Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-167

1982-167Kanag

Full text

August 9, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 167
Mr. Robert J. Watson
City Attorney
Legal Department of Kansas City, Kansas
9th Floor
Municipal Office Building
One Civic Center Plaza
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Re: Civil Procedure - - Attachment and Garnishment - -
Application to Mutual Indebtedness of Employer and
Employee
Cities, First Class - - Public Utilities - -
Right of Set-Off Where BPU and Employee Mutually
Indebted
Synopsis: Neither attachment nor garnishment of wages
held by the Board of Public Utilities, and due
its employees, is available to the Board for
the purpose of recovering unpaid utility bills
due the Board from those employees, because it
is impermissible for an aggrieved party to attach
or garnish wages it holds for its own employees.
A fundamental right of every creditor is that of
set-off. The Board of Public Utilities is, therefore,
entitled to exercise the right of set-off as a remedy
to recover unpaid utility bills from the sums it owes
employees in the form of wages. Since "state action"
exists, such right must be exercised in accordance
with the dictates of the "due process clause" of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Cited herein: K.S.A. 60-701, K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 60-703, 60-706, K.S.A. 60-714, K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 75-6201, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
Dear Mr. Watson:
You have requested our opinion regarding several questions
dealing with the collection of debts (unpaid utility bills)
from employees and former employees of the Board of Public
Utilities of Kansas City, Kansas (BPU).
The first question you pose is whether the BPU, which holds
wages due its employees, may proceed to garnish those wages
after judgment has been obtained against such employees for
unpaid utility bills. As you noted in your letter, the Kansas
garnishment statutes (K.S.A. 60-701 et seq.) do not speak to
this situation. However, early Kansas case law clearly states
that "the plaintiff cannot summon himself as garnishee."
First National Bank v. Elliott, 62 Kan. 764, 766 (1901). Thus
where an employee or former employee is indebted to the BPU
and the BPU holds wages which it owes such an employee or former
employee, the postjudgment remedy of garnishment is impermissible.
Your second question is whether prejudgment attachment of an
employee's wages is permissible under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 60-703.
That statute provides:
"The order of attachment shall be issued by a
judge of the district court upon the filing of a
petition stating the claim and the filing of an
affidavit, or an affidavit and bond as required
in this article, except that no order of at-
tachment shall be issued before judgment on
plaintiff's claim where the property of the
defendant to be attached is in the possession
of a third party and is in the form of earnings
due and owing to the defendant. The filing
of an affidavit stating one or more grounds of
attachment is required in every case. A bond
is required in every case except in actions
instituted on behalf of the state of Kansas or
a county of the state. The order of attach-
ment may be issued and executed on Sunday
or on a legal holiday if the affidavit states
that the party seeking the attachment will
lose the benefit thereof unless the writ be
issued or served on such day. The provisions
of this section shall not be applicable to
garnishments authorized pursuant to K.S.A.
1979 Supp. 60-1607." (Emphasis added)
The emphasized portion of the foregoing statute establishes that
an attachment order will not issue before judgment on plaintiff's
claim where the property in question, first, "is in the possession
of a third party" and, second, "is in the form of earnings due
and owing the defendant." You state that it is your belief that
such attachment should be allowed, because the property would not
be in the hands of a third party, but in the hands of the BPU.
Since the remedy of attachment is provided for by statute, the ques-
tion presented is basically one of statutory interpretation, and
in our judgment, the language of the statute does not contemplate
the attachment of the defendant's property unless that property is
in the hands of either the defendant or a third party. Certainly,
the BPU, which would be the plaintiff in such an action, would be
neither a defendant nor a third party. A contrary construction
would allow the plaintiff to garnish itself, which as previously
noted is impermissible.
The "attachment order" made a part of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 60-706
provides in part:
"If the real or personal property sought to be
attached by you is in the hands of some person
other than the defendant, you shall serve a copy
of this order on such third party and declare
to such party that you attach the same and that
such third party is made a garnishee in accordance
with the following directions to such third party:
"'If the officer serving this order of attachment
upon you declares to you that the officer attaches
any funds or property in your hands, you are here-
by made a garnishee in the above entitled matter.
"'You are hereby ordered as a garnishee to file with
the clerk of the above named court, within twenty
(20) days after service of this order upon you,
your answer under oath stating whether you are at
the time of the service of this order upon you,
your answer under oath stating whether you are at
the time of the service of this order upon you,
and also whether at any time thereafter but before
you file your answer, indebted to the defendant, or
have in your possession or control any property be-
longing to the defendant, and stating the amount
of any such indebtedness and description of any such
property. You are hereby further ordered to with-
hold the payment of any such indebtedness, or the
delivery away from yourself of any such property,
until further order of the court.'" (Emphasis added.
A further examination of the attachment and garnishment statutes,
in light of the questions posed, discloses a distinction between
"garnishment" and "attachment." K.S.A. 60-714 states that garnish-
ment is either "a form of or an aid to attachment" or "in lieu of
execution." The distinction is commented upon in 7 C.J.S.
Attachment §2, as follows:
"Generally speaking, garnishment is but a form of
attachment looking to the impounding of debts due
a defendant in a civil action for the recovery of
money, pending the rendering of final judgment therein,
in effect the same as physical property capable of
delivery is seized to that end by ordinary attachment.
However, attachment and garnishment differ in character
in that attachment is directed against property of
the principal defendant which is in his possession or
under his control, while the object of garnishment
is to reach an indebtedness due to the principal defen-
dant by a third person, or property in the possession
or control of a third person, which belongs to the
principal defendant." (Footnotes omitted.)
While K.S.A. 60-701 et seq. somewhat obliterate the distinction
enunciated in this encyclopedic commentary, it is still relevant
in the instant situation. Although we do agree that the BPU
is not a third party as recognized in the attachment and garnish-
ment statutes of this state, we cannot agree that because the
earnings of an employee are in the hands of the BPU, rather
than a third party, attachment would be permissible. Here,
the BPU, in attempting to attach wages not yet paid to an employee,
would not be attaching funds in the hands of the "principal defen-
dant." Rather, it would be "attaching" or, more specifically,
"garnishing" funds in its own hands. Consequently, as previously
stated, the BPU, as plaintiff, shall neither "garnish" nor
"attach" property in its possession.
You also have inquired regarding the BPU's right to offset
the indebtedness in light of Baker v. McCarl, 24 F. 2d 897 (1928),
which you state prescribes as a "general rule" that "a debt due
the employer from another transaction between the parties may
not be withheld from the compensation due the employee for
the performance of services." A series of cases at about that
time in the federal courts, involving similar factual circumstances,
reached the same conclusion. See Dillon v. Groos, 299 F. 851 (1924),
McCarl v. Cox, 8 F. 2d 669 (1925), Alexander v. Mare, 5 F. 2d 965
(1925), Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388, 385 S. Ct. 353, 62L. Ed.
785. We view those as very specialized cases, all of which pre-
ceded United States v. Munsey Trust, 332 U.S. 234, 91 L. Ed. 2022
(1946), the most widely-cited case addressing the right of set-off,
which states, in part:
"The government has the same right 'which belongs
to every creditor, to apply the unappropriated
moneys of his debtor, in his hands, in extinguish-
ment of the debts due to him.' Gratiot v. United
States, 15 Pet (US) 336, 370, 10 L.Ed. 759, 771;
McKnight v. United States, 98 US 179, 186, 25 L.Ed.
115, 116." 91 L. Ed. at 2027.
Predicated on this case and others which have followed it,
we believe the result sought by the BPU can be achieved by the appli-
cation of the common law right of set-off. This remedy has been
considered "a fundamental right of any creditor." 20 Am. Jur. 2d,
Counterclaim, Recoupment, Etc., §7. As noted in Attorney
General Opinion No. 80-244, "the doctrine of set-off is normally
considered within the context of judicial proceedings to resolve
the respective demands of mutually indebted parties." Id. at 2.
Even so, the opinion further points out that "set-off has long
been utilized outside of a judicial setting." Id. In Gratiot v.
U.S., 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 10 L.Ed. 759 (1839), the court first
expounded upon the theory that the government, as a creditor, was
entitled to this self-help procedure. The right of set-off and its
applicability has more recently been recognized where govern-
mental bodies are concerned in Atwater v. Roudebush, 452 F.
Supp. 622, 626 (1976). The right of set-off is reviewed in
detail in the foregoing opinion, as it applies to employees
of the State of Kansas, and a copy of that opinion is enclosed
for your consideration. It concluded that a fundamental right
of every creditor, including governmental entities, is that of
set-off.
In concluding, we note that the Kansas Supreme Court found a
"Board of Public Utilities to be an administrative agency of the
city charged with the duty of managing, operating, maintaining
and controlling the water and electric light plants of the city."
Board of Public Utilities v. City of Kansas City, 227 Kan. 194,
198 (1980). As a result, we believe the exercise of the BPU's
right of set-off would constitute "state action and deprivation
of an individual interest of sufficient substance to warrant
constitutional protection." Wertz v. Southern Cloud Unified
School District, 218 Kan. 25 (1975). Accordingly, we call
to your attention that Opinion No. 80-244 addresses the
extensive procedural safeguards that would need to be employed
by the BPU to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution is not violated by application of the right
of set-off. Since that opinion was written, the legislature
has enacted specific legislation providing for set-off against
debtors of the state (K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6201 et seq.).
Although neither these statutes nor the regulations adopted
thereunder are specifically applicable to the BPU as an adminis-
trative agency of the city, we commend them to your attention
as being instructive, particularly in complying with the procedural
safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Carl M. Anderson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:WRA:CMA:dml

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