Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-002

1987-002Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORN EY GENERAL JanuHonorable 9, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 2
The HonDistrict. Frey
State Senator, Thirty-Eighth Dis	Constitution of the State
Liberal, Kansas 67901-1177
Re: ConstitutJusticesState Kansas--
Judicial--CompeSynopsis: TheJustices and Judges;
Certain Limitation
SynousedThe term "salaried officer of the state," as used• -inArticle3,Section13oftheKansas
Constitution, refers to any person holding a
salaried state office. Common law criteria set out
in Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 502
(1983) must be applied to determine whether a
person holding a specific state position is a state
officer. Cit K.S.A. 25-2505, 75-4301;
L. 1972, ch. 390 and Deartorator392,Kan. Const., Art.
1, S15; Kan. Const., Art. 3, §13.
3tor Frey:
You request our interpretation of Article 4you3 Section 13 of the Kansas Constitution. of the
Kansas Constitution. Specifically, yoterms a "salaried a "salaried
officer of the state" under the terSection to the aforesaid
constitutional provision.
Article 3, Seand compensation of justices and
judges, andJanuaryfollows:
"The justices of the supreme court and
judges of the district courts shall
receive for their services such
compensation as may be provided by law,
which shall not be diminished during
their terms of office, unless by general
law applicable to all salaried officers of
the state. Such justices or judges shall
receive no fees or perquisites nor hold
any other office of profit or trust under
the authority of the state, or the United
States except as may be provided by law,
or practice law during their continuance
in office." (Emphasis added.)
Article 1, Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution contains a
similar limitation relating to reduction of compensation
provided to executive officers enumerated in Article 1, to wit:
"The officers mentioned in this article
shall at stated times receive for their
services such compensation as is
established by law, which shall not be
diminished during their terms of office,
unless by general law applicable to all
salaried officers of the state. Any
person exercising the powers and duties of
an office mentioned in this article shall
receive the compensation established by
'law for that office." (Emphasis added.)
The underscored language in both the above-quoted
constitutional provisions was added by constitutional
amendments adopted in 1972. See L. 1972, ch. 390 and
392. Our research indicates that the limitation contained
within Article 3, Section 13 (as well as the same limitation
appearing within Article 1, Section 15) was extracted from the
Constitution of the State of Alaska, and it is therefore
appropriate to review court decisions interpreting the
identical language within that state's conttitution.
In Hudson v. Johnstone, 660 P.2d 1180 (Alaska 1983), the
Supreme Court of Alaska, in the course of interpreting the
phrase "term of office," discussed the purpose of the
proscription against diminishing the compensation of justices:
"To hold otherwise would, in our judgment,
vitiate the proscription against
diminishing the compensation of justices
and judges during their terms of office.
In discussing the compensation clause
found in article III, Section 1 of the
federal constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has noted:
"'The Compensation Clause has its roots in
the longstanding Anglo-Amercian
tradition of an independent Judiciary. A
Judiciary free from control by the
Executive and the Legislature is essential
if there is a right to have claims decided
by judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of
government. . . . Hamilton, in The
Federalist No. 79, p. 491 (1818) (emphasis
deleted), emphasized the importance of
protecting judicial compensation:'
"'"In the general course of human nature,
a power over a man's subsistence amounts
to a power over his will."'
"United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
217-18, 101 S.Ct. 471, 482, 66 L.Ed.2d
392, 407-08 (1980). That the drafters of
Alaska's constitution sought to insulate
the judiciary , from political pressure that
might interfere with its impartiality is
clear: 'There is no doubt that judicial
independence was a paramount concern of
the delegates . . . Buckalew v.
Holloway, 604 P.2d 240, 245 (Alaska
1979) (footnote omitted); see 1
Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention 586-602." 660 P.2d at
1184-1185.
In accordance with the above-quoted authority, it is our
opinion that the underlying purpose of the proscription
against diminishing judicial compensation was to assure an
independent judiciary. This purpose provides guidance as to
how the term "salaried officer of the state" should be
interpreted. Specifically, it is clear that the determination
of who is an officer must be made without reference to any
statutory definition (see, e.g., K.S.A. 25-2505(b) and
K.S.A. 75-4301), since use of any such method of construction
would enable the legislature to manipulate the concept of a
public office, thereby reducing the protection afforded to
justices under Article 3, Section 13. Accordingly, it is our
opinion the term "officer" in Article 3, Section 13 refers to
the common-law concept of a public officer. That concept was
discussed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Durflinger v.
Artiles, 234 Kan. 502 (1983), wherein the court held that
the Superintendent of Larned State Hospital was a public
officer (and that staff physicians at the hospital were not
officers):
"In Sowers v. Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 95
P.2d 281 (1939), this court was asked what
is a 'public office' and who is a 'public
officer'? 150 Kan. at 633. In response
the court answered:
"'While the authorities are not in
complete harmony in defining the term
"public office," or "public officer," it
universally has been held that the right
to exercise some definite portion of
sovereign power constitutes an
indispensable attribute of "public
office:" 150 Kan. at 633.
"See also Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan.
566, 572, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979). Two years
before Sowers, this court in Miller v.
Ottawa County Comm'rs, 146 Kan.
481, 71 P.2d 875 (1937), stated:
"'The distinction between an officer and
an employee is that the responsibility for
results is upon one and not upon the
other. There is also upon an officer the
power of direction, supervision and
control. The distinction between a public
officer and an employee is concisely made
in 22 R.C.L. 379, in the following
language:'
"'"A public officer is not the same thing
as a contract, and one contracting with
the government is in no just and proper
sense an officer of the government. The
converse is likewise true and an
appointment or election to a public office
does not establish a contract relation
between the person appointed or elected
and the public.'"
"'In 53 A.L.R. 595 it is stated:'
"'"It may be stated, as a general rule
deducible from the cases discussing the
question, that a position is a public
office when it is created by law, with
duties cast on the incumbent which involve
an exercise of some portion of the
sovereign power and in the performance of
which the public is concerned, and which
also are continuing in their nature and
not occasional or intermittent; while a
public employment, on the other hand, is a
position which lacks one or more of the
foregoing elements." (See, also, 93
A.L.R. 332.)' 146 Kan. at 484-85.
(Emphasis supplied.)"'
"See also 63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers
and Employees §11, p. 634, and generally
§§1-14; Annot., Distinction between
Office and Employment, 140 A.L.R. 1076;
and 35 Words and Phrases, Public Officer,
pp. 408-14 (1963).
"In 63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and
Employees §1, at p. 625, it is commented:
"'A public officer is such an officer as
is required by law to be elected or
appointed, who has a designation or title
given him by law, and who exercises "
functions concerning the public, assigned
to him by law. The duties of such officer
do not arise out of contract or depend for
their duration or extent upon the terms of
a contract.'
"Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979), has defined public office and
public official.
"'Public office. Essential
characteristics of "public office" are (1)
authority conferred by law, (2) fixed
tenure of office, and (3) power to
exercise some portion of sovereign
functions of government; key element of
such test is that "officer" is carrying
out sovereign function. Spring v.
Constantino, 168 Con.. 563, [568-69,]
362 A.2d 871, 875 [(1975)]. Essential
elements to establish public position as
"public office" are: position must be
created by constitution, legislature, or
through authority conferred by
legislature, portion of sovereign power of
government must be delegated to position,
duties and powers must be defined,
directly or impliedly, by legislature or
through legislative authority, duties must
be performed independently without control
of superior power other than law, and
position must have some permanency and
continuity. State v. Taylor, 260 Iowa
634, [639,] 144 N.W.2d 289, 292 [(1966)].
p. 1107.'
"'Public official. The holder of a
public office though not all persons in
public employment are public officials
because public official's position
requires the exercise of some portion of
the sovereign power, whether great or
small. Town of Arlington v. Bds. of
Conciliation and Arbitration, (370 Mass.
769), 352 N.E. 2d 914 [(1974)]. p. 1107.'
"In the case before us Dr. G. W. Getz,
superintendent of the Larned State
Hospital was granted summary judgment by
the trial court on the basis he wits a
public officer and hence immune from
liability. The 'Act of Obtaining Care and
Treatment for a Mentally Ill Person'
(K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2901 et f.f.a .)
placed many duties upon Dr. Getz as the
'head of the hospital.' Among such duties -.wereauthoritytodischargeamental
patient no longer in need of care or
treatment (K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2924);
discretionary authority to grant
convalescent leave to a patient (K.S.A.
1973 Supp. 59-2924); and authority to
command any peace officer or other person
to take into custody a patient who was
absent from the hospital without leave and
to transport same back to the institution
(K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 59-2926).
"By contrast no similar grants of
authority are given to staff physicians
who were part of the unclassified service
under the Kansas Civil Service Act (K.S.A.
1973 Supp. 76-12a03). K.S.A. 1973 Supp.
76-12a03 provided any physician could be
removed by the Director of Mental Health &
Retardation Services. Further, the
Director was empowered to make all
assignments and reassignments of
physicians to the institutions. The staff
doctors were under the control and
supervision of the head of the hospital,
Dr. Getz, and the Director of Mental
Health & Retardation Services. (K.S.A..
1973 Supp. 76-12a06.)
"In Jagger v. Green, 90 Kan. 153,
133 Pac. 174 (1913), Mr. Jagger had
been discharged from his position as a
field man for the Kansas City health
department on the rationale he was a
public officer rather than a government
employee and therefore not protected by
civil se rvice laws. Mr. Jagger brought
an action in mandamus to compel the Board
of Commissioners for Kansas City to
recognize his position was subject to
civil service. In holding for Mr.
Jagger this court commented: r ,
"'The health commissioner is the only
person connected with the department of
public health who holds a position
analogous to an office. The field men are
merely subordinate employees who work
under his direction and supervision and
for whose conduct he is responsible. . .
[Tillie field men possess no other authority
which rises to the dignity of corporate
power officially vested. It is not
important that the ordinance uses the term
"officers" in one place in speaking of the
appointees in the health department.
Considering the nature of the service, its
relative importance, its essentially
subservient character, and the placing of
responsibility for results upon a superior
who is given full power of direction,
supervision and control, it must be held
that the plaintiff was not a city officer
within the meaning of the statute just
referred to.'
"'Since the plaintiff is not one of the
appointive officers or employees excepted
from the operation of the civil service
act, he is entitled to claim the benefit
of its provisions.' 90 Kan. at 158.
"In Jones v. Botkin, 92 Kan. 242,
139 Pac. 1196 (1914), a nurse-cell
attendant at the state hospital for the
criminally insane, was fired by a warden.
The warden argued Jones was a public
officer serving at the warden's pleasure.
This court held Jones was a public
employee of the institution and
accordingly, protected by the civil
service act."
In accordance with the above-quoted authorities, it is our
opinion that the term "salaried office of the state," as used
in Article 3, Section 13 of the Kansas Constitution, refers to
any person holding a salaried state office. Common law
criteria set out in Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan.
502 (1983) must be applied to determine whether a person
holding a specific state position is a state officer.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:TRH:jm

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