Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-116

1983-116Kanag

Full text

August 3, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 116
William L. Edds
General Counsel
Department of Revenue
State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66625
Re: Laws, Journals and Public Information -- Records
Open to Public -- Inspection, Access and Copying
Synopsis: Section 4(d) of 1983 House Bill No. 2327 (L. 1983,
ch. 171), the new Kansas Open Records Act, provides
that each request for access shall be acted upon
as soon as possible, but not later than three
business days following receipt of the request.
Only if the request cannot be met within this
time must the custodian of the records provide an
explanation of the cause for further delay. In
addition, the phrases "provide access to" and
"permit inspection of" are used interchangeably
throughout the bill, and may accordingly be treated
as synonymous for purposes of interpretation. Both
phrases concern the right of the public to examine
public records, and so are different than the
right to make copies. Cited herein: L. 1983,
Ch. 171.
Dear Mr. Edds:
As General Counsel of the Kansas Department of Revenue, you
request our opinion on two questions concerning the new open
records law, which was enacted by the legislature in 1983
House Bill No. 2327, now L. 1983, ch. 171. The bill, which
becomes law on January 1, 1984, replaces the prior open pub-
lic records act, which appeared at K.S.A. 45-201 et seq.
Your first query involves the language used in Section 4(d)
of the bill, which concerns the time in which requests for
public records must be answered. As originally written,
1983 House Bill No. 2327 subsection 4(d) stated:
"Each request for access to a public record
shall be acted upon as soon as possible, but
not later than the end of the second business
day following the date that the request is
received. If the request is not acted upon
immediately, the custodian shall give an ex-
planation of the cause for delay. If the re-
quest is granted, the custodian shall make
the record available for inspection at the
time the request is granted unless the custo-
dian gives a detailed explanation of the cause
for further delay and the place and earliest
time and date that the record will be avail-
able for inspection. If the request for
access is denied, the custodian shall provide,
upon request, a written statement of the
grounds for the denial. Such statement shall
cite the specific provision of law under which
access is denied and shall be furnished to the
requester not later than the end of the first
business day following the date that the re-
quest for the statement is received." (Em-
phasis added.)
In its final form, the subsection was amended so as to read:
"Each request for access to a public record
shall be acted upon as soon as possible, but
not later than the end of the third business
day following the date that the request is
received. If access to the public record is
not granted immediately, the custodian shall
give a detailed explanation of the cause for
further delay and the place and earliest time
and date that the record will be available for
inspection. If the request for access is de-
nied, the custodian shall provide, upon re-
quest, a written statement of the grounds for
the denial. Such statement shall cite the
specific provision of law under which access
is denied and shall be furnished to the re-
quester not later than the end of the third
business day following the date that the re-
quest for the statement is received." (Em-
phasis added.)
The effect of these amendments, in addition to extending the
time allowed for a response from two to three business days,
also eliminates one step in the procedure. Under the ori-
ginal bill, a failure to act immediately required an explana-
tion for the delay, while a failure to provide the material
after granting the request required a detailed explanation
for the cause of the "further delay." In making the procedure
more direct, the amended subsection requires action (either
a grant or denial) within the three day period, an explana-
tion required only if access is delayed or, alternatively,
denied.
The problem you raise concerns the use of the word "immedi-
ately" in the second sentence, and how it relates to the
language in the first sentence which requires action as soon
as possible, but not later than three business days. If the
word is interpreted to mean that action must be taken at
once or a detailed explanation given, then the effect of the
three day period is diminished. The alternative interpre-
tation, which we believe to be preferable, would equate
"immediate" action with action taken within the three day
period, with explanations required only if a request could
not be acted upon by then. We believe this result to be in
keeping with the action of the legislature in amending this
portion of the bill so as to streamline the process. Here,
as is always the case, effect should be given to the intent
of the legislature [State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin, 227 Kan.
456 (1980)], with such intent to be determined from the word-
ing of the act alone, if possible.
Your second query involves the Act's useage of the phrases
"provide access to" and "permit inspection of" with regard to
a custodial agency's records sought by the public. As you
note in your letter, the two phrases are used interchangeably
throughout the Act. For example, subsection (d) of section
4 quoted above speaks of a "request for access" which is
received by a public agency. If such a request cannot be
met without delay, the agency must notify the requester as
to when the record will be made available "for inspection."
In the same way, while subsections (a) and (b) of the section
use the word "inspect", subsection (f) speaks of "providing
access to" records, while subsection (e) actually speaks of
the two actions in the disjuctive ("[a] custodian may refuse
to provide access to a public record, or to permit inspection").
You inquire whether any difference in meaning can be ascribed
to the use of these different terms.
In our opinion, while not a model of drafting clarity, the
Act's use of the two phrases is not a defect which renders it
unworkable or open to attack as vague or ambiguous. The
bill makes it clear at the outset (at section 2) that the
public policy of the state favors open records, and that the
act should be liberally construed and applied to promote such
a policy. In effecting such a policy, the entire act must
be read as a whole. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978).
When the interpretation of one section of the act according
to the literal import of its words would contravene the mani-
fest purpose of the legislature, the spirit and reason of
the entire act controls. State ex rel. Ludwick v. Board of
Johnson County Commr's, 233 Kan. 79 (1983). Such a situation
would exist here if the two phrases were held to mean differ-
ent things, for an agency could theoretically provide access
to material without allowing the kind of inspection needed
to learn anything from it. Such an absurd result cannot be
conceived under the scope of the Act, leaving it necessary
to construe the phrases as synonymous for the present.
You also raise questions of interpretation concerning two
other phrases which also appear frequently throughout the
Act, namely "furnishing (or obtaining) copies" and "disclo-
sure." While the plain words of the former clearly mean more
than "access" or "inspection", the meaning of these phrases,
like those cited above, can only be determined in the context
of their use, on a section by section basis. However, as was.
noted earlier, the Act must be interpreted in a liberal
fashion, with doubts resolved in favor of openness. As ques-
tions arise concerning particular sections, this office will
of course be willing to assist in the process of determining
the intent of the Legislature.
In conclusion, section 4(d) of 1983 House Bill No. 2327 (L.
1983, ch. 171), provides that each request for access shall
be acted upon as soon as possible, but not later than three
business days following receipt of the request. Only if the
request cannot be met within this time must the custodian of
the records provide an explanation of the cause for further
delay. In addition, the phrases "provide access to" and "per-
mit inspection of" are used interchangeably throughout the
bill, and may accordingly be treated as synonymous for pur-
poses of interpretation. Both phrases concern the right of
the public to examine public records, and so are different
than the right to make copies.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
'Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
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