of the
manner in which persons of prudence,
discretion and intelligence would act in
the management of their own affairs."
K.S . A. 58-1201(3).
In administering investments subject to their control, cities
and counties are subject to the "prudent person" rule of
K.S.A. 17-5004. This standard is substantially similar to
K.S.A. 74-4921(4)(a). In Attorney General Opinion No. 85-153
we were asked whether the "prudent person" rule precludes
cities and counties from divesting their holdings of stocks
and other interests in corporations which do business in South
Africa. We stated:
"The 'prudent person' rule establishes a
high fiduciary standard of care in
managing trust assets. (Citations
omitted). Hence, traditional notions of
prudent investment would not enable
trustees to make a decision to divest
based solely on moral beliefs without
violating their fiduciary
responsibilities."
We concluded that the prudent person standard does permit
divestment if the trustees find that "economic conditions in
South Africa make continued investment in a particular asset
less than prudent." In like manner, it is cur opinion that
the prudent person investment standard of K.S.A. 74-4921(4)(a)
does not permit the trustees of KPERS to make divestiture
decisions solely on the basis of moral or political beliefs.
Your second question is whether federal legislation applying
sanctions on South Africa preempts state and local actions
requiring divestiture. The preemption doctrine is derived
from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution:
"This constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . ." U.S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
By virtue of this authority, federal law may preempt or
supercede any state law on the same subject.
The general principles applied by the United States Supreme
Court in determining whether federal law preempted state law
were cited by the court in Mega Renewables v. County of
Shasta, 644 F. Supp. 491, 493 1E.D.Cal. 1986):
"It is a familiar and well-established
principle that the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates
state laws that 'interfere with, or are
contrary to' federal law. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 [6 L.Ed. 23]
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.). Under the
Supremacy Clause, federal law may
supersede state law in several different
ways. First, when acting within
constitutional limits, Congress is
empowered to preempt state law by so
stating in express terms. Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 [97
S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604] (1977).
In the absence of express preemptive
language, Congress' intent to preempt all
state law in a particular area may be
inferred where the scheme of federal
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive
to make reasonable the inference that
Congress 'left no room' for supplementary
state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67
S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).
Pre-emption of a whole field also will be
inferred when the field is one in which
'the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.' Ibid.; see Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399,
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
"Even where Congress has not completely
displaced state regulation in a specific
area, state law is nullified to the extent
that it actually conflicts with federal
law. Such a conflict arises when
'compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility,'
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct.
1210, 1217-1218, 10 L.Ed. 248 (1963), or
when state law 'stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress,'
Hines v. Davidowitz, supra at 67
[61 S.Ct. at 404]. See generally Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S.
691, [404 S.Ct. 2694 at 27001 [81 L.Ed.2d
580] (1984). We have held repeatedly that
state laws can be preempted by federal
regulations as well as by federal
statutes. See, e.g., Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, supra at
[2700-2701] . . . ."
Thus, under the doctrine of preemption a state law will be
declared invalid for the following reasons:
1. The state statute is prohibited by the literal and express
terms of the national legislation;
2. Congress has preempted the field so as to preclude state
interference;
3. Conflict is found between compliance with the state law
and federal law;
4. State law obstructs the execution of the full purpose and
objectives of the federal legislation.
See Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. , 93
L.Ed.2d 183, 107 S.Ct. 334 (1986); Terry, On Behalf of C.
Herman Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F.Supp. 161, 166 (D.
Hawaii 1986); Isla Petroleum Corp. v. Dept. of Consumer
Affairs, 640 F.Supp. 474, 507 (D.Puerto Rico 1986); Joe
Flynn Rare Coins Inc. v. Stephan, 526 F.Supp. 1275, 1279
(1981).
In determining whether a state law is invalid under the
preemption doctrine, "the court's duty is to strike harmony
between the federal and the state interests." Isla
Petroleum Corp. v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 640 F.Supp.
at 507. The court begins its analysis "with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." Joe Flynn Rare Coins Inc.
v. Stephan, 526 F.Supp. at 1279 quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed.
1447 (1947). The United States Supreme Court has mandated
that the doctrine is not be applied in a "literal, mechanical
fashion" or in a manner which "sweeps away state-court
jurisdiction." Whelan's Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human
Resources, 235 Kan. 425, Syl. 1 2 (1984). Federal
preemption of state law is not favored unless there are
"persuasive reasons," such as Congress' specific declaration,
or the nature of the subject matter permits no other
conclusion. Integrity Management Intern. v. Tombs & Sons,
Inc., 614 F.Supp. 243 (D.C. Kan. 1985). The Kansas
Supreme Court has recently stated:
"Generally, in making a preemptive
determination a court should examine those
concerns emphasized by Congress in
enacting the federal legislation.
(Citation omitted). Where state
enforcement activity does riot impair the
federal regulatory interests, concurrent
enforcement activity is authorized.
(Citation emitted). State law should be
preempted only to the extent necessary to
protect achievement of the purposes of the
federal act in question." Goben v.
Barry, 237 Kan. 822, 828 (1985). See
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Riverside
Hospital, 237 Kan. 829, 833 (1985).
"[Conflict between the two laws must be
positive and direct in order to make
coexistence of two laws an impossibility.
Unless there is a specific prohibition in
federal law, state law which complements
federal law is valid. To determine
whether state law is in conflict with
federal law which regulates the same
field, it is necessary that the state law
in its application contravene federal
public policy or cause different results
or consequences." Elkins v. Showcase,
Inc., 237 Kan. 720, 727 (1985).
The United States Congress recently passed legislation
concerning the Republic of South Africa. The "Comprehensive
Anti-Aparthied Act of 1986" became law on October 2, 1986,
after the President's veto was overridden by both Houses of
Congress. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Pub. L.
No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986). The purpose of this
legislation is stated in Section Four as follows:
"The purpose of this Act is to set forth a
comprehensive and complete framework to
guide the efforts of the United States in
helping to bring an end to apartheid in
South Africa and lead to the establishment
of a nonracial, democratic form of
government. This Act sets out United
State policy toward the Government of
South Africa, the victims of apartheid,
and the other states in southern Africa.
It also provides the President with
additional authority to work with the
other industrial democracies to help end
apartheid and establish democracy in South
Africa." 100 Stat. 1089 (1986).
Title I, Section 101 of the Act provides that the "United
States policy toward the Government of South Africa shall be
designed to bring about reforms in that system of government
that will lead to the establishment of a nonracial
democracy." 100 Stat. 1089 (1986).
Sanctions by the United States on the government of South
Africa are listed in Title III of the Act, which is entitled
"Measures by the United States to Undermine Apartheid." These
measures can best be summarized by referring to the table of
contents of this legislation:
"Sec. 301. Prohibition on the importation
of krugerrands.
Sec. 302. Prohibition on the importation
of military articles.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on the importation
of products from parastatal
organizations.
Sec. 304. Prohibition on computer
exports to South Africa.
Sec. 305. Prohibition on loans to the
Government of South Africa.
Sec. 306. Prohibition on air
transportation with South Africa.
Sec. 307. Prohibitions on nuclear trade
with South Africa.
Sec. 308. Government of South Africa
bank accounts.
Sec. 309. Prohibition on importation of
uranium and coal from South Africa.
Sec. 310. Prohibition on new investment
in South Africa.
Sec. 311. Termination of certain
provisions.
Sec. 312. Policy toward violence or
terrorism.
Sec. 313. Termination of tax treaty and
protocol.
Sec. 314. Prohibition on United States
Government procurement from South
Africa.
Sec. 315. Prohibition on the promotion
of United States tourism in South
Africa.
Sec. 316. Prohibition on United States
Government assistance to, investment in,
or subsidy for trade with, South Africa.
Sec. 317. Prohibition on sale or export
of items on Munition List.
Sec. 318. Munitions list sales,
notification.
Sec. 319. Prohibition on importation of
South African agricultural products and
food.
Sec. 320. Prohibition on importation of
iron and steel.
Sec. 321. Prohibition on exports of
crude oil and petroleum products.
Sec. 322. Prohibition on cooperation
with the armed forces of South Africa.
Sec. 323. Prohibition on sugar imports."
100 Stat. 1086-1087 (1986).
Section 310 prohibits any U.S. citizen, corporation, or other
business entity from making any new investment in South
Africa. 100 Stat. 1102 (1986). The enforcement and penalty
provisions of the Act are included in Title VI. Section 606
states as follows:
"(1) no reduction in the amount of funds
for which a State or local government is
eligible or entitled under any Federal law
may be made, and
(2) no other penalty may be imposed by the
Federal Government,
by reason of the application of any State
or local law concerning apartheid to any
contract entered into by a State or local
government for 90 days after the date of
this Act." 100 Stat. 1115 (1986)
On October 27, 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued
executive order no. 12,571, which implements the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act by ordering various departments to carry
out the provisions of the law. Exec. Order No. 12,571, 51
Fed. Reg. 4224 (1986).
Several states and many local governments have enacted
divestiture legislation. See Note, State and Local
Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 Va. L. Rev. 813, 816-822
(1966). Our research has not revealed any case law as to
whether federal legislation applying sanctions on South Africa
preempts state and local actions requiring divestiture of
investments in companies doing business in or with South
Africa. Therefore, we must examine the recently enacted
federal legislation to determine whether it precludes such
state and local legislation. See Id. at 846 (discusses
preemption before enactment of Public Law 99-440).
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 provides that
no new investments can be made in South Africa, but it does
not include divestment as a measure to "undermine
apartheid." Nowhere in the Act is it stated that state and
local governments are precluded from enacting legislation in
this area. In addition, state and local actions requiring
divestiture would not seem to conflict with any provisions of
the anti-apartheid law. The purpose of the federal
legislation is to help bring an end to apartheid in South
Africa. There does not appear to be any persuasive reasons to
find that Congress has preempted the area concerning
legislation affecting South Africa, nor is there any evidence
that Congress intended to preclude state and local governments
from enacting divestiture legislation. We conolude that such
state and local actions do not contravene the purpose of the
federal law or impair its enforcement. Therefore, it is our
opinion that state and local legislation requiring divestiture
of investments in companies doing business in South Africa
would not violate the preemption doctrine, as derived from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI.
In summary, we conclude that the prudent person investment
standard of K.S.A. 74-4921(4)(a) does not permit the trustees
of KPERS to make divestiture decisions solely on the basis
of moral or political beliefs. It is also our opinion that,
even though federal legislation has been enacted applying
sanctions to the Republic of South Africa, the preemption
doctrine does not in this instance preclude state and local
governments from taking action requiring divestiture of
investments in companies doing business in South Africa.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Rita L. Noll
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:RLN:bas

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.