Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-239

1982-239Kanag

Full text

November 8, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 239
The Honorable Michael Johnston
Senator, Fourteenth District
3610 Gabriel, No. 325
Parsons, Kansas 67357
The Honorable Fred A. Kerr
Senator, Thirty-third District
Route 2
Pratt, Kansas 67124
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Code; Crimes Against
Property -- Tampering With a Traffic Signal
Synopsis: Although K.S.A. 21-3725 and 21-3726 prohibit all
persons from manipulating or tampering with railroad
traffic signal devices, railroad personnel are excused
from complying with said statutes when they are required
to manipulate such devices to conduct operational
tests in accordance with federal regulations. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 21-3725, 21-3726, 49 C.F.R. §217.9.
Dear Senators Johnston and Kerr:
You have each requested an opinion providing an interpretation of K.S.A.
21-3725 and 21-3726. You state that you have been informed that certain
railroad operating officials have removed one or more bulbs from traffic
control signals on rail lines, causing a dangerous procedure to be initiated,
i.e., the engineer must bring the train to an emergency stop. You
ask whether K.S.A. 21-3725 and 21-3726 prohibit railroad personnel
from engaging in such testing.
As we understand it, the purpose of the described procedure is to test
the efficiency and safety of railroads and their crews. We have been
informed that the test is conducted as follows: Railroad officials
change to yellow the two railroad control signal lights immediately
preceding the signal in which a light has been removed, thereby putting
the engineer on notice that there may be trouble at the third light.
According to established operating procedures, an engineer is to assume
that a red light will follow two yellow lights and be prepared to stop.
The engineer is also to assume that if a signal is not operating, e.g.,
no signal light shows because the bulb has been removed or has burned
out, the signal is red and should immediately bring his train to a
safe, complete stop. As a practical matter, we have been informed
that the above described procedure is the only method available to
adequately test this aspect of operation. We also understand that
unless the engineer has not been paying attention to the two warning
signals, no sudden emergency stop occurs. Rather, the stop is
accomplished in a normal operational manner.
K.S.A. 21-3725 provides:
"Tampering with a traffic signal is intentionally
manipulating, altering, destroying or removing
any light, sign, marker, railroad switching device
or other signal device erected or installed for the
purpose of controlling or directing the movement of
motor vehicles, railroad trains, aircraft or water-.
craft.
"Tampering with a traffic signal is a class C
misdemeanor."
K.S.A. 21-3726 states:
"Aggravated tampering with a traffic signal is
tampering with a traffic signal which results or
could result in an accident causing the death or
great bodily injury of any person.
"Aggravated tampering with a traffic signal is a
class E felony."
While we find no Kansas cases interpreting the two statutes in question,
previous administrations of attorneys general have written opinions
addressing your question. Two of these, Attorney General Opinion No. 62-46,
and a letter from Attorney General Robert LonderhoIm, dated February 2,
1967, interpreted G.S. 1949, 62-2,110, the predecessor to K.S.A. 21-3725
and 21-3726. In both instances, the opinions concluded that the then
existing statute did apply to railroad officials as well as other persons,
because said statute was intended to protect the safety of passengers and
crews. However, Attorney General Opinion No. 76-50, which considered
the scope of the current statutes prior to their amendment in 1975,
notes that "[o]bviously, in the course of employment, it may be the
duty of railroad officials and employees to manipulate such devices in
order to control and direct railroad traffic." Id. at p. 2. The opinion
merely concludes that the statutes were unclear and needed legislative
clarification as to whether railroad signals were to be included and
what conduct was proscribed. The subsequent amendment to 21-3725 in
1975 included specific references to railroad devices and omitted
language establishing a specific intention to deceive, but did not exempt
persons in their scope of employment or acting under lawful authority
from its provisions.
Applying the rules of statutory construction to the statutes in question,
we find from the plain words of the statute, which is penal in nature,
that the statute applies to any person, regardless of whether the person
is a railroad official. Because it is presumed under the rules of
statutory construction that the legislature has acted with full knowledge
and information as to the subject matter of the statute, as to prior
and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute, and
as to the judicial decisions regarding such prior law [ Rogers v.
Shanahan, 221 Kan. 221 (1976)1, we must conclude that when the legislature
amended K.S.A. 21-3725 to include railroad devices, it did not intend to
change the scope of the statute regarding the applicability of 21-3725
to railroad officials, since no exemption was included in the amendment.
Therefore, it is our opinion that the legislature did not intend to
exclude railroad personnel from the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3725 and
21-3726. However, the United States Congress has delegated its authority
to establish railroad operating rules to the United States Secretary of
Transportation in 45 U.S.C. §§431 and 438. Pursuant to this delegation,
the Secretary has promulgated such rules in Chapter 11, Part 217 of
Volume 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Section 217.9 requires
every railroad, other than those which are not part of the general
railroad system and certain other short-haul passenger service railroads,
to periodically conduct operational tests to determine the extent of
compliance with their codes of operating rules and efficiency. It
further requires that programs for such testing, including a description
of each type of operational test utilized, be filed with the Federal
Railroad Administrator who has authority to inspect said railroads.
It is our understanding that the operational test previously described
herein has been approved as being in compliance with these regulations.
Thus, insofar as such test is conducted pursuant to the requirements
of federal law, and such operational test necessitates actions proscribed
by K.S.A. 21-3725, there is a conflict between such federal requirements
and the proscriptions of the Kansas statute.
When such a conflict exists, the general rule is that state statutes may
be superseded to the extent to which they conflict with valid regulations
of a federal administrative agency. Public Utilities Com. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); United States v. Shinier, 367 U.S. 374;
2 Am.Jur.2d §213. Noncompliance with a state statute is to be excused
when a person is complying with a conflicting federal regulation. Id.
See, also, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Although a
state statute is to be superseded by federal law only when it is clear
that Congress intended to preempt the power of the state in a given
area [ Illinois C. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 245 U.S. 493, 510
(1918)], we believe such intent is clearly manifested in the regulation
of railroads. Congress has delegated the authority to establish
operational rules for all but certain limited service railroads to the
Secretary of Transportation. The Kansas statute proscribing the
manipulation of railroad traffic signal devices must yield to the
federal regulations insofar as it thwarts the federal purpose. Therefore,
it is our opinion that, although the proscriptions of K.S.A. 21-3725 and
21-3726 are applicable to all persons, so long as railroad personnel
are manipulating railroad signal devices in accordance with federal
regulations, their conduct may not be deemed to be illegal in Kansas.
However, if railroad personnel fail to comply with the pertinent
federal regulations, such conduct is subject to the provisions of
K.S.A. 21-3725 and 21-3726.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Hoyt
Assistant Attorney General
RTS : :BLH :may

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