Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-145

1983-145Kanag

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September 22, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 145
The Honorable Keith Farrar
State Representative
One Hundred Twenty-Fourth District
Star Route, Box 42A
Hugoton, Kansas 67951
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Registration
of Vehicles -- Definitions
Synopsis: The definition of "truck tractor" in K.S.A.
8-126(e) cannot be construed so as to exclude
a vehicle which is designed and used primarily
for drawing other vehicles, even though it also
is capable of carrying a load in addition to
part of the weight of a drawn vehicle. Accord-
ingly, the power unit in a combination of vehi-
cles commonly known as .a "dromedary rig" must
be regarded as a truck tractor, since it is de-
signed and used primarily for drawing other
vehicles. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-126.
Dear Representative Farrar:
You have asked for our opinion as to the application of
certain provisions of the vehicle registration statutes to
a combination of vehicles commonly referred to as a "drome-
dary rig." You note that the questions for which you
seek answers were posed to the Division of Vehicles of the
State Department of Revenue by Mr. Fred Carman, Assistant
Revisor of Statutes, and that responses to these questions
were provided by the Department's legal staff. However,
you indicate that one of your constituents disagrees with
the Department's opinion and that you concur in his disagree-
ment.
Having reviewed Mr. Carman's letter and the Department of
Revenue's responsive opinion, we think it unnecessary to
set forth here the specific questions or the answers pro-
vided thereto by the Department. It is clear from our
review that there is a single issue controlling the answer
to each of the pertinent questions, and that is the nature
of a "dromedary rig."
As we understand it, a dromedary rig is a combination of
vehicles having a power unit that is designed and used
primarily for drawing other vehicles, but which is capable
of carrying a load itself. Since the registration statutes
do not specifically address dromedary rigs or this type
of power unit, the resolution of this matter depends on
whether the power unit in question is a "truck" or "truck
tractor." These latter terms are defined in K.S.A. 8-126
for purposes of the registration statutes, which distinguish
between these vehicles with respect to the gross weight for
which the vehicle may be registered and the amount of fee
applicable thereto.
Subsection (c) of K.S.A. 8-126 defines "truck" as meaning a
"motor vehicle which is used for the transportation or de-
livery of freight or merchandise or more than 10 passengers,"
and K.S.A. 8-126(e) defines "truck tractor" as meaning
"[e]very motor vehicle designed and used primarily for
drawing other vehicles, and not so constructed as to carry
a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle or
'load so drawn."
The Department of Revenue concluded that the power unit in
question is a truck tractor. This conclusion was predi-
cated on an Attorney General's opinion dated February 14,
1973, which reversed a contrary opinion of July 30, 1971.
With respect to these prior opinions, we note first that,
until now, this office has not had occasion to consider
this matter subsequent to the 1973 opinion. We also note
that these prior opinions did not relate to the precise
question presented for our consideration, but related in-
stead to the question of whether a power unit of the type
considered here was a truck tractor within the contempla-
tion of certain sections of the Uniform Act Regulating
Traffic on Highways. However, even though the prior opin-
ions dealt with a different series of statutes, the pertin-
ent definition of "truck tractor" applicable to these
statutes at the time of the 1973 opinion was identical to
the corresponding definition in K.S.A. 8-126. Hence, even
though that prior opinion did not concern vehicle registra-
tion, we believe it to be relevant, because its ultimate
effect was to construe a definition of "truck tractor"
that is identical to the definition at issue here.
Having considered the definition of "truck tractor," we have
concluded initially that the term is somewhat ambiguous.
Hence, it is necessary and appropriate to apply pertinent
rules of statutory construction. Of principal significance
are the rules expressed in the following statement by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978):
"The fundamental rule of statutory construc-
tion, to which all others are subordinate, is
that the purpose and intent of the legisla-
ture governs when that intent can be ascer-
tained from the statute, even though words,
phrases or clauses at some place in the sta-
tute must be omitted or inserted. (Farm &
City Ins. Co. v. American Standard Ins. Co.,
220 Kan. 325 Syl. ¶3, 552 P.2d 1363 119761.)
In determining legislative intent, courts are
not limited to a mere consideration of the
language used, but look to the historical
background of the enactment, the circumstances
attending its passage, the purpose to be accom-
plished and the effect the statute may have
under the various constructions suggested.
(State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215
Kan. 700, Syl. ¶10, 527 P.2d 1340 119741.)
In order to ascertain the legislative intent,
courts are not permitted to consider only a
certain isolated part or parts of an act but
are required to consider and construe together
all parts thereof in pari materia. When the
interpretation of some one section of an act
according to the exact and literal import of
its words would contravene the manifest pur-
pose of the legislature, the entire act should
be construed according to its spirit and rea-
son, disregarding so far as may be necessary
the literal import of words or phrases which
conflict with the manifest purpose of the
legislature. (Kansas Commission on Civil
Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶2, 544
P.2d 791 [1975])." (Emphasis added.) Id.
at 199, 200.
In our opinion, the legislature's intent will not be ascer-
tained solely from a consideration of the definition of
"truck tractor" in K.S.A. 8-126(e). It must be derived
from a consideration of the entirety of the registration
statutes. "In order to ascertain the legislative intent,
courts are not permitted to consider only a certain iso-
lated part or parts of an act but are required to consider
and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia."
Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 8 (1973). See, also, Callaway
v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan. 646, 650 (1973); Brown
v. Keill, supra.
As we noted previously, by the definitions in K.S.A. 8-126
the legislature has attempted to distinguish between a
"truck" and a "truck tractor," and the registration statutes
utilize these distinctions in imposing the various regis-
tration fees. Thus, we believe it necessary and appropriate
to view the definition of "truck tractor" from this per-
spective, i.e., to view it in a way which, in fact, pro-
motes the intended distinction between trucks and truck
tractors. Although a "truck" is defined in K.S.A. 8-126(c)
as a "motor vehicle which is used for the transportation
or delivery of freight and merchandise . . ." (emphasis
added), we must take note that trucks do, in fact, tow other
vehicles without losing their character as trucks. Hence,
the definition in K.S.A. 8-126(c) circumscribes the "primary"
use. Similarly, the first portion of K.S.A. 8-126(e)
defines a "truck tractor" as a "motor vehicle designed and
used primarily for drawing other vehicles." By its very
terms, this part of the definition contemplates that there
may be other, secondary uses, e.g., transporting freight
and merchandise. Thus, the second part of the definition
should be read so as to exclude those vehicles which are
designed and used for transporting freight and merchandise
to the extent that the vehicle is not primarily designed
and used for drawing other vehicles.
In our judgment, as long as a motor vehicle is designed and
used primarily for drawing other vehicles and carrying a
part of the weight of the drawn vehicles, it is a truck
tractor, even though it also may be used to carry freight
and merchandise. Conversely, when a power unit of the type
considered here is designed and used for transporting
freight and merchandise, and is not designed and used pri-
marily for drawing other vehicles, it does not qualify
as a truck tractor. Likewise, even though a motor vehicle
may be used for drawing other vehicles, unless it is de-
signed and used primarily for that purpose, it is not a
truck tractor.
By its very definition, as it has been provided us, a
"dromedary rig" is a combination of vehicles having a
power unit that is designed and used primarily for drawing
other vehicles. Hence, it is our opinion that the power
unit of a dromedary rig is a truck tractor within the mean-
ing of K.S.A. 8-126(e). Thus, we would concur in the De-
partment of Revenue's opinion.
Before concluding, we should note that, as evidenced by
the recent opinion of the Department of Revenue, our opin-
ion is consistent with the long-standing interpretation of
the pertinent statutes by that agency. That fact serves
to buttress our opinion, since "an interpretation of state
law by a state agency delegated the responsibility of en-
forcing that law is entitled to great weight." Lincoln
American Corp. v. Victory Life Insurance Co., 375 F.Supp.
112, 118 (D. Kan. 1974). Similarly, "[t]he administrative
interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight
in determining [the] meaning of [a] statute unless clearly
wrong." Sharp v. U.S., 108 F.Supp. 745, Syl. 112 (D. Kan.
1952). Thus, in reaching our conclusion we accord sub-
stantial importance to the Department of Revenue's long-
standing interpretation, since we cannot say, as a matter
of law, that it is clearly erroneous. To the contrary, as
indicated by the rationale of this opinion, we believe the
agency's interpretation to be correct.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that the definition
of "truck tractor" in K.S.A. 8-126(e) cannot be construed
so as to exclude a vehicle which is designed and used pri-
marily for drawing other vehicles, even though it also is
capable of carrying a load in addition to part of the weight
of a drawn vehicle. To do so would contravene the manifest
purpose of the legislature to distinguish between trucks
and truck tractors on the basis of their primary uses.
Accordingly, the power unit in a combination of vehicles
commonly known as a "dromedary rig" must be regarded as a
truck tractor, since it is designed and used primarily for
drawing other vehicles.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Brad J. Smoot
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:BJS:hle

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