Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-029

1986-029Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 4, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 29
The Honorable Joseph F. Norvell
State Senator, Thirty-Seventh District
Room 452-E, State Capitol
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Taxation--Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax--Tax
Imposed; Interstate Commerce
Synopsis: The issue of whether a state or local sales tax
imposed on interstate long-distance telephone
calls violates the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution has not yet been addressed by
the United States Supreme Court. However,
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977) and
subsequent cases indicate that such a tax may be
upheld if: 1) the tax is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; 2)
the tax is fairly apportioned; 3) the tax does not
discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4)
the tax is fairly related to the services provided
by the state. Cited herein: U. S. Const., Art.
§8, cl. 3.
Dear Senator Norvell:
You have requested our opinion regarding the
constitutionality of a state imposed sales tax on interstate
long-distance telephone services. Specifically, you
question whether such a tax would violate the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3.
This particular issue has not yet been addressed by the
United States Supreme Court. Early decisions of the Court
indicated that a tax on a business engaged in interstate
commerce would not be upheld. Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 128 U.S. 39, 9 S.Ct. 6, 32 L.Ed. 345
(1888), held that "[t]he interstate business of a telegraph
company is not subject to state taxation in any way," because
"[a] state cannot regulate or tax the operations or objects
of interstate or foreign comerce." See also, Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Seay, 132 U.S. 472, 473, 10 S.Ct.
161, 33 L.Ed. 409 (1889) and Cooney v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384, 392, 393, 55
S.Ct. 477, 79 L.Ed. 934 (1935). This holding has gradually
been eroded, however, by cases such as Freeman v. Hewitt,
329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265 (1946), which hold
that a state could tax interstate commerce "to make such
commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local
government whose protection it enjoys." Id. at 253.
More recently, the Court has determined that a state tax on
interstate commerce will be sustained "when the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d
326 (1977). See also, Washington Rev. Dept. v.
Stevedoring Assn., 435 U.S. 734, 98 S.Ct. 1388, 55 L.Ed.2d
682 (1978). In examining this four-part test, several cases
and law review articles provide insight as to what
circumstances will be sufficient to meet each of the four
parts. For example,
"[T]he nexus requirement demands a more
specific relationship than the generation
of income within the state to the
interstate business; nexus instead
demands that the state somehow provide a
service to the business, a service which
so far has been found to be present when
there is at least one employee in the
state." 42 La.L.Rev. 951, 969 (1982).
In Stevedoring Assn., supra, the Supreme Court held
that the tax challenged therein was fairly apportioned
because it was levied solely on the value of the in-state
stevedoring activities of loading and unloading ships'
cargo. The Court then defined as nondiscriminatory those
taxes which apply the same rates to interstate business as to
intrastate business. It has since been pointed out, however,
that "Waxes may discriminate against interstate commerce
either because they are computed on discriminatory bases or
because their 'economic incidence falls disproportionately on
interstate activities.'" 1982 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 765, 772
(1982), citing The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv.
L.Rev. 70, 78-81 (1977).
Finally, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981), the Court
answered the fair relation requirement by asking whether the
state has given anything for which it might ask return, and
adopting "a per se rule that any tax the amount of which is
determined as a percentage of the value of the taxpayer's
activities in the state is 'fairly related to the services
provided by the state.'" 1982 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 765, 774
(1982), quoting Commonwealth Edison, supra.
At least two state courts have upheld a sales tax on
interstate telephone calls originating in and billed to
telephones within the taxing area. In Douglas v. Glacier
State Tel. Co., 615 P.2d 580 (Alaska 1980), the plaintiffs
brought an action over the imposition of local sales taxes on
long distance phone calls charged to phones within the taxing
unit, which in this case was the Kenai Peninsula Borough.
The challenged ordinances read as follows:
"There is levied a consumers' sales tax
of three percent on all retail sales, on
all rents, and on all services made or
rendered within the Borough, measured by
the gross sales price of the seller."
Kenai Peninsula Borough Book of
Ordinances, Sec. 25.10.05;
"'Services' includes all services of
every manner and description which are
performed or furnished for compensation,
except services rendered to an employer
by an employee, including but not limited
to:
"(C) Utilities and utility services not
constituting a sale of personal property,
including sewer, water, electrical and
telephone services and repair." Sec.
25.10.030(7);
and
"The obligation of the tax is upon the
buyer. The seller shall collect the tax
at the time of sale. Collection is
enforceable by the seller as a certified
tax collector of the Borough: provided,
however, that this shall not limit the
liability of the buyer to the Borough."
Sec. 25.10.010.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the tax did not violate
the Commerce Clause, finding that the plaintiffs "failed to
meet their burden of showing that a palpable risk of multiple
taxation, constituting a burden on interstate phone
communications beyond its fair share of supporting local
services, [would] result from validating this tax."
Douglas, supra, at 588. The court noted further that
"taxes based on charges to phones located within a state
could be enacted in all states without taxing the same phone
call twice in any instance, and to the extent that the
charges for long-distance calls reflect the value of
services rendered outside the Borough, we consider that
burden on interstate commerce to be too attenuated to
invalidate a practical scheme of local taxation not otherwise
shown to discriminate against interstate transactions."
Id. at 588, n. 17.
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has also held that a sales
tax imposed on interstate telephone calls originating in
Wisconsin and billed to Wisconsin telephones did not
impermissibly burden interstate commerce in violation of the
commerce clause. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Wisconsin Dept.
of Rev., 371 N.W.2d 825 (1985), involved a sales tax
statute which read as follows:
"For the privilege of selling, performing
or furnishing the services described
under par. (a) at retail in this state
to consumers or users, a tax is imposed
upon all persons selling, performing or
furnishing the services at the rate of *
* * 5% of the gross receipts from the
sale, performance or furnishing of the
services * * *.
"(a) The tax imposed herein applies to
the following types of services:
"4. The sale of telephone services of
whatever nature including, in addition to
services connected with voice
communication, any services connected
with the transmission of sound, vision,
information, data or material other than
by voice communication, and connection
move and change charges, except services
paid for by insertion of coins in a coin-
operated telephone and except
interstate service, unless that
interstate service originates from and
is charged to a telephone located in
the state." Wis. Stat. Ann.
§77.52(2)(a)(4).
Applying the four-part Complete Auto Transit test, the
court found as follows: Wisconsin had a sufficient nexus
with the telephone service sales, in that the buyers and
sellers of the services were all located in Wisconsin and the
placing of the call and subsequent billing occurred in
Wisconsin; the same factors showed the impracticality of
another state imposing a tax on the services, thus reducing
the possibility of multiple taxation and unfair
apportionment; the tax did not discriminate against
interstate commerce because interstate and intrastate
activities were placed on equal footing; and the measure of
the tax was reasonably related to services provided by the
state in that the telephone companies were all "incorporated,
organized, or doing a substantial share of their business in
Wisconsin." 371 N.W.2d at 829-831.
Neither of these cases was appealed any further than the
state supreme court. As yet, the United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue of whether a state or local sales
tax imposed on interstate long distance telephone calls is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Complete Auto
Transit and subsequent cases appear to indicate, however,
that such a tax would be upheld if the four parts of the test
are met. Thus, it is our opinion that if the tax is applied
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the state, it will not violate the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:JLM:jm

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