Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-204

1982-204Kanag

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September 14, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 204
Marvin S. Steinert
Savings and Loan Commissioner
Suite 220, 503 Kansas Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66603
John A. O'Leary, Jr.
Bank Commissioner
Suite 600, 818 Kansas Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Consumer Credit Code -- Consumer Loans -- Finance
Charge; Exemption of Adjustable Rate Loans From
Maximum Finance Charge Limits
Synopsis: Pursuant to K.S.A. 16a-2-401 (as amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 559), a supervised lender may make
loans in which the rate of interest may be periodi-
cally adjusted where any such loan is secured by
an interest in land subordinate to a prior mortgage
held by a lender other than the supervised lender.
Section 2 of the bill, which authorizes the promul-
gation of rules and regulations governing such
adjustable rate loans, also applies to loans made
pursuant to K.S.A. 16-207(h) (as amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 539) which are secured by a real
estate mortgage. 1982 Senate Bill No. 559 does
not contain more than one subject matter so as to
violate Article 2, Section 16 of the Kansas Con-
stitution, nor is section 2 of the bill an unlaw-
ful delegation of power by the legislature. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 16-207 (as amended by L. 1982, ch.
89), K.S.A. 16a-2-204 (as amended by L. 1982, ch.
94), Kansas Constitution, Article 2, §§1, 16.
Dear Commissioners Steinert and O'Leary:
As Savings and Loan Commissioner and Bank Commissioner, re-
spectively, you request our opinion on several questions
regarding 1982 Senate Bill No. 559, which now appears in the
session laws at chapter 94. This bill amends K.S.A. 16a-204
so as to authorize adjustable rate loans to be made regard-
less of the finance charge limits contained in the statute.
As noted in a prior opinion of this office (No. 82-128),
while K.S.A. 16-207(h) (as amended by 1982 Senate Bill No.
539, now at L. 1982, ch. 89), authorizes such loans to be
made where secured by a real estate mortgage, the amendment
to K.S.A. 16a-2-401 allows adjustable rates to be used in
-'realty loans which are otherwise covered by the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code.
As we read your request, you inquire concerning three points.
The first of these concerns the constitutionality of 1982
Senate Bill No. 559. Specifically, you question whether the
bill as enacted contains more than one subject matter. If
such is the case, the measure would be violative of Article 2,
Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution, which states:
"No bill shall contain more than one subject,
except appropriation bills and bills for re-
vision or codification of statutes. The sub-
ject of each bill shall be expressed in its
title. No law shall be revived or amended,
unless the new act contain the entire act re-
vived or the section or sections amended, and
the section or sections so amended shall be
repealed. The provisions of this section shall
be liberally construed to effectuate the acts
of the legislature." (Emphasis added.)
Presumably, the two subject matters at issue are the exemp-
tion from the UCCC finance charge rates found at new subsec-
tion (8) of section 1, and the provision for the enactment
of rules and regulations governing adjustable rate loans in
section 2.
As originally adopted, Section 16 of Article 2 did not con-
tain the last sentence contained therein presently, which
was added in 1974. A part of the Kansas Constitution from
the outset, the section has been relied on in numerous deci-
sions which found two or more subjects contained in bills
which were accordingly declared void. See, e.g., State ex
rel., Stephan v. Thiessen, 228 Kan. 136 (1980), State v.
Barrett, 27 Kan. 213 (1882). However, the court has also
recognized that a statute should not be declared violative
of this section unless the invalidity is manifest [State v.
Roseberry, 222 Kan. 715 (1977)], and that an act is to be
given liberal construction with all doubts resolved in favor
of its constitutionality. Brickell v. Board of Education,
211 Kan. 905 (1973). In looking past technical interpreta-
tions, the court has identified the following substantive
evils which this section is designed to prevent:
"[T]he prevention of a matter of legislative
merit from being tied to an unworthy matter,
the prevention of hodge-podge or logrolling
legislation, the prevention of surreptitious
legislation, and the lessening of improper in-
fluences which may result from intermixing
objects of legislation in the same act which
have no relation to each other." Garten Enter-
prises, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 219 Kan.
620, 622 (1976).
This language was cited with approval in both State ex rel., v.
Thiessen, supra, and in State ex rel., Stephan v. Carlin, 230
Kan. 252 (1981). In both, non-related subject matters lead
to findings of invalidity.
In our opinion, such a finding is not warranted here. Sub-
section (8), which is contained in section 1, states:
"This section [16a-2-204] shall not apply to
a loan secured by an interest in land subor-
dinate to a prior mortgage and held by a len-
der other than the lender of the first mort-
gage, the interest rate of which is governed
by subsection (b) or (h) of K.S.A. 16-207,
and any amendments thereto, unless made sub-
ject hereto by agreement."
Section 2 reads as follows:
"The state bank commissioner, consumer credit
commissioner, savings and loan commissioner
and credit union administrator shall jointly
adopt rules and regulations for the purpose
of governing loans made under the provisions
of subsection (h) of K.S.A. 16-207, and any
amendments thereto, and subsection (8) of
K.S.A. 16a-2-401, and any amendments thereto.
Such rules and regulations shall be published
in only one place in the Kansas administrative
regulations as directed by the state rules and
regulations board." (Emphasis added.)
Both of these provisions, it may be noted, deal with adjustable
rate loans, in that both reference K.S.A. 16-207(h) (as amended
by 1982 Senate Bill No. 539), for it is this latter measure
which initially authorized such loans. The 'first provision
removes additional types of realty loans from finance charge
ceilings, here established by the UCCC instead of the general
usury law, while the second authorizes rules and regulations
to be adopted governing such loans. In that the first provi-
sion cannot be read except by making reference to K.S.A.
16-207(h), as amended, the reference to both it and K.S.A.
16a-2-401 in Section 2 does not interject a totally unrelated
subject into the bill. Rather, the subject matter of both
_provisions relates to the making of adjustable rate loans,
as the same are defined by K.S.A. 16-207(h), as amended ear-
lier during the same session by Senate Bill No. 539. Given
these considerations, it is our opinion that a liberal con-
struction of 1982 Senate Bill No. 559 permits the inclusion
of both the provisions quoted hereinabove.
Your second inquiry concerns the effect of section 2 of the
bill as it relates to the adoption of rules and regulations
"governing loans made under the provisions of" K.S.A. 16-207(h),
as amended, and K.S.A. 16a-2-204, as amended. You express
the concern that the section as it now reads is an unconsti-
tutional delegation of power by the legislature. Specificall y,
in that Article 2, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution pro-
vides that the legislative power is vested only in the house
of representatives and senate, an unauthorized delegation is
against public policy and therefore void. State v. Crawford,
104 Kan. 141 (1919).
Beyond question, the legislature may delegate to an adminis-
trative body some of the legislature's functions when the
policy is fixed and standards are definitely established
which determine the manner and circumstances of the exercise
of such power. State ex rel., Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan.
285, 300 (1976), citing Board of Satanta v. Grant County
Planning Board, 190 Kan. 640 (1962). Further, such standards
can be general, rather than minute, in their scope. State ex
rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, 664 (1957), State ex rel. v.
Bennett, supra at 300. The power of an administrative agency
to adopt rules and regulations is limited in nature, and to
be valid such rules and regulations must be within the au-
thority conferred. Willcott v. Murphy, 204 Kan. 640 (1970).
As a necessary corollary, it also follows that an administra-
tive regulation which goes beyond or conflicts with the leg-
islative authorization is void. Marcotte Realty & Auction,
Inc. v. Schumacher, 225 Kan. 193 (1979).
In our view, Section 2 of the bill, when read in pari materia
with the related section of 1982 Senate Bill No. 539, estab-
lishes general standards for the adoption of rule& and regu-
lations by the four named agencies. First, both subsection
(8) of K.S.A. 16a-2-204, as amended, and subsection (h) of
K.S.A. 16-207, as amended, have the effect of removing any
statutory ceiling on the finance charge or interest rate
which may be imposed. Accordingly, any rules and regulations
adopted by the four administrative agencies could not reim-
pose any limit on such rates without going beyond the limits
imposed by the statute.
Second, as noted hereinabove, Section 2 of Senate Bill No.
- 559 makes reference to K.S.A. 16-207(h), which was added by
Senate Bill No. 539. There, the interest rate limits con-
tained in the statute are made inapplicable if the note that
is secured by a real estate mortgage permits "adjustment of
the interest rate, the term of the loan or the amortization
schedule." The enumeration of these factors provides addi-
tional standards to guide the adoption of a regulation pursu-
ant to Section 2. In that the four agencies could not limit
the effect of these factors nor add others, they are limited
to "filling in the details," something which has been approved
in previous decisions. Gumbhir v. Kansas State Board of
Pharmacy, 228 Kan. 579 (1980), State ex rel., Schneider v.
City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 115 (1980). Therefore, it is our
opinion that there do exist guidelines, albeit general ones,
for the adoption of rules and regulations under Section 2,
leaving the section constitutional as a limited delegation
of legislative authority.
For your third inquiry, you question whether the scope of
the rules and regulations adopted under Section 2 could in-
clude loans made under K.S.A. 16-207(h), as amended, as well
as those loans subject to the UCCC under K.S.A. 16a-2-204,
as amended. We believe that the plain wording of section 2,
set out above, can lead to no other conclusion but that both
types of loans are to be so included. As the two statutes are
specifically referred to, it is evident that the purpose and
intent of the legislature was to include both, leaving an
examination of additional factors unnecessary (i.e., legisla-
tive history, contemporary circumstances, other statutes,
etc.). See, e.g. Callaway v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan.
646 (1973).
In conclusion, pursuant to K.S.A. 16a-2-401 (as amended by
1982 Senate Bill No. 559), a supervised lender may make loans
in which the rate of interest may be periodically adjusted
where any such loan is secured by an interest in land subor-
dinate to a prior mortgage held by a lender other than the
supervised lender. Section 2 of the bill, which authorizes
the promulgation of rules and regulations governing such
adjustable rate loans, also applies to loans made pursuant
to K.S.A. 16-207(h) (as amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 539)
which are secured by a real estate mortgage. 1982 Senate
Bill No. 559 does not contain more than one subject matter
so as to violate Article 2, Section 16 of the Kansas Consti-
tution, nor is section 2 of the bill an unlawful delegation
of power by the legislature.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
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