Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-047

1985-047Kanag

Full text

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
May , 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 47
Stan Martin
Law Offices of Martin, Hoffman & McNish
325 Broadway
Abilene, Kansas 67410
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Franchises -- Granting
Franchises; Elections on Ordinance
Synopsis: A popular election, held pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2001,
at which the voters disapprove a city ordinance
renewing a franchise with a natural gas company
renders the ordinance in question void and without
effect. The company in question, however, may
continue to provide services and the city may continue
to accept services according to the terms of the
expired franchise under a theory of implied contract.
Popular disapproval of an ordinance granting a
franchise to a company does not prevent a city
governing body from approving a new ordinance which
grants a somewhat different franchise to the same
company Cited herein: K.S.A. 12-801, 12-2001,
12-2002.
Dear Mr. Martin:
As attorney for the City of Herington, you have requested our
opinion regarding the effect of a recent election held in
Herington. Specifically, you inquire if the result of the
election, which dealt with the granting of a franchise to a
natural gas utility, prevents the utility from operating in the
city.
You inform us that the city governing body recently approved an
ordinance renewing the franchise held by Greeley Gas Company to
operate in Herington. The franchise in question was granted and
renewed pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2001(1), which authorizes the
governing body of any city to permit any person, firm or
corporation to:
"Manufacture, sell and furnish artificial or
natural gas, light and heat; electric light,
water, power or heat; or steam heat to the
inhabitants."
The statute requires that all contracts granting such a right or
renewing an existing right to engage in such activity be made by
city ordinance. Such an ordinance must be read in full at three
regular meetings of the governing body and twice published in the
official city newspaper before taking effect. During this
period, if a petition is presented which is signed by an
appropriate number of voters seeking a popular election on the
ordinance, the ordinance must be submitted for approval at a
special election.
All of this occurred in Herington and at the election the voters
disapproved the ordinance renewing the franchise of Greeley Gas
Company. You inquire about the effect of this result and, in
particular, ask whether Greeley Gas Company lawfully may continue
to operate in the city.
K.S.A. 12-2001 clearly provides:
"If a majority of votes cast at the special
election are against the ordinance and the
making of the grant, the ordinance shall not
confer any rights, powers or privileges of any
kind whatsoever upon the applicants therefore
and shall be void." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it appears that the Herington city ordinance renewing
Greeley Gas Company's franchise to operate in the city is void.
The renewal ordinance does not confer any rights or privileges
upon the gas company; thus the company has no authority to
operate in the city under the renewed franchise.
We assume, however, that the City of Herington has not been
without natural gas service since the date of the election.
Presumably Greeley Gas has continued to supply the city and the
city residents have continued to enjoy and pay for the service.
Thus, both Greeley Gas and the city have continued to enjoy the
benefits of the original franchise agreement. In the absence of
specific plans to provide natural gas service or to replace
Greeley Gas with another franchisee, we do not know how the
situation could be any different. We doubt that the legislature
intended the disapproval of a renewal ordinance at a popular
election held pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2001 to require abrupt
cessation of services by the current franchisee, particularly if
such cessation would leave the city without the service provided
by the franchisee. This is especially true in the case of
franchises to companies which provide such basic and essential
services such as heat, water and light.
It is a general rule that a company which continues to operate in
a city after a franchise expires does so under an implied
contract. The Kansas Supreme Court has noted that generally,
upon the expiration of a municipal franchise granted to a utility,
there is no longer any contractual relationship between the city
and the utility. This would be the case in Herington, where the
original franchise to Greeley Gas has expired and the renewal
ordinance has been defeated at popular election. In Baker v.
City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 328, 332 (1982), however, the court
noted that an exception to the general rule occurs when:
. . . the parties to the franchise
agreement continue to perform after the
expiration of the franchise in the same manner
as they did when the franchise was still
formally in effect."
In such a case an implication arises that the parties have
assented to a new Contract containing the same provisions as the
old contract. The court continued:
"A number of decisions have applied this
principle to contractual relationships
existing between municipalities and
franchisees, when both continue to accept
benefits and burdens of the franchise after
the term of the franchise has expired. In
Incorporated Town of Pittsburg v. Cochrane,
195 Okla. 593, 159 P.2d 534 (1945), the
plaintiff was a holder of a franchise granted
by a city under which the franchise holder was
to furnish water and lights to the inhabitants
of the town for a period of twenty years.
After the expiration of the twenty-year term,
neither party did anything to continue or
discontinue their relationship. The utility
continued to furnish water and lights and
the town inhabitants continued to pay for such
services. The utility defaulted on its taxes,
and Cochrane acquired the utility's property
at a sheriff's sale. The city brought an
action to enjoin Cochrane from removing the
assets of the utility. The court held that
Cochrane acquired no greater rights than the
original franchise holder, and that the
utility's assets could not be removed without
first giving the town reasonable notice in
which to obtain a new water system. The court
stated in effect that the contractual
relationship that existed prior to the
expiration of the express franchise continued
on the same terms and conditions after the
date of expiration and said:
"'If after termination of the franchise the
company continues to furnish and the town
accepts the service, an implied contract of
indefinite duration arises and the company
functions as a quasi-public utility subject to
the terms of the former franchise and the
rules and regulations of the Corporation
Commission. Such arrangement may be
terminated by either party by the giving of
such reasonable notice as would be consistent
with the duty owed by both to the inhabitants
of the town. See Ann 112 A.L.R. 635, 43
Am.Jur. Sec. 79, page 622' pp. 596-597.
(Emphasis added.)" Id. at 332-333.
See also McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §34.51; City of
Richmond v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 205 Va. 919, 140
S.E.2d 683 (1965).
While the situation in Herington is not entirely the same as that
presented in the Baker v. City of Topeka case, we believe the
implied contract reasoning expressed therein is apropos in
justifying the continued operation of Greeley Gas in the city.
In our opinion, the voters did not reject anything more than the
ordinance renewing the franchise with Greeley. We understand the
renewed franchise contained some terms which differ from the
original franchise. The defeat of the renewal ordinance should
not be assumed to affect the validity of the original franchise
agreement. Thus, the implied contract theory serves to permit
the parties to continue to function under the terms of the
original franchise, even though its term has expired.
We assume, however, that both the city and the company would
prefer to operate on a more substantial footing, which raises the
question of what should happen next. You inform us that the city
governing body has no plans to either offer the franchise to
others or attempt to maintain a city-run utility pursuant to
K.S.A. 12-801 et seq. Neither option appears to be especially
practical as Greeley Gas owns the facilities and transmission
lines necessary to serve Herington. Thus, exercise of either
option would require the acquisition of Greeley's facilities or
the construction of new facilities at some considerable expense.
In addition, Kansas case law and K.S.A. 12-2002 make it clear
that the presence of a franchise granted under K.S.A. 12-2001
does not affect the authority of the Kansas Corporation
Commission to regulate public utilities, and thereby to deny a
utility's application for a certificate of convenience and
necessity. City of New Strawn v. Kansas Corporation Commission,
5 Kan. App.2d 630, 634-35 (1981). The facts present here raise
the question of whether a new utility could obtain appropriate
approval from the KCC.
In our opinion, however, the voters of Herington have rejected
only the ordinance renewing Greeley's franchise, and the vote
should not be construed as a rejection of the original franchise
nor of Greeley Gas Company as an entity. Therefore, we cannot
perceive any obstacle to the city's passing a different franchise
ordinance which renews the city's natural gas franchise with
Greeley Gas. While the city has some obligation to attempt to
alter the terms of any new franchise, in light of the voters'
earlier rejection, the city is under no obligation to refuse to
offer the franchise to Greeley Gas.
We conclude that a popular election held pursuant to K.S.A.
12-2001 at which the voters disapprove a city ordinance renewing
a franchise for a natural gas utility renders the ordinance in
question void and without effect. However, the company in
question is not thereby prohibited from operating in the city,
and the company may continue to provide, and the city may
continue to accept, service according to the terms of the expired
franchise under a theory of implied contract. Popular
disapproval of an ordinance offering a franchise to a company
will not prevent the city governing body from adopting a new
ordinance granting a somewhat different franchise to the same
company.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary Y. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
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