Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-029

1987-029Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL February 18 , 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 29
Jim Pringle
Sumner County Attorney
Sumner County Courthouse
Wellington, Kansas 67152-0497
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic; Rules of the Road; Serious
Traffic Offenses--Relevant Date for Suspension of
Drivers' License
Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Drivers' Licenses;
Habitual Violators--Suspension Date
Synopsis: The length of time that a driver's license is
suspended pursuant to a DUI conviction is
subject, to some degree, to judicial discretion.
Since in exercising that discretion the court may
rely on a presentence investigation, and such may
delay sentencing, the suspension does not become
effective until the order of suspension is made by
the court. If it were otherwise, the duration of
the suspension would in effect be shortened because
the driver, though convicted, is free to drive
until the court imposes such sanctions. In
addition, a person should be declared a habitual
violator when that person has been convicted of
specified offenses three times in a five-year
period. The date of sentencing, or the date the
division of motor vehicles receives notice of the
sentencing for the third offense, is not the
relevant time for determining whether a person is a
habitual violator under the provisions of the
statute. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-285;
8-1567; 21-4604; K.S.A. 22-3424.
Dear Mr. Pringle:
You have requested our opinion concerning the suspension of
drivers' licenses under the DUI statutes. Specifically, you
inquire first whether the effective date of suspension begins
at the time of conviction or at the time of sentencing.
Secondly, you inquire whether a person is to be certified as a
habitual violator pursuant to K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-285 when the
person has had three convictions within five years, but the
sentencing on the third conviction is not received by the
division of motor vehicles until after five years have passed
since the date of the first conviction. We will answer the
questions in the order they have been presented.
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs is a
misdemeanor. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1567. The penalties for
violations of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1567 are found in
subsections (d), (e) and (f) of that statute. Subsections (d)
and (e) both require that, upon conviction, the court shall
enter an order which suspends the person's driver's license.
The minimum length of time for which the license is to be
suspended is increased to correspond with the number of prior
convictions. Prior convictions are considered factors of the
penalty, not elements of the unlawful act. State v.
Helgeson, 235 Kan. 534 (1984).
The statute contemplates a degree of judicial discretion in
ordering the suspension of a driver's license. If the
conviction is the offender's first, then the suspension is to
be for one year or, in lieu thereof, for twenty-one days or
until an educational and treatment program is completed,
whichever is longer. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1567(d). If the
conviction is the offender's second, the suspension is to be
for one year or, in lieu thereof, for 120 days or until a
treatment program is completed, whichever is longer. K.S.A.
8-1567(e) 0 While suspension is mandatory, the duration of the
suspension is, to some extent, discretionary.
The statute does not require that sentencing take place on the
date of conviction. What is required is that sentencing take
place without unreasonable delay. K.S.A. 22-3424. K.S.A.
1986 Supp. 8-1567(i) requires that, prior to sentencing, the
court shall receive a record of the offender's prior
convictions. In addition, a presentence investigation is
optional, either at the request of the court, or at the
request of the defendant. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 21-4604(1). If
the accused has been convicted, but the penalty not yet
assessed, the suspension would not yet be effective and the
offender could legally operate a motor vehicle. If the time
of suspension were to be retroactively applied to the date of
conviction, then part of the suspension time would be
meaningless. The actual suspension time will have been
reduced by the number of days between conviction and
sentencing. It is therefore our opinion that the suspension
is to run from the date of the court order of suspension, and
not from the date of conviction.
You have also asked whether a person is to be certified as a
habitual violator pursuant to K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-285 when
that person has had three convictions within five years, but
the sentencing on the third conviction is not received by the
division of motor vehicles until after five years have passed
since the date of the first conviction. The term "habitual
violator" is defined in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-285 as a "person
who, within the immediately preceding five years, has been
convicted" three times of, violating specified offenses.
Actions to have a person declared a habitual violator are
civil, as opposed to criminal proceedings. State v. Boos,
232 Kan. 864 (1983). The fundamental rule of statutory
construction to be applied to civil statutes is that when the
purpose and intent of the legislature can be ascertained from
the statute, then that intent and purpose govern. Matter of
Estate of Estes, 239 Kan. 192 (1986). We believe that
the legislative intent is clear. When a person has been
three-times convicted of any of the enumerated offenses in
a period of five years, then that person may be declared a
habitual violator.
This construction of the statute renders the date of
sentencing of, or receipt of notice of the conviction by the
division of motor vehicles for, the third offense irrelevant.
Using the date of sentencing or certification rather than the
date of conviction would provide an incentive to defense
attorneys - in borderline cases to delay sentencing and
certification as long as possible in an effort to avoid the
habitual violator provisions.
The same argument might apply to using the conviction date as
the determinative event rather than the date the violation
occurred. However, such an argument is not supported. The
legislature has determined that the relevant event should be
the time of conviction. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-285. It is
therefore our opinion that a person should be certified as a
habitual violator when that person has been convicted of the
specified offenses three times in a five year period.
In conclusion, the length of time that a driver's license may
be suspended pursuant to a DUI conviction is subject, to
some degree, to judicial discretion. Since in the exercise of
that discretion the court may rely on a presentence
investigation, and such may delay sentencing, the suspension
does not become effective until the order of suspension is
made by the court. If it were otherwise, the duration of the
suspension would in effect be shortened because the driver,
though convicted, is free to drive until the court imposes
such sanctions. In addition, a person should be declared a
habitual violator when that person has been convicted of
specified offenses three times in a five-year period. The
date of sentencing, or the date the division of motor vehicles
receives notice of the sentencing for the third offense, is
not the relevant time for determining whether a person is a
habitual violator under the laws of the statute.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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