Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-161

1983-161Kanag

Full text

November 9, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 161
Lyndus Henry
Johnson County Counselor
Johnson County Courthouse
Olathe, Kansas 66061
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Public Improve-
ments -- Sewer Districts; Assessment of the Cost
of Construction of Improvements
Synopsis: 1983 House Bill No. 2010 authorizes the govern-
ing body of any sewer district to provide, by
resolution, for the delay of the assessment of
the actual cost incurred in the construction of
improvements except for the cost of interest on
temporary notes issued for the improvement.
During each year of the delay, the governing body
of the district is required to levy a special
assessment against the tangible taxable property
within the sewer district in an amount suffici-
ent to pay the cost of the interest on the tem-
porary notes.
The bill makes no distinction between outstanding
accrued interest and interest to be accrued in
the future and requires that the cost of the in-
terest on the temporary notes be recovered during
the delay period. In light of the legislative
intent expressed by the history of 1983 House
Bill No. 2010, it is our opinion the bill requires
that the amount of interest accrued on temporary
notes issued to finance any sewer improvement
project, whether such interest accrued on tempor-
ary notes issued before the adoption of the "de-
lay resolution" or during the period of delay, be
paid by the end of the delay period. This inter-
est may be calculated and paid over the delay
period, by means of equal annual assessments
against the tangible taxable property in the
district.
Pursuant to 1983 House Bill No. 2010, the govern-
ing board of a sewer district may provide for a
delay of assessment of costs for a period not to
exceed 10 years. Under the language of the bill
a 10 year delay is not mandatory and the governing
body may include provisions in a resolution adopted
under H.B. 2010 providing for cessation of the de-
lay period upon the occurrence of one or more pre-
scribed contingencies.
1983 House Bill No. 2010 §1(b) requires the govern-
ing body of a sewer district to hold a hearing on
the proposed special assessments in the first year
of the delay. In each year thereafter, the govern-
ing body is required to apportion the cost of in-
terest on the basis it determines and levy a special
assessment for such interest. No hearing is re-
quired on such assessments after the first year of
the delay period. Cited herein: 1983 House Bill
No. 2010 (L. 1983, ch. 89).
Dear Mr. Henry:
As Johnson County Counselor and on behalf of the Board of
County Commissioners of Johnson County, you have requested
an opinion from this office on the application of 1983
House Bill No. 2010 (L. 1983, ch. 89) to the Blue River
Main Sewer District No. 1 in Johnson County, Kansas.
We understand that in January, 1981, the Board of County
Commissioners first apportioned the costs of the Blue River
Sewer District to the landowners within the district. After
this action, various landowners in the district filed law-
suits against the Board challenging the amount and method-
ology of the assessment. Because of this litigation and
various other factors, the Board has not completed a final
apportionment of the costs of the district. You indicate
that by the end of 1983 the interest accrued on temporary
notes issued to finance the costs of the project in the
district will be approximately $1,300,000. You also have
assured us that information sought in this opinion request
does not pertain to or affect "issues threatened, pending
or scheduled for determination by the courts" in the pre-
sently pending litigation relating to this sewer district.
The legislative history of 1983 House Bill No. 2010 clearly
indicates the bill was proposed and passed in response to
the difficulties which Johnson County has encountered in
assessing the cost of improvements in the Blue River Main
Sewer District. The bill, a product of the House Committee
on Local Government, provides that the governing body of any
sewer district may delay the assessment of the actual cost
incurred in the construction of improvements for a period of
up to 10 years. During each year of the delay period, the
governing body is required to levy a special assessment upon
the property in the sewer district sufficient to pay the cost
of interest on the temporary notes issued to finance the im-
provement project. The legislative history further indicates
that this bill was offered, along with several other proposals
which were not passed, to respond to the financing and assess-
ment difficulties encountered in the Blue River District and
to provide some flexibility in resolving those difficulties.
See Minutes of the House Committee on Local Government,
January 19, 1983; March 3, 1983.
You first inquire whether all interest which has accrued on
the temporary notes to the date of action under 1983 House
Bill No. 2010 must be collected over the period of the delay
and, if so, may such accrued interest be collected in equal
installments over the delay period?
1983 House Bill No. 2010, in Section 1, provides:
"(a) The governing body of any sewer district
may provide, by resolution, for the delay of
the assessment of the actual cost incurred in
the construction of improvements except for
the cost of interest on temporary notes'
issued therefor. The delay may not exceed a
period of 10 years. The resolution shall
state the period for which the delay is
granted and a certified copy of the resolution
shall be filed with the register of deeds.
No fee shall be charged for the filing and
the register shall record and index the reso-
lution."
"During the period of delay, the governing
body annually shall levy a special assessment
against the tangible taxable property within
the district in an amount sufficient to pay
the cost of the interest on the temporary
notes. The cost of the interest may be
assessed equally per square foot against all
tracts of land within the district or against
the assessed value of the property with or
without regard to the buildings or improve-
ments thereon or in any other reasonable
manner." (Emphasis added.)
The bill authorizes the county commissioners, as the govern-
ing body of the sewer district, to delay the assessment of
the actual cost of the construction of improvements. The
cost of interest on the temporary notes issued for the im-
provement, however, is specifically excepted from the au-
thority to delay assessment of costs. The statute makes
no distinction between interest accrued and future interest,
indicating that all interest on temporary notes must be re-
tired during the period of delay.
The legislative history of the bill indicates that its pur-
pose was to provide a mechanism for delaying assessment of
the actual costs of the improvement project, except for the
interest on temporary notes. The payment of such interest
is not to be delayed; it should be recovered during each
year of the "delay period." See Minutes, Interim Committee
on Local Government, September 16, 1982; Minutes, House
Committee on Local Government January 19, 1983; March 3, 1983.
Moreover, the history of the bill offers no indication that
interest already accrued is to be distinguished from future
interest when applying the provisions of the bill. Thus,
based upon the language of H.B. 2010, it is our conclusion
that the Board of County Commissioners, should it decide to
proceed under the provisions of H.B. 2010, must provide for
the payment of interest which has accrued on temporary notes
already issued by the county and for the payment of interest
which will accrue on any temporary notes during the delay
period.
The second part of your inquiry asks whether interest which
has already accrued on the temporary notes may be collected
in equal installments spread over the delay period as
opposed to, we assume, assessing all accrued interest in
the first year of the delay. 1983 House Bill No. 2010 may
be interpreted to permit either result. Section 1(a) of the
bill provides for the delay in the assessment of the actual
cost incurred in the construction of the improvements and
specifically excepts from the delay "the cost of interest
on temporary notes issued therefor." Section 1(b) provides
that, in each year of the delay, the district governing
body shall levy a special assessment "in an amount suffi-
cient to pay the cost of the interest on the temporary notes."
Curiously, the bill does not address the question of inter-
est accured on the temporary notes at the beginning of the
delay period. In fact, the bill, as discussed above, makes
no distinction between outstanding accrued interest and
interest to accrue in the future. Instead H.B. 2010 separates
interest from principle on the temporary notes and requires
that interest be recovered on an annual basis during the
delay. Thus, it would appear at first glance that, in the
first year of the delay period the previously accrued inter-
est is an outstanding cost on the temporary notes which,
under the language of this bill, must be recovered that year.
This conclusion, although consistent with the language of
section 1(a), is inconsistent with the intent to provide
flexibility which is expressed in the history of H.B. 2010.
In addition, the assessment of all the accrued interest in
the first year of the delay will effectively negate, at least
in that year, the ostensible relief offered by this bill to
the landowners in the Blue River District.
In view of these apparent inconsistencies, it is our opinion
that the purpose of H.B. 2010 is better served by examining
it in the context of several well accepted rules of statu-
tory construction. It has often been held by Kansas appellate
courts that all rules of statutory construction are subordin-
ate to the fundamental rule that the intent of the legisla-
ture must control. The legislative intent should govern
even though it may not follow the literal words of the
statute. If a statute is susceptible to more than one con-
struction, it should be considered in its entirety and in
light of the legislative intent; "a statute should never be
construed so as to produce uncertainty, injustice or confu-
sion if it is possible to construe it otherwise." Baker v.
R.D. Andersen Constr. Co., 7 Kan.App.2d 568, 571 (1982).
Further, in determining legislative intent, the courts look
to the purpose, necessity and effect of the statute, giving
consideration to the causes of a statute's adoption, the
historical background and the effect the statute may have
under the various possible constructions. See State ex rel.
Stephan v. Lane, 228 Kan. 379, 390 (1980); State, ex rel., v.
City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, 713 (1974). Finally,
we note that a statute is not to be given arbitrary construc-
tion, according to the strict letter, but instead should be
construed to advance the sense and meaning fairly deducible
from the context. Statutes should be construed with reason,
considering the practicalities of the subject matter addressed.
See Nohinek v. Logsdon, 6 Kan.App.2d 342, 344 (1981); Anderson
v. Overland Park Credit Union, 231 Kan. 97, 106 (1982).
As noted above, 1983 House Bill No. 2010 was enacted in re-
sponse to the difficulties encountered in assessing the cost
of the Blue River Sewer District; the bill was intended to
offer relief both to the county and to the landowners in the
district. Thus, the bill should be construed to effectuate
that purpose. It is clear that the bill requires that the
cost of interest on the temporary notes be assessed during
the period of delay. Because the interest already accrued
is such a large sum it would negate the relief offered by
the bill to require that this accrued interest be assessed
in the first year of the delay. Reading subsections (a) and
(b) of H.B. 2010 together, and in light of this legislative
history, we are led to conclude that the legislature intended
to provide that the amount of interest accrued on temporary
notes issued to finance any sewer improvement project,
whether such interest accrued on temporary notes issued be-
fore the adoption of the "delay resolution" or during the
period of delay, be paid by the end of the delay period.
Apparently this total amount of interest is to be calculated
and paid over the delay period, by means of equal, annual
assessments against the tangible taxable property in the
district.
It is beyond the scope of this opinion request to examine
the possible financial arrangements which would allow the
county to utilize H.B. 2010 in this manner. It is clear
beyond question, however, that H.B. 2010 requires that all
interest on the temporary notes issued on this project be
assessed during the delay period.
You next ask whether the county commissioners, as the dis-
trict governing board, may incorporate provisions into a
resolution adopted under H.B. 2010 providing for the cessa-
tion of the delay period upon the occurrence of certain
specified contingencies. The contingencies discussed in
your request are:
"(a) The expiration of the time period in-
volved.
"(b) All lawsuits pending against Blue River
Main Sewer District No. 1 are settled or dis-
posed of by litigation during the period.
"(c) A favorable method of financing is agreed
upon by the parties in the various lawsuits
now pending which would benefit both the
county, the litigants and other property
owners in the district.
"(d) In the event the county should determine
to absorb the costs of all existing treatment
plants or a portion thereof in a county-wide
or district-wide consolidation with payment
for all plants by the consolidated entity."
You indicate that the County Commissioners do not wish to be
locked into a mandatory 10 year delay if any of the above con-
tingencies should occur.
The bill provides that a district governing body may provide,
by resolution, for the delay in assessment of costs and that
the "delay may not exceed a period of 10 years." The bill
further states "the resolution shall state the period for
which the delay is granted . . . ." The emphasized language
clearly provides the 10 year period as an outside limitation.
As discussed above, this bill was designed to provide the
district governing body with some flexibility in regard to
financing and assessing the cost of this and other public
improvements. We note here that if the contingencies dis-
cussed in your request occurred, future delay of the assess-
ment of costs in the Blue River District would be unnecessary.
Thus, it would be unduly restrictive, and inconsistent with
the language and purpose of the bill, to conclude that 10
years is the mandatory delay period. However, consistent
with our conclusions regarding your first inquiries, we must
note that, under the terms of H.B. 2010, interest on tempor-
ary notes relating to sewer improvements must be assessed
by the end of the delay period either at the end of 10 years
or upon the occurrence of one of the specified contingencies.
Your final inquiry asks whether Section 1(b) of H.B. 2010
requires the governing body of the district to conduct a
hearing in each year of the delay period before special
assessments may be levied under the terms of the bill. That
section provides:
"(b) During the period of delay, the govern-
ing body annually shall levy a special assess-
ment against the tangible taxable property
within the district in an amount sufficient
to pay the cost of the interest on the tem-
porary notes. The cost of the interest may
be assessed equally per square foot against
all tracts of land within the district or
against the assessed value of the property
with or without regard to the buildings or
improvements thereon or in any other reason-
able manner.
"After the governing body determines the cost
of the interest and the assessment to be made
against each tract of land within the dis-
trict, it shall prepare an assessment roll.
The proposed assessment roll shall be filed
with the county clerk and be open for public
inspection. The governing body shall publish
a notice that it will meet to consider the
proposed assessments. The notice shall be
published once each week for two consecutive
weeks in the official county newspaper. The
second notice shall be published at least 10
days prior to the meeting and shall state the
date, time and place of the meeting, the cost
of the interest, the proposed method of
assessment and that written or oral objections
will be considered at the hearing. A copy
of the notice also shall be mailed by prepaid
first class mail at least 10 days prior to
the hearing to all landowners made liable to
pay the assessments. The failure of any land-
owner to receive the notice shall not invali-
date the proceedings. At the meeting or at
any adjournment thereof, the governing body
shall hear all objections to each proposed
assessment and may amend the proposed assess-
ments as to any tract of land. The governing
body shall levy the special assessments against
the property described in the assessment roll
by the adoption and publication of the appro-
priate resolution. The assessment shall be-
come a lien on the property against which the
assessment is made from the effective date of
the resolution. Each year thereafter, the
governing body shall determine and apportion
the cost of the interest on the basis it de-
termines and shall levy a special assessment
therefor. Notice of the assessment shall be
published once each week for two consecutive
weeks in the official county newspaper." (Em-
pasis added.)
Based upon the emphasized language, it is possible to reach
two quite different conclusions about the meaning of this
section. The first is that the word "annually", found in
the first sentence of this section, applies to the duties
attendant to the levy of a special assessment specified in
the second paragraph. Under this interpretation, the dis-
trict governing body would be required to hold a hearing on
the special assessments levied in each year of the delay
period. This interpretation would, in effect, make the
final two sentences of section 1(b) surplusage, as those
final sentences provide for what is to happen in "each year
thereafter." If the preceding portions of that paragraph
are read as annual requirements there is no need to specify
what will happen in "each year thereafter."
Two general rules of statutory construction are helpful here.
First, it is generally understood that in construing statutes
the legislative intention should be determined from a general
consideration of the whole act, and effect must be given, if
possible, to the entire statute and every part thereof. State
ex rel. Stephan v. U.S.D. 428, 231 Kan. 579 (1982). Second,
constructions which render part of a legislative act surplus-
age and futile are to be avoided if reasonably possible.
See American Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co.,
3 Kan.App.2d 245, 249 (1979); Consumers Co-operative Ass'n v.
State Comm. of Rev. & Taxation, 174 Kan. 461 (1953). Utiliz-
ing these rules of construction, it is our conclusion that
a hearing on the proposed special assessments is required
only in the first year of the delay period. In each year
thereafter, the governing body of the sewer district "shall
determine and apportion the cost of the interest on the basis
it determines and shall levy a special assessment therefor."
Although the governing body must publish notice of the assess-
ment for two consecutive weeks it is not required, in subse-
quent years, to hold a hearing and consider objections or
amendments to the proposed assessments of interest costs.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary 4'. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:MFC:hle

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