Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-169

1982-169Kanag

Full text

August 9, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-169
Jim Pringle
Sumner County Attorney
County Courthouse
Wellington, Kansas 67152
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Serious Traffic
Offenses -- Driving While Under Influence of
Alcohol; Effect on Prosecutions Instituted Prior
to Effective Date of Amendments
Synopsis: As amended by L. 1982, ch. 144, K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
8-1567 contains new provisions for the sentencing
of persons who are convicted of operating a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. Additionally,
the act amends K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 to admit
into evidence the defendant's refusal to take a
chemical test for the presence of alcohol. While
the act does not specifically provide that these
changes will apply only to offenses committed
after its effective date of July 1, 1982, such a
result is necessary in view of the substantive,
as opposed to merely procedural, nature of these
two amendments. Accordingly, the above-referenced
amendments are applicable only to offenses committed
after the effective date of the act. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001, 8-1567, both as amended
by L. 1982, ch. 144, K.S.A. 21-3102, 22-4618.
Dear Mr. Pringle:
As County Attorney for Sumner County, you request our opinion
on two questions concerning the recent revisions of K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1567 and related statutes concerning the offense
of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Specifically, you inquire as to the effect of L. 1982, ch. 144
on those persons who were arrested prior to July 1, 1982, the
effective date of the act. Of the amendments which became
effective at that time, you are particularly interested in
those which alter the sentences that may be imposed and those
regarding the admissibility of certain evidence concerning
chemical tests for alcohol.
Prior to its amendment in 1982, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567(c)
established the following penalties for violation of the
statute:
"Every person who is convicted of a violation
of this section shall be punished by imprison-
ment of not more than one (1) year, or by a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
On a second or subsequent conviction he or she
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than ninety (90) days nor more than one (1)
year, and, in the discretion of the court, a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars
($500)."
Under subsections (c), (d) and (e) of the amended statute,
the penalty provisions have been greatly changed, both as to
the severity of the sentences and the extent of other restric-
tions which are to be imposed. For example, first-time of-
fenders "shall be sentenced to not less than 48 hours' impris-
onment or 100 hours of public service nor more than 6 months'
imprisonment and fined not less than $200 nor more than $500."
Additionally, certain restrictions shall be placed on the
individual's driver's license and he or she is required to
enroll in, and successfully complete, an alcohol and drug
safety action program. Similar new penalties are imposed on
second-time, third-time and subsequent offenders, with plea
bargaining eliminated in all cases. Diversion programs are
allowed only for first-time offenders.
Unlike some other statutes concerning criminal procedure or
crimes and punishments, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, as amended,
does not contain any provision as to offenses committed prior
to its effective date. For example, K.S.A. 21-3102(4), con-
cerning the application of the Kansas Criminal Code, provides:
"This code has no application to crimes com-
mitted prior to its effective date. [July 1,
1970] A crime is committed prior to the ef-
fective date of the code if any of the essen-
tial elements of the crime as then defined
occurred before that date. Prosecutions for
prior crimes shall be governed, prosecuted
and punished under the laws existing at the
time such crimes were committed."
Likewise, K.S.A. 22-4618, which establishes minimum sentences
for certain crimes committed with the aid of a firearm, pro-
vides at subsection (1) that it shall apply only to crimes
committed after the effective date of the act.
In our opinion, due to the substantive nature of the changes
made by the act in the sentencing provisions of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567 a similar result must be reached, even in the
absence of a specific statute so providing. While this issue
has arisen in numerous prior Kansas cases, perhaps the best
analysis of this issue (i.e. the retroactive effect of a
criminal statute) is found in State v. Hutchison, 228 Kan.
279 (1980) at p. 287. Therein, the court stated:
"Regarding the retroactive argument, the gen-
eral rule of statutory construction is that a
statute will operate prospectively unless its
language clearly indicates that the legislature
intended that it operate retrospectively.
Nitchals v. Williams, 225 Kan. 285, 590 P.2d
582 (1979). The foregoing rule of statutory
construction is modified where the statutory
change is merely procedural or remedial in
nature and does not prejudicially affect the
substantive rights of the parties. Nitchals
v. Williams, 225 Kan. 285. As related to crim-
inal law and procedure, substantive law is that
which declares what acts are crimes and pre-
scribes the punishment therefor; whereas proce-
dural law is that which provides or regulates
the steps by which one who violates a criminal
statute is punished. State v. Augustine, 197
Kan. 207, Syl. 51, 416 P.2d 281 (1966).
"Changes in the length of sentences for crim-
inal acts have been given prospective applica-
tion only. In State v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510,
Syl. 510, 502 P.2d 654 (1972), it is held:
"'The sentencing of convicted criminals pursu-
ant to K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 21-4504 is applicable
only to those initially sentenced for offenses
committed after the effective date of the new
criminal code, July 1, 1970.'
"In State v. Henning, 3 Kan. App. 2d 607, 609,
599 P.2d 318 (1979), the Court of Appeals with
regard to multiple sentences stated:
"'Further, the effective date of the amendment
to K.S.A. 21-4608(5), L. 1978, ch. 120, §8,
which extended permissible authorized sentenc-
ing to include direction that an imposed Kansas
sentence run concurrently with another state's
sentence for an offense committed prior to the
defendant's Kansas sentence, was not effective
until January 1, 1979. Retroactive application
of the amendatory statute would be improper.
The penalty for a criminal offense is the pen-
alty provided by statute at the time of the
commission of the offense. Kelsey v. State,
194 Kan. 668, 400 P.2d 736 (1965). Here it
was necessary that the penalty imposed for the
February 3, 1976, burglary by defendant be
within the sentencing statutorily authorized
as of that date.' Emphasis supplied."
See also State v. Ralls, 213 Kan. 249, 252 (1973) ("The Kansas
Criminal Code, effective July 1, 1970, has no application to
crimes committed prior to its effective date") and State v.
Henning, 3 Kan.App.2d 607, 609 (1979) ("The penalty for a
criminal offense is the penalty provided by statute at the
time of the commission of the offense").
It is furthermore our opinion that the act's amendment of
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 (relating to the admissibility of a
defendant's failure to take a breath or blood test for
sobriety) is likewise a substantive change. Accordingly, it
has application only to those offenses comitted on or after
July 1, 1982. Prior to the change, the evidence of a person's
refusal to be so tested was inadmissible in the criminal pro-
ceeding. State v. Wilson, 5 Kan.App.2d 130 (1980). Given
the potentially prejudicial effect of the introduction of
such evidence, the amendment which allows such admission
affects the rights of a defendant in a material way, and
cannot therefore be found to be merely procedural in nature.
See, e.g., State v. Augustine, 197 Kan. 207 (1966). By allow-
ing the state to introduce evidence which was previously in-
admissible, a defendant tried under the new statute is in a
less favorable position than before, a key factor in deter-
mining whether the statute should be given retroactive effect.
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 101 S.Ct. 960
(1981).
In conclusion, as amended by L. 1982, ch. 144, K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567 contains new provisions for the sentencing of
persons who are convicted of operating a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. Additionally, the act amends K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1001 to admit into evidence the defendant's re-
fusal to take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol.
While the act does not specifically provide that these changes
will apply only to offenses committed after its effective
date of July 1, 1982 , such a result is necessary in view of
the substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, nature of
these two amendments. Accordingly, the above-referenced
amendments are applicable only to offenses committed after
the effective date of the act.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
J	effreyS.Stephan
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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