Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-129

1986-129Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STE19 1-1AN
ATTORNEY GENERAL S eptember 10Marvin
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 129
The Honorable Marvin . Wm. Barkis
- State Representative, Fifteenth District
Route 2, Box 150
Louisburg, Kansas 66053
Re: Labor and Industries--Eight Hour Day on Public
Work--Enforcement of K.S.A. 44-201 et seq.
Synopsis: While the Kansas Supreme Court has not specifically
precluded the use of criminal sanctions to enforce
the eight-hour work day regulations found at
K.S.A. 44-201 et seq., it has precluded that
option for purposes of enforcing the wage rate
provisions of the act. The court has indicated a
preference for civil, as opposed to criminal,
methods of enforcement for the eight-hour work
day provisions as well. If it is a public official
who is in violation of K.S.A. 44-201 et seq.,
an action in mandamus may be brought to enforce the
act's provisions, though only by reference of the
attorney general or county attorney, or by any
citizen with a specific interest or right distinct
from that of the general public. If a contractor
is violating the statutes, a laborer might be able
to enforce those statutes through mandatory
injunction or a suit on the contract as third party
beneficiary. The Kansas Department of Human
Resources has no jurisdiction to adjudicate wage
claims based on violati44-202A. 44-201 et
seq. Cited herein: K.S.A. 44-201; 44-2STEPHAN
44-203; 44-204; 44-205; 75-6101; 7510,1986
*
Dear Representative Barkis:
You request our opinion regarding the enforceability of K.S.A.
44-201. This statute is one of five which attempt to set
forth and regulate the state's policy of eight-hour work
days and prevalent rate of pay for individuals performing
public work. K.S.A. 44-201, 44-203 and 44-204 provide the
standards to be followed, while K.S.A. 44-202 and 44-205
provide penalties for violations of those standards.
The parts of these statutes pertinent to our discussion appear
as follows:
"Eight hours shall constitute a day's work
for all laborers or other persons employed
by or on behalf of the state of Kansas or
any municipality of said state, except in
cases of extraordinary emergency which may
arise, in time of war, or in cases where
it may be necessary to work more than
eight hours per calendar day for the
protection of property or human life. . . .
Not less than the current rate of per diem
wages in the locality where the work is
performed shall be paid to laborers or
other persons so employed. . . .
"And laborers and other persons employed
by contractors or subcontractors in the
execution of any contract or contracts
with the state of Kansas or any
municipality thereof shall be deemed to be
employed by or on behalf of the state or
such municipality so far as the hours of
work and compensation herein provided are
concerned.
"That the contracts hereafter made by or
on behalf of the state of Kansas or by or
on behalf of any county, city, township or
other municipality of said state with any
corporation, person or persons which may
involve the employment of laborers,
workmen or mechanics, shall contain a
stipulation that no laborer, workman (31.mechanicintheemployofthecontractor,
subcontractor or other person doing or
contracting to do the whole or a part of
the work contemplated by the contract
shall be permitted or required to work
more than eight (8) hours in any one
calendar day except in cases of
extraordinary emergency (as defined in
this act); such contract shall contain a
provision that each laborer, workman or
mechanic employed by such contractor,
subcontractor or other person about or
upon such public work shall be paid the
wages herein provided: . . ." K.S.A.
44-201.
(K.S.A. 44-203 and 44-204 contain virtually the same
provisions as those found in K.S.A. 44-201).
"That any officer of the state of Kansas,
or of any county, city, township or
municipality of said state, or any person
acting under or for such officer, or any
contractor with the state of Kansas, or
any county, city, township or other
municipality thereof, or other person
violating any of the provisions of this
act, shall for each offense be punished by
a fine of not less than $50 nor more than
$1,000, or by imprisonment not more than
six months, or both fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court." K.S.A.
44-205.
(The provisions of K.S.A. 44-202 are contained within the
provisions of K.S.A. 44-205.)
At first blush, because of the criminal sanctions contained in
. K.S.A. 44-202 and 44-205, it may appear that the legislature
envisioned enforcement of K.S.A. 44-201 et seq. by the
state. This possibility was eliminated, however, by the
Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Blaser, 138 Kan. 447
(1933), at least insofar as the wage standards are concerned.
The court in Blaser held, in part, as follows:
"[F]irst, that the provision in the
statute to the effect that the contractor
should not pay less than the current rate
of per diem wages was not designed or
intended by the legislature to form the
basis of a criminal prosecution, but that
its purpose was to form the basis of
determining civil liability which might
grow out of the relations of the parties,
[and] second, if it were intended to
form the basis of criminal liability, it
is void for uncertainty, under the
authority of Connally v. General
Const. Co., [269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct.
126, 70 L.Ed.2d 322 (1926)] . . ." Id.
at 456. See also Anderson Constr.
Co. v. Weltmer, 224 Kan. 191, 193
(1978).
The court confined its holding to the provision dealing with
contractors, however, the opinion also discussed the
- application of K.S.A. 44-201 to contractors "or others" (138
Kan. at 450), which would include officers of the state or
•-any municipality thereof. The same reasoning would appear to
apply in either situation. The court did specifically narrow
its opinion to the wage provision. Blaser, 138 Kan. at
454-455. The court has not since held the eight-hour work
day provisions do not form the basis for criminal liability,
but has indicated that civil remedies are preferable to
penal. See Blaser, 138 Kan. 447; State v. Ottawa,
84 Kan. 100, 105 (1911). Further, all of the appellate
court cases dealing with K.S.A. 44-201 et seq.
subsequent to Blaser have been civil, rather than
criminal, actions.
It is possible that the provisions of K.S.A. 44-201 et
!2a . may be enforced via a writ of mandamus, however the
scope of that remedy has been limited by the Supreme Court of
Kansas:
"The rule that private citizens without
interest or rights distinct from those of
other citizens cannot maintain an action
in mandamus to compel public officials to
perform their duty is well-established
in this jurisdiction.
"Long ago in Bobbett v. State ex rel.
Dresher, 10 Kan. 9, we held:
'Mandamus will not lie at the
instance of a private citizen to
compel the performance of a purely
public duty.
.to
*4.
'Such a suit must be brought in the
name of the state, and the county
attorney and the attorney general are
the officers authorized to use the name
of the state in legal proceedings to
enforce the performance of public
duties.
'Where a private citizen sues out a
mandamus he must show an interest
specific and peculiar in himself, and
not one that he shares with the com-
munity in general.' (Syl. §§1, 2
and 3.)"
Dennis v. State Board of Barber
Examiners, 174 Kan. 561, 563 (1953).
,In Topeka Bldg. and Construction Trades Council v.
Leahy, 187 Kan. 112 (1960), the court held that an
unincorporated association composed of the unincorporated
trade unions whose individual members were engaged in the
building and construction trades in Shawnee County did not
have standing to bring an action in mandamus to enforce K.S.A.
44-201 and 44-203 because the association had no special
interest in any duties or rights provided in those statutes
distinct from those of other private citizens. However,
neither Leahy nor Dennis held that a citizen with an
interest or right distinct from those of other citizens could
not maintain mandamus to compel compliance with K.S.A. 44-201
et seq. Both cases indicate that mandamus is ordinarily
to be brought by the state on relation of the attorney general
or the county attorney, but neither denies the appropriateness
of an action in mandamus brought by a private citizen with
special interest in the matter. See Leahy, 187 Kan.
at 114; Dennis, 174 Kan. at 563.
One of the problems with enforcement of K.S.A. 44-201 et
seq. by mandamus occurs when the contractor has a
contractual provision as required by the statutes but is not
implementing it. The Court in Leahy, 187 Kan. 112,
held, in addition to the fact that the plaintiffs in that case
had no standing to maintain an action in mandamus, that the
statutes do not provide for any plain legal duty which may be
controlled by mandamus in that situation. An action in
mandamus is brought to compel a public officer to perform an
act which is mandated by law. Mandamus will not lie for the
performance of an act involving discretion on the part of a
public official. The court in Leahy found that the Fish
and Game Commission, the public official involved therein, had
no mandatory duty to determine the contract was being violated
by the contractor, and further, even if the Commission did
find a violation, it had no mandatory duty to file suit. Both
decisions were thus held to be discretionary and not
controllable by mandamus. Leahy, 187 Kan. at 116.
In a situation such as that described above, where the
contractor, rather than the public official, is violating the
law, one possible alternative a laborer may have to compel the
contractor to comply with K.S.A. 44-201 et seq. would be
an action for mandatory injunction. "A mandatory injunction
is an extraordinary remedial process resorted to usually for
the purpose of effectuating full and complete justice, and
commands the performance of some positive act." Prophet v.
-Builders, Inc., 204 Kan. 268, 273 (1969). However, the
court has consistently held that:
"[a] mandatory injunction is rarely
granted. The case must be an extreme one
to authorize its issue. It is universally
restricted to cases where a court of law
cannot grant adequate relief, or where
full compensation cannot be made in
damages." Cave v. Henley, 125 Kan.
214, 218 (1928) [quoting from A.T. & S.F.
Rld. Co. v. Long, 46 Kan. 701 (1891)].
"A party seeking a mandatory injunction must clearly be
entitled to such decree before it will be rendered."
Prophet, 204 Kan. at 273. See also Clawson v.
Garrison, 3 Kan. App.2d 188, 195-196 (1979). Because the
court has found the wage requirements of K.S.A. 44-201 et
seq. to be somewhat indefinite, see State v. Blazer,
138 Kan. 447 (1933), an order of mandatory injunction to
compel compliance with such requirements may be difficult to
obtain.
A second possibility for enforcement in this particular
situation is an action in common law contract brought by the
laborer as a third party beneficiary. The contract entered
into by the state or municipality and the contractor is to
provide for compliance with K.S.A. 44-201 et seq . This
contractual agreement might be argued to be in part for the
benefit of the laborers, etc. working for the contractor on
the public project. Thus, a laborer might be able to argue
that he or she stands as a third party or creditor beneficiary
of the contract.
We should note that an action in tort against a public
official for damages resulting from violations of K.S.A.
44-201 et seq. would appear to be precluded by the
Kansas tort claims act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., which
provides:
"[a] governmental entity or an employee
acting within the scope of the employee's
employment shall not be liable for damages
resulting from:. . .
"(c) enforcement of or failure to enforce
a law. . . ." K.S.A. 75-6104.
Finally, you correctly point out that the Kansas Department of
-Human Resources has no authority to investigate and adjudicate
wage claims arising under K.S.A. 44-201 et seq. R.D.
.Anderson Constr. Co. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources,
7 Kan. App.2d 453 (1982).
In conclusion, while the Kansas Supreme Court has not
specifically precluded the use of criminal sanctions to
enforce the eight-hour work day regulations found at K.S.A.
44-201 et seq., it has precluded that option for
purposes of enforcing the wage rate provisions of the act.
The court has indicated a preference for civil, as opposed to •
criminal, methods of enforcement for the eight-hour work day
provisions as well. If it is a public official who is in
violation of K.S.A. 44-201 et seq., an action in
mandamus may be brought to enforce the act's provisions,
though only by reference of the attorney general or county
attorney, or by any citizen with a specific interest or right
distinct from that of the general public. If a contractor is
violating the statutes, a laborer might be able to enforce
those statutes through mandatory injunction or a suit on the
-contract as third party beneficiary. The Kansas Department of
Human Resources has no jurisdiction to adjudicate wage claims
based on violations of K.S.A. 44-201 et sec'.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of-Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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