Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-197

1982-197Kanag

Full text

September 13, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 197
Marlin Johanning
City Attorney
City Hall
515 Kansas Avenue
Atchison, Kansas 66002
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Planning and Zoning--
Amendments or Changes in Zoning
Synopsis: A city may not "incorporate by reference" to
another instrument the legal description required
to be set forth in the published notice of a
proposed amendment to a zoning ordinance. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 12-520a, 12-708, 12-3009.
*
Dear Mr. Johanning:
You request advice as to whether an opinion of former Attorney
General Vern Miller, relating to the need for separate, "parallel"
zoning and annexation ordinances as to land proposed to be
annexed by a city, is still "endorsed" by this office. Your
specific question is as follows:
"[Would it be] legally sufficient to adopt
a 'by reference' approach which would refer
the reader of the zoning ordinance to its
necessary legal description as it appears
in the annexation ordinance, the latter of
which would be published in the same official
city newspaper on the same day as the former
ordinance?"
We have reviewed the previous opinion, a copy of which is
attached hereto, and it is hereby affirmed by this office.
In regard to the possibility of incorporating by reference (in
the publication notice of the proposed zoning amendment) the
legal description as set forth in the annexation resolution
published pursuant to K.S.A. 12-520a(c), it should be noted that
K.S.A. 12-3009, which permits certain designated items to be
incorporated by reference in city ordinances, also includes the
following proviso:
"[N]othing herein shall be deemed to waive
any statutory procedural requirement con-
cerning a zoning ordinance, except that any
city may incorporate by reference in con-
formity with K.S.A. 12-3010 a zoning ordi-
nance or subdivision regulations in code
form as that term is defined in K.S.A.
12-3301(c) if all other procedural require-
ments set forth in K.S.A. 12-708 are met."
(Emphasis added.)
The underscored portion of the above-quoted statutory excerpt
seems to indicate an intent that the authority to "incorporate
by reference" does not apply to procedural requirements set
forth in zoning statutes. One such procedural requirement re-
lating to amendment of zoning ordinances is set forth in K.S.A.
12-708, as follows:
"If such proposed amendment is not a general
revision of existing ordinances and will af-
fect specific property, it shall be designated
by legal description and general street location
and in addition to such publication notice,
written notice of such proposed amendment shall
be mailed to all owners of lands located within
two hundred (200) feet of the area proposed to
be altered and an opportunity granted to interested
parties to be heard." (Emphasis added.)
As we have noted before (see Kansas Attorney General Opinion No.
81-166), the notice and hearing procedures set forth in K.S.A.
12-708 have, on several occasions, been held to be mandatory.
See Carson v. McDowell, 203 Kan. 40 (1969); City of Manhattan v.
Ridgeview Building Co., Inc., 215 Kan. 606 (1974). In light of
this fact, and in consideration of the legislative intent re-
flected by the above-quoted language of K.S.A. 12-3009, it is
our opinion that a city may not "incorporate by reference" to
another instrument the legal description required to be set
forth in the published notice of a proposed amendment to a
zoning ordinance.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm
NEY GENERAL
sed subsidies sought to be
corporate powers of the
artin, City Attorney, Kansas City
:it-y, Kansas, and the Urban
is, are jointly working on a
iourdale District of Kansas
once its share of the project
onds under K. S. A. 12-626,
,ody of any city in the state
.d operation of its sewer system,
tern, or a combination of both,
-r reason, it is impracticable, or
-rich sewer or intercepting sewer
-wer, or in order to provide an
iT or intercepting sewer district,
-in sewers, or a combination of
ruby empowered to construct a
rich sewage of such sewer or in-
in said city over any elevation,
t the sewage thereof to a point
ling sewer, another main sewer
[Emphasis supplied.]
be used only in conjunction
rid other storm water from
water constitutes "sewage."
977 (Okl. 1969), the court
id at 80 C. J. S., Sewage or
e* . is that which passes through
from the usual character of the
,e the word signifies the refuse
parried off: excreted, as well as
.ers and drains, whether open or
underscored language
given its primary mean-
CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES 167
ing, to include that which passes through the sewer, whether it be
a storm or sanitary structure. We fully concur with your opinion
that the word "sewage" underscored above includes the contents
of either a sanitary. sewer or a storm sewer, and that accordin ,jv,
construction of the pumping station in question may he financed
under K. S. A. 12-626 et seq.
JRM
LETTER, November 21, 1972, to Edward F. Home, Manhattan
Re: . SAME—Annexation by City of Land Which is Subject to
County Zoning Regulations
You inquire concerning Ordinance No. 2789 of the City of Man-
hattan, amending § 30-407 of Ordinance No. 2650. It provides in
pertinent part thus:
"# 3-407. Annexed Land. All land which may he hereafter annexed to
the City of Manhattan shall, from and after the effective date of such annexa-
tion, be subject to the zoning regulations for the district as designated by the
annexing ordinance.
"Before the annexing ordinance may designate that the land to [he] an-
nexed shall he placed in district R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5, U, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4,
C-5, C-6, I-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, or PDD full compliance with Kansas Statutes Anno-
tated 12-708 and Article XI of Ordinance # 2650 shall he had. It is the
purpose of this provision to require that the hearing procedures before the
planning commission of said city he exhausted and that full compliance other-
wise be had with the aforesaid statute and ordinance before the City Commis-
sion may adopt the annexing ordinance containing a designation of applicable
zoning regulations as contained herein.
"The annexing ordinance may designate that the zoning regulations of RS,
R, or R-1, shall apply to the land to be annexed, without the necessity of
complying with Kansas Statutes Annotated 12-708 or Article XI of Ordinance
# 2650.
"In those instances where compliance with Kansas Statutes Annotated 12-708
and Article XI of Ordinance No. 2650 is required, full compliance herewith
shall he concluded before the annexing ordinance shall he adopted." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, as to land which is to be annexed and placed in a
more restrictive zoning classification than single family use, the city
planning commission must necessarily complete its hearing pro-
cedures prior to annexation concerning land which is at that time
beyond the corporate limits of the city. K. S. A. 12-715b provides in
pertinent part thus:
"Any city shall be authorized to adopt zoning regulations affecting land
located outside the city but within three ( 3) miles thereof under the following
conditions, except that nothing in this act shall he construed as authorizing any
168 OPINioNs OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
city to adopt regulations applying to or affecting any land in excess of three
(3) acres under one ownership which is used only for agricultural purposes:
*
"(c) The county or township does not have in effect zoning regulations for
such area outside the city but within three (3) miles thereof adopted in con-
formity with the statutes prescribing procedure for the adoption of county
zoning regulations."
You indicate that the county does have zoning regulations for this
extraterritorial three-mile area. The question remains whether the
city planning commission may lawfully discharge its duties under
K. S. A. 12-708 as to land which is not at the time thereof within the
corporate boundaries of the city, and which is subject- to county
zoning regulations.
K. S. A. 12-707 provides in pertinent part thus:
"The governing body of any city is hereby authorized by ordinance to divide
such city into zones or districts, and regulate and restrict the location and use
of buildings and the uses of the land within each district or zone. Such zones
or districts may be created for the purpose of restricting the use of buildings
and land located within the same for dwellings, business, industry, conserva-
tion, floodplain or other purposes deemed necessary. . . .
"Any floodplain zone or district shall include the floodplain area within any
incorporated area of the city and may include any unincorporated territory
lying outside of but within three (3) miles of the nearest point of the city
limits. . . ."
K. S. A. 12-708 commences thus:
"Before any city shall create any zone or district or regulate or restrict the
use of buildings or land therein, the governing body shall require the planning
commission to recommend the nature and number of zones or districts which it
deems necessary and the boundaries of the same and appropriate regulations or
restrictions to be enforced therein. . . . The governing body may either
approve such recommendations by the adoption of the same by ordinance or
return the same the planning commission for further consideration. . .
The planning , on, after reconsidering the same, may resubmit its origi-
nal recomme' - the reasons therefor or submit new and amended
recommend,. of such recommendations, the governing body
may adop ,d and adopt such recommendations ordi-
nance.
The s of the city planning commission are, of
cour .lot legislative in character, Coughlin c. City
of - 552, 4S0 P. 2d 91 ( 1971). Nothing in K. S. A.
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the conduct of
mrnishing of recommendations to the governing
id which is the subject of such hearings and recom-
at that time within the corporate limits of the city.
cisory capacities, the powers and duties of the corn-
I
CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES 169
mission are not so restricted. For example, K. S. A. 12-704 provides
thus in pertinent part:
"The planning commission is hereby authorized to make or cause to be
made a comprehensive plan for the development of such city and any unin-
corporated territory lying outside of the city but within the county in
authorizedcityislocated,whichintheopinionofthecommissionformsthetotal
community of which the city is a part."
See also K. S. A. 12-704a, and 12-705.
In our view, the city planning commission may likewise exercise
its powers under K. S. A. 12-708 as to areas outside the city at the
time of the commission's actions with respect thereto.
The general rule regarding the zoning status of annexed land is
stated in 101 C. J. S., Zoning, § 134 at p. 892:
"The zoning status of property annexed to a municipality depends on the
provisions of the municipal ordinances, and in mmendationsf any provision
covering the matter it has been held that unincorporated territory, on being
annexed to a city, occupies the status of unzoned property regardless of its
zoning status before annexation. County zoning regulations cease to apply to
territory which has become part of a city."
Applying the general rule in this case, we cannot but conclude
that upon annexation, the newly annexed land becomes subject to
the zoning power of the city. Insofar as the ordinance authorizes all
steps precedent to adoption of a zoning classification by the govern-
ing body to be accomplished prior to annexation, we believe that it
constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the city.
A second question which arises is the propriety of incorporating
in an annexing ordinance zoning designations for the annexed land.
An ordinance similar to that involved here was considered in Be-
shore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 206 A. 2d 678 ( 1965 ). The
ordinance in question there provided thus:
"In all cases where territory has not been specifically included within a dis-
trict, such territory shall automatically he classified as R-1 District until other-
wise classified, but in cases of annexation of territory where the annexation pro-
ceeding provides a zoning classification for the territory to he annexed, such
territory shall be so classified upon incorporation into the town of Bel Air.'
The ordinance was considered in the context of a statute which
stated thus:
"The [annexing) resolution shall describe . . . the exact area proposed
to be included in the change, and shall contain complete and detailed provisions
as to the conditions and circumstances applicable to the change in boundaries
and to the residents and property within the area to be annexed." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The court regarded zoning as a "condition applicable to property,"
NEY GENERAL
Ling any land in excess of three
only for agricultural purposes:
. o in effect zoning regulations for
31 miles thereof adopted in con-
tire for the adoption of county
ye zoning regulations for this
iestion remains whether the
v discharge its duties under
tt the time thereof within the
which is subject to county
)art thus:
tiithorized by ordinance to divide
restrict the location and use
n district or zone. Such zones
i restricting the use of buildings
t:gs, business, industry, conserva-
•cessary. . . .
de the floodplain area within any
, ale any unincorporated territory
of the nearest point of the city
district or regulate or restrict the
body shall require the planning
mber of zones or districts which it
:me and appropriate regulations or
The governing body may either
'ion of the same by ordinance or
for further consideration. . . .
the same, may resubmit its origi-
for or submit new and amended
itimendations, the governing body
such recommendations by ordi-
planning commission are, of
character. Coughlin v. City
1971). Nothing in K. S. A.
prerequisite to the conduct of
:nendations to the governing
t of such hearings and recom-
)(irate limits of the city.
.s and duties of the com-
170 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
and properly incorporated into an annexing ordinance. As to the
charge that the resolution in question violated the state constitution
on the grounds that it embraced more than one subject, annexation
and zoning, and that the title omitted mention of zoning, the court
regarded the resolution as falling within the principle that "[i]f
several sections of the law refer to and are germane to the same
subject matter, which is described in its title, it is considered as
embracing a single subject, and as satisfying the requirements of
the Constitution in this respect."
An ordinance purporting both to annex and to zone certain land
was upheld, albeit without discussion of this precise question, in
Westwood Development Company v. City of Abilene, 273 S. W. 2d
652, Tex. Civ. App. (1954). See also Mayor and Aldermen of the
City of Annapolis v. Kramer, 235 Md. 231, 201 R. 2d 333 (1964 ).
Kansas lacks the broad statute quoted above in Beshore, supra,
allowing the incorporation in an annexing ordinance or resolution
of detailed provisions applicable to conditions and circumstances of
the annexation. K. S. A. 12-3004 provides thus:
"No ordinance shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title; and no section or sections of an ordinance shall he amended
unless the amending ordinance contains the entire section or sections as
amended and the section or sections amended shall be repealed."
In State ex rel. Ramsey v. City of Hutchinson, 102 Kan. 325
(1918), the court considered an ordinance of the city which was
described in its title as one extending the city limits. As the new
boundary was described, however, certain portions of tracts were
omitted from the then existing boundary, notwithstanding the limits
were elsewhere extended. The court stated thus:
"The plaintiff contends, and the contention is clearly well founded, that
inasmuch as the title of an ordanance is required to express its subject . . .
any part of this one which undertakes to reduce the territory of the city is
rendered void by the fact that the title refers only to an extension and not to a
restriction of the limits." [Emphasis supplied.] 102 Kan. at 327.
As the court indicated in Babcock v. City of Kansas City, 197
Kan. 610, 419 P. 2d 882 (1966), "it has been uniformly held that
the extension of corporate limits to include new territory . . .
is, in effect, a reorganization of the city. . . ." Corporate
reorganization is, broadly, a different subject than exercise of the
police power to regulate and restrict the location and uses of
buildings and the uses of land in such annexed area. We must
concur with the opinion of Attorney General Fatzer, dated October
28, 1955, who stated thus:
CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES ♦ 171
"In other words, it would not be permissible for the city to include in one
ordinance the establishment of a zone of platted territory, and also provide
for the annexation of that territory. The cardinal rule is that an ordinance
must have but one subject."
However, we agree with your suggestion that land to he annexed
may be annexed and zoned at the same time by merely using two
separate parallel ordinances, the first to provide for annexation
and the other to designate the zoning classification for the land.
JRM
LETTER, November 29, 1972, to Rae E. Batt, City Attorney, Kinsley
Re: SAME—Funds for Centennial Celebration
As City Attorney, you raise the question whether the City of
Kinsley may lawfully appropriate public funds, in the amount if
S2,000, as a grant to a centennial celebration committee of the
Kinsley Chamber of Commerce, to support planned centennial
celebration activities to be sponsored by the Chamber. We concur
fully with your view that the City may not make a grant or loan
of public funds to a private organization to support such activities.
It has been uniformly held that such an expenditure does not
serve a public municipal corporate purpose. See 15 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, § 39.21 at p. 41 and § 39.22 (1970 Ed.).
In the latter section, the writer states thus:
"Without express authority, a municipal corporation may not appropriate
the public revenue for celebrations, entertainment, sports and games, etc.
Such power cannot be implied."
See also historical Pageant Ass'n of the City of Philadelphia, 103
A. 824 (Penn. 1918).
LETTER December 11, 1972, to Barry L. Arbuckle, Deputy County Attorney,
Wichita
Re: SAME—Charter Ordinance, Enactment of
In your letter dated November 28, 1972, you posed the following
question:
"In a vote on a proposed charter ordinance, does a three out of five vote
determination comply with the requirement of Article 12, Section 5 ( c) ( 2 )
of the Kansas Constitution?"
It is our opinion that there must be strict compliance with the
procedure set out in Article 12 before a charter ordinance can be
validly enacted.
:EY GENERAL
.ring ordinance. As to the
dated the state constitution
Tan one subject, annexation
lention of zoning, the court
in the principle that "[i]f
I are germane to the same
is title, it is considered as
;Eying the requirements of
'x and to zone certain land
f this precise question, in
;Ey of Abilene, 273 S. W. 2d
layor and Aldermen of the
201 R. 2d 333 (1964).
..nove in Beshore, supra,
ing ordinance or resolution
iitions and circumstances of
•s thus:
subject, which shall be clearly
an ordinance shall be amended
entire section or sections as
shall be repealed."
Hutchinson, 102 Kan. 325
tnce of the city which was
the city limits. As the new
rain portions of tracts were
notwithstanding the limits
sated thus:
nt is clearly well founded, that
and to express its subject . . •
!lice the territory of the city is
,nly to an extension and not to a
11 102 Kan. at 327.
City of Kansas City, 197
:s been uniformly held that
c•ude new territory . . .
city. . . ." Corporate
.object than exercise of the
location and uses of
,-xed area. We must
latzer, dated October

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