Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-004

1986-004Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL January 13, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 4
Douglas Lancaster
City Prosecutor
City of Fairway
Suite 1000, One Glenwood Place
9300 Metcalf
Overland Park, Kansas 66212
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Kansas Criminal Code;
Preliminary -- Effect of Former Prosecution
Synopsis: Under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3108(4)(c), a
second prosecution in a municipal court is not
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, after a trial de novo is dismissed
at the district court level. A defendant who
elects to be tried de novo is in the same
position as a convicted defendant who successfully
appeals. Both Kansas law and United States Supreme
Court decisions provide that such circumstances
clearly allow a successive trial. As a result, the
case may be reprosecuted in municipal court, for
the defendant's election to exercise his right to a
de novo trial has the effect of wiping out the
earlier judgment. Cited herein: K.S.A. 21-3108;
22-3609.
Dear Mr. Lancaster:
As prosecutor for the City of Fairway, you request our opinion
on a question of double jeopardy which has arisen in the
Municipal Court of the City of Fairway. Specifically, you
inquire whether, under the facts of the case, a second
prosecution in the municipal court is barred by K.S.A.
21-3108. You state that the defendant was charged with a
violation of a municipal ordinance in the lower court, and was
found guilty. On appeal to the Johnson County District Court
pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3609, defendant's
motion to dismiss was sustained. You inform us that the
district court refused to reinstate the case, and that no
appeal was taken in light of the Kansas Supreme Court decision
of City of Wichita v. Horechans, 184 Kan. 297 (1959), by
which the district court appeared to have the necessary
discretion to dismiss the case. The case was then refiled in
municipal court, and defense counsel now asserts that a second
prosecution of the case is barred under K.S.A. 21-3108.
K.S.A. 21-3108 deals with the effect of a former prosecution,
and states:
"(4) A prosecution is not barred under
this section:
"(c) If subsequent proceedings resulted
in the invalidation, setting aside,
reversal or vacating of the conviction,
unless the defendant was adjudged not
guilty."
Thus, under this statute, a second prosecution is not barred
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, if the
effect of subsequent proceedings is to invalidate, set aside,
reverse or vacate the earlier conviction. Defense counsel
appears to argue that because his client has been placed once
in jeopardy and convicted, the city may not retry him in
municipal court after his trial de novo was dismissed. We
cannot agree with this argument. In our opinion, a defendant
who elects to be tried de novo is in the same position as
a convicted defendant who successfully appeals. Under these
circumstances, it long has been clear that the State may
reprosecute if the verdict is reversed, set aside, etc.
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 41 L.Ed 300, 16 S.Ct.
1192 (1896).
In the case at hand, defendant's election to exercise his
right to a trial de novo had the effect of reversing or
setting aside his original conviction; as a result, the
requirements for a second prosecution under K.S.A.
21-3108(4)(c) were met. This reprosecution must necessarily
take place in the municipal court, since the district court
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and refused to
reinstate it. Although the case has already been tried in the
lower court, we find a successive trial is not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause, because the effect of the defendant's
election to exercise his right to a de novo trial was to
wipe out the earlier judgment in the municipal court. Thus,
any new prosecution of defendant will not place him in
jeopardy a second time for the same offense.
Although no Kansas cases have been found addressing the issue
of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial in a
municipal court after a trial de novo is dismissed,
several United States Supreme Court cases are relevant. In
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 463 U.S.
80 L.Ed.2d 311, 104 S.Ct. (1984), the Supreme Court
reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals. That court had
agreed with the federal district court that the trial de
novo of respondent Lydon, pursuant to Massachusetts'
"two-tiered" system for trying minor crimes, would violate
his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same
crime. The Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 49 L.Ed.2d 732, 96
S.Ct. 2781 (1976), stating:
"'A defendant who elects to be tried de
novo in Massachusetts is in no different
position than is a convicted defendant who
successfully appeals on the basis of the
trial record and gains a reversal of his
conviction and a remand of his case for a
new trial. Under these circumstances, it
long has been clear that the State may
reprosecute. United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, 41 L.Ed.300, 16 S.Ct. 1192
(1896).' 427 U.S. at 631-32." 80 L.Ed.2d
at 322.
Thus, the Ludwig decision was dispositive of the double
jeopardy issue in the Lydon case. The court concluded
that a successive trial for a defendant who elects to be tried
de novo is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Following this reasoning, we find a
reprosecution in municipal court, after defendant has chosen
to proceed in a trial de novo in the district court,
violates no constitutional guarantees.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 89 S.Ct 2056 (1969),
the Supreme Court held that this guarantee is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Supreme Court
cases have recognized three separate guarantees embodied in
the Double Jeopardy Clause: It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
against multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois
v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 65 L.Ed.2d 228, 100 S.Ct. 2260
(1980). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not an
absolute bar to successive trials. The general rule is that
the clause does not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose
conviction is overturned on appeal. United States v. Ball,
supra. As noted earlier in this opinion, the Ludwig
case placed a defendant who elects to be tried de novo in
the same position as a convicted defendant who successfully
appeals; thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause also does not bar
reprosecution of a defendant who chooses a trial de novo.
Further, in Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L.Ed. 300, 90
S.Ct. 1757 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized that the
concept of "continuing jeopardy" is implicit in the Ball
rule permitting retrial after reversal of a conviction. See
also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 95
S.Ct. 1779 (1975). That principle "has application where
criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their
full course." Id., at 326, 26 L.Ed.2d 300, 90 S.Ct. 1757.
Interests supporting the continuing jeopardy principle involve
fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited waiver.
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 329, N.4, 26 L.Ed.2d 300, 90
S.Ct. 1757.
We concur with the Supreme Court that acquittals, unlike
convictions, terminate the right to further proceedings.
However, the City of Fairway is not attempting to convict a
defendant after acquittal. Rather, it is trying to
reprosecute a defendant who is in the same position as one
whose conviction has been overturned on appeal. In our
opinion, jeopardy was not terminated with the appeal, but
rather continued at the district court level. In the words of
the court of appeals dissent in the Lydon case (which the
Supreme Court noted with approval):
"'While technically [the defendant] is
"tried again," the second state proceeding
can be regarded as but an enlarged,
fact-sensitive part of a single,
continuous course of judicial proceedings
during which, sooner or later, a defendant
receives more--rather than less--of
the process normally extended to criminal
defendants in this nation.' 698 F.2d,
at 12 (Campell, J., dissenting)."
Thus, defendant was never placed twice in jeopardy. Further,
we note that the defendant was in jeopardy at the municipal
court level in only a theoretical sense. In the words of the
Lydon court:
"Although technically 'jeopardy' under the
Double Jeopardy Clause entails the
'potential or risk of trial and
conviction, not punishment,' Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S., at 329, 26 L.Ed.2d
300, 90 S Ct 1757, it is worthy of note
that virtually nothing can happen to a
defendant at a first-tier trial that he
cannot avoid. He has an absolute right to
obtain the de novo trial, and he need
not allege error at the first-tier trial
to do so. Once the right to de novo
trial is exercised, the judgment at the
bench trial is 'wiped out.' Mann v.
Commonwealth, 359 Mass 661 (1971)." 80
L.Ed.2d at 326.
Therefore, the fact that the defendant had an absolute right
to obtain the de novo trial meant he was never really
placed in jeopardy twice. No matter what the outcome of the
lower court decision, defendant was guaranteed an automatic
new trial in the district court.
We believe the two-tiered system affords benefits to
defendants which are unavailable in traditional court
systems. In the Kansas system, a defendant is given two
opportunities to be acquitted on the facts. If he is
acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried. See
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, supra. If convicted, he may then
choose to invoke his right to trial de novo and once again
put the prosecution to its proof. In return, the prosecution
should be guaranteed the opportunity to retry the case, once
the defendant's request for a de novo trial is granted.
If the district court dismisses the case and refuses to
reinstate it, the prosecutor is free to refile the case in the
municipal court.
In conclusion, under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3108(4)(c), a
second prosecution in a municipal court is not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, after a trial
de novo is dismissed at the district court level. A
defendant who elects to be tried de novo is in the same
position as a convicted defendant who successfully appeals.
Both Kansas law and United States Supreme Court decisions
provide that such circumstances clearly allow a successive
trial. As a result, the case may be reprosecuted in
municipal court, for the defendant's election to exercise his
right to a de novo trial has the effect of wiping out the
earlier judgment.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:BPA:crw

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