Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-245

1982-245Kanag

Full text

November 15, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 245
Michael D. Pepoon, Esq.
117 South Pearl
P. 0. Box E
Paola, Kansas 66071
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Ambulance Service --
Obligations of County Providing County-wide Ambu-
lance Service
Synopsis: K.S.A. 19-261 authorizes a county to provide am-
bulance service at public expense within such
county, except in areas where adequate ambulance
service is already being provided.
The geographical area served by any ambulance ser-
vice need not follow the boundaries of any particu-
lar taxing district. However, absent an effective
interlocal agreement executed pursuant to K.S.A.
12-2001 et seq., there is no apparent authority
for a taxing district to provide ambulance service
beyond its boundaries.
The board of county commissioners is responsible
for determining whether a county-financed ambulance
service will serve any particular area of the
county. If an entire county receives adequate
ambulance service from the county-financed ambu-
lance service, the county is precluded from reim-
bursing any taxing district that provides a dupli-
cate service.
An effective interlocal agreement entered into
pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2901 et seq. would serve to
minimize and/or indemnify Miami County's civil
liability exposure arising from the operation of
an ambulance service pursuant to contract. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 12-2901, 19-261.
Dear Mr. Pepoon:
As retained counsel for the Board of County Commissioners of
Miami County you pose a number of questions regarding ambu-
lance service in Miami County and Attorney General Opinion
No. 82-40. In Attorney General Opinion No. 82-40 it was de-
termined that K.S.A. 19-261 authorizes a county to provide
ambulance service within such county, except where adequate
ambulance service is already provided. The opinion also
cited K.S.A. 19-261 for the proposition that any taxing dis-
trict which provides ambulance service within the county must
be reimbursed for same with its proportionate share of the
county general fund budgeted for ambulance service. We
understand that the Spring Hill Rural Volunteer Fire Depart-
ment, Inc., located in Johnson County, has provided ambulance
service to a portion of northern Miami County since 1967.
The present dispute involves whether Miami County is obli-
gated to reimburse the Spring Hill Rural Volunteer Fire De-
partment, Inc., for ambulance services.
Your first inquiry states:
"Would it have any bearing on your opinion
[Attorney General Opinion No. 82-40] and in
your interpretation of K.S.A. 19-261 if Miami
County was providing ambulance service to the
northern portion of Miami County prior to this
area being serviced by the Spring Hill Rural
Volunteer Fire Department? There is some
question before the Commissioners as to which
ambulance service began servicing the area
initially and the adequacy of each respective
service during this period of time."
As previously stated, K.S.A. 19-261 authorizes a county to
provide ambulance service at public expense within such
county, except in areas where adequate ambulance service is
already being provided. Therefore, if the board of county
commissioners authorized ambulance service for the northern
portion of Miami County, such authorization requires a deter-
mination by the county commission that the northern portion
of the county was not then receiving adequate ambulance ser-
vice. The issue of which ambulance service commenced serving
the subject area first is not germane to the county commis-
sion's duties and responsibilities under K.S.A. 19-261 et
seq. Rather, the issue that must be resolved is whether the
subject area was being adequately served at the time the
board of county commissioners authorized the county-financed
ambulance service in such area. If adequate ambulance ser-
vice was being provided to the subject area by an entity not
dependent on a county subsidy, the board of county commissioners
would not be authorized to establish and maintain a county-
financed ambulance service to cover the identical area. See
Robinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 210 Kan. 684, 691
(1972).
Your second inquiry states:
"Secondly, K.S.A. 19-261 states that reimburse-
ment shall take place when adequate ambulance
service is provided 'in any part of the county.'
Does the area which is receiving the service
have to be defined in any manner? Does it
have to be a taxing district, township, or
some other appropriately described area? Does
it matter if several ambulance services are
providing assistance to a 'part' of the County?
Who within this part of the county determines
which ambulance service should be provided and
should this decision be resolved through an
electoral process?"
It is our considered opinion that the area served by any
ambulance service need not follow the boundaries of a taxing
district. However, as stated in Attorney General Opinion No.
82-40, there is doubt regarding the statutory authority of a
taxing district to provide ambulance service beyond its boun-
daries absent an effective interlocal agreement entered into
pursuant to K.S.A. 12-2901 et seq.
In response to your inquiry regarding multiple ambulance ser-
vices providing service to the same part of the county, we
direct attention to Robinson v. Board of County Commissioners,
supra. There, the Court cited the provision of K.S.A. 19-261
which states: "The board of county commissioners shall not
provide ambulance service under the provisions of this act
in any part of the county which receives adequate ambulance
service . . . ," and construes the purpose thereof to
"provide relief from double taxation to resi-
dents of a city, fire district, hospital dis-
trict or other taxing subdivision which is
already furnishing adequate ambulance service
at public expense. The county is not to in-
vade those areas with its service, and is to
reimburse such a taxing subdivision its pro
rata share of the county-wide taxes levied by
the county for ambulance service." Id. at
689.
The legislative intent, as articulated in the above-quoted
portion of Robinson, is to preclude multiple publicly-financed
ambulance services operating in the same area.
Regarding who is responsible for determining which ambulance
service will serve a particular area, we note that K.S.A.
19-261 vests the board of county commissioners with the au-
thority to determine whether a county-financed ambulance
service will operate in any particular area. See, also,
Robinson, supra at 689-691. We find no authority for the
proposition that an election be held to decide any issue
relating to a county-financed ambulance service.
Your third inquiry states:
"Thirdly, if Miami County is currently,
through the tax dollars of its citizens, pro-
viding an ambulance service from three cities
within the county, and this service was ade-
quate to protect all of the citizens of the
county, would this make a difference in whe-
ther such reimbursement should take place?
Can there be an unlimited number of ambulance
services within the county operated by other
taxing districts from various counties, with
each district receiving its proportionate
share of Miami County tax dollars?"
In responding to the first part of this question, we note
that K.S.A. 19-261 provides, in part:
"The board of county commissioners shall not
provide ambulance service under the provisions
of this act in any part of the county which
receives adequate ambulance service, but the
county shall reimburse any taxing district
which provides ambulance services to such dis-
trict with its proportionate share of the
county general fund budgeted for ambulance
services within the county."
Here, it is appropriate to reiterate the previously-quoted
excerpt from Robinson, supra, which construed the foregoing
provisions of 19-261, as having the purpose of providing
"relief from double taxation to residents of
a city, fire district, hospital district or
other taxing subdivision which is already fur-
nishing adequate ambulance service at public
expense. The county is not to invade those
areas with its service, and is to reimburse
such a taxing subdivision its pro rata share
of the county-wide taxes levied by the county
for ambulance service." (Emphasis added.)
210 Kan. at 689.
From this interpretation, it may be concluded that, when a
board of county commissioners determines to provide ambulance
service within the county: (1) the county may not provide
such service in any area of the county where adequate ambu-
lance already is being furnished by a taxing subdivision at
public expense; and (2) the county is required to reimburse
a taxing subdivision which is already furnishing adequate am-
bulance service at public expense with its proportionate share
of the county's budget for ambulance services.
In light of these conclusions, we have determined that, in
answer to your specific question, the adequacy of the ambu-
lance service currently provided by the county has no bearing
upon the county's obligation under K.S.A. 19-261 to reimburse
other taxing districts. In our judgment, the only considera-
tions are (1) whether the taxing district was providing ambu-
lance service at public expense within the county at the time
the county began providing county-financed ambulance service
and (2) whether the ambulance service being provided by such
a taxing district is adequate.
Accordingly, in our opinion, a county is not required to re-
imburse a taxing district which was not providing adequate
ambulance service at public expense within the county at the
time the county began furnishing county-financed ambulance
service. And as noted above, the determination of the ade-
quacy of ambulance service being provided by any such taxing
district rests in the sound discretion of the board of county
commissioners. Thus, even though a taxing district is pro-
viding ambulance service within the county at public expense
at the time the county begins furnishing such service, the
county is neither precluded from duplicating such service nor
required to reimburse such taxing subdivision, unless the
county determines the service being provided by such taxing
subdivision is adequate.
In response to your question whether Miami County must reim-
burse "an unlimited number of ambulance services . . . oper-
ated by other taxing districts from other counties," we again
note that absent an interlocal agreement executed pursuant
to K.S.A. 12-2901 et seq., no statutory authority exists for
a taxing district to provide ambulance service beyond its
boundaries. If such service is provided it would be incum-
bent on such taxing district to demonstrate the explicit
authority (statutory, contractual or other) in order to be
reimbursed. Arguably, the taxing district could show that
the beneficiary county knowingly acquiesced in the provision
of such service and that reimbursement is thereby authorized.
However, this is essentially a factual matter that is beyond
the scope of this opinion.
Your next inquiry states:
"As far as I have been able to determine from
my research there has been no case law inter-
preting K.S.A. 19-261. In your opinion with
regard to interpreting this statute has there
been any research or do you have an opinion as
to what the intent of the legislature was in
drafting the statute?"
The only case law construing K.S.A. 19-261 et seq., that we
are cognizant of is Robinson, supra. Additionally, this
office has issued numerous opinions construing K.S.A. 19-261
et seq. However, in regard to your opinion request, we be-
lieve that Robinson is the controlling authority.
Finally, you inquire:
"In your opinion [No. 82-40] you state that
if a county has decided to offer ambulance
service, the county has a duty to provide am-
bulance service to all parts of the county or
to enter into an agreement whereby such ser-
vices are provided. Will such an agreement
with another taxing district legally protect
the county from any neglect of duty with re-
spect to this 'part' of the county receiving
ambulance service from another taxing district?"
We are hesitant to discuss the efficacy of any contract which
prescribes the rights, obligations and liabilities of the
parties to an ambulance service agreement without the oppor-
tunity to review the contract. However, we observe that a
properly drafted interlocal agreement could be executed which
would serve to minimize or indemnify Miami County's civil
liability exposure arising from the operation of an ambulance
service pursuant to contract.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Robert Vinson Eye
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RVE:hle

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.